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A montage of images from the
history of immunization.
Clockwise from upper left:
John Enders, who with his
colleagues Thomas Weller
and Fred Robbins first grew
poliovirus in human cell culture
in 1948; the May 1980 edition
of World Health magazine
announcing the eradication
of smallpox; a vaccine jet
injector, developed in 1967;
a molecule of immunoglobulin
type G (IgG), a critical
component of the receptor
theory of immunity developed
by Paul Ehrlich in 1897; MMR
vaccine, first licensed in 1971;
an influenza warning poster
developed by the Chicago
Public Health Department
in 1918; Edward Jenner, who
developed the first vaccine
(smallpox) in 1796; a Polio
Pioneer button, given to the
children who volunteered for
the Francis Field Trial of poliovirus vaccine in 1954; a Drinker respirator (iron lung),
which saved the lives of thousands of people paralyzed by polio in the 1940s and
1950s; and Hippocrates, a Greek physician who described diphtheria, epidemic
jaundice (probably hepatitis A), and other diseases in the 5th century BCE. He was
said to have originated the medical maxim primum non nocere—first, do no harm.
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Principles off Vaccination
Immunology and Vaccine-Preventable
Diseases
Immunology is a complicated subject, and a detailed
discussion of it is beyond the scope of this text. However, an
understanding of the basic function of the immune system is
useful in order to understand both how vaccines work and
the basis of recommendations for their use. The description
that follows is simplified. Many excellent immunology
textbooks are available to provide additional detail.
Immunity is the ability of the human body to tolerate the
presence of material indigenous to the body (“self’), and to
eliminate foreign (“nonself’) material. This discriminatory
ability provides protection from infectious disease, since
most microbes are identified as foreign by the immune
system. Immunity to a microbe is usually indicated by the
presence of antibody to that organism. Immunity is generally
very specific to a single organism or group of closely
related organisms. There are two basic mechanisms for
acquiring immunity, active and passive.
Active immunity is protection that is produced by the
person’s own immune system. This type of immunity is
usually permanent.
Passive immunity is protection by products produced by an
animal or human and transferred to another human, usually
by injection. Passive immunity often provides effective
protection, but this protection wanes (disappears) with time,
usually within a few weeks or months.
The immune system is a complex system of interacting cells
whose primary purpose is to identify foreign (“nonself’)
substances referred to as antigens. Antigens can be either
live (such as viruses and bacteria) or inactivated.
The immune system develops a defense against the antigen.
This defense is known as the immune response and usually
involves the production of protein molecules, called
antibodies (or immunoglobulins), and of specific cells (also
known as cell-mediated immunity) whose purpose is to
facilitate the elimination of foreign substances.
The most effective immune responses are generally
produced in response to a live antigen. However, an antigen
does not necessarily have to be alive, as occurs with
infection with a virus or bacterium, to produce an immune
response. Some proteins, such as hepatitis B surface antigen,
are easily recognized by the immune system. Other material,
such as polysaccharide (long chains of sugar molecules that
make up the cell wall of certain bacteria) are less effective
antigens, and the immune response may not provide as good
protection.
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immunity
• Self vs. nonself
• Protection from infectious disease
• Usually indicated by the presence
of antibody
• Very specific to a single organism
Principles of Vaccination
Active Immunity
• Protection produced by the person's
own immune system
• Usually permanent
Passive immunity
• Protection transferred from another
person or animal
• Temporary protection that wanes
with time
Principles of Vaccination
Antigen
* A live or inactivated substance
(e.g., protein, polysaccharide)
capable of producing an immune
response
Antibody
• Protein molecules
(immunoglobulin) produced by B
lymphocytes to help eliminate an
antigen
1
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Passive Immunity
* Transfer of antibody produced by
one human or other animal to
another
* Temporary protection
* Transplacental most important
source in infancy
Sources of Passive Immunity
* Almost all blood or blood
products
* Homologous pooled human
antibody (immune globulin)
* Homologous human
hyperimmune globulin
* Heterologous hyperimmune
serum (antitoxin)
Passive Immunity
Passive immunity is the transfer of antibody produced by
one human or other animal to another. Passive immunity
provides protection ajjainst some infections, hut this
protection is temporary. The antibodies will degrade during
a period of weeks to months, and the recipient will no
longer be protected.
The most common form of passive immunity is that which
an infant receives from its mother. Antibodies are transported
across the placenta during the last 1-2 months of pregnancy.
As a result, a full-term infant will have the same antibodies
as its mother. These antibodies will protect the infant from
certain diseases for up to a year. Protection is better against
some diseases (e.g., measles, rubella, tetanus) than others
(e.g., polio, pertussis).
Virtually all types cT blood products contain antibody. Some
products (e.g., washed or reconstituted red blood cells)
contain a relatively small amount of antibody, and some
(e.g., intravenous immune globulin and plasma products)
contain a large amount.
In addition to blood products used for transfusion (e.g.,
whole blood, red cells, and platelets) there are three major
sources of antibody used in human medicine. These are
homologous pooled human antibody, homologous human
hyperimmune globulin, and heterologous hyperimmune serum.
Homologous pooled human antibody is also known as
immune globulin. It is produced by combining (pooling)
the IgG antibody fraction from thousands of adult donors in
the United States. Because it comes from many different
donors, it contains antibody to many different antigens. It is
used primarily for postexposure prophylaxis for hepatitis A
and measles.
Homologous human hyperimmune globulins are antibody
products that contain high titers of specific antibody. These
products are made from the donated plasma of humans with
high levels of the antibody of interest. However, since
hyperimmune globulins are from humans, they also contain
other antibodies in lesser quantities. Hyperimmune globulins
are used for postexposure prophylaxis for several diseases,
including hepatitis B, rabies, tetanus, and varicella.
Heterologous hyperimmune serum is also known as
antitoxin. This product is produced in animals, usually
horses (equine), and contains antibodies against only one
antigen. In the United States, antitoxin is available for
treatment of botulism and diphtheria. A problem with this
product is serum sickness, a reaction to the horse protein.
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Immune globulin from human sources is polyclonal; it
contains many different kinds of antibodies. In the 1970s,
techniques were developed to isolate and “immortalize”
(cause to grow indefinitely) single B cells, which led to
the development of monoclonal antibody products.
Monoclonal antibody is produced from a single clone of
B cell, so these products contain antibody to only one
antigen or closely related group of antigens. Monoclonal
antibody products have many applications, including the
diagnosis of certain types of cancer (colorectal, prostate,
ovarian, breast), treatment of cancer (B-cell chronic
lymphocytic leukemia, non-Hodgkin lymphoma),
prevention of transplant rejection, and treatment of
autoimmune diseases (Crohn disease, rheumatoid arthritis)
and infectious diseases.
Two globulin products are available for the prevention or
treatment of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infection:
RSV'IGIV and palivizumab (Synagis). RSV-IGIV is a
hyperimmune globulin from human donors. It contains
antibody other than RSV, like other hyperimmune globulin
products. Palivizumab is a humanized monoclonal antibody
specific for RSV. It does not contain any other antibody
except RSV antibody.
Active Immunity
Active immunity is stimulation of the immune system to
produce antigen-specific humoral (antibody) and cellular
immunity. Unlike passive immunity, which is temporary,
active immunity usually lasts for many years, often for a
lifetime.
One way to acquire active immunity is to have the natural
disease. In general, once persons recover from infectious
diseases, they will have lifelong immunity to that disease.
The persistence of protection for many years after the
infection is known as immunologic memory. Following
exposure of the immune system to an antigen, certain cells
(memory B cells) continue to circulate in the blood (and
also reside in the bone marrow) for many years. Upon
reexposure to the antigen, these memory cells begin to
replicate and produce antibody very rapidly to reestablish
protection.
Another way to produce active immunity is by vaccination.
Vaccines interact with the immune system and often produce
an immune response similar to that produced by the natural
infection, but they do not subject the recipient to the disease
and its potential complications. Vaccines produce
immunologic memory similar to that acquired by having
the natural disease.
Monoclonal Antibody
* Derived from a single type, or
clone, of antibody-producing cells
(B cells)
* Antibody is specific to a single
antigen or closely related group of
antigens
Used for diagnosis and therapy of
certain cancers and autoimmune
and infectious diseases
Antibody for Prevention of RSV
• RSV-IGIV
— human hyperimmune globulin
— contains other antibodies
Palivizumab (Synagis)
— monoclonal
— contains only RSV antibody
Vaccination
* Active immunity produced by
vaccine
* Immunity and immunologic
memory similar to natural
infection but without risk of
disease
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Many factors may influence the immune response to
vaccination. These include the presence of maternal antibody,
nature and dose of antigen, route of administration, and the
presence of adjuvants (e.g., aluminum-containing materials
added to improve the immunogenic ity of the vaccine).
Host factors such as age, nutritional factors, genetics, and
coexisting disease, may also affect the response.
Inactivated Vaccines
Whole
• viruses
* bacteria
Fractional
* protein-based
— toxoid
— subunit
* polysaccharide-based
— pure
— conjugate
Classification of Vaccines
There are two basic types of vaccines; live attenuated and
inactivated. The characteristics of live and inactivated
vaccines are different, and these characteristics determine
how the vaccine is used.
Live attenuated vaccines are produced by modifying a
disease-producing (“wild”) virus or bacterium in a laboratory.
The resulting vaccine organism retains the ability to replicate
(grow) and produce immunity, but usually does not cause
illness. The majority of live attenuated vaccines available
in the United States contain live viruses. However, two
live attenuated bacterial vaccines are also available.
Inactivated vaccines can be composed of either whole
viruses or bacteria, or fractions of either. Fractional vaccines
are either protein-based or polysaccharide-based. Protein-
based vaccines include toxoids (inactivated bacterial toxin)
and subunit or subvirion products. Most polysaccharide-based
vaccines are composed of pure cell wall polysaccharide from
bacteria. Conjugate polysaccharide vaccines are those in
which the polysaccharide is chemically linked to a protein.
This linkage makes the polysaccharide a more potent vaccine.
General Rule
The more similar a vaccine is to the disease-
causing form of the organism, the better the
immune response to the vaccine.
Live Attenuated Vaccines
* Attenuated (weakened) form of
the "wild" virus or bacterium
* Must replicate to be effective
* Immune response similar to
natural infection
• Usually effective with one dose*
*except those administered orally
Live Attenuated Vaccines
Live vaccines are derived from “wild,” or disease-causing,
viruses or bacteria. These wild viruses or bacteria are
attenuated, or weakened, in a laboratory, usually by repeated
culturing. For example, the measles vaccine used today was
isolated from a child with measles disease in 1954. Almost
10 years of serial passage using tissue culture media was
required to transform the wild virus into vaccine virus.
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To produce an immune response, live attenuated vaccines
must replicate (grow) in the vaccinated person. A relatively
small dose of virus or bacteria is administered, which
replicates in the body and creates enough of the organism
to stimulate an immune response. Anything that either
damages the live organism in the vial (e.g., heat, light) or
interferes with replication of the organism in the body
(circulating antibody) can cause the vaccine to be ineffective.
Although live attenuated vaccines replicate, they usually do
not cause disease such as may occur with the “wild” form of
the organism. When a live attenuated vaccine does cause
“disease,” it is usually much milder than the natural disease
and is referred to as an adverse reaction.
The immune response to a live attenuated vaccine is
virtually identical to that produced by a natural infection.
The immune system does not differentiate between an
infection with a weakened vaccine virus and an infection
with a wild virus. Live attenuated vaccines are usually
effective with one dose, except those administered orally.
Live attenuated vaccines may cause severe or fatal reactions
as a result of uncontrolled replication (growth) of the vaccine
virus. This only occurs in persons with immunodeficiency
(e.g., from leukemia, treatment with certain drugs, or
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection).
A live attenuated vaccine virus could theoretically revert
to its original pathogenic (diseasC'Causing) form. This is
known to happen only with live (oral) polio vaccine.
Active immunity from a live attenuated vaccine may not
develop because of interference from circulating antibody
to the vaccine virus. Antibody from any source (e.g.,
transplacental, transfusion) can interfere with growth of
the vaccine organism and lead to poor response or no
response to the vaccine (also known as vaccine failure).
Measles vaccine virus seems to be most sensitive to
circulating antibody. Polio and rotavirus vaccine viruses
are least affected.
Live attenuated vaccines are fragile and can be damaged
or destroyed by heat and light. They must be handled and
stored carefully.
Currently available live attenuated viral vaccines are
measles, mumps, rubella, vaccinia, varicella, yellow fever,
and influenza (intranasal). Oral polio vaccine is a live viral
vaccine but is no longer available in the United States. A
new live recombinant rotavirus vaccine may be licensed in
the future. Live attenuated bacterial vaccines are bacille
Calmette-Guerin (BCG) and oral typhoid vaccine.
Live Attenuated Vaccines
* Severe reactions possible
• Interference from circulating
antibody
• Fragile - must be stored and
handled carefully
Live Attenuated Vaccines
* Viral measles, mumps,
rubella, vaccinia,
varicella, yellow fever,
intranasal influenza,
(oral polio)
(rotavirus)
* Bacterial BCG, oral typhoid
Vaccines In (parenthesis) a it available In the United States.
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Inactivated Vaccines
* Cannot replicate
* Less interference from circulating
antibody than live vaccines
* Generally require 3-5 doses
* Immune response mostly humoral
* Antibody titer diminishes with time
Inactivated Vaccines
Whole-cell vaccines
* Viral polio, hepatitis A,
rabies (influenza)
Bacterial (pertussis) (typhoid)
(cholera) (plague)
Vaccines In (parenthesis) are not available In the United States.
Inactivated Vaccines
Fractional vaccines
* Subunit hepatitis B, influenza,
acellular pertussis,
(Lyme) (HPV)
' Toxoid diphtheria, tetanus
Vaccines In (parenthesis) are not available In the United States.
Polysaccharide Vaccines
Pure polysaccharide
• pneumococcal
• meningococcal
• Salmonella Typhi (Vi)
Conjugate polysaccharide
* Haemophilus influenzae type b
* pneumococcal
* meningococcal
Inactivated Vaccines
Inactivated vaccines are produced by growing the bacterium
or virus in culture media, then inactivating it with heat
and/or chemicals (usually formalin). In the case of fractional
vaccines, the organism is further treated to purify only those
components to be included in the vaccine (e.g., the polysac-
charide capsule of pneumococcus).
Inactivated vaccines are not alive and cannot replicate.
The entire dose of antigen is administered in the injection.
These vaccines cannot cause disease from infection, even in
an immunodeficient person. Inactivated antigens are less
affected by circulating antibody than are live agents.
Inactivated vaccines may be given when antibody is present
in the blood (e.g., in infancy or following receipt of
antibody-containing blood products).
Inactivated vaccines always require multiple doses. In general,
the first dose does not produce protective immunity, but
“primes” the immune system. A protective immune response
develops after the second or third dose. In contrast to live
vaccines, in which the immune response closely resembles
natural infection, the immune response to an inactivated
vaccine is mostly humoral. Little or no cellular immunity
results. Antibody titers against inactivated antigens diminish
with time. As a result, some inactivated vaccines may
require periodic supplemental doses to increase, or “boost,”
antibody titers.
Currently available whole-cell inactivated vaccines are
limited to inactivated whole viral vaccines (polio, rabies,
and hepatitis A). Inactivated whole virus influenza vaccine
and whole inactivated bacterial vaccines (pertussis, typhoid,
cholera, and plague) are no longer available in the United
States. Fractional vaccines include subunits (hepatitis B,
influenza, acellular pertussis) and toxoids (diphtheria,
tetanus). A subunit vaccine for Lyme disease is no longer
available in the United States. A vaccine containing the
capsid protein (LI) of human papillomavirus may be
available in the future.
Polysaccharide Vaccines
Polysaccharide vaccines are a unique type of inactivated
subunit vaccine composed of long chains of sugar molecules
that make up the surface capsule of certain bacteria. Pure
polysaccharide vaccines are available for three diseases:
pneumococcal disease, meningococcal disease, and
Salmonella Typhi. A pure polysaccharide vaccine for
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib)is no longer available
in the United States.
Principles of Vaccination
The immune response to a pure polysaccharide vaccine is
typically T-cell independent, which means that these
vaccines are able to stimulate B cells without the
assistance of T-helper cells. T-cell-independent antigens,
including polysaccharide vaccines, are not consistently
immunogenic in children younger than 2 years of age.
Young children do not respond consistently to
polysaccharide antigens, probably because of immaturity
a
Pure Polysaccharide Vaccines
* Not consistently immunogenic in
children <2 years of age
• No booster response
* Antibody with less functional
activity
* Immunogenicity improved by
conjugation
of the immune system.
Repeated doses of most inactivated protein vaccines cause
the antibody titer to go progressively higher, or “boost.”
This is not seen with polysaccharide antigens; repeat doses
of polysaccharide vaccines do not cause a booster response.
Antibody induced with polysaccharide vaccines has less
functional activity than that induced by protein antigens.
This is because the predominant antibody produced in
response to most polysaccharide vaccines is IgM, and little
IgG is produced.
In the late 1980s, it was discovered that the problems
noted above could be overcome through a process called
conjugation, in which the polysaccharide is chemically
combined with a protein molecule. Conjugation changes
the immune response from T-cell independent to T-cell
dependent, leading to increased immunogenicity in
infants and antibody booster response to multiple doses
of vaccine.
The first conjugated polysaccharide vaccine was for Hib.
A conjugate vaccine for pneumococcal disease was licensed
in 2000. A meningococcal conjugate vaccine was licensed
in 2005.
Recombinant Vaccines
Vaccine antigens may also be produced by genetic engineering
technology. These products are sometimes referred to as
recombinant vaccines. Three genetically engineered vaccines
are currently available in the United States. Hepatitis B
vaccines are produced by insertion of a segment of the
hepatitis B virus gene into the gene of a yeast cell. The
modified yeast cell produces pure hepatitis B surface antigen
when it grows. Live typhoid vaccine (Ty21a) is Salmonella
Typhi bacteria that have been genetically modified to not
cause illness. Live attenuated influenza vaccine has been
engineered to replicate effectively in the mucosa of the
nasopharynx but not in the lungs.
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General Recommendations
on Immunization
This chapter discusses issues that are commonly encountered
in vaccination practices. A more thorough discussion of
issues common to more than one vaccine can be found in
the General Recommendations on Immunization:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices and the American Academy of
Family Physicians. These recommendations are revised
every 3-5 years as needed; the most current edition was
published in February 2002 (MMWR 2002;51(RR-2):l-36).
A revised document is expected to be published in 2006.
All providers who administer vaccine should have a copy of
this report and be familiar with its contents. It can be
downloaded from the MMWR website or ordered in print
version from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Timing and Spacing of Vaccines
The timing and spacing of vaccine doses are two of the
most important issues in the appropriate use of vaccines.
Specific circumstances that are commonly encountered in
immunization practice are the timing of antibody-containing
blood products and live vaccines (particularly measles
vaccine), simultaneous and nonsimultaneous administration
of different vaccines, and the interval between subsequent
doses of the same vaccine.
Issues Regarding Timing
and Spacing of Vaccines
* Timing of antibody-containing blood
products and live vaccines
* Simultaneous and nonsimultaneous
administration of different vaccines
* Interval between subsequent doses
of the same vaccine
General Rule
Inactivated vaccines generally are not affected by circulating
antibody to the antigen.
Live attenuated vaccines may be affected by circulating
antibody to the antigen.
Antibody-Vaccine Interactions
The presence of circulating antibody to a vaccine antigen
may reduce or completely eliminate the immune response to
the vaccine. The amount of interference produced by
circulating antibody generally depends on the type of
vaccine administered and the amount of antibody.
Inactivated antigens are generally not substantially affected by
circulating antibody, so they can be administered before, after,
or at the same time as the antibody. Simultaneous
administration of antibody (in the form of immune globulin)
and vaccine is recommended for postexposure prophylaxis of
certain diseases, such as hepatitis B, rabies, and tetanus.
General Recommendations on Immunization
Antibody and Live Vaccines
Product Given First Action
Vaccine Wait 2 weeks before
giving antibody
Antibody vVait >3 months before
giving vaccine
(See Table. Appendix A)
Antibody for Prevention of RSV
• RSV-IG (RespiGam)
—Human
—Contains other antibodies
* Palivizumab (Synagis)
—Monoclonal
—Contains only RSV antibody
Live vaccines must replicate in order to cause an immune
response. Antibody against parenteral (injected) live vaccine
antigen may interfere with replication. If a live parenteral
vaccine (measles-mumps-rubella [MMR] or varicella) must
be given around the time that antibody is given, the two
must be separated by enough time so that the antibody does
not interfere with viral replication. If the live vaccine is
given first, it is necessary to wait at least 2 weeks (i.e., an
incubation period) before giving the antibody. If the interval
between the vaccine and antibody is less than 2 weeks, the
recipient should be tested for immunity or the vaccine dose
should be repeated.
If the antibody is given before a dose of MMR or varicella
vaccine, it is necessary to wait until the antibody has waned
(degraded) before giving the vaccine to reduce the chance
of interference by the antibody. The necessary interval
between an antibody-containing product and MMR or varicella
vaccine depends on the concentration of antibody in the
product. A table listing the recommended intervals between
administration of antibody products and live vaccines
(MMR and varicella) is included in Appendix A and in the
General Recommendations on Immunization. The interval
between administration of an antibody product and MMR
or varicella vaccination can be as long as 1 1 months.
Although passively acquired antibodies can interfere with
the response to rubella vaccine, the low dose of anti-Rho(D)
globulin administered to postpartum women has not been
demonstrated to reduce the response to the RA27/3 strain
rubella vaccine. Because of the importance of rubella
immunity among childbearing age women, postpartum
vaccination of rubella'Susceptible women with rubella or
MMR vaccine should not be delayed because of receipt of
anti'Rho(D) globulin or any other blood product during the
last trimester of pregnancy or at delivery. These women
should be vaccinated immediately after delivery and, if
possible, tested 3 months later to ensure immunity to rubella
and, if necessary, to measles.
Oral typhoid, and yellow fever vaccines are not affected by
the administration of immune globulin or blood products.
They may be given simultaneously with blood products, or
separated by any interval. These vaccines are not affected
because few North Americans are immune to yellow fever or
typhoid. Consequently, donated blood products in the
United States do not contain a significant amount of
antibody to these organisms. The effect of circulating
antibody on live attenuated influenza vaccine is not known.
Two antibody products are available for the prevention of
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infection in infants and
young children. RSVTG (RespiGam) is an intravenous
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human immune globulin product. RSV-IG contains other
human antibodies in addition to antibody to RSV, and
may interfere with live parenteral vaccines for as long as
9 months. Palivizumab (Synagis) contains only monoclonal
antibody to respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). It does not
interfere with the response to live virus vaccines.
General Rule
I
There is no contraindication to the sinnultaneous I
administration of any vaccines. |
Simultaneous and IMonsimultaneous
Administration
Simultaneous administration of the most widely used live
and inactivated vaccines does not result in decreased
antibody responses or increased rates of adverse reactions.
Simultaneous administration of all vaccines for which a child
is eligible can be very important in childhood vaccination
programs because it increases the probability that a child
will be fully immunized at the appropriate age. A study
during a measles outbreak in the early 1990s showed that
about one-third of measles cases in unvaccinated but
vaccine-eligible preschool children could have been
prevented if MMR had been administered at the same visit
when another vaccine was given.
Individual vaccines should not be mixed in the same syringe
unless they are licensed for mixing by the Food and Drug
Administration. Only the sanofi-pasteur Hib/DTaP (TriHIBit)
vaccine is licensed for mixing in the same syringe.
IMonsimultaneous Administration
of Different Vaccines
In some situations, vaccines that could be given simultaneously
are not (e.g., if the child is receiving vaccines from two
different providers). Live parenteral (injected) vaccines
(MMR, varicella, and yellow fever) and live attenuated
influenza vaccine (LAIV) that are not administered
simultaneously should be separated by at least 4 weeks.
This precaution is intended to reduce or eliminate interference
from the vaccine given first on the vaccine given later. If
two live parenteral vaccines or LAIV are not administered
simultaneously but are separated by less than 4 weeks, the
vaccine given second should be repeated in 4 weeks or
confirmed to be effective by serologic testing of the recipient
(serologic testing is not recommended for LAIV). An
exception to this recommendation is yellow fever vaccine
Spacing of Vaccine Combinations
Not Given Simultaneously
Combination
Two live parenteral,
or live intranasal
influenza vaccine
Minimum Interval
4 weeks
All other None
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Spacing of Live Vaccines
Not Given Simultaneously
* If two live parenteral vaccines, or
live intranasal influenza vaccine,
are given <4 weeks apart the
vaccine given second should be
repeated
• Exception is yellow fever vaccine
given <4 weeks after measles
vaccine
administered less than 4 weeks after single-antigen measles
vaccine. A 1999 study demonstrated that yellow fever vaccine
is not affected by measles vaccine given 1-27 days earlier.
The effect of nonsimultaneously administered rubella,
mumps, varicella, and yellow fever vaccines is not known.
Live vaccines administered by the oral route (oral polio
vaccine [OPV], oral typhoid) are not believed to interfere
with each other if not given simultaneously. These vaccines
may be given at any time before or after each other. Oral
typhoid is not licensed for children younger than 6 years of
age, and OPV is no longer available in the United States, so
these vaccines are not likely to be given to the same child.
Parenteral live vaccines (MMR, varicella, and yellow fever)
and LAIV are not believed to have an effect on live vaccines
given by the oral route (OPV, oral typhoid). Live oral
vaccines may be given at any time before or after live
parenteral vaccines or LAIV.
All other combinations of two inactivated vaccines, or live
and inactivated vaccines, may be given at any time before
or after each other.
General Rule
Increasing the interval between doses of a multidose
vaccine does not diminish the effectiveness of the vaccine.
Decreasing the interval between doses of a multidose
vaccine may interfere with antibody response and protection.
Interval Between Doses
of the Same Vaccine
Immunizations are recommended for members of the
youngest age group at risk for a disease for whom efficacy,
immunogenicity, and safety of a vaccine have been
demonstrated. Most vaccines in the childhood immunization
schedule require two or more doses for stimulation of an
adequate and persisting antibody response. Studies have
demonstrated that recommended ages and intervals between
doses of the same antigen(s) provide optimal protection or
have the best evidence of efficacy. Table 1 of the General
Recommendations on Immunization (included in Appendix A)
shows the recommended minimal ages and minimal inter-
vals between immunizations for vaccines in the
recommended childhood immunization schedule.
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Administering doses of a multidose vaccine at shorter than
the recommended intervals might be necessary when an
infant or child is behind schedule and needs to be brought
up-to-date quickly or when international travel is pending.
In these cases, an accelerated schedule using the minimum
age or minimum interval criteria can be used. Accelerated
schedules should not be used routinely.
Vaccine doses should not be administered at intervals less
than the recommended minimal intervals or earlier than
the minimal ages. Two exceptions to this may occur. The
first is for measles vaccine during a measles outbreak, when
the vaccine may be administered at an age younger than
12 months (this dose would not be counted, and would be
repeated at 12 months of age or older). The second consid-
eration involves administering a dose a few days earlier than
the minimum interval or age, which is unlikely to have a
substantially negative effect on the immune response to that
dose. Although vaccinations should not be scheduled at an
interval or age less than the recommended minimums, a
child may have erroneously been brought to the office early,
or may have come for an appointment not specifically for
vaccination (for example, for an ear recheck). In these
situations, the clinician can consider administering the
vaccine earlier than the minimum interval or age. If the
parent/child is known to the clinician and is reliable, it is
preferable to reschedule the child for vaccination closer to
the recommended interval. If the parent/child is not known
to the clinician or is not reliable (e.g., habitually misses
appointments), it may be preferable to administer the
vaccine at that visit than to reschedule a later appointment
that may not be kept.
Vaccine doses administered up to 4 days before the minimum
interval or age can be counted as valid. This 4-day
recommendation does not apply to rabies vaccine because
of the unique schedule for this vaccine. Doses administered
5 days or earlier than the minimum interval or age should
not be counted as valid doses and should be repeated as age
appropriate. The repeat dose should be spaced after the
invalid dose by a time greater than the recommended
minimum interval shown in Table 1 of the General
Recommendations. In certain situations, local or state
requirements might mandate that doses of selected vaccines
be administered on or after specific ages, superseding these
4-day recommendations.
In some cases, a scheduled dose of vaccine may not be given
on time. If this occurs, the dose should be given at the next
visit. Not all permutations of all schedules for all vaccines
have been studied. However, available data indicate that
intervals between doses longer than those routinely recom-
Minimum Intervals and Ages
Vaccine doses should not be
administered at intervals less
than the recommended
minimum intervals or earlier
than the minimum ages
Violation of Minimum Intervals
or Minimum Age
• ACIP recommends that vaccine
doses given up to four days
before the minimum interval or
age be counted as valid
* Immunization programs and/or
school entry requirements may
not accept all doses given earlier
than the minimum age or interval
Extended Interval Between Doses
’ Not all permutations of all
schedules for all vaccines have
been studied
' Available studies of extended
intervals have shown no
significant difference in final titer
' It is not necessary to restart the
series or add doses because of
an extended interval between
doses
2
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mended do not affect seroconversion rate or titer when the
schedule was completed. Consequently, it is not necessary
to restart the series or add doses of any vaccine because of
an extended interval between doses. The only exception to
this rule is oral typhoid vaccine in some circumstances. In
the case of oral typhoid, some experts recommend repeating
the series if the four-dose series is extended to more than
3 weeks.
General Rule
Live attenuated vaccines generally produce
long-lasting imiriunity with a single dose.
Inactivated vaccines require multiple doses and
may require periodic boosting to maintain immunity.
Number of Doses
For live injected vaccines, the first dose administered at the
recommended age usually provides protection. An additional
dose is given to ensure seroconversion. For instance, 95%
to 98% of recipients will respond to a single dose of measles
vaccine. The second dose is given to ensure that nearly 100%
of persons are immune (i.e., the second dose is
“insurance”). Immunity following live vaccines is
long-lasting, and booster doses are not necessary.
For inactivated vaccines, the first dose administered at the
recommended age usually does not provide protection
(hepatitis A vaccine is an exception). A protective immune
response may not develop until the second or third dose.
For inactivated vaccines, antibody titers may decrease
(“wane”) below protective levels after a few years. This
phenomenon is most notable for tetanus and diphtheria.
For these vaccines, periodic “boosting” is required.
An additional dose is given to raise antibody back to
protective levels.
Not all inactivated vaccines require boosting throughout life.
For example, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine does
not require boosting because Hib disease is very rare in
children older than 5 years of age. Hepatitis B vaccine does
not require boosting because of immunologic memory to the
vaccine and the long incubation period of hepatitis B
(which can produce an “autoboost”).
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Adverse Reactions Folloiniing
Vaccination
Vaccines are intended to produce active immunity to specific
antigens. An adverse reaction is an untoward effect caused
by a vaccine that is extraneous to the vaccine’s primary
purpose of production of immunity. Adverse reactions are
also called vaccine “side effect”. A vaccine adverse event
refers to any adverse event that occurs following vaccination.
An adverse event could be a true vaccine reaction or just a
coincidental event, with further research needed to
distinguish between them.
Vaccine Adverse Reactions
• Adverse reaction
— extraneous effect caused by
vaccine
—
"side effect"
• Adverse event
— any event following vaccination
— could be true adverse reaction
— could be only coincidental
Vaccine adverse reactions fall into three general categories:
local, systemic, and allergic. Local reactions are generally
the least severe and most frequent. Allergic reactions are
the most severe and least frequent.
The most common type of adverse reactions are local
reactions, such as pain, swelling, and redness at the site of
injection. Local reactions may occur with up to 50% of
vaccine doses, depending on the type of vaccine. Local
reactions are most common with inactivated vaccines,
particularly those, such as DTaP, that contain adjuvants.
Local adverse reactions generally occur within a few hours
of the injection and are usually mild and self-limited. On
rare occasions, local reactions may be very exaggerated or
severe. These are often referred to as hypersensitivity reactions,
although they are not allergic, as the term implies. These
reactions are also known as Arthus reactions, and are most
commonly seen with tetanus and diphtheria toxoids. Arthus
reactions are believed to be due to very high titers of
antibody, usually because of too many doses of toxoid.
Systemic adverse reactions are more generalized events and
include fever, malaise, myalgias (muscle pain), headache,
loss of appetite, and others. These symptoms are common
and nonspecific; they may occur in a vaccinated persons
because of the vaccine or may be caused by something
unrelated to the vaccine, like a concomitant viral infection.
Systemic adverse reactions were relatively frequent with
DTP vaccine, which contained a whole-cell pertussis com-
ponent. However, comparison of the frequency of systemic
adverse events among vaccine and placebo recipients shows
they are not common with inactivated vaccines currently in
use, including acellular pertussis vaccine.
Systemic adverse reactions may occur following receipt of
live attenuated vaccines. Live attenuated vaccines must
replicate in order to produce immunity. The adverse
reactions that follow live attenuated vaccines, such as fever
or rash, represent symptoms produced from that replication
and are similar to a mild form of the natural disease.
Vaccine Adverse Reactions
* Local
— pain, swelling, redness at
site of injection
— common with inactivated
vaccines
— usually mild and self-limited
Vaccine Adverse Reactions
• Systemic
— fever, malaise, headache
— nonspecific
— may be unrelated to vaccine
Live Attenuated Vaccines
* Must replicate to produce
immunity
* Symptoms usually mild
Occur after an incubation period
(usually 7-21 days)
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Vaccine Adverse Reactions
• Allergic
— due to vaccine or vaccine
component
— very rare
— risk minimized by screening
Contraindication
A condition in a recipient that
increases the chance of a serious
adverse reaction
Systemic adverse reactions following live vaccines are usually
mild, and occur a week or two after the vaccine was given
(i.e., after an incubation period of the vaccine virus). LAIV
replicates in the mucous membranes of the nose and throat,
not in the lung. As a result, LAIV may cause upper respiratory
symptoms (like a cold) but not influenza-like symptoms.
A third type of vaccine adverse reaction is a severe
(anaphylactic) allergic reaction. The allergic reaction may
be caused by the vaccine antigen itself or some other
component of the vaccine, such as cell culture material,
stabilizer, preservatives, or antibiotic used to inhibit bacterial
growth. Severe allergic reactions to vaccines may be life-
threatening. Fortunately, they are very rare, occurring at a
rate of less than one in half a million doses. The risk of an
allergic reaction can be minimized by good screening prior
to vaccination. All providers who administer vaccines must
have an emergency protocol and supplies to treat anaphylaxis.
Reporting Vaccine Adverse Events
From 1978 to 1990, CDC conducted the Monitoring System
for Adverse Events Following Immunization (MSAEFl) in
the public sector. In 1990, MSAEEI was replaced by the
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS), which
includes reporting from both public and private sectors.
Providers should report any clinically significant adverse
event that occurs after the administration of any vaccine
licensed in the United States.
Providers should report a clinically significant adverse event
even if they are unsure whether a vaccine caused the event.
The telephone number to call for answers to questions and
to obtain VAERS forms is 800-822-7967, or visit the
VAERS website at http://vaers.hhs.gov. VAERS now accepts
reports of adverse events through their online system.
(See Chapter 4, Vaccine Safety.)
Contraindications and Precautions
to Vaccination
Contraindications and precautions to vaccination generally
dictate circumstances when vaccines will not be given. Most
contraindications and precautions are temporary, and the
vaccine can be given at a later time.
A contraindication is a condition in a recipient that
increases the chance of a serious adverse reaction. It is a
condition in the recipient of the vaccine, not with the vaccine
per se. If the vaccine were given in the presence of that
condition, the resulting adverse reaction could seriously
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harm the recipient. For instance, administering influenza
vaccine to a person with a true anaphylactic allergy to egg
could cause serious illness or death in the recipient. In general,
vaccines should not be administered when a contraindication
condition is present.
Precaution
A precaution is similar to a contraindication. A precaution
is a condition in a recipient that might increase the chance
or severity of a serious adverse reaction, or compromise the
ability of the vaccine to produce immunity (such as
administering measles vaccine to a person with passive
immunity to measles from a blood transfusion). Injury could
result, but the chance of this happening is less than with a
contraindication. In general, vaccines are deferred when a
precaution condition is present. However, situations may
arise when the benefit of protection from the vaccine
outweighs the risk of an adverse reaction, and a provider
may decide to give the vaccine. For example, prolonged
crying or a high fever after a dose of whole-cell or acellular
pertussis vaccine is considered a precaution to subsequent
doses of pediatric pertussis vaccine. But if the child were at
high risk of pertussis exposure (e.g., during a pertussis
outbreak in the community), a provider may choose to
vaccinate the child and treat the adverse reaction if it
occurs. In this example, the benefit of protection from the
vaccine outweighs the harm potentially caused by the vaccine.
There are very few true contraindication and precaution
conditions. Only two of these conditions are generally
considered to be permanent: severe (anaphylactic) allergic
reaction to a vaccine component or following a prior dose
of a vaccine, and encephalopathy not due to another
identifiable cause occurring within 7 days of vaccination.
Four conditions are considered permanent precautions to
further doses of pediatric pertussis-containing vaccine:
temperature greater than 105"F, collapse or shock-like state
(hypotonic hyporesponsive episode), persistent inconsolable
crying lasting 3 or more hours occurring within 48 hours of
a dose, or a seizure, with or without fever, occurring within
3 days of a dose. The occurrence of one of these events
following DTaP vaccine is not a precaution to pertussis
vaccination of an adolescent or adult.
Two conditions are temporary contraindications to vaccination
with live vaccines: pregnancy and immunosuppression.
Two conditions are temporary precautions to vaccination:
moderate or severe acute illness (all vaccines), and recent
receipt of an antibody-containing blood product (MMR
and varicella only).
A condition in a recipient that
might
•Increase the chance or severity of
an adverse reaction, or
•Compromise the ability of the
vaccine to produce immunity
Contraindications and Precautions
Permanent contraindications to
vaccination:
• severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component or following
a prior dose
• encephalopathy not due to
another identifiable cause
occurring within 7 days of
vaccination
Contraindications and Precautions
Condition Live Inactivated
Allergy to component C C
Encephalopathy — C
Pregnancy C V
Immunosuppression C V
Severe illness P P
Recent blood product P* V
C=contraindication P=precaution V=vaccinate if indicated
*MMR and varicella only
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Allergy
A severe (anaphylactic) allergic reaction following a dose of
vaccine will almost always contraindicate a subsequent dose
of that vaccine. Severe allergies are those that are mediated
by IgE, occur within minutes or hours of receiving the
vaccine, and require medical attention. Examples of severe
allergic reactions are generalized urticaria (hives), swelling
of the mouth and throat, difficulty breathing, wheezing,
hypotension, or shock. With appropriate screening these
reactions are very rare following vaccination.
A table listing vaccine contents is included in Appendix B.
Persons may be allergic to the vaccine antigen, animal
protein, antibiotics, preservatives, or stabilizers. The most
common animal protein allergen is egg protein found in
vaccines prepared using embryonated chicken eggs (e.g.,
yellow fever and influenza vaccines). Ordinarily, persons
who are able to eat eggs or egg products can receive
vaccines that contain egg; persons with histories of
anaphylactic or anaphylactic-like allergy to eggs or egg
proteins should not. Asking persons whether they can eat
eggs without adverse effects is a reasonable way to screen
for those who might be at risk from receiving yellow fever
and influenza vaccines.
Several studies have shown that children who have a
history of severe allergy to eggs rarely have reactions to
MMR vaccine. This is probably because measles and mumps
vaccine viruses are both grown in chick embryo fibroblasts,
not actually in eggs. It appears that gelatin, not egg, might
be the cause of allergic reactions to MMR. As a result, in
1998, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
removed severe egg allergy as a contraindication to measles
and mumps vaccines. Egg-allergic children may be vaccinated
with MMR without prior skin testing.
Certain vaccines contain trace amounts of neomycin.
Persons who have experienced anaphylactic reactions to
neomycin should not receive these vaccines. Most often,
a neomycin allergy reaction is a contact dermatitis, a
manifestation of a delayed-type (cell-mediated) immune
response, rather than anaphylaxis. A history of delayed-type
reactions to neomycin is not a contraindication for
administration of these vaccines.
Latex is liquid sap from the commercial rubber tree. Latex
contains naturally occurring impurities (e.g., plant proteins
and peptides), which are believed to be responsible for allergic
reactions. Latex is processed to form natural rubber latex
and dry natural rubber. Dry natural rubber and natural
rubber latex might contain the same plant impurities as
latex but in a lesser amounts. Natural rubber latex is used to
produce medical gloves, catheters, and other products. Dry
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natural rubber is used in syringe plungers, vial stoppers, and
injection ports on intravascular tubing. Synthetic rubber
and synthetic latex also are used in medical gloves, syringe
plungers, and vial stoppers. Synthetic rubber and synthetic
latex do not contain natural rubber or natural latex, and
therefore, do not contain the impurities linked to allergic
reactions.
The most common type of latex sensitivity is contact-type
(type 4) allergy, usually as a result of prolonged contact with
latex-containing gloves. However, injection-procedure-associated
latex allergies among diabetic patients have been described.
Allergic reactions (including anaphylaxis) after vaccination
procedures are rare. Only one report of an allergic reaction
after administration of hepatitis B vaccine in a patient with
known severe allergy (anaphylaxis) to latex has been published.
If a person reports a severe (anaphylactic) allergy to latex,
vaccines supplied in vials or syringes that contain natural
rubber should not be administered unless the benefit of
vaccination clearly outweighs the risk of an allergic reaction
to the vaccine. For latex allergies other than anaphylactic
allergies (e.g., a history of contact allergy to latex gloves),
vaccines supplied in vials or syringes that contain dry
natural rubber or natural rubber latex can be administered.
Pregnancy
The concern about vaccinating pregnant women is with
infection of the fetus and is theoretical. Only smallpox
(vaccinia) vaccine has been shown to cause fetal injury.
However, since the theoretical possibility exists, live vaccines
should not be given to women known to be pregnant.
Since inactivated vaccines cannot replicate, they cannot
cause fetal infection. Inactivated vaccines should be
administered to pregnant women for whom they are
indicated. Susceptible household contacts of pregnant
women should receive MMR and varicella vaccines and
may receive LAIV, if eligible.
Immunosuppression
Live vaccines can cause severe or fatal reactions in
immunosuppressed persons due to uncontrolled replication
of the vaccine virus, particularly vaccinia and oral polio
vaccine virus (and rarely measles and varicella vaccine
virus). Severely immunosuppressed persons should not be
given live vaccines for this reason. Persons with isolated
B-cell deficiency may receive varicella vaccine. Inactivated
vaccines cannot replicate, so they are safe to use in
immunosuppressed persons. However, response to the
vaccine may be decreased.
Immunosuppression
Disease
* Congenital immunodeficiency
* Leukemia or lymphoma
* Generalized malignancy
19
General Recommendations on Immunization
Immunosuppression
Both diseases and drugs can cause significant immunosup-
pression. Persons with congenital immunodeficiency,
leukemia, lymphoma, or generalized malignancy should not
receive live vaccines. OPV should not be given if an
immunosLippressed person is in the household. However,
MMR, varicella vaccines, and LAIV may be given when an
immunosLippressed person lives in the same house.
Chemotherapy
* Alkylating agents
• Antimetabolites
* Radiation
Immunosuppression
Corticosteroids
• >20 mg per day
• >2 mg/kg per day,
for > 14 days
* NOT aerosols, alternate-day,
short courses, topical
Certain drugs may cause immunosuppression. For instance,
persons receiving cancer treatment with alkylating agents or
antimetabolites, or radiation therapy should not be given
live vaccines. Live vaccines can be given after chemotherapy
has been discontinued for at least 3 months. Persons receiving
large doses of corticosteroids should not receive live vaccines.
For example, this would include persons receiving
20 milligrams or more of prednisone daily or 2 or more
milligrams of prednisone per kilogram of body weight per
day for 1 4 days or longer.
Aerosolized steroids, such as inhalers for asthma, are not
contraindications to vaccination, nor are alternate-day,
rapidly tapering, and short (less than 14 days) high-dose
schedules, topical formulations, and physiologic replacement
schedules.
The safety and efficacy of live attenuated vaccines
administered concurrently with recombinant human
immune mediators and immune modulators is not known.
There is evidence that use of therapeutic monoclonal
antibodies, especially the anti-tumor necrosis factor agents
adalimumab, infliximab, and etanercept, may lead to
reactivation of latent tuberculosis infection and tuberculosis
disease and predispose to other opportunistic infections.
Because the safety of live attenuated vaccines for persons
receiving these drugs is not known, it is prudent to avoid
administration of live attenuated vaccines for at least a
month following treatment with these drugs.
Inactivated vaccines are not contraindicated for immuno-
suppressed persons. However, response to the vaccine may
be poor. Because a relatively functional immune system is
required to develop an immune response to a vaccine, an
immunosuppressed person may not be protected even if the
vaccine has been given. Additional recommendations for
vaccination of immunosuppressed persons are detailed in
the General Recommendations on Immunization.
HIV Infection
Persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) may have no symptoms, or may be severely immuno-
suppressed. In general, the same vaccination recommendations
apply as with other types of immunosuppression. Live-virus
vaccines are usually contraindicated, but inactivated vaccines
are not contraindicated.
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Measles and varicella can be very severe illnesses in persons
with HIV infection and are often associated with complications.
Therefore, measles vaccine (as combination MMR vaccine)
and varicella vaccine are recommended for persons with
HIV infection who are asymptomatic or mildly immunosup-
pressed. However, persons with severe immunosuppression
due to HIV infection should not receive measles vaccine,
MMR, or varicella vaccine. Susceptible household contacts
of persons with HIV infection should receive MMR and
varicella vaccines. Persons with HIV infection should not
receive LAIV; they should receive inactivated influenza vaccine.
Vaccination of Hematopoietic Stem Ceii
Transpiant Recipients
Hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) is the infusion
of hematopoietic stem cells from a donor into a patient who
has received chemotherapy and often radiation, both of
which are usually bone marrow ablative. HSCT is used to
treat a variety of neoplastic diseases, hematologic disorders,
immunodeficiency syndromes, congenital enzyme deficiencies,
and autoimmune disorders. HSCT recipients can receive
either their own cells (i.e., autologous HSCT) or cells from
a donor other than the transplant recipient (i.e., allogeneic
HSCT).
Antibody titers to vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g.,
tetanus, poliovirus, measles, mumps, rubella, and encapsulated
bacteria [i.e.. Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus
influenzae type b]) decline during the 1-4 years after allogeneic
or autologous HSCT if the recipient is not revaccinated.
HSCT recipients are at increased risk for certain vaccine-
preventable diseases. As a result, HSCT recipients should be
routinely revaccinated after HSCT, regardless of the source
of the transplanted stem cells. Revaccination with inactivated
vaccines should begin 12 months after HSCT. An exception
to this recommendation is for influenza vaccine, which
should be administered 6 months after HSCT and annually
thereafter for the life of the recipient. MMR vaccine should
be administered 24 months after transplantation if the
HSCT recipient is presumed to be immunocompetent.
Varicella, meningococcal, and pneumococcal conjugate
vaccines are not currently recommended for HSCT recipients
because of insufficient experience using these vaccines
among HSCT recipients.
Household and other close contacts of HSCT recipients and
healthcare workers who care for HSCT recipients should be
appropriately vaccinated, particularly against influenza,
measles, and varicella. Additional details of vaccination of
HSCT recipients and their contacts can be found in a CDC
report on this topic available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/hsct-recs.pdf.
Recommendations for
Routine Immunization of
HIV-Infected Children
Vaccine Asymptomatic Symptomatic
Varicella Yes No
MMR Yes No
LAIV No No
All others Yes Yes
Yes = vaccinate No = do not vaccinate
Vaccination of Hematopoietic
Stem Cell Transplant Recipients
* Includes recipients of bone
marroyy, peripheral cell, and
umbilical cord blood transplants
* Autologous or allogeneic
* HSCT recipients should be
revaccinated
Vaccination of Hematopoietic
Stem Cell Transplant Recipients
* Inactivated influenza vaccine at
>6 months following transplant and
annual thereafter
* Inactivated vaccines (DTaP, Td, Hib,
IPV, hepatitis B, PPV) at 12 months
* MMR at 24 months if
immunocompetent
* Varicella, meningococcal, and PCV7
vaccines not recommended
(insufficient data)
21
General Recommendations on Immunization
Moderate or Severe Acute Illness
There is no evidence that a concurrent acute illness reduces
vaccine efficacy or increases vaccine adverse events. The
concern is that an adverse reaction (particularly fever)
following vaccination could complicate the management of
a severely ill person. If a person has a moderate or severe
acute illness, vaccination with both live and inactivated
vaccines should he delayed until the illness has improved.
Minor, common illnesses (such as otitis media, upper
respiratory infections, colds, and diarrhea) are NOT
contraindications to vaccination.
f Invalid Contraindications n,
to Vaccination
* Minor illness
* Antimicrobial therapy
* Disease exposure or convalescence
* Pregnancy or immunosuppression
in the household
* Breastfeeding
* Premature birth
* Non-vaccine-related allergies
* Nonanaphalactic allergy to vaccine component
* Family history (unrelated to
immunosuppression)
* Need for TB skin testing
Invalid Contraindications
to Vaccination
Some healthcare providers inappropriately consider certain
conditions or circumstances to be true contraindications or
precautions to vaccinations. Such conditions or circumstances
are known as invalid contraindications; they result in missed
opportunities to administer needed vaccines. Some of the
most common invalid contraindications are minor illnesses,
conditions related to pregnancy and breastfeeding, allergies
that are not anaphylactic in nature, and certain aspects of
the patient’s family history.
Invalid Contraindications
Minor Illness
* Low grade fever
* Upper respiratory infection
* Otitis media
Mild diarrhea
* Only one small study has suggested
decreased efficacy of measles vaccine in
children with URI
> Findings not replicated by multiple prior
and subsequent studies
* No evidence of increased adverse reaction
Minor Illness
Children with mild acute illnesses, such as low-grade fever,
upper respiratory infection (URI), colds, otitis media, and
mild diarrhea, can and should be vaccinated.
Several large studies have shown that young children with
URI, otitis media, diarrhea, and/or fever respond to measles
vaccine as well as those without these conditions. These
large studies refute the results of an earlier small study
(Krober, JAMA 1991) which suggested that minor infections
such as URIs might impair the response to measles vaccine.
Further, there is no evidence that mild diarrhea reduces the
success of immunization of infants in this country.
Low-grade fever is not a contraindication to immunization.
Temperature measurement is not necessary before
immunization if the infant or child does not appear ill and
the parent does not say the child is currently ill.
Antimicrobial Therapy
Antimicrobial agents do not have an effect on the immune
response to a vaccine. No commonly used antibiotic or
antiviral agent will inactivate a live-virus vaccine.
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Disease Exposure or Convalescence
If a child is not moderately or severely ill, he or she should
be vaccinated. There is no evidence that either disease
exposure or convalescence will affect the response to a
vaccine or increase the likelihood of an adverse event.
Pregnancy or Immunosuppression in the
Household or Breastfeeding
It is critical that healthy household contacts of pregnant
women and immunosuppressed persons be vaccinated.
Vaccination of healthy contacts reduces the chance of
exposure of pregnant women and immunosuppressed persons.
Most vaccines, including live vaccines (MMR, varicella,
and yellow fever), can be given to infants or children who
are household contacts of pregnant or immunosuppressed
persons, as well as to breastfeeding infants. Vaccinia (smallpox)
vaccine is not recommended for household contacts of a
pregnant or immunosuppressed person in nonemergency
situations. Live attenuated influenza vaccine should not be
administered to persons who have contact with severely
immunosuppressed persons who are hospitalized and require
care in a protected environment (i.e., who are in isolation
because of immunosuppression). LAIV may be administered
to contacts of persons with lesser degrees of immunosuppression.
Measles and mumps vaccine viruses produce a noncommu-
nicable infection and are not transmitted to household
contacts. Rubella vaccine virus has been shown to be shed
in human milk, but transmission to an infant has rarely
been documented. Transmission of varicella vaccine virus is
not common, and most women and older immunosuppressed
persons are immune from having had chickenpox. LAIV
may be administered to a woman who is breastfeeding if she
is otherwise eligible. The risk of transmission of vaccine
virus is not known but is probably low. Breastfeeding does
not decrease the response to routine childhood vaccines.
Breastfeeding also does not extend or improve the passive
immunity to vaccine-preventable disease that is provided by
maternal antibody.
Premature Birth
Vaccines should be started on schedule based on the child’s
chronological age. Premature infants have been shown to
respond adequately to vaccines used in infancy.
Studies demonstrate that decreased seroconversion rates
might occur among certain premature infants with low
birth weights (less than 2,000 grams) after administration
of hepatitis B vaccine at birth. However, by 1 month
chronological age, all premature infants, regardless of
initial birthweight or gestational age are as likely to
respond as adequately as older and larger infants.
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All premature infants born to hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg)-positive mothers and mothers with unknown
HBsAg status must receive immunoprophylaxis with hepati-
tis B vaccine and hepatitis B immunoglohulin (HBIG) with-
in 12 hours after birth. If these infants weigh less than 2,000
grams at birth, the initial vaccine dose should not be count-
ed toward completion of the hepatitis B vaccine series, and
three additional doses of hepatitis B vaccine should he
administered beginning when the infant is 1 month of age.
The optimal timing of the first dose of hepatitis B vaccine
for premature infants of HBsAg-negative mothers with a
birth weight of less than 2,000 grams has not been determined.
These infants can begin the first dose of the hepatitis B vaccine
series at 1 month of chronological age. Premature infants
discharged from the hospital prior to 1 month chronological
age may also be given hepatitis B vaccine at discharge if
they are medically stable and showing consistent weight gain.
Non-Vaccine-Related Allergies
Infants and children with nonspecific allergies, duck or
feather allergy, or allergy to penicillin, children who have
relatives with allergies, and children taking allergy shots can
and should be immunized. No vaccine available in the
United States contains duck antigen or penicillin.
Nonanaphylactic Allergy to
Vaccine Component
Anaphylactic allergy to a vaccine component (such as egg
or neomycin) is a true contraindication to vaccination.
Nonanaphylactic allergy to a vaccine constituent is not a
contraindication to that vaccine.
Family History of Adverse Events
The only family history that is relevant in the decision to
vaccinate a child is immunosuppression. A family history of
adverse reactions unrelated to immunosupression or family
history of seizures or sudden infant death syndrome is not a
contraindication to vaccination. Varicella virus vaccine
should not be administered to persons who have a family
history of congenital or hereditary immunodeficiency in
first-degree relatives (e.g., parents and siblings) unless the
immune competence of the potential vaccine recipient has
been clinically substantiated or verified by a laboratory.
Tuberculosis Skin Test [PPD]
Infants and children who need TB skin tests can and should
be immunized. All vaccines, including MMR, can be given
on the same day as a TB skin test, or any time after a TB
skin test is applied. For most vaccines, there are no TB skin
test timing restrictions at all.
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MMR vaccine may decrease the response to a TB skin test,
causing a false-negative response in someone who actually
has an infection with tuberculosis. MMR can be given the
same day as a TB skin test, but if MMR has been given and
1 or more days have elapsed, in most situations a wait of 4-6
weeks is recommended before giving a routine TB skin test.
No information on the effect of varicella vaccine or LAIV
on a TB skin test is available. Until such information is
available, it is prudent to apply rules for spacing measles
vaccine and TB skin testing to varicella vaccine and LAIV.
Screening for Contraindications and
Precautions to Vaccination
The key to preventing serious adverse reactions is screening.
Every person who administers vaccines should screen
every patient for contraindications and precautions before
giving the vaccine dose. Effective screening is not difficult
or complicated and can be accomplished with just a few
questions.
How is your child [or how are you] today?
This question screens for concurrent moderate or acute illness.
If the child has been examined, this question may not be
necessary or may have already been asked.
Does your child have any allergies
to any food or medication?
A severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component is a
contraindication to vaccination, so this question must
always be asked. It may be more time-efficient to inquire
about allergies in a generic way (i.e., any food or medication)
rather than to inquire about specific vaccine components.
Most parents will not be familiar with minor components of
vaccine, but they should know if the child has had an allergic
reaction to a food or medication that was severe enough to
require medical attention.
Did the child have any problems after
his or her last shots?
This open-ended question explores for allergic reactions to
previous doses and for conditions following pertussis vaccine
that may be precautions to additional doses, such as high
fever or a hypotonic episode.
Does the child have any problems with
his or her immune system?
This question will help identify children with immunodefi-
ciency who generally should not receive live attenuated
vaccines, particularly oral polio vaccine.
continues
Screening Questions
• How is your child today?
* Allergies to food or medication?
• Any problem after last shots?
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Screening Questions
• Problems with immune system?
• Anyone in household with
immune problems?
• Blood products in last year?
• Pregnant?
Does anyone in your household have a problem
with their immune system?
Oral polio vaccine should not be given to a healthy person
who has household contact with someone who is immunod-
eficient. LAIV should not be given to household contacts of
severely immunosuppressed persons.
^4las the child received any blood products in the last year,
like a transfusion, or immune globulin?
This question helps identify precautions for live attenuated
MMR and varicella vaccines, which should not be given to
persons who have received passive antibody in the last few
months. The question may also expose unreported illnesses
that might not have been revealed in earlier questions.
^Are you pregnant, or trying to become pregnant?
This question should be asked of all adolescent and adult
women. MMR, varicella, smallpox (vaccinia), and LAIV
vaccines should not be given to women known to be pregnant
or for 4 weeks prior to pregnancy. Persons with a pregnant
household contact should not receive smallpox (vaccinia)
vaccine in nonemergency situations. ACIP does not
recommend pregnancy testing prior to administration of
any vaccine.
Every person should be screened for contraindications and
precautions before vaccination. Standardized screening
forms for both children and adults, developed by the
Immunization Action Coalition, are included in Appendix A.
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Immunization Strategies for
Healthcare Practices and
Providers
The Need for Strategies to
Increase Immunization Levels
An important component of an immunization provider
practice is ensuring that the vaccines reach all children who
need them. While attention to appropriate administration
of vaccinations is essential, it cannot be assumed that these
vaccinations are being given to every eligible child at the
recommended age. Immunization levels in the Unites States
are high, but gaps still exist, and providers can do much to
maintain or increase immunization rates among patients in
their practice. This chapter describes the need for increasing
immunization levels and outlines strategies that providers
can adopt to increase coverage in their own practice.
Vaccine-preventable disease rates in the United States are
at their lowest level ever. In 2003, only 56 cases of measles,
7 cases of rubella, 1 case of diphtheria, 20 cases of tetanus,
and no wild-type polio were reported to CDC. Given these
immunization successes, one might question the continued
interest in strategies to increase immunization levels.
However, although levels of vaccine-preventable diseases
are low, this should not breed complacency regarding
vaccination. For several reasons—including possible
resurgence of disease, introduction of new vaccines,
suboptimal immunization levels, cost-effectiveness, and gaps
in sustainable immunization efforts—the need to focus on
immunization rates remains crucial. The viruses and bacteria
that cause vaccine-preventable disease and death still exist
and can be passed on to unprotected persons or imported
from other countries. Diseases such as measles, mumps, or
pertussis can be more severe than often assumed and can
result in social and economic as well as physical costs: sick
children miss school, parents lose time from work, and
illness among healthcare workers can severely disrupt a
healthcare system. For many of these diseases, without
vaccination, the incidence will rise to prevaccine levels.
Although levels of disease are the ultimate outcome of
interest, these are a late indicator of the soundness of the
immunization system. Immunization levels are a better
indicator for determining if there is a problem with
immunization delivery, and this chapter will focus on
increasing immunization levels and the strategies healthcare
providers can use to do this.
Immunization Strategies for Healthcare Practices and Providers
Specific concerns about U.S. immunization levels and areas
for further study include the following:
Childhood immunization rates are still suboptimal. In
2004, for example, only 85.5% of children 19 to 35 months
of age had received four doses of DTaP vaccine.
For other age groups, immunization rates are considerably
lower than those for early childhood. According to
Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance System data from 2003, a
median of only 70% of persons 65 years of age and older
received the influenza vaccine in the past 12 months, and
64-2% had ever received pneumococcal vaccine.
Economic and racial disparities exist. Low-income and
minority children and adults are at greater risk for underim-
munization. “Pockets of need” exist in our nation’s inner
cities.
Why Focus on Strategies to
Increase Immunization?
* Immunization levels not optimal
* Cost-effectiveness of some
strategies uncertain
* Sustainable systems needed
Uptake is lagging for some antigens. In 2004, for example,
the percentage of children who had received varicella vac-
cine by their second birthday was 87.5%. Rates of influenza
immunization are also unacceptably low among healthcare
workers, an important target population for vaccination.
Typically, fewer than 40% of healthcare workers receive
influenza vaccine.
Improvements in adult immunization rates have tapered
off. According to data from the National Health Interview
Survey, after a consistent increase in rates during the 1980s
and early 1990s, improvements in influenza vaccination
rates for adults 65 years of age and older have leveled off
since 1997.
Cost-effectiveness needs more research. More research is
needed regarding which strategies increase immunization
levels with the least expenditure so these strategies can be
prioritized.
Sustainable systems for vaccinating children, adolescents,
and adults must be developed. High immunization rates
cannot rest upon one-time or short-term efforts. Greater
understanding of strategies to increase immunization levels
is necessary in order to create lasting, effective immunization
delivery systems.
Many strategies have been used to increase immunizations.
Some, such as school entry laws, have effectively increased
demand for vaccines, but the effectiveness of other strategies
(e.g., advertising) is less well documented. Some proven
strategies (e.g., reducing costs, linking immunization to
Women Infants and Children (WIC) services, home visiting)
are well suited to increasing rates among specific populations,
such as persons with low access to immunization services.
30
Immunization Strategies for Healthcare Practices and Providers
One key to a successful strategy to increase immunization is
matching the proposed solution to the current problem. At
present in the United States, most persons have sufficient
interest in and access to health care and are seen, at least
periodically, in healthcare systems. Those who remain
unvaccinated are so largely because healthcare practices and
providers do not always optimally perform the activities
associated with delivering vaccines and keeping patients
up-to-date with their immunization schedules. Although a
combination of strategies—directed at both providers and
the public—is necessary for increasing and maintaining high
immunization rates, this chapter focuses on immunization
strategies for healthcare practices and providers.
The AFIX Approach
The National Immunization Program, through state and
other grantees, administers a program designed to move
healthcare personnel from a state of unawareness about the
problem of low immunization rates in their practice to one
in which they are knowledgeable, concerned, motivated to
change their immunization practices; and capable of sustaining
new behaviors. The acronym used for this approach is
AFIX: Assessment of the immunization coverage of public
and private providers. Feedback of diagnostic information to
improve service delivery. Incentives to motivate providers
to change immunization practices or recognition of
improved or high performance, and eXchange of information
among providers. First conceived by the Georgia Division
of Public Health, AFIX is now being used nationwide with
both public and private immunization providers and is
recommended by governmental and nongovernmental
vaccine programs and medical professional societies.
Overview
The AFIX process consists of an assessment of an immunization
provider’s coverage rates by a trained representative from
the state or other immunization grantee program, feedback
of the results of the assessment to provider staff, incentives
to improve deficiencies and raise immunization rates, and
exchange of information and ideas among healthcare
providers. Some specific characteristics of this approach
have made it one of the most effective for achieving high,
sustainable vaccine coverage.
First, AFIX focuses on outcomes. It starts with an assessment,
producing an estimate of immunization coverage levels in a
provider’s office, and these data help to identify specific
actions to take in order to remedy deficiencies. Outcomes
are easily measurable. Second, AFIX focuses on providers,
those who are key to increasing immunization rates. AFIX
requires no governmental policy changes, nor does it
AFIX
Assessment
Feedback
Incentives
exchange
V y
Special Characteristics of AFIX
* Focuses on outcomes
* Focuses on providers
* Blend of advanced technology
and personal interaction
31
Immunization Strategies for Healthcare Practices and Providers
attempt to persuade clients to be vaccinated, but instead
focuses on changing healthcare provider behavior. Third,
AFIX, when used successfully, is a unique blend of advanced
technology and personal interaction. Much of the AFIX
process can be done electronically, increasing speed and
accuracy of assessment and feedback and streamlining
reporting. However, the personal skills of the assessor and
that person’s ability to establish rapport with and motivate
a provider are critical to achieving lasting results.
Assessment
* Evaluation of medical records to
ascertain the immunization rate
for a defined group
* Diagnosis of potential service
delivery problems
* Assessment increases
awareness
Assessment
Assessment refers to the evaluation of medical records to
ascertain the immunization rate for a defined group of
patients as well as to provide targeted diagnosis for
improvement. This step is essential because several studies
have documented that most healthcare providers, while
supportive of immunizations, do not have an accurate
perception of their own practice’s immunization rates.
Pediatricians in these studies greatly overestimated the
proportion of fully immunized children in their practices.
Assessment increases awareness of a provider’s actual
situation and provides a basis for subsequent actions by
provider staff.
CDC has developed a software program, CoCASA, that
enables assessment to be done electronically, is flexible
enough to accommodate whatever assessment parameters
are desired, and provides results that can be printed
immediately. This program will be described further in the
section, “AFIX Tools and Training.”
Feedback
* Informing immunization
providers about their
performance
* Assessment with feedback
creates the awareness
necessary for behavior change
How to Provide Feedback
* With feeling and precision
* Without judgment
* With confidentiality as appropriate
Feedback
Feedback is the process of informing immunization
providers about their performance in delivering one or
more vaccines to a defined client population. The work of
assessment is of no use unless the results are fed back to
persons who can make a change. Assessment together with
feedback creates the awareness necessary for behavior
change.
Feedback generally consists of the immunization program
representative meeting with appropriate provider staff and
discussing the results of the assessment in order to determine
the next steps to be taken. This may be done at a second
visit following the assessment of the provider’s records, or it
may take place the same day. There are advantages and
disadvantages to each approach. If CoCASA has been used,
the summary report that is generated can identify specific
subsets of patients (e.g., those who have not completed the
series because of a missed opportunity for immunization)
that, if found in substantial numbers, can provide clues to
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which changes in the provider’s practice would be most
effective. This can save time and make the feedback session
more focused.
The personal element of feedback, as mentioned, is also
critical to its success. A reviewer who is involved and
committed to the AFIX process, who addresses deficiencies
without judgment, and who respects the confidentiality of
the data and the efforts of the provider will be likely to gain
the trust of providers and motivate them to increase
immunization rates in the practice.
Incentives
An incentive is defined as something that incites one to
action or effort. Incentives are built into the AFIX process,
recognizing that immunization providers, like everyone else,
will accomplish a desired task more successfully if motivated
to do so. The assessment and feedback components are not
intended to be done in isolation; providers may have sufficient
data about their practice’s immunization rates, but they must
recognize high immunization coverage as a desirable goal
and be motivated to achieve it.
Incentives are extremely variable. No one thing will be
effective for every provider, and a single provider may need
different types of motivation at different stages of progress.
Things like small tokens of appreciation and providing
resource materials at meetings have helped providers
approach their task positively and create an atmosphere of
teamwork, but longer-term goals must be considered as well.
Since the effort to raise immunization rates may involve an
increase in duties for staff, offering assistance in reviewing
records or sending reminder notices might more directly
address a provider’s needs. Incentives pose a challenge to
the creativity of the program representative but also offer
the opportunity to try new ideas.
Finally, incentives are opportunities for partnerships and
collaboration. Professional organizations or businesses have
been solicited to publicize the immunization efforts in a
newsletter or provide funding for other rewards for provider
staff. Many other types of collaboration are possible; these
also have the benefit of increasing awareness of immunization
among diverse groups.
exchange of Information
The final AFIX component, eXchange of information, goes
hand in hand with incentives. The more information
providers have about their own practice’s immunization cov-
erage status, how it compares with state norms and with
other providers in their community, and what strategies
Incentives
* Something that incites to action
* Vary by provider and stage of
progress
* Opportunities for partnership
and collaboration
exchange of Information
* Allows access to more
experience than an individual
can accumulate
• Motivates improvement
* Coordinates resources
and efforts
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have been successful with other providers, the more
knowledgeable and motivated they will be to increase their
immunization rates. It is up to the AFIX representative to
provide appropriate statistical and educational information
and create forums for exchange of information among providers.
Staff members at all levels can benefit from the exchange of
ideas about immunization practices and increasing rates of
coverage—what has worked or not worked with another
provider, streamlining office procedures, or where to obtain
educational or other resources. The forums for such
exchanges vary widely from informal meetings on the local
level to more structured meetings sponsored by government
or professional organizations. Immunization training sessions
can be combined with sharing of ideas regarding actual
situations in which recommendations, such as those from
ACIP, are applied.
With the increased use of electronic communication, this
method should not be neglected in the information
exchange component of AFIX. Although different from
face-tO'face communication, e-mail exchanges or newsletters
sent electronically can be cost-saving and fast means of
disseminating information.
VFC/AFIX
* Incorporate AFIX activities
during VFC site visits
• Combine VFC/AFIX site visits
* Reduces number of visits
• Extends reach of AFIX
VFC-AFIX Initiative
In the last several years, responsibility for immunization has
largely shifted from public health departments to private
providers, who now vaccinate nearly 80% of children in the
United States. Many of these providers participate in the
Vaccines for Children (VFC) program, a federal program
whereby funding is provided for state and other immunization
programs to purchase vaccines and make them available at
no cost to children who meet income eligibility requirements.
Because immunization program staff make periodic quality
assurance site visits to VFC providers, NIP launched an
initiative in 2000 to link some AFIX and VFC activities and
incorporate AFIX activities during VFC provider site visits.
VFC program staff are encouraged to promote the AFIX
approach and, if possible, to combine VFC and AFIX site
visits. This reduces the number of visits to a single
provider and helps avoid duplication of staff time and effort.
In addition, it increases the emphasis on overall quality
improvement for a provider rather than meeting the
requirements of a single program.
VFC serves more than 30,000 private provider sites, and
every state participates in the program. VFC provider site
visits are conducted to review compliance with VFC eligibility
screening requirements and to evaluate vaccine storage and
handling procedures. Linking VFC with AFIX enables
AFIX to reach a large number of providers in the private
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sector and to reinforce the goals of both programs.
Information about VFC is on the NIP website at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vfc/Default.htm.
AFIX Tools And Training
The National Immunization Program has developed a
software program titled Comprehensive Clinic Assessment
Software Application (CoCASA) to enable electronic
entry of AFIX and VFC site visit data. CoCASA, first
released in December 2005, is an update of previous versions
of CASA and supersedes previous versions. Using
CoCASA, a reviewer enters appropriate basic information
about an individual provider and conducts an assessment of
patient records. The user also has the option to record AFIX
visit outcomes and VFC site visit information.
CoCASA can provide immediate results of the assessment,
supplying the reviewer with the information needed for use
in the feedback session and noting areas that need further
follow-up. CoCASA saves the reviewer time and provides
various analysis options. CoCASA reports provide estimates
of immunization coverage levels and potential reasons for
the coverage level, such as missed opportunities for
immunization and patients who did not return to finish the
immunization series. The program can generate reports on
specific sets of patients, such as those mentioned. Data
from an immunization registry or patient management
system can be imported into CoCASA, and data collected
during the visit can be exported for further analysis.
CoCASA is available on the website of the National
Immunization Program (http://www.cdc.gov/nip/casa/).
Comprehensive training modules on AFIX and on how to
use CoCASA are built into the CoCASA program.
Additional information about AFIX is available on the
website of the National Immunization Program
(http://www.cdc.gov/nip/afix/default.htm).
AFIX Endorsements
AFIX is widely supported as an effective strategy to improve
vaccination rates. Many states have shown gradual and
consistent improvement in their coverage levels in the
public sector, and studies of private pediatricians have also
documented substantial improvements in median up-to-date
coverage at 24 months. Assessment and feedback of public
and private provider sites are recommended by the National
Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) in the Standards of
Pediatric Immunization Practices as well as by the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) in a state-
ment endorsing the AFIX process and recommending its use
by all public and private providers. Healthy People 2010 also
Comprehensive Clinic
Assessment Software
Application (CoCASA)
VFC and AFIX results
Immediate assessment results
Estimate of coverage levels
' Reasons for deficiencies
Reports on patient subsets
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Strategies for High
Immunization Levels
* Recordkeeping
* Recommendations and
reinforcement
* Reminder and recall to patients
* Reminder and recall to providers
* Reduction of missed opportunities
* Reduction of barriers to
immunization
Records
* Must be available at the time
of the visit
* Must be easy to read
* Must be accurate
—reflect current patient
population
—reflect all vaccines given
supports the AFIX concept with a recommendation for
increasing the proportion of immunization providers who
have measured vaccination levels among children in their
practice within the past 2 years.
One of the recently revised Standards for Adult Immunization
Practices issued by NVAC calls upon providers of adult
immunization to do annual assessments of coverage levels.
Although the use of AFIX among providers who serve adults
is still in its infancy and is not as widespread as among
childhood immunization providers, this strategy can be a
powerful tool to improve rates in the adult population.
Other Essential Strategies
Although a substantial portion of this chapter is devoted to
AFIX, certain other strategies for improvement of immu-
nization levels deserve emphasis. These are complementary
to AFIX; their adoption will support the goals of AFIX, i.e.,
raising immunization coverage levels, and will facilitate the
AFIX process and ensure a favorable outcome of an assessment.
Recordkeeping
Patient records are of vital importance in a medical practice,
and maintaining these records, whether paper or electronic,
is critical to providing optimal healthcare. Immunization
records, specifically, should meet all applicable legal
requirements as well as requirements of any specific
program, such as VFC, in which the provider participates.
These records should be available for inspection by an
AFIX or VFC representative and should be easy to
interpret by anyone examining the record.
Immunization records must be accurate. The active medical
records must reflect which patients are actually in the practice;
charts of persons who have moved or are obtaining services
elsewhere should be clearly marked accordingly or removed.
Records should be kept up-to-date as new immunizations are
administered, and all information regarding the vaccine and
its administration should be complete.
Because patients often receive vaccines at more than one
provider office, communication between sites is necessary
for maintaining complete and accurate immunization
records. School-based, public health, and community-based
immunization sites should communicate with primary care
personnel through quick and reliable methods such as,
telephone, fax, or e-mail. This will become increasingly
important as new vaccines for adolescents are added to the
immunization schedule and more alternative sites are
available for receiving immunizations.
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Immunization Registries
Many recordkeeping tasks, as well as patient reminder/recall
activities, can be greatly simplified by participation in a
population-based immunization registry, also known as an
immunization information system. An immunization registry
is a computerized information system that contains information
about the immunization status of each child in a given
geographic area (e.g., a state). In some areas, an immunization
registry is linked to a child’s complete medical record. A
registry provides a single data source for all community
immunization providers, enabling access to records of children
receiving vaccinations at multiple providers. It provides a
reliable immunization history for every enrolled child and
can also produce accurate immunization records, if needed
for school or summer camp entry.
Registries can also generate reminder/recall notices
(discussed below), relieving provider staff of an additional
burden, and can automatically produce reports of immuniza-
tion coverage in an individual providers’ practice, or by the
child’s age or geographic area. A goal of Healthy People 2010
is to increase to 95% the proportion of children younger
than 6 years of age who participate in fully operational,
population-based immunization registries. In 2002,
approximately 43% of children in this age-group met this
participation goal, and NIP and its partners at the federal,
state and local levels are continuing their efforts to improve
the registries themselves and to increase participation by
immunization providers. Registries are a key to increasing
and maintaining immunization levels and provide benefits
for providers, patients, and state and federal immunization
program personnel. More information about immunization
registries is available on NIP’s website at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/registry/gen.htm.
Recommendations to Parents and
Reinforcement of the Need to Return
The recommendation of a healthcare provider is a powerful
motivator for patients to comply with vaccination recom-
mendations. Parents of pediatric patients are likely to follow
vaccine recommendation of the child’s doctor, and even
adults who were initially reluctant were likely to receive an
influenza vaccination when the healthcare provider’s opinion
of the vaccine was positive.
Regardless of their child’s true immunization status, many
parents believe the child is fully vaccinated. Parents may
not have been told or may not have understood that return
visits are necessary. It is useful for patients to have the next
appointment date in hand at the time they leave the
provider’s office. An additional reminder strategy is to link
the timing of the return visit to some calendar event, e.g..
Immunization Registries
* Single data source for all
providers
* Reliable immunization history
* Produce records for patient use
* Key to increasing immunization
levels
Recommendations and
Reinforcement
• Recommend the vaccine
—powerful motivator
—patients likely to follow
recommendation of the provider
• Reinforce the need to return
—verbal
—written
—link to calendar event
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the child’s birthday or an upcoming holiday. Even with
written schedules or reminders, a verbal encouragement
and reminder can be an incentive for a patient’s completing
the immunization series and can ultimately result in higher
coverage levels.
Reminders and Recall to Patients
• Reminder—notification that
immunizations are due soon
• Recall—notification that
immunizations are past due
* Content of message and
technique of delivery vary
* Reminders and recall have been
found to be effective
Reminder and Recall Messages to Patients
Patient reminders and recall messages are messages to
patients or their parents stating that recommended
immunizations are due soon (reminders) or past due
(recall messages). The messages vary in their level of
personalization and specificity, the mode of communication,
(e.g., postcard, letter, telephone), and the degree of
automation. Both reminders and recall messages have been
found to be effective in increasing attendance at clinics and
improving vaccination rates in various settings.
Cost is sometimes thought to be a barrier to the
implementation of a reminder/recall system. However, a
range of options is available, from computer-generated
telephone calls and letters to a card file box with weekly
dividers, and these can be adapted to the needs of the
provider. The specific type of system is not directly related
to its effectiveness, and the benefits of having any system
can extend beyond immunizations to other preventive services
and increase the use of other recommended screenings.
Both the Standards for Child and Adolescent Immunization
Practices and the Standards for Adult Immunization
Practices call upon providers to develop and implement
aggressive tracking systems that will both remind parents of
upcoming immunizations and recall children who are overdue.
ACIP supports the use of reminder/recall systems by all
providers. The National Immunization Program provides
state and local health departments with ongoing technical
support to assist them in implementing reminder and recall
systems in public and private provider sites.
Reminders and Recall to Providers
* Communication to healthcare
providers that an individual
client’s immunizations are due
soon or past due
* Examples
—computer-generated list
—stamped note in the chart
—“Immunization Due” clip on chart
Reminder and Recall Messages to Providers
Providers can create reminder and recall systems for
themselves as aids for remembering for which patients
routine immunizations are due soon or past due. Provider
reminder/recall is different from “feedback,” in which the
provider receives a message about overall immunization
levels for a group of clients. Examples of reminder/recall
messages are
• A computer-generated list that notifies a provider of the
children to be seen that clinic session whose vaccinations
are past due.
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A stamp with a message such as “No Pneumococcal
Vaccine on Record,” that a receptionist or nurse can put
on a the chart of a person over age 65.
An “Immunization Due” clip that a nurse attaches to the
chart of an adolescent who has not had hepatitis B vaccine.
Reminder systems will vary according to the needs of the
provider; in addition to raising immunization rates in the
practice, they will serve to heighten the awareness of staff
members of the continual need to check the immunization
status of their patients.
Reduction of Missed Opportunities to Vaccinate
A missed opportunity is a healthcare encounter in which
a person is eligible to receive a vaccination but is not
vaccinated completely. Missed opportunities occur in all
settings in which immunizations are offered, whether
routinely or not.
Missed opportunities occur for several reasons. At the
provider level, many nurses and physicians avoid simultaneous
administration of four or even three injectable vaccines.
Frequently stated reasons have included concern about
reduced immune response or adverse events, and parental
objection. These concerns are not supported by scientific
data. Providers also may be unaware that a child is in need
of vaccination (especially if the immunization record is not
available at the visit) or may follow invalid contraindications
(see Chapter 2 for more information).
Some of the reasons for missed opportunities relate to larger
systems; e.g., a clinic that has a policy of not vaccinating at
any visits except well-child care, or not vaccinating siblings.
Other reasons relate to large institutional or bureaucratic
regulations, such as state insurance laws that deny
reimbursement if a vaccine is given during an acute-care
visit. The degree of difficulty in eliminating the missed
opportunity may vary directly with the size of the system
that has to be changed.
Several studies have shown that eliminating missed
opportunities could increase vaccination coverage by up to
20 percent. Strategies designed to prevent missed opportunities
have taken many different forms, used alone or in combination.
Examples include the following:
• Standing orders. These are protocols whereby nonphysician
immunization personnel may vaccinate clients without
direct physician involvement at the time of the immunization.
Standing orders are implemented in settings such as clinics,
hospitals, and nursing homes. When used alone or in
combination with other interventions, standing orders
have had positive effects on immunization rates among
adults.
Missed Opportunity
A healthcare encounter in which
a person is eligible to receive
vaccination but is not vaccinated
completely
Reasons for Missed
Opportunities
* Lack of simultaneous
administration
* Unaware child needs additional
vaccines
* Invalid contraindications
* Inappropriate clinic policies
Reimbursement deficiencies
Strategies for Reducing
Missed Opportunities
Standing orders
* Provider education with
feedback
• Provider reminder and recall
systems
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Reduction to Barriers
to Immunization
• Physical barriers
—waiting time
—distance
* Psychological barriers
—unpleasant experience
—safety concerns
• Provider education. Anyone responsible for administering
immunizations should be knowledgeable about principles
of vaccination and vaccination scheduling, to the extent
required for their position. Providers are largely responsible
for educating their patients, so an investment in provider
education will result in a higher level of understanding
about immunizations among the public in general.
Numerous educational materials, in a variety of formats,
are available from CDC, the Immunization Action
Coalition, and some state health departments, hospitals,
or professional organizations. Incorporating some AFIX
principles (i.e., assessment, feedback) into a provider
education program might have a greater effect on provider
behavior than an education effort aimed only at increasing
knowledge.
• Provider reminder and recall systems. Provider reminder
and recall systems are discussed above. These reminder
systems, while effective in increasing immunization levels,
can also help avoid missed opportunities if they are a
component of other practices directed toward this goal.
For example, if a reminder system is used consistently and
staff members are knowledgeable about vaccination
opportunities and valid contraindications, the system can
be an additional aid in promoting appropriate immunization
practices.
Reduction of Barriers to Immunization
Within the Practice
Despite efforts by providers to adhere to appropriate immu'
nization practices, obstacles to patients’ being vaccinated
may exist within the practice setting, sometimes unknown
to the provider. Barriers to immunization maybe physical
or psychological. Physical barriers might be such things as
inconvenient clinic hours for working patients or parents,
long waits at the clinic, or the distance patients must travel.
Providers should be encouraged to determine the needs of
their specific patient population and take steps, such as
extending clinic hours or providing some immunization
clinics, to address obstacles to immunization.
Cost is also a barrier to immunization for many patients.
In addition to evaluating their fee schedule for possible
adjustments, providers should be knowledgeable about such
programs as Vaccines for Children and the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program and the provisions specific to
their state. Enrollment as a VFC provider is recommended
for those with eligible children in their practice.
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Psychological barriers to health care are often more subtle
but may be just as important. Unpleasant experiences (e.g.,
fear of immunizations, being criticized for previously missed
Immunization Strategies for Healthcare Practices and Providers
appointments, or difficulty leaving work for a clinic
appointment) may lead clients to postpone receiving needed
vaccinations. Concerns about vaccine safety are also
preventing some parents from having their children
immunized. Overcoming such barriers calls for both knowh
edge and interpersonal skills on the part of the provider
—
knowledge of vaccines and updated recommendations and
of reliable sources to direct patients to find accurate
information, and skills to deal with fears and misconceptions
and to provide a supportive and encouraging environment
for patients.
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Vaccine Safety
Vaccine safety is a prime concern for manufacturers,
immunization providers, and recipients of vaccines. This
chapter describes how vaccines licensed for use in the
United States are monitored for safety, and presents general
information about the provider’s role in immunization safety.
Further information about contraindications and precau-
tions for individual vaccines, such as pregnancy and
immunosuppression, and about potential adverse events
associated with the vaccine is contained in Chapter 2,
General Recommendations on Immunization, and in the
chapters on specific vaccines.
The Importance of Vaccine Safety
Programs
Vaccination is among the most significant public health
success stories of all time. However, like any pharmaceutical
product, no vaccine is completely safe or completely effective.
While almost all known vaccine adverse events are minor
and self-limited, some vaccines have been associated with
very rare but serious health effects. The following key
considerations underscore the need for an active and
ongoing vaccine safety program.
Decreases in Disease Risks
Today, vaccine-preventable diseases are at or near record
lows. By virtue of their absence, these diseases are no longer
reminders of the benefits of vaccination. At the same time,
approximately 15,000 cases of adverse events following
vaccination are reported in the United States each year
(these include both true adverse reactions and events that
occur coincidentally after vaccination). This number exceeds
the current reported incidence of vaccine-preventable
childhood diseases. As a result, parents and providers in the
United States are more likely to know someone who has
experienced an adverse event following immunization than
they are to know someone who has experienced a reportable
vaccine-preventable disease. Thus, the success of vaccination
has led to increased public attention on health risks
associated with vaccines.
Importance of Vaccine Safety
* Decreases in disease risks and
increased attention on vaccine risks
* Public confidence in vaccine safety is
critical
- higher standard of safety is expected of
vaccines
- vaccinees generally healthy
(vs. ill for drugs)
- lower risk tolerance = need to search for
rare reactions
-vaccination universally recommended and
mandated
Importance of Vaccine Safety
* Ongoing safety monitoring needed
for the development of sound
policies and recommendations
V
Public Confidence
Maintaining public confidence in immunizations is critical
for preventing a decline in vaccination rates that can result
in outbreaks of disease. While the majority of parents
believe in the benefits of immunization and have their
children vaccinated, some have concerns about the safety
of vaccines. Public concerns about the safety of whole-cell
pertussis vaccine in the 1980s resulted in decreased vaccine
coverage levels and the return of epidemic disease in Japan,
1
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Sweden, United Kingdom, and several other countries. In
the United States, similar concerns led to increases both in
the number of lawsuits against manufacturers and the price
of vaccines, and to a decrease in the number of manufacturers
willing to produce vaccines. Close monitoring and timely
assessment of suspected vaccine adverse events can distinguish
true vaccine reactions from coincidental unrelated events
and help to maintain public confidence in immunizations.
A higher standard of safety is generally expected of vaccines
than of other medical interventions because in contrast to
most pharmaceutical products, which are administered to ill
persons for curative purposes, vaccines are generally given to
healthy persons to prevent disease. Public tolerance of
adverse reactions related to products given to healthy persons,
especially healthy infants and children, is substantially lower
than for reactions to products administered to persons who
are already sick. This lower risk tolerance for vaccines
translates into a need to investigate the possible causes of
very rare adverse events following vaccinations.
Adding to public concern about vaccines is the fact that
immunization is mandated by many state and local school
entry requirements. Because of this widespread use, safety
problems with vaccines can have a potential impact on large
numbers of persons. The importance of ensuring the safety
of a relatively universal human-directed “exposure” like
immunizations is the basis for strict regulatory control of
vaccines in the United States hy the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
Sound Immunization Recommendations
and Policy
Public health recommendations for vaccine programs and
practices represent a dynamic balancing of risks and benefits.
Vaccine safety monitoring is necessary to accurately weigh
this balance and adjust vaccination policy. This was done in
the United States with smallpox and oral polio vaccines as
these diseases neared global eradication. Complications
associated with each vaccine exceeded the risks of the
diseases, leading to discontinuation of routine smallpox
vaccinations in the United States (prior to actual global
eradication) and a shift to a safer inactivated polio vaccine.
Sound immunization policies and recommendations affecting
the health of the nation depend upon the ongoing monitoring
of vaccines and continuous assessment of immunization
benefits and risks.
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Methods of Monitoring Vaccine Safety
Prelicensure
Vaccines, like other pharmaceutical products, undergo
extensive safety and efficacy evaluations in the laboratory,
in animals, and in sequentially phased human clinical trials
prior to licensure. Phase I human clinical trials usually
involve anywhere from 20 to 100 volunteers and focus on
detecting serious side effects. Phase II trials generally enroll
hundreds of volunteers. These trials might take a few
months, or last up to 3 years. Phase 11 trials determine the
best dose for effectiveness and safety and the right number
of doses. Next, the vaccine moves into phase III trials,
which may last several years. A few hundred to several
thousand volunteers may be involved. Some volunteers
receive another already-licensed vaccine, allowing
researchers to compare one vaccine with another for adverse
health effects—anything from a sore arm to a serious reaction.
If the vaccine is shown to be safe and effective in Phase III,
the manufacturer applies for a license from the FDA. The
FDA licenses the vaccine itself (the “product license”) and
licenses the manufacturing plant where the vaccine will be
made (the “establishment license”). During the application,
the FDA reviews everything: the clinical trial results, product
labeling, the plant itself, and the manufacturing protocols.
FDA licensure occurs only after the vaccine has met rigorous
standards of efficacy and safety, and when its potential
benefits in preventing disease clearly outweigh any risks.
However, while rates of common vaccine reactions, such as
injection-site reactions and fever, can be estimated before
licensure, the comparatively small number of patients
enrolled in these trials generally limits detection of rare side
effects or side effects that may occur many months after the
vaccine is given. Even the largest prelicensure trials (more
than 10,000 persons) are inadequate to assess the vaccine’s
potential to induce possible rare side effects. Therefore, it is
essential to monitor reports of vaccine-associated adverse
events once the vaccine has been licensed and released for
public use.
Fundamental to preventing safety problems is the assurance
that any vaccines for public use are made using Good
Manufacturing Practices and undergo lot testing for purity
and potency. Manufacturers must submit samples of each
vaccine lot and results of their own tests for potency and
purity to the FDA before releasing them for public use.
Prelicensure Vaccine
Safety Studies
• Laboratory
• Animals
• Humans
Preiicensure Human Studies
* Phases I, II, III trials
* Common reactions are identified
* Vaccines are tested in thousands
of persons before being licensed
and allowed on the market
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Postlicensure
Postlicensure Surveillance
* Identify rare reactions
• Monitor increases in known
reactions
* identify risk factors for reactions
* identify vaccine iots with unusual
rates or types of events
Identify signais
Because rare reactions, delayed reactions, or reactions within
suhpopulations may not be detected before vaccines are
licensed, postlicensure evaluation of vaccine safety is criti-
cal. The objectives of postlicensure surveillance are to
• identify' rare reactions not detected during prelicensure
studies,
• monitor increases in known reactions,
• identify risk factors or preexisting conditions that may
promote reactions,
• identify whether there are particular vaccine lots with
unusually high rates or certain types of events,
• identify signals of possible adverse reactions that may
warrant further study or affect current immunization
recommendations.
Postlicensure Vaccine
Safety Activities
• Phase IV Trials
—10,000 participants
-better but still limited
* Large-Linked Databases
* Clinical Immunization Safety
Assessment Network
Historically, postlicensure monitoring of vaccine safety has
relied on healthcare providers and the public to report side
effects, and on “ad hoc” research studies to investigate possi-
ble rare associations between vaccines and identified health
conditions of interest to scientists. Today, Phase IV trials
and large-linked databases (LLDBs) have been added to
improve the capability to study rare risks of specific
immunizations. Phase IV studies can be an FDA requirement
for licensure. These trials include tens of thousands of vol-
unteers and may address questions of long-term effectiveness
and safety or examine unanswered questions identified in
Phase 111 clinical trials. Most recently, a clinical immunization
safety assessment network has been established which will
increase understanding of vaccine reactions at the individual
patient level.
Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System (VAERS)
* National reporting system
* Jointly administered by CDC
and FDA
* Passive (depends on healthcare
providers and others to report)
• Receives -15,000 reports per
year
Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System (VAERS)
* Detects
- new or rare events
- increases in rates of known side effects
- patient risk factors
* Additional studies required to
confirm VAERS signais
* Not all reports of adverse events
are causally related to vaccine
The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
mandated that healthcare workers who administer vaccines,
and licensed vaccine manufactures, report certain adverse
health events following specific vaccinations. The Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) is a national
reporting system, jointly administered by CDC and FDA.
VAERS was created in 1990 to unify the collection of all
reports of clinically significant adverse events. VAERS is a
passive reporting system and accepts reports from health
professionals, vaccine manufacturers, and the general public.
Reports are submitted via mail and fax as well as the
Internet. All reports, whether submitted directly to VAERS
or via state or local public health authorities or manufacturers,
are coded and entered into the VAERS database. VAERS
receives about 15,000 reports per year (more than 200,000
total to date). Though this seems like a very large number,
it is relatively small compared with the approximately 100
million doses of childhood vaccines distributed during the
past decade, as well as the millions of additional doses given
to adults.
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VAERS seeks to capture all clinically significant medical
events occurring postvaccination, even if the reporter is not
certain that the incident is vaccine related. A review of
VAERS from 1991 through 2001 indicated that reports were
received from manufacturers (36.2%), healthcare providers
(20%), state and local health departments (27.6%), patients
or parents (4.2%), others (7.3%), and unknown sources (4.7%).
Data collected on the VAERS reporting form include
information about the patient, the vaccination(s) given, the
reported health effect (called an adverse event—which may
or may not be caused by vaccine), and the person reporting
the event. Serious adverse event reports are defined as those
involving hospitalization or prolongation of hospitalization,
death, or reported life-threatening illness or permanent
disability. All reports classified as serious are followed up to
obtain additional medical information in order to provide as
full a picture of the case as possible. For serious reports, letters
to obtain information about recovery status are mailed to
the reporters at 60 days and 1 year after vaccination. All
records submitted to VAERS directly or as part of follow-up
activities are protected by strict confidentiality requirements.
Despite some limitations, VAERS has been able to fulfill
its primary purpose of detecting new or rare vaccine adverse
events, increases in rates of known side effects, and patient
risk factors for particular types of adverse events. Examples
include tracking and raising the concern about intussuscep-
tion after rotavirus vaccine and anaphylactic reaction to
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine caused by gelatin
allergy. Additional studies are always required to confirm
“signals” detected by VAERS because not all reported
adverse events are causally related to vaccine.
(See “Reporting Suspected Side Effects to VAERS” for
detailed information on submitting reports.)
VAERS data with personal identifiers removed are available
on the website at http://vaers.hhs.gov, at no cost or through
the National Technical Information Service at
http://www.ntis.gov or by phone at 800-553-6847 for a fee.
Adverse Event Classifications and Assessment
of Causality
Adverse events following vaccination can be classified by
frequency (common, rare), extent (local, systemic), severity
(hospitalization, disability, death), causality, and pre-
ventability (intrinsic to vaccine, faulty production, faulty
administration). A recent classification divides vaccine
adverse events as follows:
• Vaccine-induced: Due to the intrinsic characteristic of
the vaccine preparation and the individual response of the
Adverse Event Classification
•Vaccine-induced
* Vaccine-potentiated
* Programmatic error
* Coincidental
47
Vaccine Safety
vaccinee. These events would not have occurred without
vaccination (e.g., vaccine-associated paralytic
poliomyelitis).
• Vaccine-potentiated: The event would have occurred
anyway, hut was precipitated hy the vaccination (e.g., first
febrile seizure in a predisposed child).
• Programmatic error: Due to technical errors in vaccine
storage, preparation, handling, or administration.
• Coincidental: The reported event was not caused by
vaccination but happened by chance occurrence or due
to underlying illness.
It is natural to suspect a vaccine when a health problem
occurs following vaccination, but in reality a causal
association may or may not exist. Mote information would
be needed to establish a causal relationship. An adverse
health event can be causally attributed to vaccine more
readily if 1) the health problem occurs during a plausible
time period following vaccination, 2) the adverse event
corresponds to those previously associated with a particular
vaccine, 3) the event conforms to a specific clinical
syndrome whose association with vaccination has strong
biologic plausibility (e.g., anaphylaxis) or occurs following
the natural disease, 4) a laboratory result confirms the
association (e.g., isolation of vaccine strain varicella vaccine
from skin lesions of a patient with rash), 5) the event recurs
on re-administration of the vaccine (“positive rechallenge”),
6) a controlled clinical trial or epidemiologic study shows
greater risk of a specific adverse event among vaccinated
versus unvaccinated (control) groups, or 7) a finding linking
an adverse event to vaccine has been confirmed by other
studies.
Large-Linked Databases
Historically, when a signal of a potential vaccine safety
concern was generated from passive surveillance, further
ad hoc studies were needed to test the hypothesis. Such stud-
ies, while potentially informative about vaccine causality,
were costly, time-consuming, and usually limited to assess-
ment of a single event. The need to improve postlicensure
monitoring of drug safety became widely recognized in the
1960s following the discovery that thalidomide, a licensed
drug commonly used during pregnancy, caused severe birth
defects. The inability of passive surveillance systems to
determine clear causal relationships, and the lack of timeliness
of ad hoc studies to evaluate vaccine adverse events high-
lighted the need for an active surveillance system using
large-linked databases (LLDBs). Pharmacoepidemiologists
duting the 1980s began to establish and utilize large databases
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linking computerized pharmacy prescription (and later,
immunization records) and computerized medical records.
These LLDBs are derived from defined populations such as
members of health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
single-provider healthcare systems, and Medicaid programs.
Because these databases are usually generated in the routine
administration of such programs and do not require comple-
tion of a vaccine adverse event reporting form, the problems
of underreporting or recall bias, which are sometimes seen
with passive surveillance systems like VAERS, are reduced.
Therefore, LLDBs can potentially provide an economical
and rapid means of conducting postlicensure studies of safety
of drugs and vaccines. CDC’s Vaccine Safety Datalink
(VSD) project is one example of such a system. It links the
immunization and medical records of members of eight
HMOs, comprising more than 5.5 million persons (approxi-
mately 2% of the U.S. population) annually, for various
vaccine safety studies. Further information about LLDBs is
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe.
Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment
Network
The most recent addition to the postlicensure vaccine safety
monitoring system is the Clinical Immunization Safety
Assessment (CISA) Network, which is designed to improve
scientific understanding of vaccine safety issues at the indi-
vidual patient level. The CISA network’s goal is to evaluate
persons who have experienced certain adverse health events
following vaccination. The results of these evaluations will
be used to gain a better understanding of how such events
might occur and to develop protocols or guidelines for
healthcare providers to help them manage similar situations.
In addition, the CISA centers will serve as regional infor-
mation sources to which clinical vaccine safety questions
can be referred. Prior to the creation of the CISA network,
no coordinated facilities in the United States investigated
and managed vaccine side effects on an individual level for
the purposes of providing patient care and systematically
collecting and evaluating the experiences.
Established in 2001, the CISA network consists of six
centers of excellence with vaccine safety expertise working
in partnership with CDC. These centers are Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore, Maryland; Boston University
Medical Center in Boston, Massachusetts; Columbia
Presbyterian Hospital in New York City; Vanderbilt
University in Nashville, Tennessee; Northern California
Kaiser in Cakland, and Stanford University in Palo Alto,
California. For more information about CISA, visit
http://www.vaccinesafety.net.
Vaccine Safety
Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD)
* Large-linked database
* Links vaccination and health
records
•
“Active surveillance”
-8 HMOs
2% of the U.S. population
Powerful tool for monitoring
vaccine safety
Clinical Immunization Safety
Assessment (CISA) Network
• Improve understanding of vaccine
safety issues at individual level
Evaluate persons who experience
adverse health events
* Gain better understanding of
events
* Develop protocols for healthcare
providers
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Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP)
* Established by National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
(1986)
*
“No fault” program
* Covers all routinely
recommended childhood
vaccines
Vaccine Injury Table
Vaccine Injury Compensation
The topic of vaccine safety was prominent during the
mid-1970s, with increases in lawsuits filed on behalf of those
presumably injured by the whole-cell pertussis component of
diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine. Legal decisions
were made and damages awarded despite the lack of scientific
evidence to support vaccine injury claims. As a result of the
liability, prices soared and several manufacturers halted
vaccine production. A vaccine shortage resulted, and public
health officials became concerned about the return of
epidemic disease. To reduce liability and respond to public
health concerns. Congress passed the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) in 1986.
As a result of the NCVIA, the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP) was established. This
program is intended to compensate individuals who
experience certain health events following vaccination on
a “no fault” basis. “No fault” means that persons filing
claims are not required to prove negligence on the part of
either the healthcare provider or manufacturer to receive
compensation. The program covers all routinely recom-
mended childhood vaccinations. Settlements are based on a
Vaccine Injury Table (Appendix F), which summarizes the
adverse events associated with vaccines. TTiis table was
developed by a panel of experts who reviewed the medical
literature and identified the serious adverse events that are
reasonably certain to be caused by vaccines. The Vaccine
Injury Table was created to justly compensate those possibly
injured by vaccines while separating out unrelated claims.
As more information becomes available from research on
vaccine side effects, the Vaccine Injury Table is amended.
The VICP has received more than 7,000 claims since its
effective date of October 1, 1988. VICP has achieved its
policy goals of providing compensation to those injured by
rare adverse events and liability protection for vaccine
manufacturers and administrators. Further information
about the VICP is available at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/
The Provider’s Role
* Immunization providers can help
to ensure the safety and efficacy
of vaccines through proper:
-vaccine storage and
administration
-timing and spacing of vaccine
doses
-observation of contraindications
and precautions
The Immunization Provider’s Role
Even though federal regulations require vaccines to undergo
years of testing before they can be licensed, and vaccines are
monitored continually for safety and efficacy, immunization
providers still play a key role in helping to ensure the safety
and efficacy of vaccines. They do this through proper
vaccine storage and administration, timing and spacing of
vaccine doses, observation of precautions and contraindica-
tions, management of vaccine side effects, reporting of
suspected side effects to VAERS, and educating patients and
parents about vaccine benefits and risks. Each of these steps
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is described only briefly here. Further information is available
elsewhere in this book or in resource materials from CDC or
other organizations.
Vaccine Storage and Administration
To achieve the best possible results from vaccines,
immunization providers should carefully follow the
recommendations found in each vaccine’s package insert
for storage, handling, and administration. Other steps to
help ensure vaccine safety include 1 ) inspecting vaccines
upon delivery and monitoring refrigerator and freezer
temperatures to ensure maintenance of the cold chain,
2) rotating vaccine stock so the oldest vaccines are used
first, 3) never administering a vaccine later than the expira-
tion date, 4) administering vaccines within the prescribed
time periods following reconstitution, 5) waiting to draw
vaccines into syringes until immediately prior to administra-
tion, 6) never mixing vaccines in the same syringe unless
they are specifically approved for mixing by the FDA, and
7 ) recording vaccine and administration information,
including lot numbers and injection sites, in the patient’s
record. If errors in vaccine storage and administration occur,
corrective action should be taken immediately to prevent
them from happening again and public health authorities
should be notified. More information on vaccine storage
and handling is available in Appendix C and in CDC’s
Vaccine Storage and Handling Toolkit, available at
http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/isd/shtoolkit/splash.html.
The Provider’s Role
* Immunization providers can help
to ensure the safety and efficacy
of vaccines through proper:
-management of vaccine side
effects
-reporting of suspected side
effects to VAERS
-vaccine benefit and risk
communication
Timing and Spacing
Timing and spacing of vaccine doses are two of the most
important issues in the appropriate use of vaccines.
To ensure optimal results from each immunization, providers
should follow the currently recommended immunization
schedules for children, adolescents, and adults. Decreasing
the timing intervals between doses of the same vaccine may
interfere with the vaccine’s antibody response. For more spe-
cific information on timing and spacing of vaccines see
Chapter 2, General Recommendations on Immunization.
A table showing recommended minimum ages and intervals
between vaccine doses is contained in Appendix A.
Providers should also remember the following:
• Administering all needed vaccines during the same visit is
important because it increases the likelihood that children
will be fully immunized as recommended. Studies have
shown that vaccines are as effective when administered
simultaneously as they are individually and carry no
greater risk for adverse reactions.
Vaccine Safety
I
I
There is no medical basis for giving combination
vaccines, such as MMR, separately. Administration of
separated combination vaccines results in more discomfort
and higher risk of disease from delayed protection.
Some vaccines, such as pediatric diphtheria and tetanus,
produce increased rates of side effects when given too
frequently. Good recordkeeping, maintaining careful
patient histories, and adherence to recommended schedules
can decrease the chances that patients receive extra doses
of vaccines.
Contraindication
A condition in a recipient that
increases the chance of a
serious adverse reaction
Precaution
A condition in a recipient that
might
• Increase the chance or severity
of an adverse reaction, or
* Compromise the ability of the
vaccine to produce immunity
Invalid Contraindications
to Vaccination
* Minor illness
* Mild/moderate local reaction or fever
following a prior dose
* Antimicrobial therapy
* Disease exposure or convalescence
* Pregnancy or immunosuppression in the
household
* Premature birth
* Breastfeeding
* Allergies to products not in vaccine
* Family history (unrelated to
immunosuppression)
Contraindications and Precautions
Contraindication.s and precautions to vaccination are
conditions that indicate when vaccines should not be given.
A contraindication is a condition in a recipient that increases
the chance of a serious adverse reaction. In general, a vaccine
should not be administered when a contraindication is present.
A precaution is a condition in a recipient that might
increase the chance or severity of an adverse reaction or
compromise the ability of the vaccine to produce immunity.
Normally, vaccination is deferred when a precaution is present.
Situations may arise when the benefits of vaccination
outweigh the risk of a side effect, and the provider may
decide to vaccinate the patient. Most contraindications and
precautions are temporary and the vaccine may be given at
a later time. More information about contraindications can
be found in the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) statements for individual vaccines.
Recommendations for immunizing persons who are
immunocompromised can be found in Appendix A.
Information on allergic reactions to vaccines can be found
in the American Academy of Pediatrics Red Book.
Screening for contraindications and precautions is key to
preventing serious adverse reactions to vaccines. Every
provider who administers vaccines should screen every
patient before giving a vaccine dose. Sample screening
questionnaires can be found in Chapter 2, General
Recommendations on Immunization. Many conditions are
often inappropriately regarded as contraindications to
vaccination. In most cases, the following are not considered
contraindications:
• Minor acute illness (e.g., diarrhea and minor upper
respiratory tract illnesses, including otitis media) with or
without low-grade fever
• Mild to moderate local reactions and/or low-grade or
moderate fever following a prior dose of the vaccine
• Current antimicrobial therapy
• Convalescent phase of illness
• Recent exposure to infectious disease
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• Premature birth
• Breastfeeding
• Allergies to products not in vaccine
• Family history (unrelated to immunosuppression)
Managing Vaccine Side Effects
Providers should use their best clinical judgment regarding
specific management of suspected vaccine side effects.
Allergic reactions to vaccines are estimated to occur after
vaccination of children and adolescents at a rate of one for
every 1.5 million doses of vaccine. All providers who
administer vaccines should have procedures in place and be
prepared for emergency care of a person who experiences an
anaphylactic reaction. Epinephrine and equipment for
maintaining an airway should be available for immediate
use. All vaccine providers should be familiar with the office
emergency plan and should be certified in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.
Reporting Suspected Side Effects to VAERS
Healthcare providers are required by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 to report certain
events to VAERS and are encouraged to report any adverse
event even if they are not sure a vaccine was the cause.
A table listing reportable events is available at
http://vaers.hhs.gov/reportable.htm. and is contained in
Appendix F. Reporting can be done in one of three ways:
• Online through a secure website:
https://secure.vaers.org/VaersDataEntryIntro.htm
• Fax a completed VAERS form* to 877-72 1-0366
• Mail a completed VAERS form* to
VAERS
RO. Box 1100
Rockville, MD 20849-1100
*A one-page VAERS form can be downloaded from
www.vaers.hhs.gov/pdf/vaers_form.pdf or can be requested
by telephone at 800-822-7967 or by fax at 877-721-0366.
The form is also printed in Appendix E
When providers report suspected vaccine reactions to
VAERS, they provide valuable information that is needed
for the ongoing evaluation of vaccine safety. CDC and EDA
use VAERS information to ensure the safest strategies of
vaccine use and to further reduce the rare risks associated
with vaccines.
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Benefit and Risk
Communication
* Opportunities for questions should
be provided before each vaccination
* Vaccine Infomnation Statements (VISs)
- must be provided before each dose
of vaccine
- public and private providers
-available in multiple languages
Benefit and Risk Communication
Parents, guardians, legal representatives, and adolescent and
adult patients should be informed of the benefits and risks
of vaccines in understandable language. Opportunity for
questions should be provided before each vaccination.
Discussion of the benefits and risks of vaccination is sound
medical practice and is required by law.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act requires that
vaccine information materials be developed for each vaccine
covered by the Act. These materials, known as “Vaccine
Information Statements (VIS),” must he provided by all
public and private vaccination providers before each dose of
vaccine. Copies of VISs are available from state health
authorities responsible for immunization, or they can be
obtained from CDC’s National Immunization Program
website at http://www.cdc.gov/nip or from the Immunization
Action Coalition at http://www.immunize.org. Translations
of VISs into languages other than English are available from
certain state immunization programs and from the
Immunization Action Coalition website. Further information
about VISs and their use is contained in Appendix E.
Healthcare providers should anticipate questions that parents
or patients may have regarding the need for or safety of
vaccination. A few may refuse certain vaccines, or even
reject all vaccinations. Some persons might have religious
or personal objections to vaccinations. Having a basic
understanding of how patients view vaccine risk and devel-
oping effective approaches to dealing with vaccine safety
concerns when they arise are imperative for vaccination
providers. Healthcare professionals can accomplish this by
assessing patients’ specific concerns and information needs,
providing them with accurate information, and referring
them to credible sources for more information. The National
Immunization Program’s website contains extensive and
up-to-date information on vaccine safety issues
(http://www.cdc.gov/nip/menus/vacc_safety.htm).
When a parent or patient initiates discussion regarding a
vaccine concern, the healthcare professional should discuss
the specific concern and provide factual information, using
language that is appropriate. Effective, empathetic vaccine
risk communication is essential in responding to misinfor-
mation and concerns. The Vaccine Information Statements
provide an outline for discussing vaccine benefits and risk.
Fact sheets, titled, “Vaccines a Safe Choice” and “Helping
Parents Who Question Vaccines” (available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip) may also be helpful.
Rather than excluding from their practice those patients
who question or refuse vaccination, the more effective
public health strategy for providers is to identify common
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ground and discuss measures to be followed if the patient’s
decision is to defer vaccination. Healthcare providers can
reinforce key points regarding each vaccine, including
safety, and emphasize risks encountered by unimmunized
children. Parents should be informed about state laws
pertaining to school or child care entry, which might require
that unimmunized children stay home from school during
outbreaks. Documentation of these discussions in the
patient’s record, including the refusal to receive certain
vaccines (i.e., informed refusal), might reduce any potential
liability if a vaccine-preventable disease occurs in the
unimmunized patient.
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Diphtheria
Diphtheria is an acute, toxin-mediated disease caused by the
bacterium Corynebacterium diphtheriae. The name of the
disease is derived from the Greek diphthera, meaning leather
hide. The disease was described in the 5th century BCE by
Hippocrates, and epidemics were described in the 6th century
AD by Aetius. The bacterium was first observed in
diphtheritic membranes by Klebs in 1883 and cultivated by
Loffler in 1884. Antitoxin was invented in the late 19th
century, and toxoid was developed in the 1920s.
Corynebacterium biphtheriae
C. diphtheriae is an aerobic gram-positive bacillus. Toxin
production (toxigenicity) occurs only when the bacillus is
itself infected (lysogenized) by a specific virus (bacteriophage)
carrying the genetic information for the toxin (tox gene).
Only toxigenic strains can cause severe disease.
Culture of the organism requires selective media containing
tellurite. If isolated, the organism must be distinguished in
the laboratory from other Corynebacterium species that nor-
mally inhabit the nasopharynx and skin (e.g., diphtheroids).
C. diphtheriae has three biotypes
—
gravis, intermedins, and
mitis. The most severe disease is associated with the gravis
biotype, but any strain may produce toxin. All isolates of
C. diphtheriae should be tested by the laboratory for toxigenicity.
Pathogenesis
Susceptible persons may acquire toxigenic diphtheria bacilli
in the nasopharynx. The organism produces a toxin that
inhibits cellular protein synthesis and is responsible for local
tissue destruction and membrane formation. The toxin pro-
duced at the site of the membrane is absorbed into the
bloodstream and then distributed to the tissues of the body.
The toxin is responsible for the major complications of
myocarditis and neuritis and can also cause low platelet
counts (thrombocytopenia) and protein in the urine (proteinuria).
Clinical disease associated with non-toxin-producing strains
is generally milder. While rare severe cases have been reported,
these may actually have been caused by toxigenic strains
that were not detected because of inadequate culture sampling.
Clinical Features
The incubation period of diphtheria is 2-5 days
(range, 1-10 days).
Disease can involve almost any mucous membrane. For clinical
purposes, it is convenient to classify diphtheria into a
number of manifestations, depending on the site of disease.
Diphtheria
Diphtheria
• Greek diphthera (leather hide)
* Recognized by Hippocrates in
5th century BCE
* Epidemics described in
6th century
• C. diphtheriae described by Klebs
in 1883
• Toxoid developed in 1920s
Corynebacterium diphtheriae
* Aerobic gram-positive bacillus
* Toxin production occurs only
when C. diphtheriae infected by
virus (phage) carrying tox gene
* If isolated, must be distinguished
from normal diphtheroid
Diphtheria Clinical Features
* Incubation period 2-5 days
(range, 1-10 days)
* May involve any mucous membrane
* Classified based on site of infection
—anterior nasal
—pharyngeal and tonsillar
—laryngeal
—cutaneous
—ocular
—genital
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Anterior Nasal Diphtheria
The onset of anterior nasal diphtheria is indistinguishable
from that of the common cold and is usually characterized
hy a mucopurulent nasal discharge (containing both mucus
and pus) which may become blood-tinged. A white membrane
usually forms on the nasal septum. The disease is usually
fairly mild because of apparent poor systemic absorption of
toxin in this location, and it can be terminated rapidly by
antitoxin and antibiotic therapy.
Pharyngeal and Tonsillar Diphtheria
* Insidious onset of exudative
pharyngitis
* Exudate spreads within 2-3 days
and may form adherent
membrane
Membrane may cause
respiratory obstruction
Fever usually not high but
patient appears toxic
Pharyngeal and Tonsillar Diphtheria
The most common sites ot diphtheria infection are the
pharynx and the tonsils. Infection at these sites is usually
associated with substantial systemic absorption of toxin.
The onset of pharyngitis is insidious. Early symptoms
include malaise, sore throat, anorexia, and low-grade fever.
Within 2-3 days, a bluish-white membrane forms and
extends, varying in size from covering a small patch on the
tonsils to covering most of the soft palate. Often by the time
a physician is contacted, the membrane is greyish-green, or
black if bleeding has occurred. There is a minimal amount
of mucosal erythema surrounding the membrane. The
membrane is adherent to the tissue, and forcible attempts to
remove it cause bleeding. Extensive membrane formation
may result in respiratory obstruction.
The patient may recover at this point; or if enough toxin is
absorbed, develop severe prostration, striking pallor, rapid
pulse, stupor, and coma, and may even die within 6 to 10
days. Fever is usually not high, even though the patient may
appear quite toxic. Patients with severe disease may develop
marked edema of the submandibular areas and the anterior
neck along with lymphadenopathy, giving a characteristic
“bullneck” appearance.
Laryngeal Diphtheria
Laryngeal diphtheria can be either an extension of the
pharyngeal form or can only involve this site. Symptoms
include fever, hoarseness, and a barking cough. The membrane
can lead to airway obstruction, coma, and death.
Cutaneous [Skin] Diphtheria
In the United States, cutaneous diphtheria has been most
often associated with homeless persons. Skin infections are
quite common in the tropics and are probably responsible
for the high levels of natural immunity found in these popu-
lations. Skin infections may be manifested by a scaling rash
or by ulcers with clearly demarcated edges and membrane,
but any chronic skin lesion may harbor C. diphtheriae along
with other organisms. Generally, the organisms isolated from
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recent cases in the United States were nontoxigenic. The
severity of the skin disease with toxigenic strains appears to
be less than in other forms of infection with toxigenic
strains. Skin diseases associated with nontoxigenic strains
are no longer reported to the National Notifiable Diseases
Surveillance System in the United States.
Other sites of involvement include the mucous membranes
of the conjunctiva and vulvovaginal area, as well as the
external auditory canal.
Complications
Most complications of diphtheria, including death, are
attributable to effects of the toxin. The severity of the disease
and complications are generally related to the extent of
local disease. The toxin, when absorbed, affects organs and
tissues distant from the site of invasion. The most frequent
complications of diphtheria are myocarditis and neuritis:
Myocarditis may present as abnormal cardiac rhythms
and can occur early in the course of the illness or weeks
later, and can lead to heart failure. If myocarditis occurs
early, it is often fatal.
Neuritis most often affects motor nerves and usually
resolves completely. Paralysis of the soft palate is most
frequent during the third week of illness. Paralysis of eye
muscles, limbs, and diaphragm can occur after the fifth
week. Secondary pneumonia and respiratory failure may
result from diaphragmatic paralysis.
Other complications include otitis media and respiratory
insufficiency due to airway obstruction, especially in
infants.
Death
The overall case-fatality rate for diphtheria is 5%-10%,
with higher death rates (up to 20%) among persons younger
than 5 and older than 40 years of age. The case-fatality rate
for diphtheria has changed very little during the last 50 years.
Diphtheria Complications
* Most attributable to toxin
* Severity generally related to
extent of local disease
* Most common complications
are myocarditis and neuritis
* Death occurs in 5%-10% for
respiratory disease
Laboratory Diagnosis
Diagnosis of diphtheria is usually made on the basis of
clinical presentation since it is imperative to begin
presumptive therapy quickly.
Culture of the lesion is done to confirm the diagnosis. It is
critical to take a swab of the pharyngeal area, especially any
discolored areas, ulcerations, and tonsillar crypts. Culture
medium containing tellurite is preferred because it provides
a selective advantage for the growth of this organism.
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A blood agar plate is also inoculated for detection of
hemolytic streptococcus. If diphtheria bacilli are isolated,
they must be tested for toxin production.
Gram stain and Kenyon stain of material from the
membrane itself can be helpful when trying to confirm the
clinical diagnosis. The Gram stain may show multiple
club-shaped forms that look like Chinese characters. Other
Corynebacterium species (diphtheroids) that can normally
inhabit the throat may confuse the interpretation of direct
stain. However, treatment should be started if clinical
diphtheria is suggested, even in the absence of a diagnostic
Gram stain.
In the event that prior antibiotic therapy may have impeded
a positive culture in a suspect diphtheria case, two sources of
evidence can aid in presumptive diagnosis: 1 ) isolation of
C. diphtheriae from cultures of specimens from close contacts,
or 2) a low nonprotective diphtheria antibody titer
(less than 0.1 lU) in serum obtained prior to antitoxin
administration. This is done by commercial laboratories and
requires several days. To isolate C. diphtheriae from carriers, it
is best to inoculate a Loffler or Pai slant with the throat
swab. After an incubation period of 1 8-24 hours, growth from
the slant is used to inoculate a medium containing tellurite.
Diphtheria Antitoxin
• Produced in horses
• First used in the U.S. in 1891
• Used only for treatment of
diphtheria
• Neutralizes only unbound toxin
Medical Management
Diphtheria Antitoxin
Diphtheria antitoxin, produced in horses, was first used in
the United States in 1891. It is no longer indicated for
prophylaxis of contacts of diphtheria patients, only for the
treatment of diphtheria. Since 1997, diphtheria antitoxin
has been available only from GDC, and only through an
Investigational New Drug (IND) protocol.
Antitoxin will not neutralize toxin that is already fixed to
tissues, but it will neutralize circulating (unbound) toxin
and will prevent progression of disease. The patient must be
tested for sensitivity before antitoxin is given. Consultation
on the use of diphtheria antitoxin is available through the
duty officer at the National Immunization Program during
office hours (8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. ET) at 404-639-8257, or
at all other times through CDC's Director’s Emergency
Operations Center at 770-488-7100.
Persons with suspected diphtheria should be given antibiotics
and antitoxin in adequate dosage and placed in isolation
after the provisional clinical diagnosis is made and appropriate
cultures are obtained. Respiratory support and airway
maintenance should also be administered as needed.
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Antibiotics
Treatment with erythromycin orally or by injection
(40 mg/kg/day; maximum, 2 gm/day) for 14 days, or procaine
penicillin G daily, intramuscularly (300,000 U/day for those
weighing 10 kg or less, and 600,000 U/day for those weighing
more than 10 kg) for 14 days. The disease is usually not
contagious 48 hours after antibiotics are instituted.
Elimination of the organism should be documented by two
consecutive negative cultures after therapy is completed.
Preventive Measures
For close contacts, especially household contacts, a
diphtheria booster, appropriate for age, should be given.
Contacts should also receive antibiotics—benzathine
penicillin G (600,000 units for persons younger than 6 years
old and 1,200,000 units for those 6 years old and older) or a
7' to lO'day course of oral erythromycin, (40 mg/kg/day for
children and 1 g/day for adults). For compliance reasons, if
surveillance of contacts cannot be maintained, they should
receive benzathine penicillin G. Identified carriers in the
community should also receive antibiotics. Maintain close
surveillance and begin antitoxin at the first signs of illness.
Contacts of cutaneous diphtheria should be treated as
described above; however, if the strain is shown to be non-
toxigenic, investigation of contacts can be discontinued.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Diphtheria occurs worldwide, but clinical cases are more
prevalent in temperate zones. In the United States during
the pretoxoid era, the highest incidence was in the
Southeast during the winter. More recently, highest incidence
rates have been in states with significant populations of
Native Americans. No geographic concentration of cases is
currently observed in the United States.
Reservoir
Human carriers are the reservoir for C. diphtheriae and are
usually asymptomatic. In outbreaks, high percentages of
children are found to be transient carriers.
Transmission
Transmission is most often person-to-person spread from the
respiratory tract. Rarely, transmission may occur from skin
lesions or articles soiled with discharges from lesions of
infected persons (fomites).
Diphtheria Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human carriers
Usually asymptomatic
* Transmission Respiratory
Skin and fomites rarely
• Temporal pattern Winter and spring
* Communicability Up to several weeks
without antibiotics
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Temporal Pattern
In temperate areas, diphtheria most frequently occurs during
winter and spring.
Communicability
Transmission may occur as long as virulent bacilli are pres-
ent in discharges and lesions. The time is variable, but
organisms usually persist 2 weeks or less, and seldom more
than 4 weeks, without antibiotics. Chronic carriers may
shed organisms for 6 months or more. Effective antibiotic
therapy promptly terminates shedding.
Diphtheria - United States,
1980-2004
Diphtheria - United States, 1980-2004
Age Distribution of Reported Cases
S-14 1S-24 25.39 40.64
Age group (yrs)
Secular Trends in the United States
Diphtheria was once a major cause of morbidity and mortality
among children. In England and Wales during the 1930s,
diphtheria was among the top three causes of death for
children younger than 15 years of age.
In the 1920s in the United States, 100,000-200,000 cases
of diphtheria (140-150 cases per 100,000 population) and
13,000-15,000 deaths were reported each year. In 1921, a
total of 206,000 cases and 15,520 deaths were reported. The
number of cases gradually declined to about 19,000 cases in
1945 (15 per 100,000 population). A more rapid decrease
began with the widespread use of toxoid in the late 1940s.
Erom 1970 to 1979, an average of 196 cases per year were
reported. This included a high proportion of cutaneous cases
from an outbreak in Washington State. Beginning in 1980,
all cases with nontoxigenic cutaneous isolates were excluded
from reporting. Diphtheria was seen most frequently in
Native Americans and persons in lower socioeconomic strata.
Erom 1980 through 2004, 57 cases of diphtheria were
reported in the United States, an average of 2-3 per year
(range, 0-5 cases per year). Only 5 cases have been reported
since 2000.
Of 53 reported cases with known patient age since 1980, 31
(58%) were in persons 20 years of age or older; 44% of cases
were among persons 40 years of age or older. Most cases
have occurred in unimmunized or inadequately immunized
persons. The current age distribution of cases corroborates
the finding of inadequate levels of circulating antitoxin in
many adults (up to 60% with less than protective levels).
Although diphtheria disease is rare in the United States, it
appears that Corynebacterium diphtheriae continues to
circulate in areas of the country with previously endemic
diphtheria. In 1996, 10 isolates of C. diphtheriae were
obtained from persons in an Native American community
in South Dakota. Eight of these isolates were toxigenic.
Diphtheria
None of the infected persons had classic diphtheria disease,
although five had either pharyngitis or tonsillitis. The
presence of toxigenic C. diphtheriae in this community is a
good reminder for providers not to let down their guard
against this organism.
Diphtheria continues to occur in other parts of the world.
A major epidemic of diphtheria occurred in countries of the
former Soviet Union beginning in 1990. By 1994, the epidemic
had affected all 15 Newly Independent States (NIS). More
than 157,000 cases and more than 5,000 deaths were reported.
In the 6 years from 1990 through 1995, the NIS accounted
for more than 90% of all diphtheria cases reported to the
World Health Organization from the entire world. In some
NIS countries, up to 80% of the epidemic diphtheria cases
have been among adults. The outbreak and the age distribution
of cases are believed to be due to several factors, including a
lack of routine immunization of adults in these countries.
Diphtheria Toxoid
Characteristics
Beginning in the early 1900s, prophylaxis was attempted
with toxin-antitoxin mixtures. Toxoid was developed
around 1921 but was not widely used until the early 1930s.
It was incorporated with tetanus toxoid and pertussis
vaccine and became routinely used in the 1940s.
Diphtheria toxoid is produced by growing toxigenic
C. diphtheriae in liquid medium. The filtrate is incubated with
formaldehyde to convert toxin to toxoid and is then
adsorbed onto an aluminum salt.
Single-antigen diphtheria toxoid is not available.
Diphtheria toxoid is available combined with tetanus toxoid
as pediatric DT or adult Td, and with both tetanus toxoid
and acellular pertussis vaccine as DTaP and Tdap.
Diphtheria toxoid is also available as a combined
DTaP'inactivated poliovirus (IPV)-hepatitis B combination
(Pediarix—see the pertussis chapter for more information).
Pediatric formulations (DT and DTaP) contain a similar
amount of tetanus toxoid as adult Td, but contain 3-4 times
as much diphtheria toxoid. Children younger than 7 years of
age should receive either DTaP or pediatric DT. Persons 7
years of age or older should receive the adult formulation
(adult Td), even if they have not completed a series of
DTaP or pediatric DT. Two brands of Tdap are available
—
Boostrix (approved for children 10-18 years of age) and
Adacel (approved for persons 11-64 years of age). DTaP and
Tdap vaccines do not contain thimerosal as a preservative.
DTaP, DT, and Td ^
Diphtheria Tetanus
DTaP, DT 7-8 Lf units 5-12.5 Lf units
Td, Tdap 2-2.5 Lf units 5 Lf units
(adult)
DTaP and pediatric DT used through age 6
years. Adult Td for persons 7 years and
older. Tdap for persons 10-18 years
(Boostrix) or 11-64 years (Adacel)
Diphtheria Toxoid
' Formalin-inactivated diphtheria toxin
' Schedule Three or four doses + booster
Booster every 10 years
' Efficacy Approximately 95%
' Duration Approximately 10 years
' Should be administered with tetanus
toxoid as DTaP, DT, Td, or Tdap
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Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
After a primary series of three properly spaced diphtheria
toxoid doses in adults or four doses in infants, a protective
level of antitoxin (defined as greater than 0.1 lU of
antitoxin/mL) is reached in more than 95%. Diphtheria
toxoid has been estimated to have a clinical efficacy of 97%.
Routine DTaP Primary
Vaccination Schedule
Dose Age Interval
Primary 1 2 months ...
Primary 2 4 months 4 wks
Primary 3 6 months 4 wks
Primary 4 15-18 months 6 mos
Children Who Receive DT
• The number of doses of DT
needed to complete the series
depends on the child’s age at
the first dose:
—if first dose given at <12 months
of age, 4 doses are recommended
—if first dose given at >1 2 months,
3 doses complete the primary
series
Routine DTaP Schedule
Children <7 years of age
Booster Doses
• 4-6 years of age, before entering
school
•11-12 years of age if 5 years
since last dose (Tdap)
• Every 10 years thereafter (Td)
Routine Td Schedule
Unvaccinated Persons i7 Years of Age
Dose* Interval
Primary 1
Primary 2 4 wks
Primary 3 6-12 mos
Booster dose every 10 years
*ACiP recommends that one of these doses
(preferably the first) be administered as Tdap
Uaccination Schedule and Use
DTaP (diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis
vaccine) is the vaccine of choice for children 6 weeks
through 6 years of age. The usual schedule is a primary series
of 4 doses at 2,4,6, and 15-18 months of age. The first,
second, and third doses of DTaP should be separated by a
minimum of 4 weeks. The fourth dose should follow the
third dose by no less than 6 months, and should not he
administered before 12 months of age.
If a child has a valid contraindication to pertussis vaccine,
pediatric DT should be used to complete the vaccination
series. If the child was younger than 12 months old when
the first dose of DT was administered (as DTP, DTaP, or
DT), the child should receive a total of four primary DT
doses. If the child was 1 2 months of age or older at the time
the first dose of DT was administered, three doses (third
dose 6-12 months after the second) completes the primary
DT series.
If the fourth dose of DT, DTP or DTaP is administered
before the fourth birthday, a booster (fifth) dose is recom-
mended at 4-6 years of age. The fifth dose is not required if
the fourth dose was given on or after the fourth birthday.
Because of waning antitoxin titers, most persons have antitoxin
levels below the optimal level 10 years after the last dose.
Tetanus toxoid should be given with diphtheria toxoid as
Td every 10 years. The first booster dose may be given at
1 1-12 years of age if at least 5 years have elapsed since the
last dose of DTP, DTaP, or DT. ACIP recommends this dose
be administered as Tdap. If a dose is given sooner as part of
wound management, the next booster is not needed for 10
years thereafter. More frequent boosters are not indicated
and have been reported to result in an increased incidence
and severity of local adverse reactions.
Td is the vaccine of choice for children 7 years and older
and for adults. A primary series is three or four doses,
depending on whether the person has received prior doses of
diphtheria-containing vaccine and the age these doses were
administered. The number of doses recommended for
children who received one or more doses of DTP, DTaP, or
DT before age 7 years is discussed above. For unvaccinated
persons 7 years and older (including persons who cannot
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document prior vaccination), the primary series is three
doses. The first two doses should be separated by at least 4
weeks, and the third dose given 6-12 months after the second.
ACIP recommends that one of these doses (preferably the
first) be administered as Tdap. A booster dose of Td should
be given every 10 years. Tdap is approved for a single dose
at this time (i.e., it should not be used for all the doses of
Td in a previously unvaccinated person 7 years or older).
Refer to the pertussis chapter for more information about Tdap.
Interruption of the recommended schedule or delay of
subsequent doses does not reduce the response to the vaccine
when the series is finally completed. There is no need to
restart a series regardless of the time elapsed between doses.
Diphtheria disease might not confer immunity. Persons
recovering from diphtheria should begin or complete active
immunization with diphtheria toxoid during convalescence.
Aduerse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Local reactions, generally erythema and induration with or
without tenderness, are common after the administration of
vaccines containing diphtheria toxoid. Local reactions are
usually self'limited and require no therapy. A nodule may be
palpable at the injection site for several weeks. Abscess at
the site of injection has been reported. Fever and other
systemic symptoms are not common.
Exaggerated local (Arthus-type) reactions are occasionally
reported following receipt of a diphtheria- or tetanus-containing
vaccine. These reactions present as extensive painful
swelling, often from shoulder to elbow. They generally begin
2-8 hours after injections and are reported most often in
adults, particularly those who have received frequent doses
of diphtheria or tetanus toxoid. Persons experiencing these
severe reactions usually have very high serum antitoxin levels;
they should not be given further routine or emergency
booster doses of Td more frequently than every 10 years.
Less severe local reactions may occur in persons who have
multiple prior boosters.
Rarely, severe systemic reactions such as generalized
urticaria, anaphylaxis, or neurologic complications have
been reported following administration of diphtheria toxoid.
Contraindications and Precautions
to Vaccination
Persons with a history of a severe allergic reaction following
a prior dose should not receive additional doses of diphtheria
toxoid. Diphtheria toxoid should be deferred for those
Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoids
Adverse Reactions
• Local reactions (erythema,
induration)
• Exaggerated local reactions
(Arthus-type)
• Fever and systemic symptoms
not common
Severe systemic reactions rare
Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoids
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to
vaccine component or following
a prior dose
• Moderate or severe acute illness
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persons who have moderate to severe acute illness, but
persons with minor illness may be vaccinated.
Immunosuppression and pregnancy are not contraindications
to receiving diphtheria toxoid. See pertussis chapter for
additional information on contraindications and precautions
to Tdap.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
DTaP, DT (pediatric), Td, DTP/Hib, Tdap, and tetanus
toxoid should be stored continuously at 35°-46°F (2°-8°C).
The vaccine may be out of refrigeration for as long as
4 days, but it should be refrigerated immediately when
received. Freezing reduces the potency of the tetanus
component. Vaccine exposed to freezing temperature
should never be administered.
Suspect Case Investigation
and Control
Immediate action on all highly suspect cases (including
cutaneous) is warranted until they are shown not to be
caused by toxigenic C. diphtheriae. The following action
should also be taken for any toxigenic C. diphtheriae carriers
who are detected.
1. Contact state health department or CDC.
2. Obtain appropriate cultures and preliminary clinical and
epidemiologic information (including vaccine history).
3. Begin early presumptive treatment with antibiotics and
antitoxin. Impose strict isolation until at least two
cultures are negative 24 hours after antibiotics were
discontinued.
4. Identify close contacts, especially household members
and other persons directly exposed to oral secretions of
the patient. Culture all close contacts, regardless of their
immunization status. Ideally, culture should be from both
throat and nasal swabs. After culture, all contacts should
receive antibiotic prophylaxis. Inadequately immunized
contacts should receive DTaP/DT/Td/Tdap boosters. If
fewer than three doses of diphtheria toxoid have been
given, or vaccination history is unknown, an immediate
dose of diphtheria toxoid should be given and the pri-
mary series completed according to the current schedule.
If more than 5 years have elapsed since administration of
diphtheria toxoid-containing vaccine, a booster dose
should be given. If the most recent dose was within 5
years, no booster is required (see the ACIP's 1991
Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis: Recommendations for
Vaccine Use and Other Preventive Measures for schedule for
Diphtheria
children younger than 7 years of age.) Unimmunized
contacts should start a course of DTaP/DT/Td vaccine
and be monitored closely for symptoms of diphtheria
for 7 days.
5. Treat any confirmed carrier with an adequate course of
antibiotic, and repeat cultures at a minimum of 2 weeks
to ensure eradication of the organism. Persons who
continue to harbor the organism after treatment with
either penicillin or erythromycin should receive an
additional lO-day course of erythromycin and should
submit samples for follow-up cultures.
6. Treat any contact with antitoxin at the first sign
of illness.
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ITetanus
I Tetanus is an acute, often fatal, disease caused hy an exotoxin
produced by the bacterium Clostridium tetani. It is character-
ized by generalized rigidity and convulsive spasms of skeletal
muscles. The muscle stiffness usually involves the jaw
I (lockjaw) and neck and then becomes generalized.
I
Although records from antiquity (5th century BCE) contain
i
clinical descriptions of tetanus, it was Carle and Rattone in
1884 who first produced tetanus in animals by injecting
them with pus from a fatal human tetanus case. During the
same year, Nicolaier produced tetanus in animals by injecting
them with samples of soil. In 1889, Kitasato isolated the
organism from a human victim, showed that it produced
disease when injected into animals, and reported that the
toxin could be neutralized by specific antibodies. In 1897,
Nocard demonstrated the protective effect of passively
transferred antitoxin, and passive immunization in humans
was used for treatment and prophylaxis during World War I.
Tetanus toxoid was developed by Descombey in 1924, It was
first widely used during World War II.
Tetanus
’ First described by Hippocrates
’ Etiology discovered in 1884 by
Carle and Rattone
' Passive immunization used for
treatment and prophylaxis
during World War I
’ Tetanus toxoid first widely used
during World War II
ClostriiNum tetani
C. tetani is a slender, gram-positive, anaerobic rod that may
develop a terminal spore, giving it a drumstick appearance.
The organism is sensitive to heat and cannot survive in the
presence of oxygen. The spores, in contrast, are very resistant
to heat and the usual antiseptics. They can survive
autoclaving at 249.8°F (121°C) for 10-15 minutes. The
spores are also relatively resistant to phenol and other
chemical agents.
The spores are widely distributed in soil and in the
intestines and feces of horses, sheep, cattle, dogs, cats, rats,
guinea pigs, and chickens. Manure-treated soil may
contain large numbers of spores. In agricultural areas, a
significant number of human adults may harbor the
organism. The spores can also be found on skin surfaces
and in contaminated heroin.
Clostridium tetani
* Anaerobic gram-positive, spore'
forming bacteria
* Spores found in soil, animal
feces; may persist for months to
years
* Multiple toxins produced with
growth of bacteria
' Tetanospasmin estimated
human lethal dose = 2.5 ng/kg
i
I
i
C. tetani produces two exotoxins, tetanolysin and
tetanospasmin. The function of tetanolysin is not known
with certainty. Tetanospasmin is a neurotoxin and causes
the clinical manifestations of tetanus. On the basis of
weight, tetanospasmin is one of the most potent toxins
known. The estimated minimum human lethal dose is
2.5 nanograms per kilogram of body weight (a nanogram
is one billionth of a gram), or 175 nanograms for a 70-kg
(1541b) human.
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Pathogenesis
Tetanus Pathogenesis
* Anaerobic conditions allow
germination of spores and
production of toxins
* Toxin binds in central nervous
system
* Interferes with neurotransmitter
release to block inhibitor impulses
Leads to unopposed muscle
contraction and spasm
C. tetani usually enters the body through a wound. In the
presence of anaerobic (low oxygen) conditions, the spores
germinate. Toxins are produced and disseminated via blood
and lymphatics. Toxins act at several sites within the central
nervous system, including peripheral motor end plates,
spinal cord, and brain, and in the sympathetic nervous
system. The typical clinical manifestations of tetanus are
caused when tetanus toxin interferes with release of neuro-
transmitters, blocking inhibitor impulses. This leads to
unopposed muscle contraction and spasm. Seizures may
occur, and the autonomic nervous system may also be affected.
Tetanus Clinical Features
* Incubation period; 8 days
(range, 3-21 days)
* Three ciinicai forms: local (not common),
cephalic (rare), generaiized (most common)
* Generalized tetanus; descending symptoms
of trismus (lockjaw), difficulty swallowing,
muscie rigidity, spasms
* Spasms continue for 3-4 weeks; complete
recovery may take months
Neonatal Tetanus
* Generalized tetanus in newborn
infant
* Infant born without protective
passive immunity
* Estimated >215,000 deaths
worldwide in 1998
Clinical Features
The incubation period ranges from 3 to 2 1 days, usually
about 8 days. In general the further the injury site is from
the central nervous system, the longer the incubation period.
The shorter the incubation period, the higher the chance of
death. In neonatal tetanus, symptoms usually appear from
4 to 14 days after birth, averaging about 7 days.
On the basis of clinical findings, three different forms of
tetanus have been described.
Local tetanus is an uncommon form of the disease, in which
patients have persistent contraction of muscles in the same
anatomic area as the injury. These contractions may persist
for many weeks before gradually subsiding. Local tetanus
may precede the onset of generalized tetanus but is generally
milder. Only about 1% of cases are fatal.
Cephalic tetanus is a rare form of the disease, occasionally
occurring with otitis media (ear infections) in which
C. tetani is present in the flora of the middle ear, or following
injuries to the head. There is involvement of the cranial
nerves, especially in the facial area.
The most common type (about 80%) of reported tetanus is
generalized tetanus. The disease usually presents with a
descending pattern. The first sign is trismus or lockjaw,
followed by stiffness of the neck, difficulty in swallowing,
and rigidity of abdominal muscles. Other symptoms include
elevated temperature, sweating, elevated blood pressure, and
episodic rapid heart rate. Spasms may occur frequently and
last for several minutes. Spasms continue for 3-4- weeks.
Complete recovery may take months.
Neonatal tetanus is a form of generalized tetanus that
occurs in newborn infants. Neonatal tetanus occurs in
infants bom without protective passive immunity, because
the mother is not immune. It usually occurs through infection
of the unhealed umbilical stump, particularly when the
stump is cut with an unsterile instrument. Neonatal tetanus
is common in some developing countries (estimated more
than 215,000 deaths worldwide in 1998), but very rare in
the United States.
Complications
Laryngospasm (spasm of the vocal cords) and/or spasm of
the muscles of respiration leads to interference with breathing.
Fractures of the spine or long bones may result from
sustained contractions and convulsions. Hyperactivity of the
autonomic nervous system may lead to hypertension and/or
an abnormal heart rhythm.
Nosocomial infections are common because of prolonged
hospitalization. Secondary infections may include sepsis
from indwelling catheters, hospital-acquired pneumonias,
and decubitus ulcers. Pulmonary embolism is particularly a
problem in drug users and elderly patients. Aspiration
pneumonia is a common late complication of tetanus, found
in 50%-70% of autopsied cases. In recent years, tetanus has
been fatal in approximately 11% of reported cases. Cases
most likely to be fatal are those occurring in persons 60
years of age and older (18%) and unvaccinated persons
(22%). In about 20% of tetanus deaths, no obvious pathology
is identified and death is attributed to the direct effects of
tetanus toxin.
Tetanus
Tetanus Complications
* Laryngospasm
* Fractures
* Hypertension
* Nosocomial infections
* Pulmonary embolism
* Aspiration pneumonia
* Death
Laboratory Diagnosis
There are no laboratory findings characteristic of tetanus.
The diagnosis is entirely clinical and does not depend upon
bacteriologic confirmation. C. tetani is recovered from the
wound in only 30% of cases and can be isolated from
patients who do not have tetanus. Laboratory identification
of the organism depends most importantly on the demon-
stration of toxin production in mice.
Medical Management
All wounds should be cleaned. Necrotic tissue and foreign
material should be removed. If tetanic spasms are occurring,
supportive therapy and maintenance of an adequate airway
are critical.
Tetanus immune globulin (TIG) is recommended for persons
with tetanus. TIG can only help remove unbound tetanus
toxin. It cannot affect toxin bound to nerve endings. A single
intramuscular dose of 3,000 to 5,000 units is generally
recommended for children and adults, with part of the dose
infiltrated around the wound if it can be identified.
Intravenous immune globulin (IVIG) contains tetanus
antitoxin and may be used if TIG is not available.
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Because of the extreme potency of the toxin, tetanus disease
does not result in tetanus immunity. Active immunization
with tetanus toxoid should begin or continue as soon as the
person’s condition has stabilized.
Tetanus Wound Management
Clean, minor
wounds
Alt other
wounds
Vaccination History Td TIG Td TIG
Unknown or <3 doses Yes No Yes Yes
2* doses No" No No'* No
' Yes, If >10 years since last dose
** Yes, If >5 years since last dose
Wound Management
Antibiotic prophylaxis against tetanus is neither practical
nor useful in managing wounds; proper immunization plays
the more important role. The need for active immunization,
with or without passive immunization, depends on the con-
dition of the wound and the patient’s immunization history
(see table. Tetanus Wound Management). Rarely have cases
of tetanus occurred in persons with a documented primary
series of tetanus toxoid.
Persons with wounds that are neither clean nor minor, and
who have had 0-2 prior doses of tetanus toxoid or have an
uncertain history of prior doses should receive TIG as well
as Td toxoid. This is because early doses of toxoid may not
induce immunity, but only prime the immune system. The
TIG provides temporary immunity by directly providing
antitoxin. This ensures that protective levels of antitoxin
are achieved even if an immune response has not yet occurred.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Tetanus occurs worldwide but is most frequently encoun-
tered in densely populated regions in hot, damp climates
with soil rich in organic matter.
Tetanus Epidemiology
• Reservoir Soil and intestine of
animals and humans
• Transmission Contaminated wounds
Tissue injury
' Temporal pattern Peak in summer or
wet season
Communicability Not contagious
Reservoir
Organisms are found primarily in the soil and intestinal
tracts of animals and humans.
Mode of Transmission
Transmission is primarily by contaminated wounds (apparent
and inapparent). The wound may be major or minor. In
recent years, however, a higher proportion of patients had
minor wounds, probably because severe wounds are more
likely to be properly managed. Tetanus may follow elective
surgery, burns, deep puncture wounds, crush wounds, otitis
media (ear infections), dental infection, animal bites,
abortion, and pregnancy.
Communicabiiity
Tetanus is not contagious from person to person. It is the
only vaccine-preventable disease that is infectious but not
contagious.
Tetanus
Secular Trends in the United States
A marked decrease in mortality from tetanus occurred from
the early 1900s to the late 1940s. In the late 1940s, tetanus
toxoid was introduced into routine childhood immunization
and tetanus became nationally notifiable. At that time,
500-600 cases (approximately 0.4 cases per 100,000 population)
were reported per year.
After the 1940s, reported tetanus incidence rates declined
steadily. Since the mid'1970s, 50-100 cases (-0.05 cases per
100,000) have been reported annually. The death-to-case
ratio has declined from 30% to approximately 10% in recent
years. An all-time low of 20 cases (0.01 cases per 100,000)
were reported in 2003.
From 1980 through 2000, 70% of reported cases of tetanus
were among persons 40 years of age or older. From 1980
through 1990, a median of 21% of reported cases were
among persons younger than 40 years of age. The age
distribution of reported cases shifted to a younger age group
in the last half of the 1990s. Persons younger than 40 years
accounted for 28% of cases during 1991-1995, increasing to
42% of cases during 1996-2000. This change in age
distribution is a result of both an increase in cases in persons
younger than 40 years and a decrease in cases in older people.
The increase in cases among younger persons is related in
part to an increased number of cases among young
injection-drug users in California in the late 1990s.
Almost all reported cases of tetanus are in persons who have
either never been vaccinated, or who completed a primary
series but have not had a booster in the preceding 10 years.
Heroin users, particularly persons who inject themselves
subcutaneously, appear to be at high risk for tetanus.
Quinine is used to dilute heroin and may support the growth
of C. tetani.
Neonatal tetanus is rare in the United States, with only two
cases reported since 1989. Neither of the infants' mothers
had ever received tetanus toxoid.
During 1998-2000 (the most recent years for which data are
available), acute injuries or wounds preceded tetanus in 94
(73%) of the 129 cases for which information was available.
Among the most frequent wound types were puncture
wounds (50%), lacerations (33%), and abrasions (9%).
The most common puncture wound was from stepping on a
nail (15 cases). Other puncture wounds involved barbed
wire, splinters, animal or insect bites, self-piercing, and self-
performed tattoos. The environment in which acute injuries
occurred was indoors or at home in 45%, in the yard, garden,
or farm in 31%, and other outdoor locations in 23%.
Tetanus—United States, 1980-2003
Age Distribution
Age Distribution of
Reported Tetanus Cases,
1991-1995 and 1996-2000
1991-1995 1996-2000
Tetanus
Five percent of reported case-patients were intravenous drug
users without other known injury, and 11% had chronic
wounds. Twenty patients were reported to have received at
least a primary series of tetanus toxoid; 18 had an outcome
reported. Among these 18 patients, one (6%) death
occurred; the death was in an injection-drug user whose last
dose of tetanus toxoid was 1 1 years before the onset of
tetanus. A total of 1 10 patients reported fewer than three
doses of tetanus toxoid or had an unknown vaccination
history; 95 of these patients had an outcome reported.
Nineteen (20%) deaths occurred among these 95 patients.
DTaP, DT, and Td ^
Diphtheria Tetanus
DTaP, DT 7-8 Lf units 5-12.5 Lf units
Td, Tdap 2-2.5 Lf units 5 Lf units
(adult)
DTaP and pediatric DT used through age 6
years. Aduit Td for persons 7 years and
older. Tdap for persons 10-18 years
(Boostrix) or 11-64 years (Adacel)
Tetanus Toxoid
* Formalin-inactivated tetanus toxin
* Schedule Three or four doses booster
Booster every 10 years
* Efficacy Approximately 100%
* Duration Approximately 10 years
* Should be administered with diphtheria
toxoid as DTaP, DT, Td, or Tdap
Tetanus Toxoid
Characteristics
Tetanus toxoid was first produced in 1924, and tetanus toxoid
immunizations were used extensively in the armed services
during World War II. Tetanus cases among this population
declined from 70 in World War I (13.4/100,000 wounds
and injuries) to 12 in World War II (0.44/100,000). Of the
12 case-patients, half had received no prior toxoid.
Tetanus toxoid consists of a formaldehyde-treated toxin.
The toxoid is standardized for potency in animal tests
according to Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations. Occasionally, potency is mistakenly equated
with Lf units, which are a measure of the quantity of toxoid,
not its potency in inducing protection.
There are two types of toxoid available—^adsorbed (aluminum
salt precipitated) toxoid and fluid toxoid. Although the
rates of seroconversion are about equal, the adsorbed toxoid
is preferred because the antitoxin response reaches higher
titers and is longer lasting than that following the fluid toxoid.
Tetanus toxoid is available as a single-antigen preparation,
combined with diphtheria toxoid as pediatric DT or adult
Td, and with both diphtheria toxoid and acellular pertussis
vaccine as DTaP or Tdap. Tetanus toxoid is also available as
a combined DTaP-IPV-hepatitis B combination (Pediarix
—
see Chapter 7, Pertussis, for more information). Pediatric
formulations (DT and DTaP) contain a similar amount of
tetanus toxoid as adult Td, but contain 1>-A times as much
diphtheria toxoid. Children younger than 7 years of age
should receive either DTaP or pediatric DT. Persons 7 years
of age or older should receive the adult formulation (adult
Td), even if they have not completed a series of DTaP or
pediatric DT. The use of single-antigen tetanus toxoid is not
recommended. Tetanus toxoid should be given in
combination with diphtheria toxoid, since periodic boosting
is needed for both antigens. Two brands of Tdap are available:
Boostrix (approved for children 10-18 years of age) and
Adacel (approved for persons 11-64 years of age). DTaP and
Tdap vaccines do not contain thimerosal as a preservative.
Tetanus
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
After a primary series (three properly spaced doses of tetanus
toxoid in persons 7 years of age and older, and four doses in
children younger than 7 years of age) essentially all recipients
achieve antitoxin levels considerably greater than the
minimal protective level of 0.01 lU/mL.
Efficacy of the toxoid has never been studied in a vaccine
trial. It can be inferred from protective antitoxin levels that
a complete tetanus toxoid series has a clinical efficacy of
virtually 100%; cases of tetanus occurring in fully
immunized persons whose last dose was within the last
10 years are extremely rare.
Antitoxin levels decrease with time. While some persons
may be protected for life, by 10 years after the last dose,
most persons have antitoxin levels that only approach the
minimal protective level. As a result, routine boosters are
recommended every 10 years.
In a small percentage of individuals, antitoxin levels fall
below the minimal protective level before 10 years have
elapsed. To ensure adequate protective antitoxin levels,
persons who sustain a wound that is other than clean and
minor should receive a tetanus booster if more than 5 years
have elapsed since their last dose. (See Wound Management
for details on persons who previously received fewer than
three doses.)
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
DTaP (diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis
vaccine) is the vaccine of choice for children 6 weeks to
7 years of age. The usual schedule is a primary series of four
doses at 2, 4, 6, and 15-18 months of age. The first, second,
and third doses of DTaP should be separated by a minimum
of 4 weeks. The fourth dose should follow the third dose by
no less than 6 months and should not be administered
before 12 months of age.
If a child has a valid contraindication to pertussis vaccine,
pediatric DT should be used to complete the vaccination
series. If the child was younger than 12 months old when
the first dose of DT was administered (as DTaP or DT), the
child should receive a total of four primary DT doses. If the
child was 12 months of age or older at the time that the first
dose of DT was administered, three doses (third dose 6-12
months after the second) completes the primary DT series.
If the fourth dose of DTaP, DTP, or DT is administered
before the fourth birthday, a booster dose is recommended at
4-6 years of age. The fifth dose is not required if the fourth
dose was given on or after the fourth birthday.
Routine DTaP Primary
Vaccination Schedule
Dose Age Interval
Primary 1 2 months ...
Primary 2 4 months 4 wks
Primary 3 6 months 4 wks
Primary 4 15-18 months 6 mos
Children Who Receive DT
• The number of doses of DT
needed to complete the series
depends on the child’s age at the
first dose:
—if first dose given at <12 months
of age, 4 doses are recommended
—if first dose given at >12 months,
3 doses complete the primary series
Tetanus
Because of waning antitoxin titers, most persons have antitoxin
levels below the optimal level 10 years after the last dose of
DTaP, DTP, DT, or Td. Additional booster doses of tetanus
and diphtheria toxoids are required every 10 years to
maintain protective antitoxin titers. The first booster dose
of Td may he given at 1 1-12 years of age if at least 5 years
have elapsed since the last dose of DTaP, DTP, or DT The
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
recommends that this dose be administered as Tdap. If a
dose is given sooner as part of wound management, the next
booster is not needed for 10 years thereafter. More frequent
boosters are not indicated and have been reported to result
in an increased incidence and severity of local adverse reactions.
Routine DTaP Schedule
Children <7 years of age
Booster Doses
* 4-6 years of age, before entering
school
•11-12 years of age if 5 years
since last dose (Tdap)
• Every 10 years thereafter (Td)
Routine Td Schedule
Unvaccinated Persons >7 Years of Age
Dose* Interval
Primary 1
Primary 2 4 wks
Primary 3 6-12 mos
Booster dose every 10 years
*ACIP recommends that one of these doses
(preferably the first) be administered as Tdap
Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoids
Adverse Reactions
• Local reactions (erythema,
induration)
• Exaggerated local reactions
(Arthus-type)
• Fever and systemic symptoms
not common
• Severe systemic reactions rare
Td is the vaccine of choice for children 7 years and older
and for adults. A primary series is three or four doses,
depending on whether the person has received prior doses
of diphtheria-containing vaccine and the age these doses
were administered. The number of doses recommended for
children who received one or more doses of DTP, DTaP, or
DT before age 7 years is discussed above. For unvaccinated
persons 7 years and older (including persons who cannot
document prior vaccination), the primary series is three
doses. The first two doses should be separated by at least
4 weeks, and the third dose given 6 to 12 months after the
second. ACIP recommends that one of these doses (prefer-
ably the first) be administered as Tdap. A booster dose of
Td should be given every 10 years. Tdap is approved for a
single dose at this time (i.e., it should not be used for all the
doses of Td in a previously unvaccinated person 7 years or
older). Refer to the pertussis chapter for more information
about Tdap.
Interruption of the recommended schedule or delay of
subsequent doses does not reduce the response to the vaccine
when the series is finally completed. There is no need to
restart a series regardless of the time elapsed between doses.
Tetanus disease does not confer immunity because of the
very small amount of toxin required to produce illness.
Persons recovering from tetanus should begin or complete
active immunization with tetanus toxoid (Td) during
convalescence.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Local adverse reactions (e.g., erythema, induration, pain at
the injection site) are common but are usually self-limited
and require no therapy. A nodule may be palpable at the
injection site of adsorbed products for several weeks.
Abscess at the site of injection has been reported. Fever and
other systemic symptoms are not common.
Tetanus
Exaggerated local (Arthus-like) reactions are occasionally
reported following receipt of a diphtheria' or tetanus-
containing vaccine. These reactions present as extensive
painful swelling, often from shoulder to elbow. They generally
begin from 2 to 8 hours after injections and are reported
most often in adults, particularly those who have received
frequent doses of diphtheria or tetanus toxoid. Persons
experiencing these severe reactions usually have very high
serum antitoxin levels; they should not he given further
routine or emergency booster doses of Td more frequently
than every 10 years. Less severe local reactions may occur in
persons who have multiple prior boosters.
Severe systemic reactions such as generalized urticaria
(hives), anaphylaxis, or neurologic complications have been
reported after receipt of tetanus toxoid. A few cases of
peripheral neuropathy and Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS)
have been reported following tetanus toxoid administration.
Following a recent review, the Institute of Medicine
concluded that the available evidence favors a causal
relationship between tetanus toxoid and both brachial
neuritis and GBS, although these reactions are very rare.
See Chapter 7, Pertussis, for additional information on
contraindications and precautions to Tdap.
Contraindications and Precautions
to Vaccination
A severe allergic reaction (acute respiratory distress or
collapse) to a vaccine component or following a prior dose
of tetanus toxoid is a contraindication to receipt of tetanus
toxoid. If a generalized reaction is suspected to represent
allergy, it may be useful to refer an individual for appropriate
skin testing before discontinuing tetanus toxoid immunization.
A moderate or severe acute illness is reason to defer
routine vaccination, but a minor illness is not.
If a contraindication to using tetanus toxoid-containing
preparations exists, passive immunization with tetanus
immune globulin (TIG) should he considered whenever
an injury other than a clean minor wound is sustained.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
DTaP, DT (pediatric), Td, DTP/Hib, Tdap, and tetanus
toxoid should be stored continuously at 35°-46°F (2°-8°C).
The vaccine may be out of refrigeration for as long as 4
days, but it should be refrigerated immediately when
received. Freezing reduces the potency of the tetanus
component. Vaccine exposed to freezing temperature
should never be administered.
Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoids
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to
vaccine component or following
a prior dose
• Moderate or severe acute illness
I*
r
t
(
*
I
1
I
(
{
77
Selected References
American Academy of Pediatrics. Tetanus. In Pickering L,
ed. Red Book 2003: Report of the Committee on Infectious
Diseases. 26th ed. Elk Grove Village, IL: American
Academy of Pediatrics, 2003:61 1-16.
CDC. Diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis: Recommendations
for vaccine use and other preventive measures.
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR 1991;40
(No. RR-10):l-28.
CDC. Pertussis vaccination: use of acellular pertussis vaccines
among infants and young children. Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).
MMWR 1997;46(No. RR-7):l-25.
CDC. Provisional recommendations for the use of Tdap are
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/provisional_recs/default.htm
CDC. Tetanus surveillance—United States, 1998-2000.
MMWR 2003;52(No. SSC):1-12.
Orenstein WA, Hadler S, Wharton M. Trends in vaccine-
preventable diseases. Semin Pediatr Infect Dis 1997;8:23-33.
Sutter RW, Orenstein WA, Wassilak SGF. Tetanus In:
Evans AS, Brachman PS, eds. Bacterial Infections of Humans:
Epidemiology and Control. 3rd ed. New York: Plenum
Medical Book Company, 1998:741-57.
Wassilak SGF, Roper MH, Murphy TV, Orenstein WA.
Tetanus. In: Plotkin SA, Orenstein WA, eds. Vaccines.
4th ed. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders, 2003:745-81.
World Health Organization. The “high-risk” approach: the
WHO-recommended strategy to accelerate elimination of
neonatal tetanus. Wlky Epidemiol Rec 1996;71:33-36.
Pertussis
Pertussis, or whooping cough, is an acute infectious disease
caused hy the bacterium Bordetella pertussis. Outbreaks of
pertussis were first described in the 16th century, and the
organism was first isolated in 1906.
Pertussis
Highly contagious respiratory infection
caused by Bordetella pertussis
Outbreaks first described in 16th century
In the 20th century, pertussis was one of the most common
childhood diseases and a major cause of childhood mortality
in the United States. Before the availability of pertussis
vaccine in the 1940s, more than 200,000 cases of pertussis
were reported annually. Since widespread use of the vaccine
began, incidence has decreased more than 80% compared
with the prevaccine era.
Pertussis remains a major health problem among children
in developing countries, with an estimated 285,000 deaths
resulting from the disease in 2001.
• Bordetella pertussis isolated in 1906
* Estimated 285,000 deaths worldwide
in 2001
Bordetella pertussis
B. pertussis is a small, aerobic gram-negative rod. It is
fastidious and requires special media for isolation (see
Laboratory Diagnosis).
B. pertussis produces multiple antigenic and biologically
active products, including pertussis toxin, filamentous
hemagglutinin, agglutinogens, adenylate cyclase, pertactin,
and tracheal cytotoxin. These products are responsible for
the clinical features of pertussis disease, and an immune
response to one or more produces immunity to subsequent
clinical illness. Recent evidence suggests that immunity
from B
.
pertussis infection is not permanent.
Pathogenesis
Pertussis is primarily a toxin-mediated disease. The bacteria
attach to the respiratory cilia, produce toxins that paralyze
the cilia, and cause inflammation of the respiratory tract,
which interferes with the clearing of pulmonary secretions.
Pertussis antigens appear to allow the organism to evade
host defenses, in that lymphocytosis is promoted but
chemotaxis is impaired. Until recently it was thought that
B. pertussis did not invade the tissues. However, recent
studies have shown the bacteria to be present in alveolar
macrophages.
Bordetella pertussis
* Fastidious gram-negative bacteria
* Antigenic and biologically active
components:
— pertussis toxin (PT)
— filamentous hemagglutinin (FHA)
— agglutinogens
— adenylate cyclase
— pertactin
— tracheal cytotoxin
Pertussis Pathogenesis
Attachment to cilia of ciliated epithelial
cells in respiratory tract
Pertussis antigens allow evasion of
host defenses (lymphocytosis promoted
but impaired chemotaxis)
Local tissue damage in respiratory tract
Systemic disease may be toxin
mediated
Clinical Features Pertussis Clinical Features
The incubation period of pertussis is commonly 7—10 days,
with a range of 4-21 days, and rarely may be as long as
42 days. The clinical course of the illness is divided into
three stages.
* Incubation period 7-10 days
(range 4-21 days)
* Insidious onset, similar to minor
upper respiratory infection with
nonspecific cough
* Fever usually minimal throughout
course of illness
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Pertussis Clinical Features
* Catarrhal stage 1-2 weeks
Paroxysmal
cough stage 1-6 weeks
• Convalescence Weeks to
months
Pertussis Among Adolescents
and Adults
* Disease often milder than in infants
and children
* Infection may be asymptomatic, or
may present as classic pertussis
* Adolescents and adults account for
more than half of reported cases
* Older persons often source of
infection for children
Pertussis Complications^
Condition
Pneumonia
Seizures
Encephalopathy
Hospitalization
Death
Percent reported
5.2
0.8
0.1
20
0.2
'Cases reported to CDC 1997-2000 (N=28.187)
The first stage, the catarrhal stage, is characterized by the
insidious onset of coryza (runny nose), sneezing, low-grade
fever, and a mild, occasional cough, similar to the common
cold. The cough gradually becomes more severe, and after
1-2 weeks, the second, or paroxysmal stage, begins.
It is during the paroxysmal stage that the diagnosis of
pertussis is usually suspected. Characteristically, the patient
has bursts, or paroxysms, of numerous, rapid coughs, apparently
due to difficulty expelling thick mucus from the tracheo-
bronchial tree. At the end of the paroxysm, a long inspiratory
effort is usually accompanied by a characteristic high-pitched
whoop. During such an attack, the patient may become
cyanotic (turn blue). Children and young infants, especially,
appear very ill and distressed. Vomiting and exhaustion
commonly follow the episode. The patient usually appears
normal between attacks.
Paroxysmal attacks occur more frequently at night, with an
average of 15 attacks per 24 hours. During the first 1 or 2
weeks of this stage, the attacks increase in frequency, remain
at the same level for 2 to 3 weeks, and then gradually
decrease. The paroxysmal stage usually lasts 1 to 6 weeks but
may persist for up to 10 weeks. Infants younger than 6
months of age may not have the strength to have a whoop,
but they do have paroxysms of coughing.
In the convalescent stage, recovery is gradual. The cough
becomes less paroxysmal and disappears in 2 to 3 weeks.
However, paroxysms often recur with subsequent respiratory
infections for many months after the onset of pertussis.
Fever is generally minimal throughout the course of the illness.
Older persons (i.e., adolescents and adults) and those
partially protected by the vaccine may become infected with
B. pertussis but often have milder disease. Pertussis infection
in these persons may be asymptomatic, or present as illness
ranging from a mild cough illness to classic pertussis with
persistent cough (i.e., lasting more than 7 days). Inspiratory
whoop is uncommon. Adolescents and adults have accounted
for more than half of reported pertussis cases in recent years.
Even though the disease may be milder in older persons,
those who are infected may transmit the disease to other
susceptible persons, including unimmunized or underimmunized
infants. Older persons are often found to have the first case
in a household with multiple pertussis cases.
Complications
Young infants are at highest risk for acquiring pertussis-
associated complications. The most common complication,
and the cause of most pertussis-related deaths, is secondary
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bacterial pneumonia. Data from 1997—2000 indicate that
pneumonia occurred in 5.2% of all reported pertussis cases,
and among 11.8% of infants younger than 6 months of age.
Neurologic complications such as seizures and encephalopathy
(a diffuse disorder of the brain) may occur as a result of
hypoxia (reduction of oxygen supply) from coughing, or
possibly from toxin. Neurologic complications of pertussis
are more common among infants. Other less serious
complications of pertussis include otitis media, anorexia,
and dehydration. Complications resulting from pressure
effects of severe paroxysms include pneumothorax, epistaxis,
subdural hematomas, hernias, and rectal prolapse.
Among persons of all ages with pertussis, 33 cases of
encephalopathy and 56 pertussis-related deaths were reported
during 2001-2003. Fifty-one (91%) of the deaths were
among infants younger than 6 months of age, and 42 (75%)
were among infants aged younger than 2 months of age.
Adolescents and adults may also develop complications of
pertussis such as difficulty sleeping, urinary incontinence,
pneumonia, and rib fracture.
Laboratory Diagnosis
The diagnosis of pertussis is usually based on a characteristic
history and physical examination. However, laboratory tests
may be useful with young infants, atypical cases, and cases
modified by vaccine.
The standard and preferred laboratory test for diagnosis of
pertussis is isolation of B. pertussis by culture. A positive
culture for B
.
pertussis confirms the diagnosis. However,
fastidious growth requirements make B. pertussis difficult to
isolate. Isolation of the organism using direct plating is most
successful during the catarrhal stage. Specimens from the
posterior nasopharynx, not the throat, should be obtained
using Dacron® or calcium alginate (not cotton) swabs and
should be plated directly onto selective media. Success in
isolating the organism declines if the patient has had prior
antibiotic therapy effective against pertussis (erythromycin
or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole), if specimen collection is
delayed beyond the first 2 weeks of illness, or if the patient
has been vaccinated.
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing of nasopharyngeal
swabs or aspirates can be a rapid, sensitive, and specific
method for diagnosing pertussis. Currently, it is available
only in certain laboratories; the assays vary among laboratories
and are not standardized. PCR should be used in addition to
culture, not as a replacement for culture, because bacterial
isolates may be required for evaluation of antimicrobial
resistance or for molecular typing.
Pertussis
Direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) testing of nasopharyngeal
specimens may be useful as a screening test for pertussis.
Because DFA testing of nasopharyngeal secretions has been
shown in some studies to have low sensitivity and variable
specificity, it should not be relied on as a criterion for
laboratory confirmation.
Serologic testing has proved useful in clinical studies but is
not yet standardized. Because of the lack of association
between antibody levels and immunity to pertussis, results of
serologic testing are difficult to interpret. For these reasons,
serologic testing is not widely available. In some areas, it is
used for clinical diagnosis and reporting, but in the absence
of standardization, serologic test results should not be relied
upon for case confirmation for the purpose of national
reporting.
An elevated white blood cell count with a lymphocytosis
is usually present in classical disease. The absolute lympho-
cyte count often reaches 20,000 or greater. However, there
may be no lymphocytosis in infants and children or in
persons with mild or modified cases of pertussis.
More information on the laboratory diagnosis of pertussis is
available on the National Immunization Program website.
Medical Management
The medical management of pertussis cases is primarily
supportive, although antibiotics are of some value.
Erythromycin is the drug of choice. This therapy eradicates
the organism from secretions, thereby decreasing communi-
cability and, if initiated early, may modify the course of the
illness.
An antibiotic effective against pertussis (such as azithromycin,
erythromycin or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole) should be
administered to all close contacts of persons with pertussis,
regardless of age and vaccination status. Revised treatment
and postexposure prophylaxis recommendations were
published in December 2005 (see selected reference list).
All close contacts younger than 7 years of age who have not
completed the four-dose primary series should complete the
series with the minimal intervals, (minimum age for first
dose is 6 weeks; minimum intervals from dose 1 to 2 and
from dose 2 to 3 are 4 weeks; minimum interval from dose
3 to 4 is 6 months.) Close contacts who are 4-6 years of age
and who have not yet received the second booster dose
(usually the fifth dose of DTaP) should be vaccinated.
82
Pertussis
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Pertussis occurs worldwide.
Reservoir
Pertussis is a human disease. No animal or insect source or
vector is known to exist. Adolescents and adults are an
important reservoir for B
.
pertussis and are often the source
of infection for infants.
Transmission
Transmission most commonly occurs by the respiratory route
through contact with respiratory droplets, or by contact
with airborne droplets of respiratory secretions. Transmission
occurs less frequently by contact with freshly contaminated
articles of an infected person. A silent carrier state is
thought to exist, but it is infrequent, transient in duration,
and probably of little importance in maintaining pertussis
organisms in the community.
Temporal Pattern
Pertussis has no distinct seasonal pattern, but it may
increase in the summer and fall.
Communicability
Pertussis is highly communicable, as evidenced by secondary
attack rates of 80% among susceptible household contacts.
Persons with pertussis are most infectious during the
catarrhal period and the first 2 weeks after cough onset
(i.e., approximately 21 days).
Secular Trends in the United States
Before the availability of vaccine, pertussis was a common
cause of morbidity and mortality among children. During
the 6'year period from 1940 through 1945, more than
1 million cases of pertussis were reported, an average of
175,000 cases per year (incidence of approximately 150
cases per 100,000 population).
Following introduction of vaccine in the 1940s, pertussis
incidence gradually declined, reaching 15,000 reported cases
in 1960 (~8 per 100,000 population). By 1970, annual
incidence was fewer than 5,000 cases per year, and during
1980-1990, an average of 2,900 cases per year were reported
(~1 per 100,000 population).
Pertussis Epidemiology
* Reservoir Human
Adolescents and adults
* Transmission Respiratory droplets
* Communicability Maximum in catarrhal stage
Secondary attack rate
up to 80%
Pertussis
Pertussis incidence has been gradually increasing since the
early 1980s. A total of 25,827 cases was reported in 2004,
the largest number since 1959. The reasons for the increase
are not clear but may be a reflection of the 3-5 year cyclicity
observed with the disease.
During 2001-2003, the highest average annual pertussis
incidence was among infants younger than 1 year of age
(55.2 cases per 100,000 population), and particularly among
children younger than 6 months of age (98.2 per 100,000
population. In 2002, 24% of all reported cases were in this
age group. However, in recent years, adolescents (11-18
years of age) and adults (20 years and older) have accounted
for an increasing proportion of cases. During 2001-2003, the
annual incidence of pertussis among persons aged 10-19
years increased from 5.5 per 100,000 in 2001, to 6.7 in
2002, and 10.9 in 2003. In 2004, approximately 60% of
cases were among persons 1 1 years of age and older.
Increased recognition and diagnosis of pertussis in older age
groups probably contributed to this increase of reported
cases among adolescents and adults.
Of the 10,650 children 3 months to 4 years of age with
reported pertussis during 1990-1996 and known vaccination
status, 54% were not age-appropriately vaccinated with DTaP.
Pertussis Surveillance
Pertussis cases are reported to CDC via two systems. States
provide information about cases of pertussis, including
demographic information, through the National Electronic
Transmittal System for Surveillance. More detailed informa'
tion is reported to CDC through the Supplementary
Pertussis Surveillance System. Although many pertussis
cases are not reported, the surveillance system is useful for
monitoring epidemiologic trends. For instance, although
the highest incidence of pertussis occurs in infancy, the age
group at greatest risk for severe illness and complications,
in recent years, the surveillance system has reflected an
increase in the incidence of pertussis in all age groups, most
notably among adolescents and adults.
Guidelines on pertussis surveillance and outbreak control
are available on the National Immunization Program
website at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/pertussis/guide.htm.
Case Definition
The current case definition for pertussis was developed and
adopted by the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE) and CDC. It defines a clinical case
of pertussis as an acute cough illness lasting at least 2 weeks
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with either paroxysms of coughing, inspiratory “whoop,”
or posttussive vomiting without other apparent cause (as
reported by a health professional).
Case Classification
Probable—Meets the clinical case definition, but is not
laboratory confirmed and is not epidemiologically linked
to a laboratory-confirmed case.
Confirmed—A clinically compatible case that is laboratory
confirmed or epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-
confirmed case.
The clinical case definition above is appropriate for endemic
or sporadic cases. In outbreak settings, including household
exposures, a case can be defined as an acute cough illness
lasting at least 2 weeks without other symptoms. See the
pertussis chapter of the Manual for the Surveillance of
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases (available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/surv-manual/)
for more information on case classification.
Both probable and confirmed cases should be reported to
the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System
(NNDSS).
Pertussis Vaccines
Whole-Cell Pertussis Vaccine
Whole-cell pertussis vaccine is composed of a suspension of
formalin-inactivated B. pertussis cells. It was developed in
the 1930s and used widely in clinical practice by the mid- 1940s.
Based on controlled efficacy trials conducted in the 1940s
and on subsequent observational efficacy studies, a primary
series of four doses of whole-cell DTP vaccine was 70% to
90% effective in preventing serious pertussis disease.
Protection decreased with time, resulting in little or no
protection 5 to 10 years following the last dose. Local
reactions such as redness, swelling, and pain at the injection
site occurred following up to half of doses of whole-cell DTP
vaccines. Fever and other mild systemic events were also
common. More severe systemic reactions, such as convulsions
and hypotonic hyporesponsive episodes occurred less
frequently (one case per 1,750 doses administered). Acute
encephalopathy occurred even more rarely (0-10.5 cases per
million doses administered). Experts disagreed on whether
whole-cell pertussis vaccine caused lasting brain damage,
but they agreed that if the vaccine caused such damage, it
did so only rarely. Concerns about safety led to the develop-
ment of more purified (acellular) pertussis vaccines that are
associated with a lower frequency of adverse reactions.
Whole-Cell Pertussis Vaccine
* Developed in mid-1930s and
combined as DTP in mid-1940s
* 70%-90% efficacy after 3 doses
* Protection for 5-10 years
* Local adverse reactions common
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Acellular Pertussis Vaccines
* Purified "subunit" vaccines
* Pediatric formulations (DTaP)
licensed for full series in 1996
* Adolescent and adult formulations
(Tdap) licensed in 2005
Acellular Pertussis Vaccine
Characteristics
Acellular pertussis vaccines contain purified, inactivated
components of B. pertussis cells. Several acellular pertussis
vaccines have been developed for different age groups; these
contain different pertussis components in varying concen-
trations. Acellular pertussis vaccines are available only as
combinations with tetanus and diphtheria toxoids.
Pediatric Formulation IDTaPJ
Pediatric formulations of acellular pertussis vaccines were
first licensed for the fourth and fifth doses of the pertussis
series in 1991, and for the primary series in 1996. Three
pediatric acellular pertussis vaccines are currently available
for use in the United States. All three vaccines are combined
with diphtheria and tetanus toxoids as DTaP. Infanrix
(GlaxoSmithKline) contains three antigens, mostly pertussis
toxin (PT) and FHA. Tripedia (sanofi pasteur) contains two
components, FHA and PT, in equal amounts. Daptacel
(sanofi pasteur) contains five components, PT, FHA,
pertacin, and fimbriae types 2 and 3. None of the available
DTaP vaccines contains thimerosal as a preservative,
although Infanrix and Daptacel contain 2-phenoxyethanol
as a preservative. Tripedia does not contain a preservative.
All three vaccines are supplied in single-dose vials or syringes.
Composition* of Acelluiar
Pertussis Vaccines
Product El
Daptacel 10
Infanrix 25
Tripedia 23
Boostrix 8
Adacel 2.5
*mcg per dose
FHA PERT FIM
5 3 5
25 8
23
8 2.5
5 3 5
y
Adolescent and Adult Formulation ITdapJ
Acellular pertussis-containing vaccines were first licensed
for adolescents and adults in 2005. Two vaccines are
currently available. Both vaccines are combined with
tetanus toxoid and a reduced amount of diphtheria toxoid
compared with pediatric DTaP (that is, similar quantities of
tetanus and diphtheria toxoid to adult formulation Td).
Boostrix (GlaxoSmithKline) was licensed in May 2005 and
contains three pertussis antigens (PT, FHA, and pertactin)
in a reduced quantity from the GlaxoSmithKline pediatric
formulation. The vaccine contains aluminum hydroxide as
an adjuvant and does not contain a preservative. Adacel
(sanofi pasteur) was licensed in June 2005. It contains same
five components as Daptacel but with a reduced quantity of
PT. Adacel contains aluminum phosphate as an adjuvant
and does not contain a preservative. Both vaccines are
supplied as single-dose vials or syringes.
DTaP Clinical Trials Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Product
Daptacel
Tripedia
Infanrix
Location
Sweden
Germany
Italy
VE i95% cn
85% (80-89)
80% (59-90)
84% (76-89)
DTaP
Since 1991, several studies conducted in Europe and Africa
have evaluated the efficacy of DTaP vaccines administered
to infants. These studies varied in type and number of
vaccines, design, case definition, and laboratory method
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used to confirm the diagnosis of pertussis, so comparison
among studies must be made with caution. Point estimates
of vaccine efficacy ranged from 80% to 85% for vaccines
currently licensed in the United States. Confidence
intervals for vaccine efficacy overlap, suggesting that none
of the vaccines is significantly more effective than the
others. When studied, the acellular pertussis vaccine was
significantly more effective than whole-cell DTP. Mild local
and systemic adverse reactions and more serious adverse
reactions (such as high fever, persistent crying, hypotonic
hyporesponsive episodes, and seizures) occurred less
frequently among infants vaccinated with acellular pertussis
vaccines than among those vaccinated with whole-cell DTP.
Tdap
Adolescent and adult formulation Tdap vaccines were
licensed on the basis of noninferiority of the serologic
response to the various components compared with each
company’s pediatric DTaP formulation (Infanrix and
Daptacel) among persons who had received pediatric DTaP
or DTP in childhood. For both vaccines, the antibody
response to a single dose of Tdap was similar to that following
three doses of DTaP in infants. This type of study is known
as “bridging.” The new vaccines are assumed to have similar
clinical efficacy as DTaP vaccine since a similar level of
antibody to the components was achieved.
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
DTaP
Acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) is recommended for all
doses of the pertussis schedule. Whole-cell vaccine (DTP) is
no longer available in the United States. The primary series
of DTaP consists of four doses of vaccine, the first three
doses given at 4- to 8-week intervals (minimum of 4 weeks),
beginning at 6 weeks to 2 months of age. The fourth dose is
given 6-12 months after the third to maintain adequate
immunity for the ensuing preschool years. DTaP should be
administered simultaneously with all other indicated vaccines.
The fourth dose of all brands of DTaP is licensed, and
recommended by ACIP, to be administered at 15—18 months
of age (17-20 months for Daptacel). However, ACIP
recommends that in certain circumstances the fourth dose
be given earlier than 15 months of age. The fourth dose of
DTaP may be given if the child is at least 1 2 months of age,
and at least 6 months have elapsed since the third dose of pertussis
vaccine was given, and, in the opinion of the immunization
provider, the child is unlikely to return for an additional visit at
15-18 months of age. All three of these criteria should be
met in order to administer the fourth dose of DTaP at 12-14
months of age.
Routine DTaP Primary
Vaccination Schedule
Dose Age
Minimum
Interval
Primary 1 2 months
Primary 2 4 months 4 wks
Primary 3 6 months 4 wks
Primary 4 15-18 months 6 mos
DTaP Fourth Dose
• Recommended at 15-18 months*
* May be given at 12 months of age if:
— chiid is 12 months of age, and
— 6 months since DTaP3, and
— unlikely to return at 15-18 months
*17*20 months for Daptacel
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School Entry (Fifth) Dose
• Fifth dose recommended when
4th dose given before age 4 years
• Infanrix and Tripedia licensed for
5th dose after DTaP series
Interchangeability of Different
Brands of DTaP Vaccine
* Series should be completed with same
brand of vaccine if possible
* Limited data suggest that “mix and
match” DTaP schedules do not adversely
affect safety and immunogenicity
* Use different brand of DTaP if necessary
Provisional ACIP Recommendations
for Tdap Vaccines
* Adolescents 11-18 years of age should
receive a single dose of Tdap instead
of Td, preferably at 1 1 -12 years of age*
• Adolescents who received a Td
booster should receive a single dose
of Tdap to provide protection against
pertussis*
*if the person has completed the recommended
childhood OTaP/DTP vaccination series
Children who received all four primary doses before the
fourth birthday should receive a fifth (booster) dose of
DTaP before entering school. This booster dose is not
necessary if the fourth dose in the primary series was given
on or after the fourth birthday. The booster dose increases
protective antibody levels and may decrease the risk of
school-age children transmitting the disease to younger
siblings who are not fully vaccinated. Tripedia and Infanrix
are approved for the fifth dose following a series of four
doses of DTaP.
For children who have started the vaccination series with
whole cell'DTP, DTaP should be substituted for any
remaining doses of the pertussis series.
ACIP recommends that the series be completed with the
same btand of DTaP vaccine if possible. However, limited
data suggest that “mix and match” DTaP schedules do not
adversely affect safety and immunogenicity. If the vaccine
provider does not know or have available the type of DTaP
vaccine previously administered to a child, any available
DTaP vaccine should be used to continue or complete the
vaccination series. Unavailability of the vaccine used for
earlier doses is not a reason for missing the opportunity to
administer a dose of acellular pertussis vaccine for which the
child is eligible.
Interruption of the recommended schedule or delayed
doses does not lead to a reduction in the level of immunity
reached on completion of the primary series. There is no
need to restart a series regardless of the time that has
elapsed between doses.
Tdap
Both Tdap vaccines are approved by the Food and Drug
Administration for a single (booster) dose for persons who
have completed the recommended childhood DTP/DTaP
vaccination series. The two vaccines are approved for use in
different age groups: Boostrix is approved for persons 10-18
years of age; Adacel is approved for persons 1 1-64 years of age.
At the time of publication of this book (January 2006)
ACIP recommendations for the use of Tdap vaccines fot
adolescents and adults have not been published. Provisional
recommendations are that adolescents 11-18 years of age
should receive a single dose of Tdap instead of Td, preferably
at 1 1-12 years of age. Adolescents aged 1 1-18 years who
received Td but not Tdap are encouraged to receive a single
dose of Tdap to provide protection against pertussis. A 5-year
interval between Td and Tdap is encouraged to teduce the
risk of local and systemic adverse reactions. However, Tdap
may be given at an interval of less than 5 years if the benefits
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of protection from pertussis outweigh the risk of an adverse
reaction. An interval of less than 5 years can be considered
in situations of increased risk of pertussis, such as during a
pertussis outbreak, or if protection is desired because of close
contact with an infant younger than 6 months of age or a
young child who has not been vaccinated against pertussis.
Provisional recommendations for vaccination of adults are
for a single dose of Tdap to replace a single dose of Td for
booster immunization against tetanus, diphtheria, and
pertussis if the most recent tetanus toxoid-containing vaccine
was received at least 10 years earlier. Tdap may be given at
an interval shorter than 10 years since receipt of the last
tetanus toxoid-containing vaccine if necessary to protect
against pertussis. Adults who have or who anticipate having
close contact with an infant 1 2 months of age or younger
(e.g., parents, child care providers, healthcare providers)
should receive a single dose of Tdap. An interval of 2 years
or more since the most recent tetanus toxoid-containing
vaccine is suggested for these adults; shorter intervals may
be used. Ideally, Tdap should be given at least 1 month
before beginning close contact with the infant. Women
should receive a dose of Tdap in the immediate postpartum
period if they have not previously received Tdap. Any
woman who might become pregnant is encouraged to
receive a single dose of Tdap.
Provisional ACIP Recommendations
for Tdap Vaccines
* Adults should receive a single dose of Tdap to
replace a single dose of Td’
* Adults who have or who anticipate having
close contact with an infant 12 months of age
or younger (e.g., parents, child care providers,
healthcare providers) should receive a single
dose of Tdap’
* Any woman who might become pregnant is
encouraged to receive a single dose of Tdap
*if the person has completed the recommended
childhood DTaP/DTP vaccination series
Tdap vaccine may be given at the same visit, or any time
before or after any other vaccine.
Immunity following pertussis is not permanent. Persons with
a history of pertussis should receive a single dose of Tdap if
otherwise indicated.
All adolescents and adults should have documentation of
having received a primary series of at least three doses of
tetanus and diphtheria toxoids during their lifetime. A
person without such documentation should receive a series
of three doses of tetanus and diphtheria-containing vaccine.
One of these doses, preferably the first, should be Tdap if
the person is at least 10 years of age (the minimum age
approved for one of the two available Tdap products).
The remaining two doses should be adult formulation Td.
No pertussis vaccine is approved for children 7-9 years of
age or for persons older than 64 years. ACIP does not
recommend the use of Tdap in persons in these age groups.
Combination Vaccines Containing DTaP
TriHIBit
One combination DTaP-Hib (Haemophilus influenzae type
b) vaccine is available in the United States (TriHIBit,
TriHIBit
• DTaP-Hib combination
* Do not use for primary immunization
at 2, 4, or 6 months of age
* May be used as the booster dose of
the Hib series at >12 months of age
following any Hib vaccine*
‘booster dose should follow prior dose by >2 months
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i
1
sanofi pasteur). The vaccines are provided in separate vials, I
and the DTaP component (Tripedia) is used to reconstitute
j
the Hih component (ActHIB). No other brand of DTaP and
Hib vaccine may be used to produce this combination (e.g.,
j
Infanrix must not be substituted for Tripedia). In addition,
|
when supplied as TriHlBit, the DTaP and Hib components '
have a single lot number. Providers should generally use
only the DTaP and Hib supplied together as TriHlBit.
However, it is acceptable to combine Tripedia and ActHIB
that have been supplied separately (i.e., not packaged as
TriHlBit). In this situation, the lot numbers of both vaccines
should be recorded in the child's chart.
,
Because of evidence of reduced immunogenicity of the Hib
component when used as a combination, TriHlBit is not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use as '
the primary series at 2, 4, or 6 months of age. It is approved i
only for the fourth dose of the DTaP and Hib series. If
TriHlBit is administered as one or more doses of the primary
series at 2, 4, or 6 months of age, the Hib doses should not
be counted, and the child should be revaccinated as age-
appropriate for Hib. The DTaP doses may be counted as
valid and do not need to be repeated.
Pediarix
* DTaP - Hep B - IPV combination
* Approved for 3 doses at 2, 4 and
6 months
* Not approved for booster doses
Licensed for children 6 v/eeks to
7 years of age
Although TriHlBit cannot be used in the primary series at
2, 4, or 6 months of age, it may be used as the booster
(final) dose following a series of single-antigen Hib vaccine
or combination hepatitis B-Hib vaccine (Comvax).
Therefore, TriHlBit can be used if the child is 12 months of
age or younger, has received at least one prior dose of Hib
vaccine 2 or more months earlier, and TriHlBit will be the
last dose in the Hib series. For example, TriHlBit can be
used for the booster dose at 12-15 months of age in a child
who has received Comvax or PedvaxHib at 2 and 4 months
of age, or three prior doses of HibTiter or ActHib. TriHlBit
can also be used at 15-59 months of age in a child who has
received at least one prior dose of any Hib-containing
vaccine. TriHlBit should not be used if the child has
received no prior Hib doses.
i
Pediarix
In 2002, the FDA approved Pediarix (GlaxoSmithKline),
the first pentavalent (5 component) combination vaccine
licensed in the United States. Pediarix contains DTaP
(Infanrix), hepatitis B (Engerix-B), and inactivated polio
vaccines. In prelicensure studies, the proportion of children
who developed a protective level of antibody and the titer
of antibody itself were at least as high when the vaccine
antigens were given together as Pediarix as when children
received separate vaccines.
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The minimum age for the first dose of Pediarix is 6 weeks,
so it cannot be used for the birth dose of the hepatitis B
series. Pediarix is approved for the first three doses of the
DTaP and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) series, which are
usually given at about 2, 4, and 6 months of age; it is not
approved for fourth or fifth (booster) doses of the DTaP or
IPV series. However, Pediarix is approved for use through 6
years of age. A child who is behind schedule can still
receive Pediarix as long as it is given for doses 1, 2, or 3 of
the series, and the child is younger than 7 years of age.
A dose of Pediarix inadvertently administered as the fourth
or fifth dose of the DTaP or IPV series does not need to be
repeated.
Pediarix may be used interchangeably with other pertussis-
containing vaccines if necessary (although ACIP prefers the
use of the same brand of DTaP for all doses of the series, if
possible). It can be given at 2, 4, and 6 months to infants
who received a birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine (total of
four doses of hepatitis B vaccine). Although not labeled for
this indication by FDA, Pediarix may be used in infants
whose mothers are HBsAg positive or whose HBsAg status
is not known.
Pediarix
* May be used interchangeably with
other pertussis-containing vaccines if
necessary
* Can be given at 2, 4, and 6 months in
infants who received a birth dose of
hepatitis B vaccine (total of 4 doses)
* May be used in infants whose mothers
are HBsAg positive or status unknown
Other DTaP Issues
Infants and children with underlying neurologic conditions
present a unique problem, whether these conditions are fully
recognized or only possible or potential. These children
appear to be at increased risk for manifesting the underlying
neurologic disorder within 2-3 days after vaccination.
However, more prolonged manifestations or increased
progression of the disorder or exacerbation of the disorder
have not been recognized.
In certain circumstances, vaccination with DTaP vaccine
should be delayed until the child has been evaluated,
treatment initiated, and the condition stabilized. These
conditions include the presence of an evolving neurologic
disorder (e.g., uncontrolled epilepsy, infantile spasms, and
progressive encephalopathy), a history of seizures that has
not been evaluated, or a neurologic event that occurs
between doses of pertussis vaccine.
A family history of seizures or other neurologic diseases, or
stable or resolved neurologic conditions (e.g., controlled
idiopathic epilepsy, cerebral palsy, developmental delay) are
not contraindications to pertussis vaccination.
Acetaminophen or ibuprofen may be administered to these
children at the time of DTaP vaccination and for 24 hours
thereafter to reduce the possibility of postvaccination fever.
Pertussis Vaccine Use in Children
with Underlying Neurologic Disorders
Underlying Condition
Prior seizure
Suspected
neurologic disorder
Neurologic event
between doses
Stable/resolved
neurologic condition
Recommendation
Delay and assess*
Delay and assess*
Delay and assess*
Vaccinate
'vaccinate after treatment initiated and condition stabilized
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Pertussis Vaccination of Children
Who Have Recovered From Pertussis
* If documented disease, do not need
additional doses of pertussis vaccine
* Satisfactory documentation of disease:
—recovery of B. pertussis on culture, or
—typical symptoms and clinical course
when epidemiologically linked to a
culture-proven case
Reducing the dose of whole-cell DTP or DTaP vaccine or
giving the full dose in multiple smaller doses may result in
an altered immune response and inadequate protection.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the chance of a
significant vaccine reaction is likely to be reduced by this
practice. The use of multiple reduced doses that together
equal a full immunizing dose, or the use of smaller, divided
doses is not endorsed or recommended. Any vaccination
using less than the standard dose should not be counted,
and the person should be revaccinated according to age.
Children who have recovered from documented pertussis
do not need additional doses of pertussis vaccine.
Satisfactory documentation includes recovery of B. pertussis
on culture or typical symptoms and clinical course when
these are epidemiologically linked to a culture-confirmed
case, as may occur during outbreaks. When such confirmation
of diagnosis is lacking, vaccination should be completed
because cough illness may be caused by other other
Bordetella species, other bacteria, or certain viruses.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
DTaP Adverse Reactions
* Local reactions (pain, redness, or
swelling at the site of injection)
• Low-grade fever
* More severe adverse reactions
not common
• Local reactions more common
following 4“' and 5"’ doses
DTaP
As with all injected vaccines, administration of DTaP may
cause local reactions, such as pain, redness, or swelling.
Local reactions have been reported in 20%-40% of children
after the first three doses. Local reactions appear to be more
frequent after the fourth and/or fifth doses. Mild systemic
reactions such as drowsiness, fretfulness, and low-grade fever
may occur after either whole-cell DTP vaccination or DTaP
vaccination. However, mild reactions following the first four
doses are less common among children who receive DTaP.
For instance, fever of higher than lOloF is reported in
3%-5% of DTaP recipients compared with 16% of recipients
of whole-cell DTP. These reactions are self-limited and can
be managed with symptomatic treatment with acetaminophen
or ibuprofen. Moderate or severe systemic events (such as
fever [105 F or higher], febrile seizures, persistent crying last-
ing 3 hours or longer, and hypotonic hyporesponsive
episodes) have been reported after administration of DTaP
but occur less frequently among children administered DTaP
than among children administered whole-cell DTP. Rates of
these less common reactions vary by symptom and vaccine
but generally occur in fewer than 1 in 10,000 doses. See the
pertussis chapter in the textbook Vaccines (Plotkin and
Orenstein, eds., 2003) for a comprehensive review of DTaP
adverse event data.
Information on adverse reactions following a full series of
DTaP is also limited. Available data suggest a substantial
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increase in the frequency and magnitude of local reactions
after the fourth and fifth doses. For example, swelling at the
site of injection occurred in 2% of patients after the first
dose of Tripedia, and in 29% following the fourth dose.
Increases in the frequency of fever after the fourth dose have
also been reported, although the increased frequencies of
other systemic reactions (e.g., fretfulness, drowsiness, or
decreased appetite) have not been observed. Further details
on this issue can be found in a supplemental ACIP state-
ment published in 2000 {MMWR 2000;49(No RR-13):l-8).
Swelling involving the entire thigh or upper arm has been
reported after booster doses of certain acellular pertussis
vaccines. The limb swelling may be accompanied by
erythema, pain and fever. Although the swelling may interfere
with walking, most children have no limitation of activity.
The pathogenesis and frequency of substantial local reactions
and limb swelling are not known, but these conditions
appear to be self-limited and resolve without sequelae.
In the absence of a vaccine supply shortage, ACIP continues
to recommend that a fifth dose of DTaP be administered
before a child enters school. It is not known whether children
who experience entire limb swelling after a fourth dose of
DTaP are at increased risk for this reaction after the fifth
dose. Because of the importance of this dose in protecting a
child during school years, ACIP recommends that a history
of extensive swelling after the fourth dose should not be
considered a contraindication to receipt of a fifth dose at
school entry. Parents should be informed of the increase in
reactogenicity that has been reported following the fourth
and fifth doses of DTaP.
Despite the increased reactogenicity of the fourth and fifth
doses, DTaP remains the preferred vaccine for preventing
pertussis, diphtheria, and tetanus among children because of
the improved safety profile when compared with whole-cell
pertussis vaccines.
Tdap
The safety of Tdap vaccines was evaluated as part of
prelicensure studies. The most common adverse reaction
following both brands of Tdap vaccine is a local reaction,
such as pain redness or swelling at the site of injection.
Vaccine recipients also reported low-grade fever and a
variety of nonspecific systemic events, such as headache,
fatigue and gastrointestinal symptoms. Local reactions, fever,
and nonspecific systemic symptoms occurred at
approximately the same rate in recipients of Tdap and the
comparison group that received Td without acellular
pertussis vaccine. No serious adverse events have been
attributed to Tdap.
Adverse Reactions Following the
4th and 5th DTaP Dose
* Local adverse reactions and fever
increased with 4th and 5th doses
of DTaP
* Reports of swelling of entire limb
* Extensive swelling after 4th dose
NOT a contraindication to 5th dose
Tdap Adverse Reactions
• Local reactions (pain, redness, or
swelling at the site of injection)
• Low-grade fever
• Adverse reactions occur at
approximately the same rate as Td
alone (without acellular pertussis
vaccine)
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DTaP Contraindications
* Severe allergic reaction to vaccine
component or following a prior dose
* Encephalopathy not due to another
identifiable cause occurring within 7
days after vaccination
DTaP Precautions*
* Moderate or severe acute illness
• Temperature >105°F (40.5°C) or higher within
48 hours with no other identifiable cause
* Collapse or shock-liKe state (hypotonic
hyporesponsive episode) within 48 hours
* Persistent, inconsolable crying lasting >3
hours, occurring within 48 hours
* Convulsions with or without fever occurring
within 3 days
Tdap Contraindications
* Severe allergic reaction to vaccine
component or following a prior dose
* Encephalopathy not due to another
identifiable cause occurring within 7
days after vaccination with a
pertussis-containing vaccine
Tdap Precautions
* History of Guillain-Barre syndrome within 6
weeks after a previous dose of tetanus
toxoid-containing vaccine
* Progressive neurological disorder until the
condition has stabilized
* History of a severe local reaction (Arthus
reaction) following a prior dose of a tetanus
and/or diphtheria toxoid-containing vaccine
* Moderate or severe acute illness
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
DTaP
Contraindications to further vaccination with DTaP are
severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component or following
prior dose of vaccine, and encephalopathy not due to
another identifiable cause occurring within 7 days after
vaccination.
Moderate or severe acute illness is a precaution to vaccina-
tion. Children with mild illness, such as otitis media or
upper respiratory infection, should be vaccinated. Children
for whom vaccination is deferred because of moderate or
severe acute illness should be vaccinated when their
condition improves.
Certain infrequent adverse reactions following pertussis
vaccination are considered to be precautions for subsequent
doses of pertussis vaccine. These adverse reactions are
temperature of 105°F (40.5°C) or higher within 48 hours
that is not due to another identifiable cause; collapse or
shock-like state (hypotonic hyporesponsive episode) within
48 hours; persistent, inconsolable crying lasting 3 hours or
longer, occurring within 48 hours; and convulsions with or
without fever occurring within 3 days.
There may be circumstances (e.g., during a communitywide
outbreak of pertussis) in which the benefit of vaccination
outweighs the risk, even if one of the four precautionary
adverse reactions occurred following a prior dose. In these
circumstances, one or more additional doses of pertussis
vaccine may be considered. DTaP should be used in these
circumstances.
Tdap
Tdap is contraindicated for persons with a history of a
severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component or following
a prior dose of vaccine. Tdap is also contraindicated for
persons with a history of encephalopathy not due to another
identifiable cause occurring within 7 days after administration
of a pertussis-containing vaccine.
Precautions to Tdap include a history of Guillain-Barre
syndrome within 6 weeks after a previous dose of tetanus
toxoid-containing vaccine, and a progressive neurologic
disorder (such as uncontrolled epilepsy or progressive
encephalopathy) until the condition has stabilized. Persons
with a history of a severe local reaction (Arthus reaction)
following a prior dose of a tetanus and/or diphtheria toxoid-
containing vaccine should generally not receive Tdap or Td
vaccination until at least 10 years have elapsed after the last
Pertussis
Td'Containing vaccine. Moderate or severe acute illness is a
precaution to vaccination. Persons for whom vaccination is
deferred because of moderate or severe acute illness should
be vaccinated when their condition improves.
As noted above, certain conditions following DTaP vaccine,
such as temperature of 105° F or higher, collapse or shock-
like state, persistent crying, or convulsions with or without
fever are a precaution to subsequent doses of DTaP. However,
occurrence of one of these adverse reactions following DTaP
vaccine in childhood is not a contraindication or precaution
to administration of Tdap to an adolescent or adult. A
history of extensive limb swelling following DTaP is not a
contraindication to Tdap vaccination. A stable neurologic
disorder (such as controlled seizures or cerebral palsy),
pregnancy, breastfeeding, and immunosuppression are not
contraindications or precautions to administration of Tdap.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
DTaP and Tdap vaccines should be stored at 35°-46°F
(2°-8°C) at all times The vaccines must never be frozen.
Vaccine exposed to freezing temperature must not be
administered and should be discarded. DTaP and Tdap
should not be used after the expiration date printed on the
box or label.
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The words polio (grey) and myelon (marrow, indicating the
spinal cord) are derived from the Greek. It is the effect of
poliomyelitis virus on the spinal cord that leads to the classic
manifestation of paralysis.
Records from antiquity mention crippling diseases compatible
with poliomyelitis. Michael Underwood first described a
debility of the lower extremities in children that was
recognizable as poliomyelitis in England in 1789. The first
outbreaks in Europe were reported in the early 19th century,
and outbreaks were first reported in the United States in
1843. For the next hundred years, epidemics of polio were
reported from developed countries in the Northern
Hemisphere each summer and fall. These epidemics became
increasingly severe, and the average age of persons affected
rose. The increasingly older age of persons with primary
infection increased both the disease severity and number of
deaths from polio. Polio reached a peak in the United States
in 1952, with more than 21,000 paralytic cases. However,
following introduction of effective vaccines, polio incidence
declined rapidly. The last case of wild-virus polio acquired
in the United States was in 1979, and global polio eradica-
tion may be achieved within the next decade.
Poliovirus
Poliovirus is a member of the enterovirus subgroup, family
Picornaviridae. Enteroviruses are transient inhabitants of
the gastrointestinal tract, and are stable at acid pH.
Picornaviruses are small, ether-insensitive viruses with an
RNA genome.
There are three poliovirus serotypes (PI, P2, and P3).
There is minimal heterotypic immunity between the three
serotypes. That is, immunity to one serotype does not
produce significant immunity to the other serotypes.
The poliovirus is rapidly inactivated by heat, formaldehyde,
chlorine, and ultraviolet light.
Pathogenesis
The virus enters through the mouth, and primary multipli-
cation of the virus occurs at the site of implantation in the
pharynx and gastrointestinal tract. The virus is usually present
in the throat and in the stool before the onset of illness.
One week after onset there is less virus in the throat, but
virus continues to be excreted in the stool for several weeks.
The virus invades local lymphoid tissue, enters the blood-
stream, and then may infect cells of the central nervous system.
Replication of poliovirus in motor neurons of the anterior
horn and brain stem results in cell destruction and causes
the typical manifestations of poliomyelitis.
Poliomyelitis
Poliomyelitis
* First described by Michael
Underwood in 1789
* First outbreak described in U.S.
in 1843
* >21,000 paralytic cases reported in
the U.S. in 1952
* Global eradication in near future
Poliovirus
' Enterovirus (RNA)
' Three serotypes: 1, 2, 3
' Minimal heterotypic immunity
between serotypes
Rapidly inactivated by heat,
formaldehyde, chlorine, ultraviolet light
Poliomyelitis Pathogenesis
* Entry into mouth
* Replication in pharynx, Gl tract,
local lymphatics
* Hematologic spread to lymphatics
and central nervous system
* Viral spread along nerve fibers
* Destruction of motor neurons
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Clinical Features
The incubation period for poliomyelitis is commonly 6-20
days with a range of 3-35 days.
Outcomes of poliovirus infection
Asymptomatic • Mnof non-CNS illness
I Aseptic menigitls 0 Paralytic
The response to poliovirus infection is highly variable and
has been categorized on the basis of the severity of clinical
presentation.
Up to 95% of all polio infections are inapparent or
asymptomatic. Estimates of the ratio of inapparent to
paralytic illness vary from 50:1 to 1,000:1 (usually 200:1).
Infected persons without symptoms shed virus in the stool
and are able to transmit the virus to others.
Approximately 4%-8% of polio infections consist of a
minor, nonspecific illness without clinical or laboratory
evidence of central nervous system invasion. This clinical
presentation is known as abortive poliomyelitis, and is
characterized by complete recovery in less than a week.
Three syndromes observed with this form of poliovirus
infection are upper respiratory tract infection (sore throat
and fever), gastrointestinal disturbances (nausea, vomiting,
abdominal pain, constipation or, rarely, diarrhea), and
influenza-like illness. These syndromes are indistinguishable
from other viral illnesses.
Nonparalytic aseptic meningitis (symptoms of stiffness of
the neck, back, and/or legs), usually following several days
after a prodrome similar to that of minor illness, occurs in
l%-2% of polio infections. Increased or abnormal sensations
can also occur. Typically these symptoms will last from 2 to
10 days, followed by complete recovery.
Fewer than 1% of all polio infections result in flaccid
paralysis. Paralytic symptoms generally begin 1 to 10 days
after prodromal symptoms and progress for 2 to 3 days.
Generally, no further paralysis occurs after the temperature
returns to normal. The prodrome may be biphasic, especially
in children, with initial minor symptoms separated by a
1' to 7-day period from more major symptoms. Additional
prodromal signs and symptoms can include a loss of superficial
reflexes, initially increased deep tendon reflexes and severe
muscle aches and spasms in the limbs or back. The illness
progresses to flaccid paralysis with diminished deep tendon
reflexes, reaches a plateau without change for days to weeks,
and is usually asymmetrical. Strength then begins to return.
Patients do not experience sensory losses or changes in cognition.
Many persons with paralytic poliomyelitis recover completely
and, in most, muscle function returns to some degree.
Weakness or paralysis still present 12 months after onset is
usually permanent.
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Paralytic polio is classified into three types, depending on
the level of involvement. Spinal polio is most common, and
during 1969-1979, accounted for 79% of paralytic cases. It
is characterized by asymmetric paralysis that most often
involves the legs. Bulbar polio leads to weakness of muscles
innervated by cranial nerves and accounted for 2% of cases
during this period. Bulbospinal polio, a combination of
bulbar and spinal paralysis, accounted for 19% of cases.
The death'tO'Case ratio for paralytic polio is generally 2%-5%
among children and up to 15%-30% for adults (depending
on age). It increases to 25%-75% with bulbar involvement.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Viral Isolation
Poliovirus may be recovered from the stool or pharynx of a
person with poliomyelitis. Isolation of virus from the cere-
brospinal fluid (CSF) is diagnostic, but is rarely accomplished.
If poliovirus is isolated from a person with acute flaccid
paralysis, it must be tested further, using oligonucleotide
mapping (fingerprinting) or genomic sequencing, to determine
if the virus is “wild type” (that is, the virus that causes polio
disease) or vaccine type (virus that could derive from a
vaccine strain).
Serology
Neutralizing antibodies appear early and may be at high
levels by the time the patient is hospitalized; therefore, a
fourfold rise in antibody titer may not be demonstrated.
Cerebrospinal Fluid
In poliovirus infection, the CSF usually contains an
increased number of white blood cells (10-200 cells/mmk
primarily lymphocytes) and a mildly elevated protein
(40-50 mg/100 mL).
Epidemiology
Occurrence
At one time poliovirus infection occurred throughout the
world. Transmission of wild poliovirus was interrupted in the
United States in 1979, or possibly earlier. A polio eradication
program conducted by the Pan American Health
Organization led to elimination of polio in the Western
Hemisphere in 1991. The Global Polio Eradication Program
has dramatically reduced poliovirus transmission throughout
the world. In 2003, only 784 confirmed cases of polio were
reported globally and polio was endemic in six countries.
Poliomyelitis
Reservoir
Humans are the only known reservoir of poliovirus, which is
transmitted most frequently hy persons with inapparent
infections. There is no asymptomatic carrier state except in
immune deficient persons.
Transmission
Person-tO'person spread of poliovirus via the fecahoral route
is the most important route of transmission, although the
oral'Oral route may account for some cases.
Poliovirus Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
•Transmission Fecal-oral
Oral-oral possible
• Communicability 7-10 days before onset
Virus present in stool
3-6 weeks
Temporal Pattern
Poliovirus infection typically peaks in the summer months
in temperate climates. There is no seasonal pattern in
tropical climates.
Communicability
Poliovirus is highly infectious, with seroconversion rates among
susceptible household contacts of children nearly 100%, and
greater than 90% among susceptible household contacts of
adults. Persons infected with poliovirus are most infectious
from 7 to 10 days before and after the onset of symptoms, but
poliovirus may be present in the stool from 3 to 6 weeks.
Secular Trends in the United States
Before the 18th century, polioviruses probably circulated
widely. Initial infections with at least one type probably
occurred in early infancy, when transplacentally acquired
maternal antibodies were high. Exposure throughout life
probably provided continual boosting of immunity, and
paralytic infections were probably rare. (This view has been
recently challenged based on data from lameness studies in
developing countries.)
In the immediate prevaccine era, improved sanitation
allowed less frequent exposure and increased the age of
primary infection. Boosting of immunity from natural
exposure became more infrequent and the number of
susceptible persons accumulated, ultimately resulting in
the occurrence of epidemics, with 13,000 to 20,000
paralytic cases reported annually.
In the early vaccine era, the incidence dramatically
decreased after the introduction of inactivated polio vaccine
(IPV) 1955. The decline continued following oral polio
vaccine (OPV) introduction in 1961. In 1960, a total of
2,525 paralytic cases were reported, compared with 61 in 1965.
The last cases of paralytic poliomyelitis caused by endemic
transmission of wild virus in the United States were in 1979,
when an outbreak occurred among the Amish in several
Midwest states. The virus was imported from the Netherlands.
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From 1980 through 1999, a total of 152 confirmed cases of
paralytic poliomyelitis were reported, an average of 8 cases
per year. Six cases were acquired outside the United States
and imported. The last imported case was reported in 1993.
Two cases were classified as indeterminant (no poliovirus
isolated from samples obtained from the patients, and
patients had no history of recent vaccination or direct
contact with a vaccine recipient). The remaining 144 (95%)
cases were vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) caused
by live oral polio vaccine.
In order to eliminate VAPP from the United States, ACIP
recommended in 2000 that IPV be used exclusively in the
United States. The last case of VAPP acquired in the
United States was reported in 1999. In 2005, an unvaccinated
U.S. resident was infected with polio vaccine virus in Costa
Rica and subsequently developed VAPP. Also in 2005,
several asymptomatic infections with a vaccine-derived
poliovirus were detected in unvaccinated children in
Minnesota. The source of the vaccine virus has not been
determined, but it appeared to have been circulating among
humans for at least 2 years based on genetic changes in the
virus. No VAPP has been reported from this virus.
Poliovirus Vaccines
Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) was licensed in 1955
and was used extensively from that time until the early
1960s. In 1961, type 1 and 2 monovalent oral poliovirus
vaccine (MOPV) was licensed, and in 1962, type 3 MOPV
was licensed. In 1963, trivalent OPV was licensed and largely
replaced IPV use. Trivalent OPV was the vaccine of choice
in the United States and most other countries of the world
after its introduction in 1963. An enhanced-potency IPV
was licensed in November 1987 and first became available
in 1988. Use of OPV was discontinued in the United States
in 2000.
Poliovirus Vaccine
• 1955 Inactivated vaccine
• 1961 Types 1 and 2 monovalent OPV
• 1962 Type 3 monovalent OPV
• 1963 Trivalent OPV
• 1987 Enhanced-potency IPV (IPV)
Characteristics
Inactivateti poliovirus vaccine
Two enhanced forms of inactivated poliovirus vaccine are
currently licensed in the United States, but only one vaccine
(IPOL, Sanofi Pasteur) is actually distributed. This vaccine
contains all three serotypes of polio vaccine virus. The viruses
are grown in a type of monkey kidney tissue culture (Vero
cell line) and inactivated with formaldehyde. The vaccine
contains 2-phenoxyethanol as a preservative, and trace
amounts of neomycin, streptomycin, and polymyxin B.
It is supplied in a single-dose prefilled syringe and should
be administered by either subcutaneous or intramuscular
injection.
Inactivated Polio Vaccine
* Contains 3 serotypes of vaccine virus
• Grown on monkey kidney (Vero) cells
* Inactivated with formaldehyde
• Contains 2-phenoxyethanol,
neomycin, streptomycin, polymyxin B
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Oral Polio Vaccine
* Contains 3 serotypes of vaccine virus
* Grown on monkey kidney (Vero) cells
* Contains neomycin and streptomycin
* Shed in stool for up to 6 weeks
following vaccination
Inactivated Polio Vaccine
* Highly effective in producing
immunity to poliovirus
• >90% immune after 2 doses
• >99% immune after 3 doses
* Duration of immunity not
known with certainty
Oral poliovirus vaccine
Trivalent OPV contains live attenuated strains of all three
serotypes of poliovirus in a 10:1:3 ratio. The vaccine viruses
are grown in monkey kidney tissue culture (Vero cell line).
The vaccine is supplied as a single 0.5-mL dose in a plastic
dispenser. The vaccine contains trace amounts of neomycin
and streptomycin. OPV does not contain a preservative.
Live attenuated polioviruses replicate in the intestinal
mucosa and lymphoid cells and in lymph nodes that drain
the intestine. Vaccine viruses are excreted in the stool of
the vaccinated person for up to 6 weeks after a dose.
Maximum viral shedding occurs in the first 1-2 weeks after
vaccination, particularly after the first dose.
Vaccine viruses may spread from the recipient to contacts.
Persons coming in contact with fecal material of a vaccinated
person may be exposed and infected with vaccine virus.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Inactivated poliovirus vaccine
IPV is highly effective in producing immunity to poliovirus
and protection from paralytic poliomyelitis. Ninety percent
or more of vaccine recipients develop protective antibody to
all three poliovirus types after two doses, and at least 99%
are immune following three doses. Protection against
paralytic disease correlates with the presence of antibody.
IPV appears to produce less local gastrointestinal immunity
than does OPV, so persons who receive IPV are more readily
infected with wild poliovirus than OPV recipients.
The duration of immunity with IPV is not known with
certainty, although it probably provides protection for many
years after a complete series.
Oral Polio Vaccine
* Highly effective in producing
immunity to poliovirus
•
-50% immune after 1 dose
• >95% immune after 3 doses
* Immunity probably lifelong
Oral poliovirus vaccine
OPV is highly effective in producing immunity to
poliovirus. A single dose of OPV produces immunity to all
three vaccine viruses in approximately 50% of recipients.
Three doses produce immunity to all three poliovirus types
in more than 95% of recipients. As with other live-virus
vaccines, immunity from oral poliovirus vaccine is probably
lifelong. OPV produces excellent intestinal immunity,
which helps prevent infection with wild virus.
Serologic studies have shown that seroconversion following
three doses of either IPV or OPV is nearly 100% to all three
vaccine viruses. However, seroconversion rates after three
doses of a combination of IPV and OPV are lower, particularly
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to type 3 vaccine virus (as low as 85% in one study). A
fourth dose (most studies used OPV as the fourth dose)
usually produces seroconversion rates similar to three doses
of either IPV or OPV.
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
Trivalent OPV was the vaccine of choice in the United
States (and most other countries of the world) since it was
licensed in 1963. The nearly exclusive use of OPV led to
elimination of wild-type poliovirus from the United States
in less than 20 years. However, one case of VAPP occurred
for every 2 to 3 million doses of OPV administered, which
resulted in 8 to 10 cases of VAPP each year in the United
States (see Adverse Reactions section for more details on
VAPP). From 1980 through 1999, VAPP accounted for
95% of all cases of paralytic poliomyelitis reported in the
United States.
In 1996, ACIP recommended an increase in use of IPV
through a sequential schedule of IPV followed by OPV.
This recommendation was intended to reduce the occur-
rence of vaccine-associated paralytic polio. The sequential
schedule was expected to eliminate VAPP among vaccine
recipients by producing humoral immunity to polio vaccine
viruses with inactivated polio vaccine prior to exposure to
live vaccine virus. Since OPV was still used for the third
and fourth doses of the polio vaccination schedule, a risk of
VAPP would continue to exist among contacts of vaccinees,
who were exposed to live vaccine virus in the stool of
vaccine recipients.
The sequential IPV-OPV polio vaccination schedule was
widely accepted by both providers and parents. Fewer cases
of VAPP were reported in 1998 and 1999, suggesting an impact
of the increased use of IPV. However, only the complete
discontinuation of use of OPV would lead to complete
elimination of VAPP. To further the goal of complete
elimination of paralytic polio in the United States, ACIP
recommended in July 1999 that inactivated polio vaccine be
used exclusively in the United States beginning in 2000.
OPV is no longer routinely available in the United States.
Exclusive use of IPV eliminated the shedding of live vaccine
virus, and eliminated any indigenous VAPP.
A primary series of IPV consists of three doses. In infancy,
these primary doses are integrated with the administration
of other routinely administered vaccines. The first dose may
be given as early as 6 weeks of age but is usually given at 2
months of age, with a second dose at 4 months of age. The
third dose should be given at 6-18 months of age.
Polio Vaccination
Recommendations, 1996-1999
* Increased use of IPV (sequential IPV-
OPV schedule) recommended in 1996
* Intended to reduce the risk of vaccine-
associated paralytic polio (VAPP)
* Continued risk of VAPP for contacts
of OPV recipients
Polio Vaccination
Recommendations
* Exclusive use of IPV recommended in
2000
* OPV no longer routinely available in
the United States
* Indigenous VAPP eliminated
Polio Vaccination Schedule
Age Vaccine
Minimum
Interval
2 months IPV
4 months IPV 4 wks
6-18 months IPV 4 wks
4-6 years* IPV 4 wks
*the fourth dose of IPV may be given as earty
as 18 weeks of age
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The first and second doses of IPV are necessary to induce a
primary immune response, and the third dose of IPV ensures
“boosting” of antibody titers to high levels. The preferred
interval between the second and third doses of IPV is 2-8
months. However, if accelerated protection is needed, the
minimum interval between all doses of IPV is 4 weeks, and
the minimum age for the fourth dose is 18 months. Children
who receive three doses of IPV before the fourth birthday
should receive a fourth dose before or at school entry. The
fourth dose is not needed if the third dose is given on or
after the fourth birthday. If all four IPV doses are adminis-
tered after 6 weeks of age and are all separated by at least 4
weeks, a fifth dose is not needed, even if the fourth dose was
administered before 4 years of age (except if a specific state
school entry requirement mandates a dose of polio vaccine
on or after the fourth birthday). It is not necessary to repeat
or add doses if the interval between doses is prolonged.
Schedules that Include
Both IPV and OPV
* Only IPV is available in the
United States
* Schedule begun with OPV
should be completed with IPV
* Any combination of 4 doses of
IPV and OPV by 4-6 years of age
constitutes a complete series
Pediarix
• Contains IPV, DTaP, and
hepatitis B vaccines
* Minimum age 6 weeks, maximum
age 6 years
• Approved by FDA for first 3
doses of the IPV and DTaP series
* Not approved for booster doses
Only IPV is available for routine polio vaccination of
children in the United States. A polio vaccination schedule
begun with OPV should be completed with IPV. If a child
receives both types of vaccine, four doses of any combination
of IPV or OPV by 4-6 years of age is considered a complete
poliovirus vaccination series. A minimum interval of 4 weeks
should separate all doses of the series.
In 2002, a pentavalent (5-component) combination
vaccine (Pediarix) containing IPV was approved for use in
the United States. The vaccine also contains DTaP and a
pediatric dose of hepatitis B vaccine. The minimum age
for the first dose of Pediarix is 6 weeks (as it is for IPV and
DTaP). Pediarix is approved only for the first three
doses of the DTaP and IPV series, which are usually
given at about 2, 4, and 6 months of age. However,
Pediarix is approved for use through 6 years of age, the
same as the DTaP component. A child who is behind
schedule can receive Pediarix as long as it is given for
doses 1, 2, or 3 of the series, and the child is younger than
7 years of age. Pediarix is not approved for fourth dose of
the IPV series, or the fourth or fifth (booster) doses of the
DTaP series.
Polio Vaccination of Adults
* Routine vaccination of U.S.
residents >18 years of age not
necessary or recommended
* May consider vaccination of
travelers to polio-endemic
countries and selected laboratory
workers
Polio Vaccination of Aduits
Routine vaccination of adults (18 years of age and older)
who reside in the United States is not necessary or recom-
mended because most adults are already immune and have
a very small risk of exposure to wild poliovirus in the
United States.
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Some adults, however, are at increased risk of infection with
poliovirus. These include travelers to areas where poliomyelitis
is endemic or epidemic (currently limited to South Asia, the
eastern Mediterranean, and Africa), laboratory workers
handling specimens that may contain polioviruses, and
healthcare workers in close contact with patients who may
be excreting wild polioviruses. In addition, members of
specific population groups with a current disease caused by
wild polioviruses (e.g., during an outbreak) are also at
increased risk.
Recommendations for poliovirus vaccination of adults in
the above categories depend upon the previous vaccination
history and the time available before protection is required.
For unvaccinated adults (including adults without a
written record of prior polio vaccination) at increased
risk of exposure to poliomyelitis, primary immunization
with IPV is recommended. The recommended schedule
is two doses separated by 1-2 months, and a third dose
given 6-12 months after the second dose.
In some circumstances time will not allow completion of
this schedule. If 8 weeks or more are available before
protection is needed, three doses of IPV should be given at
least 4 weeks apart. If 4-8 weeks are available before
protection is needed, two doses of IPV should be given at
least 4 weeks apart. If less than 4 weeks are available before
protection is needed, a single dose of IPV is recommended.
In all instances, the remaining doses of vaccine should be
given later, at the recommended intervals, if the person
remains at increased risk.
Polio Vaccination of
Unvaccinated Adults
• IPV
• Use standard IPV schedule if
possible (0, 1-2 months, 6-12 months)
• May separate doses by 4 weeks if
accelerated schedule needed
Adults who have previously completed a primary
series of 3 or more doses and who are at increased risk
of exposure to poliomyelitis should be given one dose of
IPV. The need for further supplementary doses has not
been established. Only one supplemental dose of polio
vaccine is recommended for adults who have received a
complete series (i.e., it is not necessary to administer
additional doses for subsequent travel to a polio
endemic country).
Adults who have previously received less than a full
primary course of OPV or IPV and who are at
increased risk of exposure to poliomyelitis should be
given the remaining doses of IPV, regardless of the
interval since the last dose and type of vaccine previously
received. It is not necessary to restart the series of either
vaccine if the schedule has been interrupted.
Polio Vaccination of
Previously Vaccinated Adults
• Previously complete series
—administer one dose of IPV
* Incomplete series
—administer remaining doses in
series
—no need to restart series
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Polio Vaccine Adverse Reactions
* Rare local reactions (IPV)
* No serious reactions to IPV have
been documented
* Paralytic poliomyelitis (OPV)
Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Polio
* Increased risk in persons >18 years
* Increased risk In persons with
immunodeficiency
* No procedure avaiiable for identifying
persons at risk of paralytic disease
* 5-10 cases per year with exclusive use
of OPV
* Most cases in healthy children and their
household contacts
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Minor local reactions (pain, redness) may occur following
IPV. No serious adverse reactions to IPV have been docu-
mented. Because IPV contains trace amounts of strepto-
mycin, polymyxin B, and neomycin, allergic reactions may
occur in persons sensitive to these antibiotics.
Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis
Vaccine-associated paralytic polio is a rare adverse reaction
following live oral poliovirus vaccine. Inactivated poliovirus
vaccine does not contain live virus, so it cannot cause
VAPP. The mechanism of VAPP is believed to be a mutation,
or reversion, of the vaccine virus to a more neurotropic
form. These mutated viruses are called revertants. Reversion
is believed to occur in almost all vaccine recipients, but it
only rarely results in paralytic disease. The paralysis that
results is identical to that caused by wild virus, and may be
permanent.
VAPP is more likely to occur in persons 18 years of age and
older than in children, and is much more likely to occur in
immunodeficient children than in those who are immuno-
logically normal. Compared with immunocompetent children,
the risk of VAPP is almost 7,000 times higher for persons
with certain types of immunodeficiencies, particularly
B-lymphocyte disorders (e.g., agammaglobulinemia and
hypogammaglobulinemia), which reduce the synthesis of
immune globulins. There is no procedure available for
identifying persons at risk of paralytic disease, except
excluding older persons and screening for immunodeficiency.
Vaccine-Associated Paralytic
Polio (VAPP) 1980-1998
Healthy recipients of OPV 41%
Healthy contacts of
OPV recipients 31%
Community acquired 5%
Immunodeficient 24%
From 1980 through 1998, 152 cases of paralytic polio were
reported in the United States; 144 (95%) of these cases
were VAPP, and the remaining eight were in persons who
acquired documented or presumed wild-virus polio outside
the United States. Of the 144 VAPP cases, 59 (41%) occurred
in healthy vaccine recipients (average age 3 months). Forty-
four (31%) occurred in healthy contacts of vaccine recipients
(average age 26 years), and 7 (5%) were community
acquired (i.e., vaccine virus was recovered but there was no
known contact with a vaccine recipient). Thirty-four (24%)
of VAPP cases occurred in persons with immunologic
abnormalities (27 in vaccine recipients and 7 in contacts of
vaccine recipients). None of the vaccine recipients were
known to be immunologically abnormal prior to vaccination.
The risk of VAPP is not equal for all OPV doses in the
vaccination series. The risk of VAPP is 7 to 2 1 times higher
for the first dose than for any other dose in the OPV series.
From 1980 through 1994, 303 million doses of OPV were
Poliomyelitis
distributed and 125 cases of VAPP were reported, for an
overall risk of VAPP of one case per 2.4 million doses. Forty-
nine paralytic cases were reported among immunologically
normal recipients of OPV during this period. The overall
risk to these recipients was one VAPP case per 6.2 million
OPV doses. However, 40 (82%) of these 49 cases occurred
following receipt of the first dose, making the risk of VAPP
one case per 1.4 million first doses. The risk for all other
doses was one per 27.2 million doses. The reason for this
difference by dose is not known with certainty, but it is
probably because the vaccine virus is able to replicate longer
in a completely nonimmune infant. This prolonged replication
increases the chance of the emergence of a revertant virus
that may cause paralysis. The situation is similar for contacts.
A nonimmune child may shed virus longer, increasing the
chance of exposure of a contact.
The last case of VAPP acquired in the United States was
reported in 1999. As noted above a U.S. resident with
VAPP was reported in 2005, but the vaccine virus infection
was acquired in Costa Rica.
Contraindications And Precautions
To Vaccination
Severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component, or
following a prior dose of vaccine, is a contraindication to
further doses of that vaccine. Since IPV contains trace
amounts of streptomycin, neomycin, and polymyxin B, there
is a possibility of allergic reactions in persons sensitive to
these antibiotics. Persons with allergies that are not anaphy-
lactic, such as skin contact sensitivity, may be vaccinated.
Moderate or severe acute illness is a precaution for IPV.
Breastfeeding does not interfere with successful immunization
against poliomyelitis with IPV. IPV may be administered to
a child with diarrhea. Minor upper respiratory illnesses with
or without fever, mild to moderate local reactions to a prior
dose of vaccine, current antimicrobial therapy, and the con-
valescent phase of an acute illness are not contraindications
for vaccination with IPV
Contraindications to combination vaccines that contain
IPV are the same as the contraindications to the individual
components (e.g., DTaP, hepatitis B).
Polio Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component or following a
prior dose of vaccine
* Moderate or severe acute illness
Vaccine Storage and Handling
IPV may be shipped without refrigeration provided it is
delivered within 4 days. It should be maintained at
35°-46°F (2°-8°C). The vaccine should be clear and
colorless. Any vaccine showing particulate matter, turbidity,
or change in color should be discarded.
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Polio Eradication
• Last case in United States in 1979
• Western Hemisphere certified polio
free in 1994
* Last isolate of type 2 poliovirus in
India in October 1999
* Global eradication goal
Wild Poliovirus 1988
Wild Poliovirus 2004
Outbreak Investigation and Control
Collect preliminary clinical and epidemiologic information
(including vaccine history and contact with OPV vaccines)
on any suspected case of paralytic polio. Notify the National
Immunization Program, CDC, (404'639-8255) after appro-
priate local and state health authorities have been notified.
Intensify field investigation to verify information and collect
appropriate specimens for viral isolation and serology.
A single case of paralytic poliomyelitis demands immediate
attention. If the evidence indicates vaccine-associated disease,
no outbreak control program is needed. If, however, evidence
indicates wild virus (for example, two cases in a community),
all unvaccinated persons in the epidemic area who are 6 weeks
of age and older and whose vaccine histories are uncertain
should be vaccinated.
Polio Eradication
Following the widespread use of poliovirus vaccine in the
mid-1950s, the incidence of poliomyelitis declined rapidly
in many industrialized countries. In the United States, the
number of cases of paralytic poliomyelitis reported annually
declined from more than 20,000 cases in 1952 to fewer than
100 cases in the mid-1960s. The last documented indigenous
transmission of wild poliovirus in the United States was
in 1979.
In 1985, the member countries of the Pan American Health
Organization adopted the goal of eliminating poliomyelitis
from the Western Hemisphere by 1990. The strategy to
achieve this goal included increasing vaccination coverage;
enhancing surveillance for suspected cases (i.e., surveillance
for acute flaccid paralysis); and using supplemental
immunization strategies such as national immunization
days, house-to-house vaccination, and containment activities.
Since 1991, when the last wild-virus-associated indigenous
case was reported from Peru, no additional cases of
poliomyelitis have been confirmed despite intensive
surveillance. In September 1994, an international commission
certified the Western Hemisphere to be free of indigenous
wild poliovirus. The commission based its judgment on
detailed reports from national certification commissions that
had been convened in every country in the region.
In 1988, the World Health Assembly (the governing body
of the World Health Organization) adopted the goal of
global eradication of poliovirus by the year 2000. Although
this goal was not achieved, substantial progress has been
made. One type of poliovirus appears to have already been
eradicated. The last isolation of type 2 virus was in India in
October 1999.
Poliomyelitis
The polio eradication initiative is supported by a coalition
of international organizations that includes WHO, the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other
bilateral and multilateral organizations. Rotary International
has contributed more than $500 million to support the
eradication initiative. Current information on the status
of the global polio eradication initiative is available on
the World Health Organization website at
www.polioeradication.org/.
Postpolio Syndrome
After an interval of 30-40 years, 25%-40% of persons who
contracted paralytic poliomyelitis in childhood experience
new muscle pain and exacerbation of existing weakness, or
develop new weakness or paralysis. This disease entity is
referred to as postpolio syndrome. Factors that increase the
risk of postpolio syndrome include increasing length of time
since acute poliovirus infection, presence of permanent
residual impairment after recovery from the acute illness,
and female sex. The pathogenesis of postpolio syndrome is
thought to involve the failure of oversized motor units
created during the recovery process of paralytic poliomyelitis.
Postpolio syndrome is not an infectious process, and persons
experiencing the syndrome do not shed poliovirus.
For more information, or for support for persons with
postpolio syndrome and their families, contact:
Post-Polio Health International
4207 Lindell Boulevard #110
St. Louis, MO 63108-2915
314-534-0475
www.post-polio.org
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HaemophUus influenzae Type b
I
Haemophilus influenzae is a cause of bacterial infections that
I
are often severe, particularly among infants. It was first
I
described by Pfeiffer in 1892. During an outbreak of influenza
I
he found the bacteria in sputum of patients and proposed a
I causal association between this bacterium and the clinical
syndrome known as influenza. The organism was given the
I
name Haemophilus by Winslow, et al. in 1920. It was not
I until 1933 that Smith, et al. established that influenza was
caused by a virus and that H. influenzae was a cause of
I
secondary infection.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
* Severe bacterial infection,
particularly among infants
* During late 19th century believed to
cause influenza
* Immunology and microbiology
clarified in 1930s
In the 1930s, Margaret Pittman demonstrated that
H. influenzae could be isolated in encapsulated and
unencapsulated forms. She identified six capsular types
(a-f), and observed that virtually all isolates from
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and blood were of the
capsular type b.
Before the introduction of effective vaccines, H. influenzae
type b (Hib) was the leading cause of bacterial meningitis
and other invasive bacterial disease among children
younger than 5 years of age; approximately one in 200
children in this age group developed invasive Hib disease.
Nearly all Hib infections occurred among children
younger than 5 years of age, and approximately two-thirds
of all cases occurred among children younger than
18 months of age.
Haemophilus influenzae
Haemophilus influenzae is a gram-negative coccobacillus. It is
generally aerobic but can grow as a facultative anaerobe. In
vitro growth requires accessory growth factors, including “X”
factor (hemin) and “V” factor (nicotinamide adenine dinu-
cleotide [NAD]).
Chocolate agar media are used for isolation. H. influenzae
will generally not grow on blood agar, which lacks NAD.
The outermost structure of H. influenzae is composed of
polyribosyl-ribitol phosphate (PRP), a polysaccharide that
is responsible for virulence and immunity. Six antigenically
and biochemically distinct capsular polysaccharide
serotypes have been described; these are designated
types a through f. In the prevaccine era, type b organisms
accounted for 95% of all strains that caused invasive
disease.
Haemophilus influenzae
• Aerobic gram-negative bacteria
* Polysaccharide capsule
• Six different serotypes (a-f) of
polysaccharide capsule
* 95% of invasive disease caused
by type b
I:
(
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Haemophilus influenzae type b
Pathogenesis
* Organism colonizes nasopharynx
* In some persons organism invades
bloodstream and cause infection at
distant site
* Antecedent upper respiratory tract
infection may be a contributing
factor
Pathogenesis
The organism enters the body through the nasopharynx.
Organisms colonize the nasopharynx and may remain only
transiently or for several months in the absence of symptoms
(“asymptomatic carrier”). In the prevaccine era, Hih could
be isolated from the nasopharynx of 0.5%-3% of normal
infants and children but was not common in adults.
Nontypeable (unencapsulated) strains are also frequent
inhabitants of the human respiratory tract.
In some persons, the organism causes an invasive infection.
The exact mode of invasion to the bloodstream is unknown.
Antecedent viral or mycoplasma infection of the upper
respiratory tract may be a contributing factor. The bacteria
spread in the bloodstream to distant sites in the body.
Meninges are especially likely to be affected.
The most striking feature of Hib disease is age-dependent
susceptibility. Hib disease is not common beyond 5 years
of age. Passive protection of some infants is provided by
transplacentally acquired maternal IgG antibodies and
breastfeeding during the first 6 months of life. In the
prevaccine era peak attack rates occurred at 6-7 months of
age, declining thereafter. The presumed reason for this age
distribution is the acquisition of immunity to Hib with
increasing age.
Antibodies to Hib capsular polysaccharide are protective.
The precise level of antibody required for protection against
invasive disease is not clearly established. However, a titer
of 1 jig/mL 3 weeks postvaccination correlated with
protection in studies following vaccination with unconju-
gated purified polyribosylribitol phosphate (PRP) vaccine
and suggested long-term protection from invasive disease.
Acquisition of both anticapsular and serum bactericidal
antibody is inversely related to the age-specific incidence
of Hib disease.
In the prevaccine era, most children acquired immunity by
5-6 years of age through asymptomatic infection by Hib
bacteria. Since only a relatively small proportion of children
carry Hib at any time, it has been postulated that exposure
to organisms that share common antigenic structures with
the capsule of Hib (so-called “cross-reacting organisms”)
may also stimulate the development of anticapsular antibodies
against Hib. Natural exposure to Hib also induces antibodies
to outer membrane proteins, lipopolysaccharides, and other
antigens on the surface of the bacterium.
The genetic constitution of the host may also be important
in susceptibility to infection with Hib. Risk for Hib disease
has been associated with a number of genetic markers, but
I
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the mechanism of these associations is unknown. No single
genetic relationship regulating susceptibility or immune
responses to polysaccharide antigens has yet been
convincingly demonstrated.
Clinical Features
Invasive disease caused by H. influenzae type b can affect
many organ systems. The most common types of invasive
disease are meningitis, epiglottitis, pneumonia, arthritis,
and cellulitis.
Meningitis is infection of the membranes covering the brain
and is the most common clinical manifestation of invasive
Hib disease, accounting for 50%-65% of cases in the pre-
vaccine era. Hallmarks of Hib meningitis are fever,
decreased mental status, and stiff neck (these symptoms also
occur with meningitis caused by other bacteria). Hearing
impairment or other neurologic sequelae occur in 15%-30%
of survivors. The case-fatality rate is 2%-5%, despite
appropriate antimicrobial therapy.
Epiglottitis is an infection and swelling of the epiglottis, the
tissue in the throat that covers and protects the larynx during
swallowing. Epiglottitis may cause life-threatening airway
obstruction.
Septic arthritis (joint infection), cellulitis (rapidly progress-
ing skin infection which usually involves face, head, or
neck), and pneumonia (which can be mild focal or severe
empyema) are common manifestations of invasive disease.
Osteomyelitis (bone infection) and pericarditis (infection
of the sac covering the heart) are less common forms of
invasive disease. Otitis media and acute bronchitis due to
H. influenzae are generally caused by nontypeable strains.
Hib strains account for only 5%-10% of H. influenzae
causing otitis media.
Nontypeable (unencapsulated) strains may cause invasive
disease but are generally less virulent than encapsulated
strains. Nontypeable strains are rare causes of serious
infection among children but are a common cause of ear
infections in children and bronchitis in adults.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Clinical Features*
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Meningitis
* Accounted for approximately
50%-65% of cases in the
prevaccine era
* Hearing impairment or neurologic
sequelae in 15%-30%
• Case fatality rate 2%-5% despite of
effective antimicrobial therapy
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Laboratory Diagnosis
A Gram stain of an infected body fluid may demonstrate
small gram-negative coccobacilli suggestive of invasive
Haemophilus disease. CSF, blood, pleural fluid, joint fluid,
and middle ear aspirates should be cultured on appropriate
media. A positive culture for H. influenzae establishes the
diagnosis.
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All isolates of H. influenzae should be serotyped. This is
an extremely important laboratory procedure that should be
performed on every isolate of H. influenzae, especially those
obtained from children younger thanl5 years of age. This
test determines whether an isolate is type b, which is the
only type that is potentially vaccine preventable. Serotyping
is usually done by either the state health department
laboratory or a reference laboratory.
Antigen detection may be used as an adjunct to culture,
particularly in diagnosing H. influenzae infection in patients
who have been partially treated with antimicrobial agents,
in which case the organism may not be viable on culture.
Two tests are available. Latex agglutination is a rapid, sensitive,
and specific method to detect Hib capsular polysaccharide
antigen in CSF, but a negative test does not exclude the
diagnosis, and false-positive tests have been reported.
Antigen testing of serum and urine is not recommended.
Counterimmunoelectrophoresis is similar to latex aggluti-
nation but is less sensitive, takes longer, and is more difficult
to perform.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Medical Management
Hospitalization required
• Treatment with an effective 3rd
generation cephalosporin, or
chloramphenicol plus ampicillin
* Ampicillin-resistant strains now
common throughout the United
States
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Epidemiology
• Reservoir
• Transmission
• Temporal pattern
• Communicability
Human
Asymptomatic carriers
Respiratory droplets
Peaks in Sept-Dec
and March-May
Generally limited but
higher in some
circumstances
Medical Management
Hospitalization is generally required for invasive Hib disease.
Antimicrobial therapy with an effective third-generation
cephalosporin (cefotaxime or ceftriaxone), or chloram-
phenicol in combination with ampicillin should be begun
immediately. The treatment course is usually 10 days.
Ampicillin-resistant strains of Hib are now common
throughout the United States. Children with life-threatening
illness in which Hib may be the etiologic agent should not
receive ampicillin alone as initial empiric therapy.
I
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Epidemiology
|
Occurrence i
Hib disease occurs worldwide. However, the incidence out-
j
side the United States and Europe has not been determined.
]
Reservoir
Humans (asymptomatic carriers) are the only known
reservoir. Hib does not survive in the environment on
inanimate surfaces.
Transmission
The primary mode of Hib transmission is presumably by
respiratory droplet spread, although firm evidence for this
mechanism is lacking.
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Temporal Pattern
Several studies in the prevaccine era described a bimodal
seasonal pattern in the United States, with one peak during
September through December and a second peak during
March through May. The reason for this bimodal pattern is
not known.
Communicability
The contagious potential of invasive Hib disease is consid-
ered to be limited. However, certain circumstances, particu-
larly close contact with a case-patient (e.g., household, child
care, or institutional setting) can lead to outbreaks or direct
secondary transmission of the disease.
Secular Trends in the United States
H. influenzae infections became nationally reportable in 1991.
Serotype-specific reporting continues to be incomplete.
Before the availability of national reporting data, several
areas conducted active surveillance for H. influenzae disease,
which allowed estimates of disease nationwide. In the early
1980s, it was estimated that about 20,000 cases occurred
annually in the United States, primarily among children
younger than 5 years of age (40-50 cases per 100,000 popu-
lation). The incidence of invasive Hib disease began to
decline dramatically in the late 1980s, coincident with
licensure of conjugate Hib vaccines, and has declined by
more than 99% compared with the prevaccine era.
From 1996 through 2000, an average of 1,247 invasive
H. influenzae infections per year were reported to CDC in
all age groups (range 1,162-1,398 per year). Of these, an
average of 272 (approximately 22%) per year were among
children younger than 5 years of age. Serotype was known
for 76% of the invasive cases in this age group.
Three-hundred forty-one (average of 68 cases per year) were
due to type b.
There is evidence that Hib vaccines decrease the rate of car-
riage of Hib among vaccinated children, thereby decreasing
the chance that unvaccinated children will be exposed.
Incidence is strikingly age-dependent. In the prevaccine
era, up to 60% of invasive disease occurred before age
1 2 months, with a peak occurrence among children
6-11 months of age. Children 60 months of age and older
account for less than 10% of invasive disease.
In 1998-2000, approximately 44% of children younger than
5 years of age with confirmed invasive Hib disease were
younger than 6 months of age and too young to have
Haemophilus influenzae type b-
United States, 1996-2000
* Incidence has fallen 99% since
prevaccine era
* 341 confirmed Hib cases reported
during 1996-2000 (average of 68
cases per year)
* Most recent cases in unvaccinated
or incompletely vaccinated
children
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completed a three-dose primary vaccination series. Fifty-six
percent were age 6 months or older and were eligible to have
completed the primary vaccination series. Of these age-eligible
children, 68% were either incompletely vaccinated (fewer
than 3 doses) or their vaccination status was unknown.
Thirty-two percent of children aged 6-59 months with
confirmed type h disease had received three or more doses of
Hih vaccine, including 22 who had received a booster dose
14 or more days before onset of their illness. The cause of
Hih vaccine failure in these children is not known.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Risk Factors for Invasive Disease
• Exposure factors
—household crowding
—large household size
—child care attendance
—low socioeconomic status
—low parental education
—school-aged siblings
• Host factors
—race/ethnicity
—chronic disease
In 2004, among children younger than 5 years of age, 19 cases
of invasive disease due to Hih were reported in the United
States. In addition, another 177 cases caused by unknown
H. influenzae serotypes were reported, so the actual number
of Hih cases could be between 19 and 196. Most cases were
among unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated children.
Risk factors for Hih disease include exposure factors and
host factors that increase the likelihood of exposure to Hih.
Exposure factors include household crowding, large house-
hold size, child care attendance, low socioeconomic status,
low parental education levels, and school-aged siblings.
Host factors include race/ethnicity (elevated risk among
African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans
—
possibly
confounded by socioeconomic variables that are associated
with both race/ethnicity and Hih disease), chronic diseases
(e.g., sickle cell anemia, antibody deficiency syndromes,
malignancies, especially during chemotherapy), and possibly
gender (risk is higher for males).
Protective factors (effect limited to infants younger than
6 months of age) include breastfeeding and passively
acquired maternal antibody.
Secondary Hib disease is defined as illness occurring 1-60
days following contact with an ill child, and accounts for
less than 5% of all invasive Hib disease. Among household
contacts, six studies have found a secondary attack rate of
0.3% in the month following onset of the index case, which
is about 600-fold higher than the risk for the general popu-
lation. Attack rates varied substantially with age, from 3.7%
among children 2 years of age and younger to 0% among
contacts 6 years of age and older. In these household contacts,
64% of secondary cases occurred within the first week
(excluding the first 24 hours) of disease onset in the index
patient, 20% during the second week, and 16% during the
third and fourth weeks.
Data are conflicting regarding the risk of secondary trans-
mission among child care contacts. Secondary attack rates
have varied from 0% to as high as 2.7%. Most studies seem
to suggest that child care contacts are at relatively low risk
for secondary transmission of Hib disease particularly if
contacts are age-appropriately vaccinated.
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Haemophilus influenzae type b Vaccines
Characteristics
A pure polysaccharide vaccine (HbPV) was licensed in the
United States in 1985. The vaccine was not effective in
children younger than 18 months of age. Estimates of
efficacy in older children varied widely, from 88% to '69%
(a negative efficacy implies greater disease risk for vaccinees
than nonvaccinees). HhPV was used until 1988 but is no
longer available in the United States.
The characteristics of the Hib polysaccharide were similar
to other polysaccharide vaccines (e.g., pneumococcal,
meningococcal). The response to the vaccine was typical of
a T'independent antigen, most notably an age-dependent
immune response, and poor immunogenicity in children
2 years of age and younger. In addition, no boost in
antibody titer was observed with repeated doses, the antibody
that was produced was relatively low-affinity IgM, and
switching to IgG production was minimal.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Polysaccharide-Protein Conjugate Vaccines
Conjugation is the process of chemically bonding a polysac-
charide (a somewhat ineffective antigen) to a protein “carrier,”
which is a more effective antigen. This process changes the
polysaccharide from a T-independent to a T-dependent
antigen and greatly improves immunogenicity, particularly
in young children. In addition, repeat doses of Hib conjugate
vaccines elicit booster responses and allow maturation of
class-specific immunity with predominance of IgG antibody.
The Hib conjugates also cause carrier priming and elicit
antibody to “useful” carrier protein.
The first Hib conjugate vaccine (PRP-D, ProHIBIT) was
licensed in December 1987. This vaccine was not consistently
immunogenic in children younger than 18 months of age.
PRP-D is no longer available in the United States.
Three conjugate Hib vaccines are licensed for use in infants
as young as 6 weeks of age (see below). All three vaccines
utilize different carrier proteins. Two combination vaccines
that contain Hib conjugate vaccine are also available.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Polysaccharide Vaccine
' Available 1985-1988
• Not effective in children
<18 months of age
• Effectiveness in older children
variable
Polysaccharide Vaccines
* Age-related immune response
* Not consistently immunogenic in
children <2 years old
• No booster response
• Antibody with less functional
activity
Polysaccharide Conjugate
Vaccines
* Stimulates T-dependent immunity
* Enhanced antibody production,
especially in young children
* Repeat doses elicit booster
response
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Conjugate Vaccines
* 3 conjugate vaccines licensed for
use in infants as young as 6 weeks
of age
* All utilize different carrier proteins
* 2 combination vaccines available
that contain Hib vaccine
Haemophilus influenzae type b Conjugate Vaccines
Vaccine Protein Carrier Manufacturer
HbOC (HibTITER) Mutant diphtheria protein Wyeth
PRP-T (ActHIB) Tetanus toxoid sanofi pasteur
PRP-OMP (PedvaxHIB) Meningococcal group B
outer membrane protein
Merck
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Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
All three Hib conjugate vaccines licensed for use in infants
are highly immunogenic. More than 95% of infants will
develop protective antibody levels after a primary series of
two or three doses. Clinical efficacy has been estimated at
95% to 100%. Invasive Hih disease in a completely
vaccinated infant is uncommon.
Hih vaccine is immunogenic in patients with increased risk
for invasive disease, such as those with sickle-cell disease,
leukemia, or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infec-
tion, and those who have had a splenectomy. However, in
persons with HIV infection, immunogenicity varies with
stage of infection and degree of immunocompromise.
Efficacy studies have not been performed in populations
with increased risk of invasive disease.
Vaccination Schedule and Use
All infants, including those born prematurely, should
receive a primary series of conjugate Hih vaccine (separate
or in combination), beginning at 2 months of age. The
number of doses in the primary series depends on the type of
vaccine used. A primary series of PRP-OMP (PedvaxHIB)
vaccine is two doses; HbOC (HihTITER) and PRP-T
(ActHIB) require a three-dose primary series (see table
below). A booster is recommended at 12-15 months
regardless of which vaccine is used for the primary series.
ACIP-Recommended Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib)
Routine Vaccination Schedule
Vaccine 2 Months 4 Months 6 Months 12-15 Months
HbOC Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Booster
PRP-T Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Booster
PRP-OMP Dose 1 Dose 2 Booster
The recommended interval between primary series doses is
8 weeks, with a minimum interval of 4 weeks. At least 8
weeks should separate the booster dose from the previous
(second or third) dose. Hib vaccines may be given simulta-
neously with all other vaccines.
Limited data suggest that Hib conjugate vaccines given
before 6 weeks of age may induce immunologic tolerance
to subsequent doses of Hib vaccine. A dose given before
6 weeks of age may reduce the response to subsequent doses.
As a result, Hib vaccines, including combination vaccines
that contain Hib conjugate, should never be given to a
child younger than 6 weeks of age.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine
* Recommended interval 8 weeks for
primary series doses
* Minimum interval 4 weeks for
primary series doses
* Vaccination at <6 weeks of age
may induce immunologic tolerance
to Hib antigen
* Minimum age 6 weeks
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All three conjugate Hib vaccines licensed for use in
infants are interchangeable. A series that includes
vaccine of more than one type will induce a protective
antibody level. If it is necessary to change vaccine type,
three doses of any combination constitute the primary
series. Any licensed conjugate vaccine may be used for
the booster dose, regardless of what was administered in
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine Interchangeability
* All conjugate Hib vaccines
interchangeable for primary series
and booster dose
• 3 dose primary series if more than
one brand of vaccine used
the primary series.
Unvaccinated children 7 months of age and older may
not require a full series of three or four doses. The number
of doses a child needs to complete the series depends on
the child’s current age.
Haemophilus influenzae type b Vaccine
Delayed Vaccination Schedule
* Children starting late may not need
entire 3 or 4 dose series
* Number of doses child requires
depends on current age
* All children 15-59 months of age
need at least 1 dose
Detailed Vaccination Schedule
for Haemophilus influenzae type b Conjugate Vaccines
Vaccine
Age at Dose
(Months) Primary Series Booster
HbOC/PRP-T
(HibTITER, ActHIB)
2-6 3 doses, 2 months apart 12-15 months*
7-11 2 doses, 2 months apart 12-15 months*
12-14 1 dose 2 months later
15-59 1 dose —
PRP-OMP
(PedvaxHIB)
2-6 2 doses, 2 months apart 12-15 months*
7-11 2 doses, 2 months apart 12-15 months*
12-14 1 dose 2 months later
15-59 1 dose —
*At least 2 months after previous dose
HbOC or PRP-T [HibTITER, ActHIR]
Previously unvaccinated infants aged 2-6 months should
receive three doses of vaccine administered 2 months apart,
followed by a booster dose at age 12-15 months, administered
at least 2 months after the last dose. Unvaccinated children
aged 7-1 1 months should receive two doses of vaccine
2 months apart, followed by a booster dose at age 12-15
months, administered at least 2 months after the last dose.
Unvaccinated children aged 12-14 months should receive
two doses of vaccine, at least 2 months apart. Any previously
unvaccinated child aged 15-59 months should receive a
single dose of vaccine.
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Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine
Vaccination Following Invasive Disease
• Children <24 months may not
develop protective antibody after
invasive disease
• Vaccinate during convalescence
• Complete series for age
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine
Use in Older Children and Adults
• Generally not recommended for
persons >59 months of age
• Consider for high-risk persons:
asplenia, immunodeficiency, HIV
infection, HSCT
One pediatric dose of any
conjugate vaccine
Combination Vaccines
Containing Hib
• DTaP—Hib
-TriHIBit
• Hepatitis B—Hib
-COMVAX
PRP-OMP [PedvaxHIB]
Unvaccinated children aged 2-1 1 months should receive
two doses of vaccine 2 months apart, followed by a booster
dose at 12-15 months of age, at least 2 months after the last
dose. Unvaccinated children aged 12-14 months should
receive two doses of vaccine 2 months apart. Any previously
unvaccinated child 15-59 months of age should receive a
single dose of vaccine.
Children with a lapsed Hib immunization series (i.e., children
who have received one or more doses of Hib-containing
vaccine but are not up-to-date for their age) may not need
all the remaining doses of a three- or four-dose series.
Vaccination of children with a lapsed schedule is addressed
in the catch-up schedule, published annually with the
childhood vaccination schedule.
Hib invasive disease does not always result in development
of protective anti-PRP antibody levels. Children younger
than 24 months of age who develop invasive Hib disease
should be considered susceptible and should receive Hih
vaccine. Vaccination of these children should start as soon
as possible during the convalescent phase of the illness.
The schedule should be completed as recommended for the
child's age.
Vaccination of Older Children and Adults
In general, Hib vaccination of children older than 59
months of age is not recommended. The majority of older
children are immune to Hib, probably from asymptomatic
infection as infants. However, some older children and
adults are at increased risk for invasive Hib disease and may
be vaccinated if they were not vaccinated in childhood.
These include those with functional or anatomic asplenia
(e.g., sickle cell disease, postsplenectomy), immunodeficiency
(in particular, persons with IgG2 subclass deficiency),
immunosuppression from cancer chemotherapy, infection
with HIV, and receipt of a hematopoietic stem cell transplant
(HSCT). Previously unvaccinated persons older than
59 months of age with one of these high-risk conditions
should be given at least one pediatric dose of any Hib
conjugate vaccine.
Combination Vaccines
Two combination vaccines that contain H. influenzae type b
are available in the United States—a DTaP-Hib combination
(TriHIBit, sanofi pasteur), and a hepatitis B-Hib combination
(Comvax, Merck). Combination vaccines containing
whole-cell pertussis vaccine and Hib are no longer available
in the United States.
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TriHIBit
TriHlBit was approved for use in the United States in
September 1996. The vaccines are packaged together in
separate vials, and the DTaP component (Tripedia) is used
to reconstitute the Hib component (ActHIB). No other
brand of DTaP and Hib vaccine may be used to produce this
combination (e.g., Infanrix must not be substituted for
Tripedia). In addition, when supplied as TriHIBit, the DTaP
and Hib components have a single lot number. Providers
should generally use only the DTaP and Hib supplied
together as TriHIBit. However, it is acceptable to combine
Tripedia and ActHIB that have been supplied separately
(i.e., not packaged as TriHIBit). In this situation, the lot
numbers of both vaccines should be recorded.
Because of evidence of reduced immunogenicity of the Hib
component when used as a combination, TriHIBit is not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use as
the primary series at 2, 4, or 6 months of age. It is
approved only for the fourth dose of the DTaP and Hib
series. If TriHIBit is administered as one or more doses of
the primary series at 2, 4, or 6 months of age, the Hib doses
should be disregarded, and the child should be revaccinated
as age-appropriate for Hib. The DTaP doses may be counted
as valid and do not need to be repeated.
Although TriHIBit cannot be used in the primary series at
2, 4, or 6 months of age, it may be used as the booster
(final) dose following a series of single-antigen Hib vaccine
or combination hepatitis B—Hib vaccine (Comvax).
Therefore, TriHIBit can be used if the child is 12 months of
age or older and has received at least one prior dose of Hih
vaccine 2 or more months earlier and TriHIBit will be the
last dose in the Hib series. For example, TriHIBit can be
used for the booster dose at 12—15 months of age in a child
who has received Comvax or PedvaxHib at 2 and 4 months
of age, or three prior doses of HihTiter or ActHih. TriHIBit
can also be used at 15-59 months of age in a child who has
received at least one prior dose of any Hib-containing vaccine.
TriHIBit should not be used if the child has received no
prior Hib doses.
TriHIBit
* ActHIB reconstituted with Tripedia
* Not approved for the primary series
at 2, 4, or 6 months of age
* Approved for the fourth dose of the
DTaP and Hib series only
* Primary series Hib doses given as
TriHIBit should be disregarded
TriHIBit ^
* May be used as the booster dose
of the Hib series at >12 months of
age following any Hib vaccine
series*
Should not be used if child has
receive no prior Hib doses
*booster dose should follow prior dose by >2 months
Comvax
Comvax is a combination hepatitis B—Hib vaccine, licensed
in October 1996. The vaccine contains a standard dose of
PRP-OMP (PedvaxHlB), and 5 meg (pediatric dose) of
Merck’s hepatitis B vaccine. Comvax is licensed for use when
either or both antigens are indicated. However, because of
the potential of immune tolerance to the Hib antigen,
Comvax should not be used in infants younger than 6
weeks of age (i.e., the birth dose of hepatitis B, or a dose at
1 month of age, if the infant is on a 0-1 -6-month schedule).
COMVAX
* Hepatitis B-Hib combination
* Use when either or both antigens
indicated >6 weeks of age
* Not licensed for use if mother
HBsAg+
* Spacing and timing rules same as
for individual antigens
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Comvax is not licensed for infants whose mothers are
known to he hepatitis B surface antigen positive (i.e., acute
or chronic infection with hepatitis B virus). However, the
vaccine contains the same dose of Merck’s hepatitis B
vaccine recommended for these infants, so response to the
hepatitis B component of Comvax should he adequate. The
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
has approved off-label use of Comvax in children whose
mother is HBsAg positive or whose HBsAg status is
unknown. See
http://www.cdc.gOv/nip/vfc/acip_recs/1003hepb.pdf.
Recommendations for spacing and timing of Comvax are
the same as those for the individual antigens. In particular,
the third dose must be given at 12 months of age or older
and at least 2 months after the second dose, as recommended
for PRP-OMP.
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
* Swelling, redness, or pain in
5%-30% of recipients
* Systemic reactions infrequent
* Serious adverse reactions rare
Haemophilus influenzae type b
Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
* Swelling, redness, or pain in
5%-30% of recipients
* Systemic reactions infrequent
* Serious adverse reactions rare
Adverse Reactions Folloiniing
Vaccination
Adverse reaction following Hib conjugate vaccines are not
common. Swelling, redness, or pain have been reported in
5%-30% of recipients and usually resolve within 12-24
hours. Systemic reactions such as fever and irritability are
infrequent. Serious adverse reactions are rare. Available
information on adverse reactions suggests that the risks for
local and systemic reactions following TriHIBit administration
are similar to those following concurrent administration of
its individual component vaccines, and are probably due to
the DTaP vaccine.
All serious adverse events that occur after receipt of any
vaccine should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Events
Reporting System (VAERS) (http://vaers.hhs.gov/).
Contraindications and Precautions
to Vaccination
Vaccination with Hib conjugate vaccine is contraindicated
for persons known to have experienced a severe allergic
reaction (anaphylaxis) following a prior dose of that vaccine.
Vaccination should be delayed for children with moderate
or severe acute illnesses. Minor illnesses (e.g., mild upper
respiratory infection) are not contraindications to vaccination.
Hib conjugate vaccines are contraindicated for children
younger than 6 weeks of age because of the potential for
development of immunologic tolerance.
Contraindications and precautions for the use of TriHIBit
and Comvax are the same as those for its individual component
vaccines (i.e., DTaP, Hib, and hepatitis B).
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Vaccine Storage and Handling
All Hib conjugate vaccines should be shipped in insulated
containers to prevent freezing. Unreconstituted or liquid
vaccine should be stored at refrigerator temperature
(35 -46 F 12 -8 C]). Hib vaccine must not be frozen.
ActHlB should be used within 24 hours of reconstitution and
TriHlBit should be used immediately (within 30 minutes).
Surveillance and Reporting of
Hib Disease
Invasive Hib disease is a reportable condition in most states.
All healthcare workers should report any case of invasive
Hib disease to local and state health departments.
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Measles is an acute viral infectious disease. References to
measles can be found from as early as the 7th century. The
disease was described by the Persian physician Rhazes in the
10th century as “more dreaded than smallpox.”
In 1846, Peter Panum described the incubation period of
measles and lifelong immunity after recovery from the disease.
Enders and Peebles isolated the virus in human and monkey
kidney tissue culture in 1954. The first live attenuated
vaccine was licensed for use in the United States in 1963
(Edmonston B strain).
Mleasles
Measles
* Highly contagious viral illness
• First described in 7th century
• Near universal infection of
childhood in prevaccination era
* Common and often fatal in
developing countries
Before a vaccine was available, infection with measles virus
was nearly universal during childhood, and more than 90%
of persons were immune by age 15 years. Measles is still a
common and often fatal disease in developing countries. The
World Health Organization estimates there were 30-40 million
cases and 745,000 deaths from measles in 2001.
Measles Virus
The measles virus is a paramyxovirus, genus Morbillivirus.
It is 100-200 nm in diameter, with a core of single-stranded
RNA, and is closely related to the rinderpest and canine
distemper viruses. Two membrane envelope proteins are
important in pathogenesis. They are the E (fusion) protein,
which is responsible for fusion of virus and host cell
membranes, viral penetration, and hemolysis, and the
H (hemagglutinin) protein, which is responsible for
adsorption of virus to cells.
There is only one antigenic type of measles virus. Although
studies have documented changes in the H glycoprotein,
these changes do not appear to be epidemiologically important
(i.e., no change in vaccine efficacy has been observed).
Measles virus is rapidly inactivated by heat, light, acidic pH,
ether, and trypsin. It has a short survival time (less than 2
hours) in the air or on objects and surfaces.
Measles Virus
* Paramyxovirus (RNA)
* Hemagglutinin important surface
antigen
* One antigenic type
* Rapidly inactivated by heat and
light
Pathogenesis
Measles is a systemic infection. The primary site of infection
is the respiratory epithelium of the nasopharynx. Two to
three days after invasion and replication in the respiratory
epithelium and regional lymph nodes, a primary viremia
occurs with subsequent infection of the reticuloendothelial
system, hollowing further viral replication in regional and
distal reticuloendothelial sites, a second viremia occurs 5 to 7
days after initial infection. During this viremia, there may he
infection of the respiratory tract and other organs. Measles virus
is shed from the nasopharynx beginning with the prodrome
until 3-4 days after rash onset.
Measles Pathogenesis
Respiratory transmission of virus
* Replication in nasopharynx and
regional lymph nodes
• Primary viremia 2-3 days after
exposure
• Secondary viremia 5-7 days after
exposure with spread to tissues
125
Measles
10
1
Measles Clinical Features
* Incubation period 10-12 days
Clinical Features
The incubation period of measles, from exposure to prodrome
averages 10-12 days. From exposure to rash onset averages
14 days (range, 7-18 days).
Prodrome
* Stepwise increase in fever to
lOS^F or higher
* Cough, coryza, conjunctivitis
* Koplik spots
The prodrome lasts 2-4 days (range 1-7 days). It is charac-
terized by fever, which increases in stepwise fashion, often
peaking as high as 103°-105°F. This is followed by the onset
of cough, coryza (runny nose), or conjunctivitis.
Koplik spots, a rash (enanthem) present on mucous
membranes, is considered to be pathognomonic for measles.
It occurs 1-2 days before the rash to 1-2 days after the rash,
and appears as punctate blue-white spots on the bright red
background of the buccal mucosa.
Measles Clinical Features
Rash
• 2-4 days after prodrome, 14 days
after exposure
• Persists 5-6 days
* Begins on face and head
* Maculopapular, becomes
confluent
Fades in order of appearance
Measles Complications
Condition
Diarrhea
Otitis media
Pneumonia
Encephalitis
Seizures
Death
Percent reported
8
7
6
0.1
0.6 - 0.7
0.2
Based on 1965>1992 surveillance data
Measles Complications by Age Group
<5 $-19 20*
Age group (yrs)
The measles rash is a maculopapular eruption that usually
lasts 5-6 days. It begins at the hairline, then involves the
face and upper neck. During the next 3 days, the rash
gradually proceeds downward and outward, reaching the
hands and feet. The maculopapular lesions are generally
discrete, but may become confluent, particularly on the upper
body. Initially, lesions blanch with fingertip pressure. By 3-4
days, most do not blanch with pressure. Fine desquamation
occurs over more severely involved areas. The rash fades in
the same order that it appears, from head to extremities.
Other symptoms of measles include anorexia, diarrhea,
especially in infants, and generalized lymphadenopathy.
Complications
Approximately 30% of reported measles cases have one or
more complications. Complications of measles are more
common among children younger than 5 years of age and
adults 20 years of age and older.
From 1985 through 1992, diarrhea was reported in 8% of
measles cases, making this the most commonly reported
complication of measles. Otitis media was reported in 7% of
cases and occurs almost exclusively in children. Pneumonia
(in 6% of reported cases) may be viral or superimposed
bacterial, and is the most common cause of death.
Acute encephalitis occurs in approximately 0.1% of reported
cases. Onset generally occurs 6 days after rash onset (range
1-15 days) and is characterized by fever, headache, vomiting,
stiff neck, meningeal irritation, drowsiness, convulsions, and
coma. Cerebrospinal fluid shows pleocytosis and elevated
protein. The case-fatality rate is approximately 15%. Some
form of residual neurologic damage occurs in as many as
25% of cases. Seizures (with or without fever) are reported
in 0.6% to 0.7% of cases.
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Death from measles was reported in approximately 0.2% of
the cases in the United States from 1985 through 1992. As
with other complications of measles, the risk of death is
higher among young children and adults. Pneumonia
accounts for about 60% of deaths. The most common causes
of death are pneumonia in children and acute encephalitis
in adults.
Subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (SSPE) is a rare
degenerative central nervous system disease believed to be
due to persistent measles virus infection of the hrain. Onset
occurs an average of 7 years after measles (range 1
month-27 years), and occurs in five to ten cases per million
reported measles cases. The onset is insidious, with progres-
sive deterioration of behavior and intellect, followed by
ataxia (awkwardness), myoclonic seizures, and eventually
death. SSPE has been extremely rare since the early 1980s.
Measles illness during pregnancy results in a higher risk of
premature labor, spontaneous abortion, and low-birthweight
infants. Birth defects (with no definable pattern of malfor-
mation) have been reported rarely, without confirmation
that measles was the cause.
Atypical measles occurs only in persons who received inac-
tivated (“killed”) measles vaccine (KMV) and are
subsequently exposed to wild-type measles virus. An estimated
600,000 to 900,000 persons received KMV in the United
States from 1963 to 1967. KMV sensitizes the recipient to
measles virus antigens without providing protection.
Subsequent infection with measles virus leads to signs of
hypersensitivity polyserositis. The illness is characterized by
fever, pneumonia, pleural effusions, and edema. The rash is
usually maculopapular or petechial, but may have urticarial,
purpuric, or vesicular components. It appears first on the
wrists or ankles. Atypical measles may be prevented by
revaccinating with live measles vaccine. Moderate to severe
local reactions with or without fever may follow vaccination;
these reactions are less severe than with infection with wild
measles virus.
Modified measles occurs primarily in patients who received
immune globulin (IG) as postexposure prophylaxis and in
young infants who have some residual maternal antibody.
It is usually characterized hy a prolonged incubation period,
mild prodrome, and sparse, discrete rash of short duration.
Similar mild illness has been reported among previously
vaccinated persons.
Rarely reported in the United States, hemorrhagic measles
is characterized by high fever (105°-106°F), seizures, delirium,
respiratory distress, and hemorrhage into the skin and
mucous membranes.
Measles
Measles in an immunocompromised person may be severe
with a prolonged course. It is reported almost exclusively in
persons with T-cell deficiencies (certain leukemias, lym-
phomas, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome [AIDS])
It may occur without the typical rash, and a patient may
shed virus for several weeks after the acute illness.
Measles Laboratory Diagnosis
* Isolation of measles virus from a
clinical specimen (e.g.,
nasopharynx, urine)
* Significant rise in measles IgG by
any standard serologic assay
(e.g., EIA, HI)
* Positive serologic test for measles
IgM antibody
Measles in developing countries has resulted in high attack
rates among children younger than 12 months of age.
Measles is more severe in malnourished children, particularly
those with vitamin A deficiency. Complications include
diarrhea, dehydration, stomatitis, inability to feed, and
bacterial infections (skin and elsewhere). The case-fatality
rate may be as high as 25%. Measles is also a leading cause
of blindness in African children.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Isolation of measles virus is not recommended as a routine
method to diagnose measles. However, virus isolates are
extremely important for molecular epidemiologic surveillance
to help determine the geographic origin of the virus and the
viral strains circulating in the United States.
Measles virus can be isolated from urine, nasopharyngeal
aspirates, heparinized blood, or throat swabs. Specimens for
virus culture should be obtained from ever^' person with a
clinically suspected case of measles and should he shipped to
the state public health laboratory or CDC, at the direction
of the state health department. Clinical specimens for viral
isolation should be collected at the same time as samples
taken for serologic testing. Because the virus is more likely
to be isolated when the specimens are collected within
3 days of rash onset, collection of specimens for virus isolation
should not be delayed until serologic confirmation is
obtained. Clinical specimens should be obtained within
7 days, and not more than 10 days, after rash onset. A
detailed protocol for collection of specimens for viral
isolation is available on the CDC website at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/revb/measles/viral-isolation.htm.
Serologic testing, most commonly by enzyme-linked
immunoassay (ELISA or EIA), is widely available and may
be diagnostic if done at the appropriate time. Generally, a
previously susceptible person exposed to either vaccine or
wild-type measles virus will first mount an IgM response and
then an IgG response. The IgM response will be transient
(1-2 months), and the IgG response should persist for many
years. Uninfected persons should be IgM negative and will
be either IgG negative or IgG positive, depending upon
their previous infection history.
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ELISA for IgM antibody requires only a single serum specimen
and is diagnostic if positive. The preferred reference test is a
capture IgM test developed by CDC. This test should be
used to confirm every case of measles that is reported to have
some other type of laboratory confirmation. IgM capture tests
for measles are often positive on the day of rash onset.
However, in the first 72 hours after rash onset, up to 20% of
tests for IgM may give false-negative results. Tests that are
negative in the first 72 hours after rash onset should he
repeated. IgM is detectable for at least 28 days after rash
onset and frequently longer.
A variety of tests for IgG antibodies to measles are available
and include ELISA, hemagglutination inhibition (HI),
indirect fluorescent antibody tests, microneutralization, and
plaque reduction neutralization. Complement fixation,
while widely used in the past, is no longer recommended.
IgG testing for acute measles requires demonstration of a
rise in titer of antibody against measles virus, so two serum
specimens are always required. The first specimen should be
drawn as soon after rash onset as possible. The second speci-
men should be drawn 10-30 days later. The tests for IgG
antibody should be conducted on both specimens at the
same time. The same type of test should be used on both
specimens. The specific criteria for documenting an increase
in titer depend on the test.
Tests for IgG antibody require two serum specimens, and a
confirmed diagnosis cannot be made until the second
specimen is obtained. As a result, IgM tests are generally
preferred to confirm the diagnosis of measles.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Measles occurs throughout the world. However, interruption
of indigenous transmission of measles has been achieved in
the United States and other parts of the Western Hemisphere.
Reservoir
Measles is a human disease. There is no known animal
reservoir, and an asymptomatic carrier state has not been
documented.
Transmission
Measles transmission is primarily person to person via large
respiratory droplets. Airborne transmission via aerosolized
droplet nuclei has been documented in closed areas (e.g.,
office examination room) for up to 2 hours after a person
with measles occupied the area.
Measles Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
• Transmission Respiratory
Airborne
• Temporal pattern Peak in late winter-spring
* Communicability 4 days before to 4 days after
rash onset
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Temporal Pattern
In temperate areas, measles disease occurs primarily in late
winter and spring.
1
Communicability
Measles is highly communicable, with greater than 90%
secondary attack rates among susceptible persons. Measles
may he transmitted from 4 days before to 4 days after rash
onset. Maximum communicability occurs from onset of
prodrome through the first 3-4 days of rash.
Secular Trends in the United States
Before 1963, approximately 500,000 cases and 500 deaths
were reported annually, with epidemic cycles every 2-3
years. However, the actual number of cases was estimated
at 3-4 million annually. More than 50% of persons had
measles by age 6, and more than 90% had measles by age
15. The highest incidence was among 5-9-year'olds, who
generally accounted for more than 50% of reported cases.
Following licensure of vaccine in 1963, the incidence of
measles decreased by more than 98%, and 2-3-year epidemic
cycles no longer occurred. Because of this success, a 1978
Measles Elimination Program set a goal to eliminate indigenous
measles by October 1, 1982 (26,871 cases were reported in
1978). The 1982 elimination goal was not met, but in 1983,
only 1,497 cases were reported (0.6 cases per 100,000
population), the lowest annual total ever reported up to
that time.
During 1980-1988, a median of 57% of reported cases were
among school-aged persons (5-19 years of age), and a median
of 29% were among children younger than 5 years of age.
A median of 8% of cases were among infants younger than
1 year of age.
From 1985 through 1988, 42% of cases occurred in persons
who were vaccinated on or after their first birthday. During
these years, 68% of cases in school-aged children (5-19
years) occurred among those who had been appropriately
vaccinated. The occurrence of measles among previously
vaccinated children (i.e., vaccine failure) led to the
recommendation for a second dose in this age group.
Measles Resurgence
—
United States, 1989-1991
' Cases 55,622
' Age group affected Children <5 yrs
' Deaths 123
Measles Resurgence in 1989-1991
From 1989 through 1991, a dramatic increase in cases
occurred. During these 3 years a total of 55,622 cases were
reported (18,193 in 1989; 27,786 in 1990; 9,643 in 1991).
In addition to the increased number of cases, a change
occurred in their age distribution. Prior to the resurgence.
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school-aged children had accounted for the largest proportion
of reported cases. During the resurgence, 45% of all reported
cases were in children younger than 5 years of age. In 1990,
48% of patients were in this age group, the first time that
the proportion of cases in children younger than 5 years of
age exceeded the proportion of cases in 5-19-year'olds (35%).
Overall incidence rates were highest for Hispanics and
blacks and lowest for non-Hispanic whites. Among children
younger than 5 years of age, the incidence of measles among
blacks and Hispanics was four to seven times higher than
among non-Hispanic whites.
A total of 123 measles-associated deaths were reported
(death-to-case ratio of 2.2 per 1,000 cases). Forty-nine percent
of deaths were among children younger than 5 years of age.
Ninety percent of fatal cases occurred among persons with
no history of vaccination. Sixty-four deaths were reported in
1990, the largest annual number of deaths from measles
since 1971.
The most important cause of the measles resurgence of
1989-1991 was low vaccination coverage. Measles vaccine
coverage was low in many cities, including some that
experienced large outbreaks among preschool-aged children
throughout the early to mid-1980s. Surveys in areas experi-
encing outbreaks among preschool-aged children indicated
that as few as 50% of children had been vaccinated against
measles by their second birthday, and that black and
Hispanic children were less likely to be age-appropriately
vaccinated than were white children.
In addition, measles susceptibility of infants younger than
1 year of age may have increased. During the 1989—1991 ^
measles resurgence, incidence rates for infants were more '
than twice as high as those in any other age group. The
mothers of many infants who developed measles were
young, and their measles immunity was most often due to
vaccination rather than infection with wild virus. As a
result, a smaller amount of antibody was transferred across
the placenta to the fetus, compared with antibody transfer
from mothers who had higher antibody titers resulting from
wild-virus infection. The lower quantity of antibody resulted
in immunity that waned more rapidly, making infants
susceptible at a younger age than in the past.
The increase in measles in 1989-1991 was not limited to
the United States. Large outbreaks of measles were reported
by many other countries of North and Central America,
including Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
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Measles Since 1993
Reported cases of measles declined rapidly after the
1989-1991 resurf^ence. This decline was due primarily to
intensive efforts to vaccinate preschool-aged children.
Measles vaccination levels among 2-year-old children
increased from 70% in 1990 to 91% in 1997.
Since 1993, fewer than 500 cases have been reported annually,
and fewer than 200 cases per year have been reported since
1997. A record low annual total of 37 cases was reported in
2004. Available epidemiologic and virologic data indicate
that measles transmission in the United States has been
interrupted. The majority of cases are now imported from
other countries or linked to imported cases. Most imported
cases originate in Asia and Europe and occur both among
U.S. citizens traveling abroad and persons visiting the
United States from other countries. An aggressive measles
vaccination program by the Pan American Health
Organization has resulted in measles incidence now being
very low in Latin America and the Oaribbean. Measles elim-
ination from the Americas appears to be an achievable goal.
Since the mid-1990s, no age group has predominated among
reported cases of measles. Relative to earlier decades, an
increased proportion of cases now occur among adults. In
1973, persons 20 years of age and older accounted for only
about 3% of cases. In 1994, adults accounted for 24% of
cases, and in 2001, for 48% of all reported cases.
The size and makeup of measles outbreaks has changed since
the 1980s. Prior to 1989, the majority of outbreaks occurred
among middle, high school and college student populations.
As many as 95% of persons infected during these outbreaks
had received one prior dose of measles vaccine. A second
dose of measles vaccine was recommended for school-aged
children in 1989, and 49 states now require two doses of
measles vaccine for school-aged children. As a result,
measles outbreaks in school settings are now uncommon.
During the measles resurgence of 1989-1991, outbreaks
among preschool-aged children became more prominent.
More than 200 outbreaks were reported during each of these
years, several of which included more than 1,000 cases. The
largest outbreak involving predominantly unvaccinated pre-
school-aged children was in metropolitan Los Angeles,
California. More than 12,000 measles cases were reported
during this outbreak, which continued for almost 5 years
(1987-1992). The last large outbreak involving preschool-
aged children was reported in 1992.
Measles 1993-2004
* Record low annual total in 2004
(37 total cases)
* Transmission in the United States
interrupted
* Many cases among adults
* Most cases imported or linked to
importation
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Since 1993, the largest outbreaks of measles have occurred
in populations that refuse vaccination for religious or
i personal belief reasons, including communities in Utah and
j
Nevada and Christian Scientist schools in Missouri and
Illinois. Most outbreaks have involved limited spread from
measles imported from outside the United States. The
largest outbreak in 2000 involved nine persons in New York.
In 2003, a large measles outbreak occurred in the Republic of
the Marshall Islands. Between July 13 and November 7, a
total of 826 cases had been reported, with 100 measles-related
hospitalizations and 3 deaths. The outbreak affected pre-
dominantly preschool-aged children (41% of cases); adults
20 years and older accounted for 24% of cases. The measles
virus isolated in this outbreak (HI genotype) has been
documented to circulate in East Asia, particularly Japan,
China, and Korea. Factors contributing to this outbreak
were low population immunity due to inadequate vaccine
coverage, absence of recent transmission of measles virus,
and high susceptibility among infants. The outbreak was
controlled with aggressive case finding and a large vaccination
campaign targeting persons 6 months to 40 years of age.
Classification of IVleasies Cases
Clinical Classification of IVleasies Cases
A suspect case is defined as a febrile illness accompanied by
a generalized maculopapular rash.
A probable case meets the measles case definition of gener-
alized maculopapular rash lasting 3 days or longer, with fever
(101 F 138.3 C] or higher), which is accompanied by cough,
coryza, or conjunctivitis and has no or noncontributory
serologic or virologic testing and is not epidemiologically
linked to a confirmed case. A confirmed case meets the case
definition and is epidemiologically linked to another confirmed
or probable case or is laboratory confirmed. A laboratory-
confirmed case does not need to meet the clinical case definition.
Only confirmed cases should be reported to CDC, but both
confirmed and probable cases should be reported as soon as
possible to the local or state health department.
Epidemiologic Classification
An international imported case has its source outside the
country, rash onset occurs within 2 1 days after entering the
country, and illness cannot be linked to local transmission.
An indigenous case is any case that cannot be proved to be
imported. Subclasses of indigenous cases exist; for more
information, see CDC Manual for Surveillance of Vaccine-
Preventable Diseases (available on the NIP website at
http://www.cdc.gov.nip/publications/surv-manual/default.htm).
Measles
Measles Clinical Case Definition
* Generalized rash lasting >3 days,
and
• Temperature >101°F (38.3“C), and
Cough or coryza or conjunctivitis
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Measles Vaccines
1963 Killed and live attenuated vaccines
1965 Live further attenuated vaccine
1967 Killed vaccine withdrawn
1968 Live further attenuated vaccine
(Edmonston-Enders strain)
1971 Licensure of combined measles-
mumps-rubella vaccine
1989 Two-dose schedule
2005 Licensure of combined measles-
mumps-rubella-varicella vaccine
Measles Vaccine
Measles virus was first isolated by John Enders in 1954. The
first measles vaccines were licensed in 1963. In that year,
both an inactivated (“killed”) and a live attenuated vaccine
(Edmonston B strain) were licensed for use in the United
States. The inactivated vaccine was withdrawn in 1967
because it did not protect against measles virus infection.
Eurthermore, recipients of inactivated measles vaccine fre-
quently developed a unique syndrome, atypical measles, if
they were infected with wild-type measles virus (see
Atypical Measles, above). The original Edmonston B vaccine
was withdrawn in 1975 because of a relatively high frequency
of fever and rash in recipients. A live, further attenuated
vaccine (Schwarz strain) was first introduced in 1965 hut
also is no longer used in the United States. Another live,
further attenuated strain vaccine (Edmonston-Enders strain)
was licensed in 1968. These further attenuated vaccines
caused fewer reactions than the original Edmonston B vaccine.
Characteristics
Measles Vaccine
* Composition
• Efficacy
* Duration of
Immunity
• Schedule
Live virus
95% (range, 90%-98%)
Lifelong
2 doses
* Should be administered with mumps
and rubella as MMR or with mumps,
rubella and varicella as MMRV
The only measles virus vaccine now available in the United
States is a live, more attenuated Edmonston-Enders strain
(formerly called “Moraten”). The vaccine is available as a
single-antigen preparation, combined with rubella vaccine,
combined with mumps and rubella vaccines (MMR), or
combined with mumps, rubella, and varicella vaccine as
MMRV (ProQuad). The Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that a
combination vaccine (MMR or MMRV) be used when any
of the individual components is indicated (and for MMRV,
if the vaccinee is 12 months through 12 years of age). Use
of single-antigen measles vaccine is not recommended.
Measles vaccine is prepared in chick embryo fibroblast tissue
culture. MMR and MMRV are supplied as a lyophylized
(freeze-dried) powder and are reconstituted with sterile,
preservative-free water. The vaccines contain a small
amount of human albumin, neomycin, sorbitol, and gelatin.
MMR Vaccine Failure
* Measles, mumps, or rubella
disease (or lack of immunity) in a
previously vaccinated person
* 2%-5% of recipients do not
respond to the first dose
* Caused by antibody, damaged
vaccine, incorrect records
' Most persons with vaccine failure
will respond to second dose
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Measles vaccine produces an inapparent or mild, noncom-
municable infection. Measles antibodies develop in approxi-
mately 95% of children vaccinated at 12 months of age and
98% of children vaccinated at 15 months of age.
Seroconversion rates are similar for single-antigen measles
vaccine, MMR, and MMRV Approximately 2%-5% of
children who receive only one dose of MMR vaccine fail to
respond to it (i.e., primary vaccine failure). MMR vaccine
failure may occur because of passive antibody in the vaccine
recipient, damaged vaccine, incorrect records, or possibly
other reasons. Most persons who fail to respond to the first
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dose will respond to a second dose. Studies indicate that
more than 99% of persons who receive two doses of measles
vaccine (with the first dose administered no earlier than the
first birthday) develop serologic evidence of measles immunity.
Although the titer of vaccine-induced antibodies is lower
than that following natural disease, both serologic and epi-
demiologic evidence indicate that vaccine-induced immunity
appears to be long-term and probably lifelong in most persons.
Most vaccinated persons who appear to lose antibody show
an anamnestic immune response upon revaccination, indicating
that they are probably still immune. Although revaccination
can increase antibody titer in some persons, available data
indicate that the increased titer may not be sustained. Some
studies indicate that secondary vaccine failure (waning
immunity) may occur after successful vaccination, but this
appears to occur rarely and to play only a minor role in
measles transmission and outbreaks.
Vaccination ScKeduie and Use
Two doses of measles vaccine, as combination MMR,
separated by at least 4 weeks, are routinely recommended for
all children. All persons born during or after 1957 should
have documentation of at least one dose of MMR or other
evidence of measles immunity (see below). Certain adoles-
cents and adults should receive two doses of MMR.
Measles (MMR) Vaccine Indications
* All infants >12 months of age
* Susceptible adolescents and
adults without documented
evidence of immunity
The first dose of MMR should be given on or after the first
birthday. Any dose of measles-containing vaccine given
before 1 2 months of age should not be counted as part of
the series. Children vaccinated with measles-containing
vaccine before 12 months of age should be revaccinated
with two doses of MMR vaccine, the first of which should
be administered when the child is at least 12 months of age.
A second dose of MMR is recommended to produce
immunity in those who failed to respond to the first dose.
The second dose of MMR vaccine should routinely be given
at age 4-6 years, before a child enters kindergarten or first
grade. The preadolescent health visit at age 11-12 years can
serve as a catch-up opportunity to verify vaccination status
and administer MMR vaccine to those children who have
not yet received two doses of MMR.
The second dose of MMR may be administered as soon as
1 month (i.e., minimum of 28 days) after the first dose.
Children who have already received two doses of MMR
vaccine at least 4 weeks apart, with the first dose administered
no earlier than the first birthday, do not need an additional
dose when they enter school. Children without documentation
of adequate vaccination against measles, rubella, and mumps
or other acceptable evidence of immunity to these diseases
Measles Mumps Rubella Vaccine
*12 months is the recommended
and minimum age
• MMR given before 12 months
should not be counted as a valid
dose
* Revaccinate at >12 months of age
Second Dose of Measles Vaccine
* Intended to produce measles
immunity in persons who failed to
respond to the first dose (primary
vaccine failure)
* May boost antibody titers in some
persons
10
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Second Dose Recommendation
• First dose of MMR at 12-15
months
• Second dose of MMR at 4-6 years
• Second dose may be given any
time >4 weeks after the first dose
when they enter school should be admitted after receipt of
the first dose of MMR. A second dose should be administered
as soon as possible, hut no less than 4 weeks after the first dose.
Only doses of vaccine with written documentation of the
date of receipt should he accepted as valid. Self-reported
doses or a parental report of vaccination is not considered
adequate documentation. A healthcare worker should not
provide an immunization record for a patient unless that
healthcare worker has administered the vaccine or has seen
a record that documents vaccination. Persons who lack
adequate documentation of vaccination or other acceptable
evidence of immunity should he vaccinated. Vaccination
status and receipt of all vaccinations should be documented
in the patient’s permanent medical record and in a vaccina-
tion record held by the individual.
At the time of publication of this book (January 2006),
ACIP has not made specific recommendations for the use
of MMRV (ProQuad). MMRV is approved by the Food and
Drug Administration for children 12 months through
12 years of age (that is, until the 13th birthday). However,
ACIP has previously stated a preference for use of
combination vaccines when one or more component of the
combination is indicated and none of the other components
are contraindicated. MMRV should not be administered to
persons 1 3 years of age or older.
Adults at Increased Risk of Measles
* College students
* Persons working in medical
facilities
* International travelers
Vaccination of Adults
Adults born in 1957 or later who do not have a medical
contraindication should receive at least one dose of MMR
vaccine unless they have documentation of vaccination with
at least one dose of measles-, rubella-, and mumps-containing
vaccine or other acceptable evidence of immunity to these
three diseases. With the exception of women who might
become pregnant (see Chapter 12, Rubella) and persons
who work in medical facilities, birth before 1957 generally
can be considered acceptable evidence of immunity to
measles, rubella, and mumps.
Certain groups of adults may be at increased risk for exposure
to measles and should receive special consideration for
vaccination. These include persons attending colleges and
other post-high school educational institutions, persons
working in medical facilities, and international travelers.
Colleges and other post-high school educational institutions
are potential high- risk areas for measles, rubella, and
mumps transmission because of large concentrations of sus-
ceptible persons. Prematriculation vaccination requirements
for measles immunity have been shown to significantly
decrease the risk of measles outbreaks on college campuses
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where they are implemented and enforced. Colleges,
universities, technical and vocational schools, and other
institutions for post-high school education should require
documentation of two doses of MMR vaccine or other
acceptable evidence of measles, rubella, and mumps
immunity before entry.
Students who have no documentation of live measles,
rubella, or mumps vaccination or other acceptable evidence
of measles, rubella, and mumps immunity at the time of
enrollment should be admitted to classes only after receiving
the first dose of MMR. A second dose of MMR should be
administered no less than 4 weeks (i.e., minimum of 28
days) later. Students with evidence of prior receipt of only
one dose of MMR or other measles-containing vaccine on
or after their first birthday should receive a second dose of
MMR, provided at least 4 weeks have elapsed since their
previous dose.
Persons who work in medical facilities are at higher risk for
exposure to measles than the general population. Between
1985 and 1991, at least 795 measles cases occurred in adult
healthcare workers, including nurses, physicians, laboratory
and radiology technicians, clerks, assistants and students.
An overall decline in measles incidence occurred after the
1989-1991 measles resurgence, with a total of 36 cases during
1993-1996 occurring among persons working in medical
facilities. However, in 15 of the 75 measles outbreaks reported
during 1993-1996, transmission occurred in a medical facility.
Measles Immunity in
Healthcare Personnel
* All persons who work within
medical facilities should have
evidence of immunity to measles
All persons who work within medical facilities should
have evidence of immunity to measles and rubella.
Because any healthcare worker (i.e., medical or nonmedical,
paid or volunteer, full time or part time, student or nonstudent,
with or without patient-care responsibilities) who is suscep-
tible to measles or rubella can contract and transmit these
diseases, all medical facilities (i.e., inpatient and outpatient,
private and public) should ensure measles and rubella
immunity among those who work within their facilities. (A
possible exception might be a facility that treats only elderly
patients considered at low risk for measles and rubella and
their complications.)
Adequate vaccination for measles and rubella for healthcare
workers born during or after 1957 consists of two doses of a
live measles-containing vaccine and at least one dose of a
live rubella-containing vaccine. Healthcare workers needing
a second dose of measles-containing vaccine should be
revaccinated at least 4 weeks after their first dose.
Although birth before 1957 is generally considered acceptable
evidence of measles and rubella immunity, medical facilities
should consider recommending a dose of MMR vaccine to
10
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unvaccinated workers bom before 1957 who do not have a
history of prior measles disease or laboratory evidence of
measles immunity, and to those without laboratory evidence
of rubella immunity.
Serologic screening need not be done before vaccinating for
measles and rubella unless the medical facility considers it
cost-effective. Serologic testing is appropriate only if tracking
systems are used to ensure that tested persons who are
identified as susceptible are subsequently vaccinated in a
timely manner. Serologic testing for immunity to measles
and rubella is not necessary for persons documented to be
appropriately vaccinated or who have other acceptable
evidence of immunity. If the return and timely vaccination
of those screened cannot be assured, serologic testing before
vaccination should not be done.
Persons who travel outside the United States are at
increased risk of exposure to measles. Measles is endemic or
epidemic in many countries throughout the world.
Although proof of immunization is not required for entry
into the United States or any other country, persons traveling
or living abroad should have evidence of measles immunity.
Adequate vaccination of persons who travel outside the
United States is two doses of MMR.
Measles Vaccine
Indications for Revaccination
• Vaccinated before the first birthday
* Vaccinated with kilied measles
vaccine (KMV)
* Vaccinated with KMV foiiowed by live
vaccine <4 months after the iast dose
of KMV
• Vaccinated before 1968 with an
unknown type of vaccine
* Vaccinated with IG in addition to a
further attenuated strain or vaccine of
unknown type
Revaccination
Revaccination is recommended for certain persons. The
following groups should be considered unvaccinated and
should receive at least one dose of measles vaccine: persons
1) vaccinated before the first birthday, 2) vaccinated with
killed measles vaccine (KMV), 3) vaccinated with KMV
followed by live vaccine less than 4 months after the last
dose of KMV, 4) vaccinated before 1968 with an unknown
type of vaccine (the vaccine may have been KMV), or 5)
vaccinated with IG in addition to a further attenuated strain
or vaccine of unknown type. (Revaccination is not neces-
sary if IG was given with Edmonston B vaccine.)
Postexposure Prophylaxis
Live measles vaccine provides permanent protection and
may prevent disease if given within 72 hours of exposure.
Immune globulin (IG) may prevent or modify disease and
provide temporary protection if given within 6 days of
exposure. The dose is 0.25 mL/kg body weight, with a
maximum of 15 mL intramuscularly. The recommended
dose of IG for immunocompromised persons is 0.5mL/kg of
body weight (maximum 15 mL) intramuscularly. IG may be
especially indicated for susceptible household contacts of
measles patients, particularly contacts younger than 1 year
of age (for whom the risk of complications is highest). If the
child is 12 months of age or older, live measles vaccine
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should be given about 5 months later when the passive
j
measles antibodies have waned. IG should not be used to
control measles outbreaks.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Adverse reactions following measles vaccine (except allergic
reactions) represent replication of measles vaccine virus
with subsequent mild illness. These events occur 5-12 days
postvaccination and only in persons who are susceptible to
infection. There is no evidence of increased risk of adverse
reactions following MMR vaccination in persons who are
already immune to the diseases.
Fever is the most common adverse reaction following MMR
vaccination. Although measles, rubella, and mumps vaccines
may cause fever after vaccination, the measles component of
MMR vaccine is most often associated with this adverse
reaction. After MMR vaccination, 5%-15% of susceptible
persons develop a temperature of 103 F (39.4 C) or higher,
usually occurring 7-12 days after vaccination and generally
lasting 1-2 days. Most persons with fever are otherwise
asymptomatic.
Measles- and rubella-containing vaccines, including MMR,
may cause a transient rash. Rashes, usually appearing 7-10
days after MMR or measles vaccination, have been reported
in approximately 5% of vaccinees.
Rarely, MMR vaccine may cause thrombocytopenia (low
platelet count) within 2 months after vaccination. Estimates
of the frequency of clinically apparent thrombocytopenia
from Europe are one case per 30,000 to 40,000 vaccinated
susceptible persons, with a temporal clustering of cases
occurring 2 to 3 weeks after vaccination. The clinical course
of these cases was usually transient and benign, although
hemorrhage occurred rarely. The risk for thrombocytopenia
during rubella or measles infection is much greater than the
risk after vaccination. Based on case reports, the risk for
MMR-associated thrombocytopenia may be higher for persons
who have previously had immune thrombocytopenic purpura,
particularly for those who had thrombocytopenic purpura
after an earlier dose of MMR vaccine.
Transient lymphadenopathy sometimes occurs following
receipt of MMR or other rubella-containing vaccine, and
parotitis has been reported rarely following receipt of MMR
or other mumps-containing vaccine.
Arthralgias and other joint symptoms are reported in up to
25% of susceptible adult women given MMR vaccine. This
adverse reaction is associated with the rubella component
(see Chapter 12, Rubella, for more details).
MMR Adverse Reactions
* Fever
* Rash
* Joint symptoms
* Thrombocytopenia
* Parotitis
* Deafness
* Encephalopathy
5%-15%
5%
25%
<1/30,000 doses
rare
rare
<1/1,000,000 doses
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Allergic reactions following the administration of MMR or
any of its component vaccines are rare. Most of these reactions
are minor and consist of a wheal and flare or urticaria at the
injection site. Immediate, anaphylactic reactions to MMR
or its component vaccines are extremely rare. Allergic
reactions including rash, pruritus, and purpura have been
temporally associated with mumps vaccination, hut these
are uncommon and usually mild and of brief duration.
To date there is no convincing evidence that any vaccine
causes autism or autism spectrum disorder. Concern has
been raised about a possible relation between MMR vaccine
and autism by some parents of children with autism.
Symptoms of autism are often noticed by parents during the
second year of life, and may follow administration of MMR
by weeks or months. Two independent nongovernmental
groups, the Institute of Medicine (lOM) and the American
J Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), have reviewed the evidence
regarding a potential link between autism and MMR vaccine.
Both groups independently concluded that available evidence
does not support an association, and that the United States
should continue its current MMR vaccination policy.
Additional research on the cause of autism is needed.
MMR Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to vaccine
component or following a prior
dose
* Pregnancy
* Immunosuppression
* Moderate or severe acute illness
* Recent blood product
Measles and Mumps
Vaccines and Egg Allergy
* Measles and mumps viruses
grown in chick embryo fibroblast
culture
* Studies have demonstrated safety
of MMR in egg allergic children
* Vaccinate without testing
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
Persons who have experienced a severe allergic reaction
(i.e., hives, swelling of the mouth or throat, difficulty
breathing, hypotension, shock) following a prior dose of
measles vaccine or to a vaccine component (e.g., gelatin,
neomycin), should generally not be vaccinated with MMR.
In the past, persons with a history of anaphylactic reactions
following egg ingestion were considered to be at increased
risk for serious reactions after receipt of measles- or mumps-
containing vaccines, which are produced in chick embryo
fibroblasts. However, data suggest that anaphylactic reactions
to measles- and mumps-containing vaccines are not
associated with hypersensitivity to egg antigens but to other
components of the vaccines (such as gelatin). The risk for
serious allergic reactions following receipt of these vaccines
by egg-allergic persons is extremely low, and skin-testing
with vaccine is not predictive of allergic reaction to
vaccination. Therefore, MMR may be administered to egg-
allergic children without prior routine skin testing or the
use of special protocols.
MMR vaccine does not contain penicillin. A history of
penicillin allergy is not a contraindication to vaccination
with MMR or any other U.S. vaccine.
Women known to be pregnant should not receive measles
vaccine. Pregnancy should be avoided for 4 weeks following
MMR vaccine. Close contact with a pregnant woman is
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NOT a contraindication to MMR vaccination of the contact.
Breastfeeding is NOT a contraindication to vaccination of
either the woman or the breastfeeding child.
Replication of vaccine viruses can be prolonged in persons
who are immunosuppressed or immunodeficient. Severe
immunosuppression can be due to a variety of conditions,
including congenital immunodeficiency, HIV infection,
leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy, or therapy
with alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or large
doses of corticosteroids. Evidence based on case reports has
linked measles vaccine virus infection to subsequent death
in at least six severely immunocompromised persons. For this
reason, patients who are severely immunocompromised for
any reason should not be given MMR vaccine. Healthy
susceptible close contacts of severely immunocompromised
persons should be vaccinated.
Measles Vaccine and HIV Infection
• MMR recommended for persons
with asymptomatic and mildly
symptomatic HIV infection
• NOT recommended for those with
evidence of severe immuno-
suppression
• Prevaccination HIV testing not
recommended
In general, persons receiving large daily doses of
corticosteroids (2 mg/kg or more per day, or 20 mg or more
per day of prednisone) for 14 days or more should not
receive MMR vaccine because of concern about vaccine
safety. MMR and its component vaccines should be avoided
for at least 1 month after cessation of high-dose therapy.
Persons receiving low-dose or short-course ( less than 14
days) therapy, alternate-day treatment, maintenance
physiologic doses, or topical, aerosol, intra-articular, bursal,
or tendon injections may be vaccinated. Although persons
receiving high doses of systemic corticosteroids daily or on
alternate days during an interval of less than 14 days generally
can receive MMR or its component vaccines immediately
after cessation of treatment, some experts prefer waiting
until 2 weeks after completion of therapy.
Patients with leukemia in remission who have not received
chemotherapy for at least 3 months may receive MMR or its
component vaccines.
Measles disease may be severe in persons with HIV infection.
Available data indicate that vaccination with MMR has not
been associated with severe or unusual adverse reactions in
HIV-infected persons without evidence of severe immunosup-
pression, although antibody responses have been variable. MMR
vaccine is recommended for all asymptomatic HIV-infected
persons and should be considered for symptomatic persons
who are not severely immunosuppressed. Asymptomatic
children do not need to be evaluated and tested for HIV
infection before MMR or other measles-containing vaccines
are administered. A theoretical risk of an increase (probably
transient) in HIV viral load following MMR vaccination
exists because such an effect has been observed with other
vaccines. The clinical significance of such an increase is not
known.
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MMR and other measles-containing vaccines are not
recommended for HIV-infected persons with evidence of
severe immunosuppression (see table), primarily because
of a report of measles pneumonitis in a recipient of measles
vaccine who had severe HIV-related immunosuppression.
Age-specific CD4+ T-lymphocyte count and percent of total lymphocytes
as criteria for severe immunosuppression in HIV-infected persons.
Criteria age <12 months age 1-5 years age 6-12 years age >13 years
Total CD4+ T-lymphocytes <750 per pL <500 per pL <200 per pL <200 per pL
OR OR OR OR OR
CD4+ T-lymphocytes
(as % of total lymphocytes) <15% <15% <15% <14%
Persons with moderate or severe acute illness should not be
vaccinated until the illness has improved or resolved. This
precaution is intended to prevent complicating the manage-
ment of an ill patient with a potential vaccine adverse
reaction, such as fever. Minor illness (e.g., otitis media, mild
upper respiratory infections), concurrent antibiotic therapy,
and exposure to or recovery from other illness are not
contraindications to measles vaccination. One recent study
suggested that seroconversion after measles vaccine was
reduced in children with upper respiratory infections.
However, multiple previous and subsequent studies have not
confirmed this finding.
Receipt of antibody-containing blood products (e.g.,
immune globulin, whole blood or packed red blood cells,
intravenous immune globulin) may interfere with serocon-
version after measles vaccine. TTie length of time that such
passively acquired antibody persists depends on the concen-
tration and quantity of blood product received. For instance,
it is recommended that vaccination be delayed for 3 months
following receipt of immune globulin for prophylaxis of
hepatitis A; a 7-1 1 month delay is recommended following
administration of intravenous immune globulin, depending
on the dose. For more information, see Chapter 2, General
Recommendations on Immunization, and the table in
Appendix A.
Persons who have a history of thrombocytopenic purpura or
thrombocytopenia may be at increased risk for developing
clinically significant thrombocytopenia after MMR vaccination.
No deaths have been reported as a direct consequence of
vaccine-induced thrombocytopenia. The decision to vaccinate
with MMR depends on the benefits of immunity to measles,
mumps, and rubella and the risks for recurrence or
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exacerbation of thrombocytopenia after vaccination or during
natural infection with measles or rubella. The benefits of
immunization are usually greater than the potential risks, and
administration of MMR vaccine is justified because of the
even greater risk for thrombocytopenia after measles or
rubella disease. However, deferring a subsequent dose of
MMR vaccine may be prudent if the previous episode of
thrombocytopenia occurred within 6 weeks after the previous
dose of the vaccine. Serologic evidence of measles immunity
in such persons may be sought in lieu of MMR vaccination.
Tuberculin testing (PPD) is not a prerequisite for vaccination
with MMR or other measles-containing vaccine. PPD
testing has no effect on the response to MMR vaccination.
However, measles vaccine (and possibly mumps, rubella, and
varicella vaccines) may transiently suppress the response to
PPD in a person infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis. If
tuberculin skin testing is needed at the same time as admin-
istration of measles-containing vaccine, PPD and vaccine
can be administered at the same visit. Simultaneously
administering PPD and measles-containing vaccine does not
interfere with reading the PPD result at 48-72 hours and
ensures that the person has received measles vaccine. If the
measles-containing vaccine has been administered recently,
PPD screening should be delayed at least 4 weeks after
vaccination. A delay in administering PPD will remove the
concern of any theoretical suppression of PPD reactivity
from the vaccine. PPD screening can be performed and
read before administering the measles-containing vaccine.
This option is the least favored because it will delay receipt
of the vaccine.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Measles vaccine and MMR must be shipped with refrigerant
to maintain a temperature of 50 F (10 C ) or less at all
times. Vaccine must be refrigerated immediately on arrival
and protected from light at all times. The vaccine must be
stored at refrigerator temperature (35 -A6 F [2 -8 C]), but
may be frozen. Diluent may be stored at refrigerator
temperature or at room temperature. MMRV must be
shipped to maintain a temperature of -4 F (-20 C ) or less at
all times. MMRV must be stored at an average temperature
of5F(-15C ) or less at all times. MMRV may not be stored
at refrigerator temperature at any time.
After reconstitution, measles and MMR vaccines must be
stored at refrigerator temperature and protected from light.
Reconstituted vaccine should be used immediately. If recon-
stituted vaccine is not used within 8 hours, it must be
discarded. MMRV must be administered within 30 minutes
of reconstitution.
Measles
PPD and Measles Vaccine
• Apply PPD at same visit as MMR
• Delay PPD >4 weeks if MMR given
first
• Apply PPD first
—
give MMR when
skin test read
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!Mumps is an acute viral illness. Parotitis and orchitis were
I
described by Hippocrates in the 5th century BCE. In 1934,
Johnson and Goodpasture showed that mumps could be
transmitted from infected patients to rhesus monkeys and
demonstrated that mumps was caused by a filterable agent
present in saliva. This agent was later shown to be a virus.
Mumps was a frequent cause of outbreaks among military
personnel in the prevaccine era, and was one of the most
common causes of aseptic meningitis and sensorineural
deafness in childhood. During World War I, only influenza
and gonorrhea were more common causes of hospitalization
among soldiers. Outbreaks of mumps have been reported
among military personnel as recently as 1986.
Mumps
* Acute viral illness
• Parotitis and orchitis described by
Hippocrates in 5th century BCE
• Viral etiology described by
Johnson and Goodpasture in 1934
• Frequent cause of outbreaks
among military personnel in
prevaccine era
Mumps Virus
Mumps virus is a paramyxovirus in the same group as
parainfluenza and Newcastle disease virus. Parainfluenza
and Newcastle disease viruses produce antibodies that cross-
react with mumps virus. The virus has a single-stranded
RNA genome.
The virus can be isolated or propagated in cultures of various
human and monkey tissues and in embryonated eggs. It has
been recovered from the saliva, cerebrospinal fluid, urine,
blood, milk, and infected tissues of patients with mumps.
Mumps virus is rapidly inactivated by formalin, ether,
chloroform, heat, and ultraviolet light.
Pathogenesis
The virus is acquired by respiratory droplets. It replicates in
the nasopharynx and regional lymph nodes. After 12-25
days a viremia occurs, which lasts from 3 to 5 days. During
the viremia, the virus spreads to multiple tissues, including
the meninges, and glands such as the salivary, pancreas,
testes, and ovaries. Inflammation in infected tissues leads to
characteristic symptoms of parotitis and aseptic meningitis.
Clinical Features
The incubation period of mumps is 14-18 days (range, 14-25 days).
The prodromal symptoms are nonspecific, and include
myalgia, anorexia, malaise, headache, and low-grade fever.
Parotitis is the most common manifestation and occurs in
30%—40% of infected persons. Parotitis may be unilateral or
bilateral, and any combination of single or multiple salivary
glands may be affected. Parotitis tends to occur within the
first 2 days and may first be noted as earache and tenderness
on palpation of the angle of the jaw. Symptoms tend to
decrease after 1 week and usually resolve after 10 days.
Mumps Virus
• Paramyxovirus
• RNA virus
* One antigenic type
* Rapidly inactivated by chemical
agents, heat, and ultraviolet light
Mumps Pathogenesis
Respiratory transmission of virus
* Replication in nasopharynx and
regional lymph nodes
• Viremia 12-25 days after exposure
with spread to tissues
* Multiple tissues infected during
viremia
II
J
f
Mumps Clinical Features
* Incubation period 14-18 days
* Nonspecific prodrome of myalgia,
malaise, headache, low-grade fever
* Parotitis in 30%-40%
* Up to 20% of infections
asymptomatic
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As many as 20% of mumps infections are asymptomatic. An
additional 40%-50% may have only nonspecific or primarily
respiratory symptoms.
Mumps Complications
CNS involvement 15% of clinical cases
Orchitis 20%-50% in post-
pubertal males
Pancreatitis
Deafness
Death
2%-5%
1 /20,000
Average 1 per year
(1980-1999)
Complications
Central nervous system (CNS) involvement in the form of
aseptic meningitis is common, occurring asymptomatically
(inflammatory cells in cerebrospinal fluid) in 50%-60% of
patients. Symptomatic meningitis (headache, stiff neck)
occurs in up to 1 5% of patients and resolves without sequelae
in 3-10 days. Adults are at higher risk for this complication
than are children, and hoys are more commonly affected
than girls (3:1 ratio). Parotitis may be absent in as many as
50% of such patients. Encephalitis is rare (less than 2 per
100,000 mumps cases).
Orchitis (testicular inflammation) is the most common
complication in postpubertal males. It occurs in as many as
50% of postpubertal males, usually after parotitis, but it may
precede it, begin simultaneously, or occur alone. It is bilateral
in approximately 30% of affected males. There is usually
abrupt onset of testicular swelling, tenderness, nausea,
vomiting, and fever. Pain and swelling may subside in
1 week, but tenderness may last for weeks. Approximately
50% of patients with orchitis have some degree of testicular
atrophy, but sterility is rare.
Oophoritis (ovarian inflammation) occurs in 5% of
postpubertal females. It may mimic appendicitis. There is
no relationship to impaired fertility.
Pancreatitis is infrequent, but occasionally occurs without
parotitis; the hyperglycemia is transient and is reversible.
Although single instances of diabetes mellitus have been
reported, a causal relationship with mumps virus infection
has yet to be conclusively demonstrated; many cases of
temporal association have been described both in siblings
and individuals, and outbreaks of diabetes have been
reported a few months or years after outbreaks of mumps.
Deafness caused by mumps virus occurs in approximately
1 per 20,000 reported cases. Hearing loss is unilateral in
approximately 80% of cases and may be associated with
vestibular reactions. Onset is usually sudden and results in
permanent hearing impairment.
Electrocardiogram changes compatible with myocarditis are
seen in 3%-15% of patients with mumps, but symptomatic
involvement is rare. Complete recovery is the rule, but
deaths have been reported.
146
Other less common complications of mumps include
arthralgia, arthritis, and nephritis. An average of one death
from mumps per year was reported during 1980-1999.
Mumps
Laboratory Diagnosis
The diagnosis of mumps is usually suspected based on clinical
manifestations, in particular the presence of parotitis.
Mumps Laboratory Diagnosis
* Isolation of mumps virus
Mumps virus can be isolated from clinical specimens. The
clinical samples acceptable for mumps virus isolation are
throat or nasopharyngeal swabs, urine, and fluid collected
from the buccal cavity. The buccal cavity is the space
between the cheek and teeth. The parotid duct drains in
this space near the upper rear molars. Fluid from this area
may yield the best viral sample, particularly when the
parotid gland area just below the ear is massaged for 30
seconds prior to collection of secretions. Virus may be
isolated from the buccal mucosa or urine from 7 days before
until 9 days after onset of parotitis. Collection of viral
samples from persons suspected of having mumps is strongly
recommended. Mumps virus can also be detected by
polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
* Detection of mumps antigen by
PCR
* Serologic testing
-positive IgM antibody
—significant increase in IgG
antibody between acute and
convalescent specimens
Serology is the simplest method for confirming mumps virus
infection and enzyme immunoassay (ElA), is the most
commonly used test.. ElA is widely available and is more
sensitive than other serologic tests. It is available for both
IgM and IgG. IgM antibodies usually become detectable
during the first few days of illness and reach a peak about a
week after onset. However, as with measles and rubella,
mumps IgM may be transient or missing in persons who
have had any doses of mumps-containing vaccine. Sera
should be collected as soon as possible after symptom onset
for IgM testing or as the acute-phase specimen for IgG
seroconversion. Convalescent-phase sera should be collected
2 weeks later.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Mumps occurs worldwide.
Reservoir
Mumps is a human disease. Although persons with asympto^
matic or nonclassical infection can transmit the virus, no
carrier state is known to exist.
Transmission
Mumps is spread through airborne transmission or by direct
contact with infected droplet nuclei or saliva.
Mumps Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
Asymptomatic infections
may transmit
• Transmission Respiratory drop nuclei
* Temporal pattern Peak in iate winter and spring
* Communicability Three days before to four
days after onset of active
disease
Temporal Pattern
Mumps incidence peaks predominantly in late winter and
spring, but the disease has been reported throughout the year.
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Communicability
Contagiousness is similar to that of influenza and rubella,
but is less than that for measles or varicella. The infectious
period is considered to he from 3 days before to the 4th day
of active disease; virus has been isolated from saliva 7 days
before to 9 days after onset of parotitis.
Mumps—United States, 1980-2004
Mumps—United States, 1980-2003
Age Distribution of Reported Cases
Secular Trends in the United States
Mumps became a nationally reportable disease in the
United States in 1968. However, an estimated 212,000 cases
occurred in the United States in 1964. Following vaccine
licensure, reported mumps decreased rapidly. Approximately
3,000 cases were reported annually in 1983-1985 (1.3-1.55
cases per 100,000 population).
In 1986 and 1987, there was a relative resurgence of mumps,
which peaked in 1987, when 12,848 cases were reported.
The highest incidence of mumps during the resurgence was
among older school-age and college-age youth (10-19 years
of age), who were born before routine mumps vaccination
was recommended. Mumps incidence in this period correlat-
ed with the absence of comprehensive state requirements for
mumps immunization. Several mumps outbreaks among highly
vaccinated school populations were reported, indicating that
high coverage with a single dose of mumps vaccine did not
always prevent disease transmission, probably because of
vaccine failure.
Since 1989, the number of reported mumps cases has steadily
declined, from 5,712 cases to a total of 258 cases in 2004.
As more children, adolescents, and adults received two doses
of measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine, the number of
reported cases of mumps has continued to decrease. Because
many reported cases are not confirmed by laboratory testing,
it is likely that many of the cases lacking laboratory confir-
mation are, in fact, not due to infection with mumps virus.
Experience in states that have conducted more complete
laboratory testing for confirmation suggests that case
investigation combined with appropriate laboratory testing
will result in many suspected cases being discarded and a
resulting decrease in reported mumps morbidity. Laboratory
confirmation helps ensure that only true mumps cases are
reported.
Before vaccine licensure in 1967, and during the early years
of vaccine use, most reported cases occurred in the 5-9-year
age group; 90% of cases occurred among children 1 5 years of
age and younger. In the late 1980s, there was a shift towards
older children. Since 1990, persons age 15 years and older
have accounted for 30%—40% of cases per year (42% in 2002).
Males and females are affected equally.
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Eighty percent or more of adults in urban and suburban
areas with or without a history of mumps have serologic
evidence of immunity.
Case Definition
The clinical case definition of mumps is an acute onset of
unilateral or bilateral tender, self-limited swelling of the
parotid or other salivary gland lasting more than 2 days
without other apparent cause.
Mumps Vaccine
Mumps Clinical Case Definition
* Acute onset of unilateral or
bilateral tender, self-limited
swelling of the parotid or other
salivary gland lasting >2 days
without other apparent cause
Characteristics
Mumps virus was isolated in 1945, and an inactivated
vaccine was developed in 1948. This vaccine produced
only short-lasting immunity, and its use was discontinued
in the mid-1970s. The currently used Jeryl Lynn strain of
live attenuated mumps virus vaccine was licensed in
December 1967.
Mumps vaccine is available as a single-antigen preparation,
combined with rubella vaccine, combined with measles and
rubella vaccines, or combined with mumps, rubella, and
varicella vaccine as MMRV (ProQuad). The Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends
that combined measles-mumps-rubella vaccine be used
when any of the individual components is indicated (and for
MMRV, if the vaccinee is 12 months through 12 years of age).
Use of single-antigen mumps vaccine is not recommended.
Mumps vaccine is prepared in chick embryo fibroblast tissue
culture. MMR and MMRV are supplied as a lyophilized
(freeze-dried) powder and are reconstituted with sterile,
preservative-free water. The vaccine contains small amounts
of human albumin, neomycin, sorbitol, and gelatin.
Mumps Vaccine
* Composition
* Efficacy
* Duration of
Immunity
’ Schedule
Live virus (Jeryl Lynn strain)
95% (Range, 90%-97%)
Lifelong
>1 Dose
Should be administered with measies and
rubella (MMR) or with measles, rubella and
varicella (MMRV)
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Mumps vaccine produces an inapparent, or mild, noncom-
municable infection. More than 97% of recipients of a single
dose develop measurable antibody. Seroconversion rates are
similar for single antigen mumps vaccine, MMR, and
MMRV. Clinical efficacy has been estimated to be 95%
(range, 90%-97%). The duration of vaccine-induced
immunity is believed to be greater than 25 years, and is
probably lifelong in most vaccine recipients.
Vaccination Schedule and Use
At least one dose of mumps-containing vaccine is routinely
recommended for all children and for all persons born during or
after 1957. The first dose of mumps-containing vaccine should
Mumps (MMR) Vaccine Indications
* All infants >12 months of age
* Susceptible adolescents and
adults without documented
evidence of immunity
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be given on or after the first birthday. Mumps-containing
vaccine given before 12 months of age should not be counted as
part of the series. Children vaccinated with mumps-containing
vaccine before 12 months of age should be revaccinated
with two doses of MMR vaccine, the first of which should
be administered when the child is at least 12 months of age.
A second dose of MMR is recommended to produce immunity
to measles in those who failed to respond to the first dose.
Data indicate that almost all persons who do not respond to
the measles component of the first dose will respond to a
second dose. Few data on the immune response to the rubella
and mumps components of a second dose of MMR are
available. However, most persons who do not respond to the
rubella or mumps component of the first MMR dose would
be expected to respond to the second dose. The second dose
of MMR is not generally considered a booster dose because a
primary immune response to the first dose provides long-
term protection. Although a second dose of vaccine may
increase antibody titers in some persons who responded to
the first dose, available data indicate that these increased
antibody titers are not sustained. The combined MMR
vaccine is recommended for both doses to ensure immunity
to all three viruses.
The second dose of MMR vaccine should be given routinely
at age 4-6 years, before a child enters kindergarten or first
grade. The adolescent health visit at age 1 1-12 years can
serve as a catch-up opportunity to verify vaccination status
and administer MMR vaccine to those children who have
not yet received two doses of MMR. The second dose of
MMR may be administered as soon as 4 weeks (i.e., 28 days)
after the first dose.
Adults born in 1957 or later who do not have a medical
contraindication should receive at least one dose of MMR
vaccine unless they have documentation of vaccination with
at least one dose of measles-, rubella-, and mumps-containing
vaccine or other acceptable evidence of immunity to these
three diseases. Some adults at high risk of measles exposure
may require a second dose of measles vaccine. This second
dose should be administered as combined MMR vaccine
(see Chapter 10, Measles, for details).
Only doses of vaccine with written documentation of the
date of receipt should be accepted as valid. Self-reported
doses or a parental report of vaccination is not considered
adequate documentation. A healthcare worker should not
provide an immunization record for a patient unless that
healthcare worker has administered the vaccine or has seen
a record that documents vaccination. Persons who lack
adequate documentation of vaccination or other acceptable
evidence of immunity should be vaccinated. Vaccination
1
1
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Mumps
;
status and receipt of all vaccinations should be documented
1
in the patient’s permanent medical record and in a vaccination
record held by the individual.
At the time of publication of this book (January 2006),
1
ACIP has not made specific recommendations for the use
of MMRV (ProQuad). MMRV is approved by the Food and
Drug Administration for children 12 months through 12
years of age (that is, until the 13th birthday). However, ACIP
has previously stated a preference for use of combination
vaccines when one or more component of the combination
is indicated and none of the other components are
contraindicated. MMRV should not be administered to
persons 13 years of age or older.
Mumps Immunity
Generally, persons can be considered immune to mumps if
they were born before 1957, have serologic evidence of
mumps immunity, have documentation of physician-diagnosed
mumps, or have documentation of vaccination with at least
one dose of live mumps vaccine on or after their first
birthday. Demonstration of mumps IgG antibody by any
commonly used serologic assay is acceptable evidence of
mumps immunity. Persons who have an “equivocal” serologic
test result should be considered susceptible to mumps.
Mumps Immunity
• Born before 1957
• Serologic evidence of mumps
immunity
* Documentation of physician-
diagnosed mumps
* Documentation of adequate
vaccination
Live mumps vaccine was not used routinely before 1977, and
the peak incidence of disease was among 5- to 9'year-olds
before the vaccine was introduced. Most persons born before
1957 are likely to have been infected naturally between
1957 and 1977. As a result, persons born before 1957 generally
may be considered to be immune, even if they did not have
clinically recognizable mumps disease. However, as with
measles and rubella, this 1957 cutoff date for susceptibility is
arbitrary, and vaccination with MMR should be considered
during mumps outbreaks for persons born before 1957 who
may be exposed to mumps and may be nonimmune.
Laboratory testing for mumps susceptibility before vaccination
is not necessary.
Postexposure Prophylaxis
Neither mumps immune globulin nor immune globulin (IG)
is effective postexposure prophylaxis. Vaccination after
exposure is not harmful and may possibly avert later disease.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Mumps is a very safe vaccine. Most adverse events reported
following MMR vaccine (such as fever, rash, and joint
symptoms) are attributable to the measles or rubella compo-
nents. No adverse reactions were reported in large-scale
MMR Adverse Reactions
' Fever 5%-15%
' Rash 5%
' Joint symptoms 25%
Thrombocytopenia <1/30,000 doses
Parotitis rare
' Deafness rare
’ Encephalopathy <1/1,000,000 doses
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field trials. Subsequently, parotitis and fever have been
reported rarely. A few cases of orchitis (all suspect) also
have been reported.
Rare cases of CNS dysfunction, including cases of deafness,
within 2 months of mumps vaccination have been reported.
The calculated incidence of CNS reactions is approximately
one per 800,000 doses of Jeryl Lynn strain of mumps vaccine
virus. The Institute of Medicine (1993) concluded that evi-
dence is inadequate to accept or reject a causal relationship
between the Jeryl Lynn strain of mumps vaccine and aseptic
meningitis, encephalitis, sensorineural deafness, or orchitis.
Allergic reactions, including rash, pruritus, and purpura,
have been temporally associated with vaccination, but these
are transient and generally mild.
MMR Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to
vaccine component or following a
prior dose
* Pregnancy
* Immunosuppression
* Moderate or severe acute illness
* Recent blood product
Measles and Mumps Vaccines
and Egg Allergy
* Measles and mumps viruses
grown in chick embryo fibroblast
culture
• Studies have demonstrated
safety of MMR in egg allergic
children
* Vaccinate without testing
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
Persons who have experienced a severe allergic reaction
(i.e., hives, swelling of the mouth or throat, difficulty
breathing, hypotension, shock) following a prior dose of
mumps vaccine or to a vaccine component (e.g., gelatin,
neomycin), should generally not be vaccinated with MMR.
In the past, persons with a history of anaphylactic reactions
following egg ingestion were considered to be at increased
risk of serious reactions after receipt of measles- or mumps-
containing vaccines, which are produced in chick embryo
fibroblasts. However, data suggest that most anaphylactic
reactions to measles- and mumps-containing vaccines are
not associated with hypersensitivity to egg antigens but to
other components of the vaccines (such as gelatin). The risk
for serious allergic reactions such as anaphylaxis following
receipt of these vaccines by egg-allergic persons is extremely
low, and skin-testing with vaccine is not predictive of allergic
reaction to vaccination. As a result, MMR may be administered
to egg-allergic children without prior routine skin-testing or
the use of special protocols.
MMR vaccine does not contain penicillin. A history of
penicillin allergy is not a contraindication to MMR
vaccination.
Pregnant women should not receive mumps vaccine,
although the risk in this situation is theoretic. There is no
evidence that mumps vaccine virus causes fetal damage.
Pregnancy should be avoided for 4 weeks after vaccination
with MMR vaccine.
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Persons with immunodeficiency or immunosuppression
resulting from leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy.
Mumps
I
immune deficiency disease, or immunosuppressive therapy
I
should not be vaccinated. However, treatment with low-dose
(less than 2 mg/kg/day), alternate-day, topical, or aerosolized
I steroid preparations is not a contraindication to mumps
vaccination. Persons whose immunosuppressive therapy with
steroids has been discontinued for 1 month (3 months for
chemotherapy) may be vaccinated. See Chapter 10, Measles,
I
for additional details on vaccination of immunosuppressed
i persons, including those with human immunodeficiency
virus infection.
j
Persons with moderate or severe acute illness should not be
vaccinated until the illness has resolved. Minor illness (e.g.,
otitis media, mild upper respiratory infections), concurrent
antibiotic therapy, and exposure or recovery from other
illnesses are not contraindications to mumps vaccination.
Receipt of antibody-containing blood products (e.g.,
immune globulin, whole blood or packed red blood cells,
intravenous immune globulin) may interfere with serocon-
version following mumps vaccination. Vaccine should be
given 2 weeks before, or deferred for at least 3 months
following, administration of an antibody-containing blood
product. See Chapter 2, General Recommendations on
Immunization, for details.
A family history of diabetes is not a contraindication for
vaccination.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
MMR vaccine must be shipped with refrigerant to maintain
a temperature of 50 F (10 C) or less at all times. Vaccine
must be refrigerated immediately on arrival and protected
from light at all times. The vaccine must be stored at refrig-
erator temperature (35 —46 F 12 -8 C]), but may be frozen.
Diluent may be stored at refrigerator temperature or at room
temperature. MMRV must be shipped to maintain a temperature
of -4 F (-20 C ) or less at all times. It must be stored at an
average temperature of 5 F (-15 C ) or less at all times. MMRV
may not be stored at refrigerator temperature at any time.
After reconstitution, MMR vaccines must be stored at
refrigerator temperature and protected from light.
Reconstituted vaccine should be used immediately. If
reconstituted vaccine is not used within 8 hours, it must be
discarded. MMRV must be administered within 30 minutes
of reconstitution.
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Rubella
The name rubella is derived from Latin, meaning “little
red.” Rubella was initially considered to be a variant of
measles or scarlet fever and was called “third disease.” It was
not until 1814 that it was first described as a separate disease
in the German medical literature, hence the common name
“German measles.” In 1914, Hess postulated a viral etiology
based on his work with monkeys. Hiro and Tosaka in 1938
confirmed the viral etiology by passing the disease to children
using filtered nasal washings from persons with acute cases.
Following a widespread epidemic of rubella infection in
1940, Norman Gregg, an Australian ophthalmologist,
reported in 1941 the occurrence of congenital cataracts
among 78 infants born following maternal rubella infection
in early pregnancy. This was the first reported recognition
of congenital rubella syndrome (CRS).
Rubella
• From Latin meaning "little red"
Discovered in 18th century - thought
to be variant of measles
First described as distinct clinical
entity in German literature
Congenital rubella syndrome (CRS)
described by Gregg in 1941
Rubella Virus
Rubella virus was first isolated in 1962 by Parkman and
Weller. Rubella virus is classified as a togavirus, genus
Ruhivirus. It is most closely related to group A arboviruses,
such as eastern and western equine encephalitis viruses. It is
an enveloped RNA virus, with a single antigenic type that
does not cross'teact with other members of the togavirus group.
Rubella virus is relatively unstable and is inactivated by
lipid solvents, trypsin, formalin, ultraviolet light, low pH,
heat, and amantadine.
Rubella Virus
Togavirus
RNA virus
One antigenic type
Rapidly inactivated by chemical
agents, ultraviolet light, low pH,
and heat
Pathogenesis
Following respiratory transmission of rubella virus, replication
of the virus is thought to occur in the nasopharynx and
regional lymph nodes. A viremia occurs 5-7 days after
exposure with spread of the virus throughout the body.
Transplacental infection of the fetus occurs during viremia.
Fetal damage occurs through destruction of cells as well as
mitotic arrest.
Clinical Features
Acquired Rubella
The incubation period of rubella is 14 days, with a range of
12-23 days. Symptoms are often mild, and up to 50% of
infections may be subclinical or inapparent. In children,
rash is usually the first manifestation and a prodrome is rare.
In older children and adults, there is often a 1-5 day prodrome
with low-grade fever, malaise, lymphadenopathy, and upper
respiratory symptoms preceding the rash. The rash of rubella
is maculopapular and occurs 14-17 days after exposure. The
Rubella Pathogenesis
• Respiratory transmission of virus
• Replication in nasopharynx and
regional lymph nodes
• Viremia 5-7 days after exposure
with spread to tissues
Placenta and fetus infected
during viremia
Rubella Clinical Features
• Incubation period 14 days
(range 12-23 days)
• Prodrome of low-grade fever
• Maculopapular rash 14-17 days
after exposure
• Lymphadenopathy in second
week
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12
Rubella Complications
Arthralgia or arthritis
adult female up to 70%
children rare
Thrombocytopenic
purpura
Encephalitis
Neuritis
Orchitis
1/3,000 cases
1/6,000 cases
rare
rare
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Epidemic Rubella - United States, 1964-1965
* 12.5 million rubella cases
2,000 encephalitis cases
* 11,250 abortions (surgical/spontaneous)
• 2,100 neonatal deaths
• 20,000 CRS cases
-deaf -11,600
-blind -3,580
-mentally retarded - 1,800
rash usually occurs initially on the face and then progresses
from head to foot. It lasts about 3 days and is occasionally
pruritic. The rash is fainter than measles rash and does not
coalesce. The rash is more prominent after a hot shower or bath.
Lymphadenopathy may begin a week before the rash and
last several weeks. Postauricular, posterior cervical, and
suboccipital nodes are commonly involved.
Arthralgia and arthritis occur so frequently in adults that
they are considered by many to be an integral part of the
illness rather than a complication. Other symptoms of rubella
include conjunctivitis, testalgia, or orchitis. Forschheimer
spots may be noted on the soft palate but are not diagnostic
for rubella.
Complications
Complications are not common, but they tend to occur
more often in adults than in children.
Arthralgia or arthritis may occur in up to 70% of adult
women who contract rubella, but it is rare in children and
adult males. Fingers, wrists, and knees are often affected.
Joint symptoms tend to occur about the same time or shortly
after appearance of the rash and may last for up to 1 month;
chronic arthritis is rare.
Encephalitis occurs in one in 6,000 cases, more frequently
in adults (especially in females) than in children. Mortality
estimates vary from 0 to 50%.
Hemorrhagic manifestations occur in approximately one
per 3,000 cases, occurring more often in children than in
adults. These manifestations may be secondary to low
platelets and vascular damage, with thrombocytopenic i
purpura being the most common manifestation. |
Gastrointestinal, cerebral, or intrareiaal hemorrhage may
j
occur. Effects may last from days to months, and most |
patients recover.
|
!
Additional complications include orchitis, neuritis, and a
rare late syndrome of progressive panencephalitis. |
Congenital Rubella Syndrome
Prevention of CRS is the main objective of rubella
vaccination programs in the United States.
A rubella epidemic in the United States in 1964-1965
resulted in 12.5 million cases of rubella infection and about
20,000 newborns with CRS. The estimated cost of the
epidemic was $840 million. This does not include the
Rubella
j emotional toll on the families involved. The estimated
!
lifetime cost of one case of CRS today is estimated to he
in excess of $200,000.
Infection with rubella virus can be disastrous in early gestation.
The virus may affect all organs and cause a variety of
congenital defects. Infection may lead to fetal death,
spontaneous abortion, or premature delivery. The severity of
the effects of rubella virus on the fetus depends largely on
the time of gestation at which infection occurs. As many as
85% of infants infected in the first trimester of pregnancy
will be found to be affected if followed after birth. While
fetal infection may occur throughout pregnancy, defects are
rare when infection occurs after the 20th week of gestation.
The overall risk of defects during the third trimester is
probably no greater than that associated with uncomplicated
pregnancies.
Congenital infection with rubella virus can affect virtually
all organ systems. Deafness is the most common and often
the sole manifestation of congenital rubella infection, espe-
cially after the fourth month of gestation. Eye defects, includ-
ing cataracts, glaucoma, retinopathy, and microphthalmia
may occur. Cardiac defects such as patent ductus arteriosus,
ventricular septal defect, pulmonic stenosis, and coarctation
of the aorta are possible. Neurologic abnormalities, including
microcephaly and mental retardation, and other abnormalities,
including bone lesions, splenomegaly, hepatitis, and
thrombocytopenia with purpura may occur.
Congenital Rubella Syndrome
• Infection may affect all organs
May lead to fetal death or premature
delivery
Severity of damage to fetus depends
on gestational age
Up to 85% of infants affected if
infected during first trimester
Congenital Rubella Syndrome
• Deafness
• Cataracts
• Heart defects
• Microcephaly
• Mental retardation
• Bone alterations
• Liver and spleen damage
Manifestations of CRS may be delayed from 2 to 4 years.
Diabetes mellitus appearing in later childhood occurs
frequently in children with CRS. In addition, progressive
encephalopathy resembling subacute sclerosing
panencephalitis has been observed in some older children
with CRS.
Infants with CRS may have low titers by hemagglutination
inhibition (HI) but may have high titers of neutralizing
antibody that may persist for years. Reinfection may occur.
Impaired cell-mediated immunity has been demonstrated in
some children with CRS.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Many rash illnesses can mimic rubella infection, and as
many as 50% of rubella infections may be subclinical. The
only reliable evidence of acute rubella infection is a positive
viral culture for rubella or detection of rubella virus by
polymerase chain reaction, the presence of rubella-specific
IgM antibody, or demonstration of a significant rise in IgG
antibody from paired acute- and convalescent-phase sera.
Rubella Laboratory Diagnosis
Isolation of rubella virus from clinical
specimen (e.g., nasopharynx, urine)
Positive serologic test for rubella IgM
antibody
Significant rise in rubella IgG by any
standard serologic assay (e.g.,
enzyme immunoassay)
Rubella
Rubella virus can be isolated from nasal, blood, throat,
urine and cerebrospinal fluid specimens from rubella and
CRS patients. Virus may be isolated from the pharynx
1 week before and until 2 weeks after rash onset. Although
isolation of the virus is diagnostic of rubella infection, viral
cultures are labor intensive, and therefore not done in many
laboratories; they are generally not used for routine diagnosis
of rubella. Viral isolation is an extremely valuable epidemio-
logic tool and should be attempted for all suspected cases of
rubella or CRS. A state laboratory or CDC should be consulted
for details of viral isolation.
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Serology is the most common method of confirming the
diagnosis of rubella. Acute rubella infection can be
serologically confirmed by a significant rise in rubella
antibody titer in acute- and convalescent-phase serum
specimens or by the presence of serum rubella IgM. Serum
should be collected as early as possible (within 7-10 days)
after onset of illness, and again 14-21 days (minimum of 7)
days later.
False-positive serum rubella IgM tests have occurred in persons
with parvovirus infections, with a positive heterophile test
for infectious mononucleosis, or with a positive rheumatoid
factor.
The serologic tests available for laboratory confirmation of
rubella infections vary among laboratories. The state health
department can provide guidance on available laboratory
services and preferred tests.
Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). ELISA is
sensitive, widely available, and relatively easy to perform. It
can also be modified to measure IgM antibodies. Most of the
diagnostic testing done for rubella antibodies uses some
variation of ELISA.
Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test was once the
“standard” and most commonly used technique. It is sensitive
and simple to perform and allows for either screening or
diagnosis (if paired acute- and convalescent-phase sera are
tested). A fourfold rise or greater in Hl-derived antibody
titer in paired sera is diagnostic of recent infection. The test
may be modified to detect rubella-specific IgM antibody
indicative of primary infection.
Immunofluorescent antibody assay (IFA) is a rapid and
sensitive assay. Commercial assays for both IgG and IgM are
available in the United States. Care must be taken with the
IgM assay to avoid false-positive results due to complexes
with rheumatoid antibody.
Rubella
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Epidemiology
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Occurrence
Rubella occurs worldwide.
Reservoir
Rubella is a human disease. There is no known animal reser-
voir. Although infants with CRS may shed rubella virus for
an extended period, a true carrier state has not been described.
Transmission
Rubella is spread from person to person via airborne trans-
mission or droplets shed from the respiratory secretions of
infected persons. There is no evidence of insect transmission.
Rubella Epidemiology
Reservoir Human
Transmission Respiratory
Subclinical cases may
transmit
Temporal pattern Peak In late winter and spring
Communicability 7 days before to 5-7 days
after rash onset
Infants with CRS may shed
virus for a year or more
Rubella may be transmitted by persons with subclinical or
asymptomatic cases (up to 50% of all rubella virus infections).
Temporal Pattern
In temperate areas, incidence is usually highest in late
winter and early spring.
Communicability
Rubella is only moderately contagious. The disease is most
contagious when the rash is erupting, but virus may be shed
from 7 days before to 5-7 days or more after rash onset.
Infants with CRS shed large quantities of virus from body
secretions for up to 1 year and can therefore transmit rubella
to persons caring for them who are susceptible to the disease.
Secular Trends in the United States
Rubella and congenital rubella syndrome became nationally
notifiable diseases in 1966. The largest annual total of cases
of rubella in the United States was in 1969, when 57,686
cases were reported (58 cases per 100,000 population).
Following vaccine licensure in 1969, rubella incidence
declined rapidly. By 1983, fewer than 1,000 cases per year
were reported (less than 0.5 cases per 100,000 population).
A moderate resurgence of rubella occurred in 1990-1991,
primarily due to outbreaks in California (1990) and among
the Amish in Pennsylvania (1991). In 2003, a record low
annual total of seven cases was reported. In October 2004,
CDC convened an independent expert panel to review
available rubella and CRS data. After a careful review, the
panel unanimously agreed that rubella was no longer
endemic in the United States.
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Rubella - United States, 1980-2003
Age Distribution of Reported Cases
Rubella and CRS in the
United States
• Most reported rubella in the U.S.
since the mid-1990s has occurred
among foreign-born Hispanic adult
Majority of CRS since 1997
occurred in children of
unvaccinated women born to
Hispanic women, most born in
Latin America
Rubella Case Definition
• Acute onset of generalized
maculopapular rash, and
• Temperature of >99°F (37.2 °C), if
measured, and
• Arthralgia or arthritis,
lymphadenopathy, or conjunctivitis
Until recently, there was no predominant aj»e f'roup tor
rubella cases. From 1982 through 1992, approximately 30%
of cases occurred in each of three age groups: younger than
5, 5-14, and 1 5-39 years. Adults 40 years of age and older
typically accounted for less than 10% of ca.ses. However,
since 1993, persons 15-39 years of age have accounted for
more than half the cases. In 2003, this age group accounted
for 71% of all reported cases.
Most reported rubella in the United States since the mid-
1990s has occurred among Hi.spanic young adults who were
horn in areas where rubella vaccine is routinely not given.
CRS surveillance is maintained through the National
Congenital Rubella Registry, which is managed hy the
National Immunization Program. The largest annual total of
reported CRS cases to the registry was in 1970 (67 cases).
An average of 5-6 CRS cases have been reported annually
since 1980. Although reported rubella activity has consistently
and significantly decreased since vaccine has been used in the
United States, the incidence of CRS has paralleled the
decrease in rubella cases only since the mid-1970s. The
decline in CRS since the mid-1970s was due to an increased
effort to vaccinate susceptible adolescents and young adults,
especially women. Rubella outbreaks are almost always
followed hy an increase in CRS.
Rubella outbreaks in California and Pennsylvania in
1990-1991 resulted in 25 cases of CRS in 1990 and 33 cases
in 1991. Two CRS cases were reported in 2001, and in
2004, no cases were reported. Since 1997, the mothers of
the majority of infants with CRS were Hispanic women,
most of whom were born in Latin American or Caribbean
countries where rubella vaccine is routinely not used or has
only recently begun to be used.
Classification of Rubella Cases
Clinical Case Definition of Acquired Rubella
A clinical case of rubella is defined as an illness with all of
the following characteristics: 1) acute onset of generalized
maculopapular rash; 2) a temperature higher than 99°F
(37.2°C), if measured; and 3) arthralgia or arthritis,
lymphadenopathy, or conjunctivitis. Cases meeting the
measles case definition are excluded. Also excluded are
cases with serology compatible with recent measles virus
infection.
Case Classification of Acquired Rubella
A suspected case is any generalized rash illness of acute
onset. A probable case meets the clinical case definition.
Rubella
has noncontrihutory or no serologic or virologic test results,
and is not epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed
case. A confirmed case is laboratory confirmed or meets the
clinical case definition and is epidemiologically linked tc) a
laboratory-confirmed case.
Clinical Case Definition of Congenital Rubella
Syndrome
The clinical case definition of CRS is an illness, usually
manifesting in infancy, resulting from rubella infection in
utero and characterized by symptoms from the following
categories:
A. Cataracts, congenital glaucoma, congenital heart disease
(most commonly patent ductus arteriosus or peripheral
pulmonary artery stenosis), loss of hearing, pigmentary
retinopathy
B. Purpura, hepatosplenomegaly, jaundice, microcephaly,
developmental delay, meningoencephalitis, radiolucent
boiae disease
Case Classification of Congenital Rubella
Syndrome
An infection-only case is one with laboratory evidence of
infection but without any clinical symptoms or signs. A
suspected case has some compatible clinical findings, but
does not meet the criteria for a probable case. A probable
case is one that is not laboratory confirmed, has any two
complications listed in category A above or one complication
from category A and one from B, and lacks evidence of any
other etiology. A confirmed case is a clinically consistent
case that is laboratory confirmed. In probable cases, either
or both of the eye-related findings (cataracts and congenital
glaucoma) count as a single complication. In cases classified
as infection only, if any compatible signs or symptoms (e.g.,
hearing loss) are identified later, the case is reclassified as
confirmed.
Rubella Vaccine
Three rubella vaccines were licensed in the United States in
1969: HPV-77:DE-5 (duck embryo), HPV-77:DK-12 (dog
kidney), and GMK-3:RK53 Cendevax (rabbit kidney)
strains. HPV-77:DK-12 was later removed from the market
because there was a higher rate of joint complaints following
vaccination with this strain. In January 1979, the RA 27/3
(human diploid fibroblast) strain (Meruvax-II, Merck) was
licensed and all other strains were discontinued.
Rubella Vaccine
Vaccine Trade Name Licensure
HPV-77:DE5 Meruvax 1969
HPV-77:DK12 Rubelogen 1969
GMK-3:RK53 Cendevax 1969
RA 27/3* Meruvax II 1979
'Only vaceint currantiy llcantad In U.S.
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Rubella Vaccine
• Composition
• Efficacy
• Duration of
Immunity
• Schedule
Live virus (RA 27/3 strain)
95% (Range, 90%-97%)
Lifelong
>1 Dose
Should be administered with measles and
mumps as MMR or with measles, mumps
and varicella as MMRV
Rubella Vaccine (MMR) Indications
* All infants >12 months of age
* Susceptible adolescents and adults
without documented evidence of
rubella immunity
Emphasis on nonpregnant women
of childbearing age, particularly
those born outside the U.S.
Characteristics
The RA 27/3 rubella vaccine is a live attenuated virus. It
was first isolated in 1965 at the Wistar Institute from a
rubella- infected aborted fetus. The virus was attenuated by
25-30 passages in tissue culture, using human diploid fibrob-
lasts. It does not contain duck, chicken or egg protein.
Vaccine virus is not communicable except in the setting of
breastfeeding (see Contraindications, below), even though
virus may be cultured from the nasopharynx of vaccinees.
Rubella vaccine is available as a single-antigen preparation,
combined with mumps vaccine, combined with measles and
mumps vaccines as MMR, or combined with mumps, rubella,
and varicella vaccine as MMRV (ProQuad). The Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends
that combined measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (MMR) be
used when any of the individual components is indicated
(and for MMRV, if the vaccinee is 12 months through 12
years of age). Use of single-antigen rubella vaccine is not
routinely recommended.
MMR and MMRV are supplied as a lyophylized (freeze-dried)
powder and are reconstituted with sterile, preservative-free
water. The vaccines contains a small amount of human
albumin, neomycin, sorbitol, and gelatin.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
RA 27/3 rubella vaccine is safe and more immunogenic than
rubella vaccines used previously. In clinical trials, 95% or
more of vaccinees aged 12 months and older developed
serologic evidence of rubella immunity after a single dose.
More than 90% of vaccinated persons have protection
against both clinical rubella and viremia for at least 15
years. Follow-up studies indicate that one dose of vaccine
confers long-term, probably lifelong, protection.
Seroconversion rates are similar for single-antigen rubella
vaccine, MMR, and MMRV.
Several reports indicate that viremic reinfection following
exposure may occur in vaccinated persons who have low
levels of detectable antibody. The frequency and consequences
of this phenomenon are unknown, but it is believed to be
uncommon. Rarely, clinical reinfection and fetal infection
have been reported among women with vaccine-induced
immunity. Rare cases of CRS have occurred among infants
born to women who had documented serologic evidence of
rubella immunity before they became pregnant.
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Vaccination Schedule and Use
At least one dose of rubella vaccine, as combination MMR
I
(or MMRV) vaccine, is routinely recommended for all
|j
children. All persons born during or after 1957 should have
documentation of at least one dose of MMR. The first dose
of MMR should be given on or after the first birthday. Any
dose of rubella-containing vaccine given before 1 2 months
of age should not be counted as part of the series. Children
vaccinated with rubella-containing vaccine before 12 months
of age should be revaccinated with two doses of MMR
vaccine, the first of which should be administered when the
child is at least 12 months of age.
A second dose of MMR is recommended to produce immu-
nity to measles in those who failed to respond to the first
dose. Data indicate that almost all persons who do not
respond to the measles component of the first dose will
respond to a second dose of MMR. Few data on the immune
response to the rubella and mumps components of a second
dose of MMR are available. However, most persons who do
not respond to the rubella or mumps component of the first
MMR dose would be expected to respond to the second
dose. The second dose is not generally considered a booster
dose because a primary immune response to the first dose
provides long-term protection. Although a second dose of
vaccine may increase antibody titers in some persons who
responded to the first dose, available data indicate that these
increased antibody titers are not sustained. The combined
MMR vaccine is recommended for both doses to ensure
immunity to all three viruses.
The second dose of MMR vaccine should routinely be given
at age 4-6 years, before a child enters kindergarten or first
grade. The adolescent health visit at age 11-12 years can
serve as a catch-up opportunity to verify vaccination status
and administer MMR vaccine to those children who have
not yet received two doses of MMR (with the first dose
administered no earlier than the first birthday). The second
dose of MMR may be administered as soon as 1 month (i.e.,
minimum of 28 days) after the first dose.
All older children not previously immunized should receive
at least one dose of rubella vaccine as MMR.
Adults born in 1957 or later who do not have a medical
contraindication should receive at least one dose ofMMR
vaccine unless they have documentation of vaccination with
at least one dose of measles-, rubella-, and mumps-containing
vaccine or other acceptable evidence of immunity to these
three diseases. Some adults at high risk of measles exposure
may require a second dose of measles vaccine. This second
dose should be administered as combined MMR vaccine
(see Measles chapter for details). Efforts should be made to
identify and vaccinate susceptible adolescents and adults,
particularly women of childbearing age who are not
Rubella
pregnant. Particular emphasis should he placed on vaccinating
both males and females in colleges, places of employment,
and healthcare settings.
Only doses of vaccine with written documentation of the
date of receipt should be accepted as valid. Self-reported
doses or a parental report of vaccination is not considered
adequate documentation. A healthcare worker should not
provide an immunization record for a patient unless that
healthcare worker has administered the vaccine or has seen
a record that documents vaccination. Persons who lack
adequate documentation of vaccination or other acceptable
evidence of immunity should be vaccinated. Vaccination
status and receipt of all vaccinations should he documented in
the patient’s permanent medical record and in a vaccination
record held by the individual.
At the time of publication of this book (January 2006)
ACIP has not made specific recommendations for the use
of MMRV (ProQuad). MMRV is approved by the Food and
Drug Administration for children 12 months through 12
years of age (that is, until the 13th birthday). However,
ACIP has previously stated a preference for use of
combination vaccines when one or more component of the
combination is indicated and none of the other components
are contraindicated. MMRV should not be administered to
persons 13 years or older.
Rubella Immunity
* Documentation of one dose of
rubella-containing vaccine on or
after the first birthday
Serologic evidence of immunity
Birth before 1957 (except women
of childbearing age)
Rubella Immunity
• Birth before 1957 is not
acceptable evidence of rubella
immunity for women who might
become pregnant
* Only serology or documented
vaccination should be accepted
Rubella Immunity
Persons generally can be considered immune to rubella if
they have documentation of vaccination with at least one
dose of MMR (or MMRV) or other live rubella-containing
vaccine administered on or after their first birthday, have
serologic evidence of rubella immunity, or were born before
1957. Persons who have an “equivocal” serologic test result
should be considered rubella-susceptible. Although only one
dose of rubella-containing vaccine is required as acceptable
evidence of immunity to rubella, children should receive
two doses of MMR vaccine according to the routine childhood
vaccination schedule.
Birth before 1957 provides only presumptive evidence of
rubella immunity; it does not guarantee that a person is
immune to rubella. Because rubella can occur in some
unvaccinated persons bom before 1957 and because congenital
rubella and congenital rubella syndrome can occur in the
offspring of women infected with rubella during pregnancy,
birth before 1957 is not acceptable evidence of rubella
immunity for women who might become pregnant. Only a
positive serologic test for rubella antibody or documentation
of appropriate vaccination should be accepted for women
who may become pregnant.
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Healthcare workers born before 1957 also should not be
|j
presumed to be immune. Medical facilities should consider
if recommending a dose of MMR vaccine to unvaccinated
|l healthcare workers born before 1957 who do not have
j|
laboratory evidence of rubella immunity. Rubella vaccination
j or laboratory evidence of rubella immunity is particularly
' important for healthcare workers who could become pregnant,
' including those born before 1957. This recommendation is
j
based on serologic studies which indicate that among
I
hospital workers born before 1957, 5%-9% had no detectable
I
measles antibody.
Clinical diagnosis of rubella is unreliable and should not
be considered in assessing immune status. Because many
rash illnesses may mimic rubella infection and many rubella
infections are unrecognized, the only reliable evidence of
previous rubella infection is the presence of serum rubella
IgG antibody. Laboratories that regularly perform antibody
testing are generally the most reliable because their reagents
and procedures are strictly standardized.
Occasionally, a person with a history of documented rubella
vaccination is found to have a negative serum IgG by
ELISA. Such persons may be given a dose of MMR vaccine
and do not need to be retested for serologic evidence of
rubella immunity.
Serologic screening need not be done before vaccinating
for measles and rubella unless the medical facility considers
it cost-effective. Serologic testing is appropriate only if
tracking systems are used to ensure that tested persons who
are identified as susceptible are subsequently vaccinated in a
timely manner. If the return and timely vaccination of those
screened cannot be assured, vaccination should be done
without prior testing. Serologic testing for immunity to
measles and rubella is not necessary for persons documented
to be appropriately vaccinated or who have other acceptable
evidence of immunity.
Neither rubella vaccine nor immune globulin is effective for
postexposure prophylaxis of rubella. Vaccination after
exposure is not harmful and may possibly avert later disease.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Rubella is a very safe vaccine. Most adverse reactions
reported following MMR vaccination (such as fever and
rash) are attributable to the measles component. The most
common complaints following rubella vaccination are fever,
lymphadenopathy, and arthralgia. These adverse reactions
only occur in susceptible persons and are more common in
adults, especially in women.
MMR Adverse Reactions
Fever 5%-15%
Rash 5%
Joint symptoms 25%
Thrombocytopenia <1/30,000 doses
Parotitis rare
Deafness rare
Encephaiopathy <1/1,000,000 doses
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Rubella Vaccine Arthropathy
Acute arthralgia in about 25% of
susceptable adult women
Acute arthritis-like signs and symptoms
occurs in about 10%
Rare reports of chronic or persistent
symptoms
Population-based studies have not
confirmed association
MMR Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
• Severe allergic reaction to vaccine
component or following a prior dose
• Pregnancy
• Immunosuppression
• Moderate or severe acute illness
• Recent blood product
Joint symptoms, such as arthralgia (joint pain) and arthritis
(joint redness and/or swelling), are associated with the
rubella component of MMR. Arthralgia and transient
arthritis occur more frequently in susceptible adults than in
children and more frequently in susceptible women than in
men. Acute arthralgia or arthritis is rare following vaccination
of children with RA 27/3 vaccine. By contrast, approximately
25% of susceptible postpubertal females develop acute arthralgia
following RA 27/3 vaccination, and approximately 10% have
been reported to have acute arthritis-like signs and symptoms.
Rarely, transient peripheral neuritic complaints, such as
paresthesias and pain in the arms and legs, have been reported.
When acute joint symptoms occur, or when pain or
paresthesias not associated with joints occur, the symptoms
generally begin 1-3 weeks after vaccination, persist for 1 day
to 3 weeks, and rarely recur. Adults with acute joint symptoms
following rubella vaccination rarely have had to disrupt
work activities.
Data from studies in the United States and experience from
other countries using the RA 27/3 strain rubella vaccine
have not supported an association between the vaccine and
chronic arthritis. One study among 958 seronegative
immunized and 932 seronegative unimmunized women aged
15-39 years found no association between rubella vaccination
and development of recurrent joint symptoms, neuropathy,
or collagen disease.
The ACIP continues to recommend the vaccination of all
adult women who do not have evidence of rubella immunity.
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
Persons who have experienced a severe allergic reaction
(i.e., hives, swelling of the mouth or throat, difficulty
breathing, hypotension, shock) following a prior dose of
rubella vaccine or to a vaccine component (e.g., gelatin,
neomycin), should generally not be vaccinated with MMR.
Women known to be pregnant or attempting to become
pregnant should not receive rubella vaccine. Although
there is no evidence that rubella vaccine virus causes fetal
damage (see next section), pregnancy should be avoided for
4 weeks (28 days) after rubella or MMR vaccination.
Persons with immunodeficiency or immunosuppression,
resulting from leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy,
immune deficiency disease, or immunosuppressive therapy
should not be vaccinated. However, treatment with low-dose
(less than 2 mg/kg/day), alternate-day, topical, or aerosolized
steroid preparations is not a contraindication to rubella
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ij vaccination. Persons whose immunosuppressive therapy
I
with steroids has been discontinued for 1 month (3 months
for chemotherapy) may be vaccinated. Rubella vaccine
I
should be considered for persons with asymptomatic or
I
mildly symptomatic HIV infection.
j
Persons with moderate or severe acute illness should not
be vaccinated until the illness has improved. Minor illness
(e.g., otitis media, mild upper respiratory infections), con-
current antibiotic therapy, and exposure or recovery from
other illnesses are not contraindications to rubella vaccination.
Receipt of antibody-containing blood products (e.g.,
immune globulin, whole blood or packed red blood cells,
intravenous immune globulin) may interfere with serocon-
version to rubella vaccine. Vaccine should be given 2 weeks
before, or deferred for at least 3 months following adminis-
tration of an antibody-containing blood product. If rubella
vaccine is given as combined MMR, a longer delay may be
necessary before vaccination. For more information, see
Chapter 2, General Recommendations on Immunization.
Previous administration of human anti-Rho(D) immune
globulin (RhoGam) does not generally interfere with an
immune response to rubella vaccine and is not a contraindi-
cation to postpartum vaccination. However, women who
have received anti-Rho immune globulin should be serologi-
cally tested 6-8 weeks after vaccination to ensure that
seroconversion has occurred.
Although vaccine virus may be isolated from the pharynx,
vaccinees do not transmit rubella to others, except occa-
sionally in the case of the vaccinated breastfeeding woman.
In this situation, the infant may be infected, presumably
through breast milk, and may develop a mild rash illness,
but serious effects have not been reported. Infants infected
through breastfeeding have been shown to respond
normally to rubella vaccination at 12-15 months of age.
Breastfeeding is not a contraindication to rubella vaccination
and does not alter rubella vaccination recommendations.
Rubella Vaccination of Women of
Childbearing Age
Women who are pregnant or who intend to become pregnant
within 4 weeks should not receive rubella vaccine. ACIP
recommends that vaccine providers ask a woman if she is
pregnant or likely to become pregnant in the next 4 weeks.
Those who are pregnant or intend to become pregnant
should not be vaccinated. All other women should be
vaccinated after being informed of the theoretical risks of
vaccination during pregnancy and the importance of not
becoming pregnant during the 4 weeks following vaccination.
Vaccination of Women of
Childbearing Age
Ask if pregnant or likely to
become so in next 4 weeks
Exclude those who say "yes"
For others
- explain theoretical risks
- vaccinate
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ACIP does not recommend routine pregnancy screening of
women before rubella vaccination.
If a pregnant woman is inadvertently vaccinated or if she
becomes pregnant within 4 weeks after vaccination, she
should be counseled about the concern for the fetus (see
below), but MMR vaccination during pregnancy should not
ordinarily be a reason to consider termination of the pregnancy.
Vaccination in Pregnancy
Study 1971-1989
321 women vaccinated
324 live births
No observed CRS
95% confidence limits 0%-1.2%
When rubella vaccine was licensed, concern existed about
women being inadvertently vaccinated while they were
pregnant or shortly before conception. This concern came
from the known teratogenicity of the wild-virus strain. To
determine whether CRS would occur in infants of such
mothers. CDC maintained a registry from 1971 to 1989 of
women vaccinated during pregnancy. This was called the
Vaccine in Pregnancy (VIP) Registry.
Although subclinical fetal infection has been detected
serologically in approximately l%-2% of infants born to
susceptible vaccinees, regardless of the vaccine strain, the data
collected by CDC in the VIP Registry showed no evidence of
CRS occurring in offspring of the 321 susceptible women
who received rubella vaccine and who continued pregnancy
to term. The observed risk of vaccine-induced malformation
was 0%, with a maximum theoretical risk of 1.6%, based on
95% confidence limits (1.2% for all types of rubella vaccine).
Since the risk of the vaccine to the fetus appears to be
extremely low, if it exists at all, routine termination of
pregnancy is not recommended. Individual counseling for
these women is recommended. As of April 30, 1989, CDC
discontinued the VIP registry.
The ACIP continues to state that because of the small
theoretical risk to the fetus of a vaccinated woman,
pregnant women should not be vaccinated.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
MMR vaccine must be shipped with refrigerant to maintain
a temperature of 50 F (10 C) or less at all times. Vaccine
must be refrigerated immediately on arrival and protected
from light at all times. The vaccine must be stored at refrig-
erator temperature (35 -46 F [2 -8 C]), but may be frozen.
Diluent may be stored at refrigerator temperature or at room
temperature. MMRV must be shipped to maintain a temperature
of -4^'F (-20“C ) or colder at all times. MMRV must be stored
at an average temperature of 5 F (-15 C ) or colder at all
times. MMRV may not be stored at refrigerator temperature
at any time.
After reconstitution, MMR vaccines must be stored at
refrigerator temperature and protected from light.
Rubella
Reconstituted vaccine should be used immediately. If recon-
stituted vaccine is not used within 8 hours, it must he
discarded. MMRV must be administered within 30 minutes
of reconstitution.
Strategies to Decrease Rubella and CRS
Although the number of CRS cases is low, rubella transmission
continues to occur, and increased in 1989 and 1990. The
elimination of CRS will require several interventions:
•Achievement and maintenance of high immunization
levels.
•Intensive surveillance of rubella and CRS.
•Prompt outbreak control when rubella occurs.
Vaccination of Susceptible Postpubertal
Females
Elimination of indigenous rubella and CRS can be maintained
by continuing efforts to vaccinate susceptible adolescents
and young adults of childbearing age, particularly those born
outside the United States. These efforts should include
vaccinating in family planning clinics, sexually transmitted
disease (STD) clinics, and as part of routine gynecologic care;
maximizing use of premarital serology results; emphasizing
immunization for college students; vaccinating women
postpartum and postabortion; immunizing prison staff and,
when possible, prison inmates, especially women inmates;
offering vaccination to at-risk women through the special
supplemental program for Women, Infants and Children
(WIC); and implementing vaccination programs in the
workplace, particularly those employing persons bom
outside the United States.
Hospital Rubella Programs
Emphasis should be placed on vaccinating susceptible
hospital personnel, both male and female (e.g., volunteers,
trainees, nurses, physicians.) Ideally, all hospital employees
should be immune. It is important to note that screening
programs alone are not adequate. Vaccination of susceptible
staff must follow.
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Varicella
Varicella is an acute infectious disease caused by varicella
zoster virus (VZV). The recurrent infection (herpes zoster,
also known as shingles) has been recognized since ancient
times. Primary varicella infection (chickenpox) was not
reliably distinguished from smallpox until the end of the
19th century. In 1875, Steiner demonstrated that chickenpox
was caused by an infectious agent by inoculating volunteers
with the vesicular fluid from a patient with acute varicella.
Clinical observations of the relationship between varicella
and herpes zoster were made in 1888 by von Bokay, when
children without evidence of varicella immunity acquired
varicella after contact with herpes zoster. VZV was isolated
from vesicular fluid of both chickenpox and zoster lesions in
cell culture by Thomas Weller in 1954- Subsequent laboratory
studies of the virus led to the development of a live
attenuated varicella vaccine in Japan in the 1970s. The
vaccine was licensed for use in healthy children and adults
in the United States in March 1995.
Varicella
* Acute viral illness
* Zoster described in premedieval
times
* Varicella not differentiated from
smallpox until end of 19th
century
* Infectious nature demonstrated
in 1875
Varicella Zoster Virus
VZV is a DNA virus and is a member of the herpesvirus
group. Like other herpesviruses, VZV has the capacity to
persist in the body after the primary (first) infection as a
latent infection. VZV persists in sensory nerve ganglia.
Primary infection with VZV results in chickenpox. Herpes
zoster (shingles) is the result of recurrent infection. The
virus is believed to have a short survival time outside the
infected host.
Pathogenesis
VZV enters through the respiratory tract and conjunctiva.
The virus is believed to replicate at the site of entry in the
nasopharynx and in regional lymph nodes. A primary
viremia occurs 4-6 days after infection and disseminates the
virus to other organs, such as the liver, spleen, and sensory
ganglia. Further replication occurs in the viscera, followed
by a secondary viremia, with viral infection of the skin.
Virus can be cultured from mononuclear cells of an infected
person from 5 days before to 1 or 2 days following the
appearance of the rash.
Clinical Features
The incubation period is from 14 to 16 days from exposure,
with a range of 10-21 days. The incubation period may be
prolonged in immunocompromised patients and those who
have received varicella zoster immune globulin (VZIG).
The incubation period may be up to 28 days after receipt
of VZIG.
Varicella Zoster Virus
* Herpesvirus (DNA)
* Primary infection results in
varicella (chickenpox)
* Recurrent infection results in
herpes zoster (shingles)
* Short survival in environment
Varicella Pathogenesis
* Respiratory transmission of virus
* Replication in nasopharynx and
regional lymph nodes
* Repeated episodes of viremia
* Multiple tissues, including sensory
ganglia, infected during viremia
Varicella Clinical Features
* Incubation period 14-16 days
(range 10-21 days)
* Mild prodrome for 1-2 days
* Generally appear first on head;
most concentrated on trunk
* Successive crops (2-4 days) of
pruritic vesicles
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Primary Infection IChickenpox]
A mild prodrome may precede the onset of a rash. Adults
may have 1-2 days of fever and malaise prior to rash onset,
hut in children the rash is often the first sign of disease.
The rash is generalized and pruritic and progresses rapidly
from macules to papules to vesicular lesions before crusting.
The rash usually appears first on the scalp, then on the trunk,
and then the extremities, with the highest concentration of
lesions on the trunk (centripetal distribution). Lesions also
can occur on mucous membranes of the oropharynx,
respiratory tract, vagina, conjunctiva, and the cornea.
Lesions are usually 1-4 mm in diameter. The vesicles are
superficial and delicate and contain clear fluid on an
erythematous base. Vesicles may rupture or become purulent
before they dry and crust. Successive crops appear over
several days, with lesions present in several stages of
development. For example, macular lesions may be observed
in the same area of skin as mature vesicles. Healthy children
usually have 200-500 lesions in 2 to 4 successive crops.
The clinical course in healthy children is generally mild,
with malaise, pruritus (itching), and fever up to 102°F for
2-3 days. Adults may have more severe disease and have a
higher incidence of complications. Respiratory and gastroin-
testinal symptoms are absent. Children with lymphoma and
leukemia may develop a severe progressive form of varicella
characterized by high fever, extensive vesicular eruption,
and high complication rates. Children infected with human
immunodeficiency vims may also have severe, prolonged illness.
Recovery from primary varicella infection usually results in
lifetime immunity. In otherwise healthy persons, a second
occurrence of chickenpox is not common, but this can
happen, particularly in immunocompromised persons. As
with other viral diseases, reexposure to natural (wild)
varicella may lead to reinfection that boosts antibody titers
without causing clinical illness or detectable viremia.
Herpes Zoster
* Reactivation of varicella zoster
virus
* Associated with;
— aging
— immunosuppression
— intrauterine exposure
— varicella at <18 months of age
Recurrent Disease [Herpes Zoster]
Herpes zoster, or shingles, occurs when latent VZV reactivates
and causes recurrent disease. The immunologic mechanism
that controls latency of VZV is not well understood.
However, factors associated with recurrent disease include
aging, immunosuppression, intrauterine exposure to VZV,
and having had varicella at a young age (younger than 18
months). In immunocompromised persons, zoster may
disseminate, causing generalized skin lesions and central
nervous system, pulmonary, and hepatic involvement.
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The vesicular eruption of zoster generally occurs unilaterally
in the distribution of a dermatome supplied by a dorsal root
Varicella
j
or extramedullary cranial nerve sensory ganglion. Most
I
often, this involves the trunk or the area of the fifth cranial
nerve. Two to four days prior to the eruption, there may he
pain and paresthesia in the segment involved. There are few
systemic symptoms. Postherpetic neuralgia, or pain in the
area of the recurrence which persists after the lesions have
resolved, is a distressing complication of zoster, with no
adequate therapy currently available. Postherpetic neuralgia
may last as long as a year after the episode of zoster. Ocular
nerve and other organ involvement with zoster can occur,
often with severe sequelae.
Complications
Acute varicella is generally mild and self-limited, but it may
be associated with complications. The most common
complications of varicella include secondary bacterial
infections of skin lesions, dehydration, pneumonia, and
central nervous system (CNS) involvement. Secondary
bacterial infections of skin lesions with Staphylococcus or
Streptococcus are the most common cause of hospitalization
and outpatient medical visits. Secondary infection with
invasive group A streptococci may cause serious illness and
lead to hospitalization or death. Pneumonia following varicella
is usually viral but may be bacterial. Secondary bacterial
pneumonia is more common in children younger than
1 year of age.
Varicella Complications
• Bacterial infection of lesions
• CNS manifestations
• Pneumonia (rare in children)
• Hospitalization -3 per 1,000 cases
• Death -1 per 60,000 cases
Central nervous system manifestations of varicella range
from aseptic meningitis to encephalitis. Involvement of the
cerebellum, with resulting cerebellar ataxia, is the most
common and generally has a good outcome. Encephalitis is
an infrequent complication of varicella (estimated 1.8 per
10,000 cases) and may lead to seizures and coma. Diffuse
cerebral involvement is more common in adults than in
children.
Reye syndrome is an unusual complication of varicella and
influenza and occurs almost exclusively in children who take
aspirin during the acute illness. The etiology of Reye syndrome
is unknown. There has been a dramatic decrease in the
incidence of Reye syndrome during the past decade,
presumably related to decreased use of aspirin by children.
Rare complications of varicella include aseptic meningitis,
transverse myelitis, Guillain-Barre syndrome, thrombocy-
topenia, hemorrhagic varicella, purpura fulminans,
glomerulonephritis, myocarditis, arthritis, orchitis, uveitis,
iritis, and clinical hepatitis.
In the prevaccine era, approximately 1 1 ,000 persons with
varicella required hospitalization each year. Hospitalization
rates were approximately 2-3 per 1 ,000 cases among healthy
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children and 8 per 1,000 cases among adults. Death
occurred in approximately 1 in 60,000 cases. From 1990
through 1996, an average of 103 deaths from varicella were
reported each year. Most deaths occur in immunologically
normal children and adults.
Varicella Fatality Rate
in Healthy Persons
1*14 15*19 20*29
Ag« group (yrs)
The risk of complications from varicella varies with age.
Complications are infrequent among healthy children. They
occur much more frequently in persons older than 1 5 years
of age and infants younger than 1 year of age. For instance,
among children 1-14 years of age, the fatality rate of varicella
is approximately 1 per 100,000 cases, among persons 15-19
years, it is 2.7 per 100,000 cases, and among adults 30-49
years of age, 25.2 per 100,000 cases. Adults account for only
5% of reported cases of varicella hut approximately 35% of
mortality.
Groups at Increased Risk of
Complications of Varicella
• Healthy adults
• Immunocompromised persons
• Newborns of mothers with rash
onset within 5 days before to 48
hours after delivery
Immunocompromised persons have a high risk of acquiring
serious varicella infection and a high risk of disseminated
disease (up to 36% in one report). These persons may have
multiple organ system involvement, and the disease may
become fulminant and hemorrhagic. The most frequent
complications in immunocompromised persons are pneumo-
nia and encephalitis. Children with HIV infection are at
increased risk for morbidity from varicella and herpes zoster.
Perinatal Infection
The onset of maternal varicella from 5 days before to 48
hours after delivery may result in overwhelming infection of
the neonate and a fatality rate as high as 30%. This severe
disease is believed to result from fetal exposure to varicella
virus without the benefit of passive maternal antibody.
Infants born to mothers with onset of maternal varicella
5 days or more prior to delivery usually have a benign
course, presumably due to passive transfer of maternal
antibody across the placenta.
Congenital Varicella Syndrome
• Results from maternal infection
during pregnancy
• Period of risk may extend through
first 20 weeks of pregnancy
• Low birth weight, atrophy of
extremity with skin scarring, eye
and neurologic abnormalities
Congenital VZV Infection
Primary varicella infection in the first 20 weeks of gestation
is occasionally associated with a variety of abnormalities in
the newborn, including low birth weight, hypoplasia of an
extremity, skin scarring, localized muscular atrophy,
encephalitis, cortical atrophy, chorioretinitis, and micro-
cephaly. This constellation of abnormalities, collectively
known as congenital varicella syndrome, was first recognized
in 1947. The risk of congenital abnormalities from primary
maternal varicella infection during the first trimester
appears to be very low (less than 2%). Rare reports of
congenital birth defects following maternal zoster exist, but
virologic confirmation of maternal lesions is lacking.
Intrauterine infection with VZV, particularly after 20 weeks'
gestation, is associated with zoster in those infants at an ear-
lier age; the exact risk is unknown.
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Laboratory Diagnosis
Laboratory diagnosis is not routinely required, but is
useful if confirmation of the diagnosis or determination of
susceptibility is necessary. Varicella incidence has declined
dramatically as a result of routine varicella immunization in
the United States. This has had the combined effect of
increasing the number of atypical cases (either vaccine
adverse events or breakthrough wild-type infection in
immunized persons), and of reducing physicians' experience
in diagnosing varicella. As such, the need for laboratory
confirmation of varicella is on the increase.
Varicella zoster virus may he isolated in tissue culture.
The most frequent source of isolation is vesicular fluid.
Laboratory techniques allow differentiation of wild-type
and vaccine strains of VZV.
Rapid varicella zoster virus identification. Rapid virus
identification techniques are indicated for a case with severe
or unusual disease to initiate specific antiviral therapy. VZV
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is the method of choice
for rapid clinical diagnosis. Real-time PCR methods are
more widely available than in the past and are the most
sensitive and specific method of the available tests. Results
are available within several hours. If real-time PCR is
unavailable, the direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) method
can be used, although it is less sensitive than PCR and
requires more meticulous specimen collection and handling.
Specimens are best collected by unroofing a vesicle,
preferably a fresh fluid-filled vesicle, and then rubbing the
base of a skin lesion with a polyester swab. Crusts from
lesions are also excellent specimens for PCR. Other specimen
sources such as nasopharyngeal secretions, saliva, blood,
urine, bronchial washings, and cerebrospinal fluid are
considered less desirable sources than skin lesions because
positive test results from such specimens are much less likely.
Because viral proteins persist after cessation of viral
replication, PCR and DFA may be positive when viral
cultures are negative.
Additional information concerning virus isolation and
strain differentiation can be found at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/surv-manual/
A reliable history of chickenpox has been found to be a
valid measure of immunity to varicella because the rash is
distinctive and subclinical cases are unusual. As a result,
serologic testing of children is generally not necessary.
However, serologic testing may be useful in adult vaccination
programs.
A variety of serologic tests for varicella antibody are
available. Available tests include complement fixation (CF),
Varicella Laboratory Diagnosis
* Isolation of varicella virus from
clinical specimen
* Rapid varicella virus
identification using PCR
(preferred, if available) or DFA
* Significant rise in varicella IgG
by any standard serologic assay
(e.g., enzyme immunoassay)
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r Varicella Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
* Transmission Airborne droplet
Direct contact with lesions
• Temporal pattern Peak in winter and early
spring (U.S.)
V
* Communicability 1-2 days before to 4-5
days after onset of rash
May be longer in
immunocompromised
indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA), fluorescent antibody to
membrane antigen (FAMA), neutralization, indirect hemag-
glutination (IHA), immune adherence hemagglutination
(lAHA), radioimmunoassay (RIA), latex agglutination
(LA), and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA).
ELISA is sensitive and specific, simple to perform, and widely
available commercially. A commercially available LA is
sensitive and simple and rapid to perform. LA is generally
more sensitive than commercial ELISAs, although it can
result in false-positive results, leading to failure to identify
persons without evidence of varicella immunity. This latter
concern can be minimized by performing LA as a dilution
series. Either of these tests would be useful for screening for
varicella immunity.
Antibody resulting from vaccination is generally of lower
titer than antibody resulting from varicella disease.
Commercial antibody assays, particularly the LA test, may
not be sensitive enough to detect vaccine-induced antibody
in some recipients. Because of the potential for false-negative
serologic tests, routine postvaccination serologic testing is
not recommended. For diagnosis of acute varicella infection,
serologic confirmation would include a significant rise in
varicella IgG by any standard serologic assay. Testing using
commercial kits for IgM antibody is not recommended since
available methods lack sensitivity and specificity; false-positive
IgM results are common in the presence of high IgG levels.
The National VZV Laboratory at GDC has developed a reli-
able IgM capture assay. Call 404-639-0066, 404-639-3667,
or email vzvlab@cdc.gov for details about collecting and
submitting specimens for testing.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Varicella and herpes zoster occur worldwide. Some data
suggest that varicella infection is less common in childhood
in tropical areas, where chickenpox occurs more commonly
among adults. The reason(s) for this difference in age distri-
bution are not known with certainty, but may be related to
lack of childhood varicella infection in rural populations.
Reservoir
Varicella is a human disease. No animal or insect source or
vector is known to exist.
Transmission
Infection with VZV occurs through the respiratory tract.
The most common mode of transmission of VZV is believed
to be person to person from infected respiratory tract secre-
tions. Transmission may also occur by respiratory contact
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f| with airborne droplets or by direct contact or inhalation of
I
aerosols from vesicular fluid of skin lesions of acute varicella
or zoster.
I
I
Temporal Pattern
I'
In temperate areas, varicella has a distinct seasonal fluctuation,
with the highest incidence occurring in winter and early
spring. In the United States, incidence is highest between
March and May and lowest between September and
November. Less seasonality is reported in tropical areas.
Herpes zoster has no seasonal variation and occurs through-
out the year.
Communicability
The period of communicability extends from 1 to 2 days
before the onset of rash through the first 4 to 5 days, or
until lesions have formed crusts. Immunocompromised
patients with varicella are probably contagious during the
entire period new lesions are appearing. The virus has not
been isolated from crusted lesions.
Varicella is highly contagious. It is less contagious than
measles, but more so than mumps and rubella. Secondary
attack rates among susceptible household contacts of
persons with varicella are as high as 90% (that is, 9 of 10
susceptible household contacts of persons with varicella will
become infected).
Secular Trends in the United States
In the prevaccine era, varicella was endemic in the United
States, and virtually all persons acquired varicella by adult-
hood. As a result, the number of cases occurring annually
was estimated to approximate the birth cohort, or approxi-
mately 4 million per year. Varicella was removed from the
list of nationally notifiable conditions in 1981, but some
states continued to report cases to CDC.
In the prevaccine era, the majority of cases (approximately
85%) occurred among children younger than 15 years of
age. The highest age-specific incidence of varicella was
among children 1-4 years of age, who accounted for 39% of
all cases. This age distribution was probably a result of earlier
exposure to VZV in preschool and child care settings.
Children 5-9 years of age accounted for 38% of cases.
Adults 20 years of age and older accounted for only 7% of
cases (National Health Interview Survey data, 1990-1994).
Data from three active varicella surveillance areas indicate
that the incidence of varicella, as well as varicella-related
hospitalizations, has decreased significantly since licensure
of vaccine in 1995. In 2004, varicella vaccination coverage
Varicella Age-Specific Incidence
United States, 1990-1994
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Reduction in Age-Specific Varicella Incidence Rate
Varicella Active Surveillance Project Sites, 1995 to 2004
Age group
Antelope
Valley, CA*
(%)
West
Philadelphia
(%)
< 1 83 77
1-4 94 89
5-9 83 95
10-14 49 98
15-19 65 78
20+ 81 67
Total 83 93
^003 population uMd for rata calculations
among children 19-35 months in two of the active surveillance
areas was estimated to be 89% and 90%. Compared with
1995, varicella cases declined 83%-93% by 2004. Cases
declined most among children aged 1-4 and 5-9 years, but a
decline occurred in all age groups including infants and adults,
indicating reduced transmission of the virus in these groups.
Herpes Zoster
Herpes zoster is not a notifiable condition. An estimated
300,000 episodes of zoster occur annually. Ninety-five
percent of these episodes are first occurrences, and 5% are
recurrences. The risk of zoster increases with increasing age.
By age 80, almost 15% of persons will have experienced at
least one episode of zoster.
Varicella Vaccine
• Composition Live virus (Oka/Merck strain)
• Efficacy 95% (Range, 65%-100%)
* Duration of >7 years
Immunity
* Schedule 1 Dose (<13 years of age)
May be administered simultaneously with
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine
Varicella Vaccine
Characteristics
Varicella zoster vaccine is a live attenuated viral vaccine,
derived from the Oka strain of VZV. The vaccine virus was
isolated by Takahashi in the early 1970s from vesicular fluid
from an otherwise healthy child with varicella disease.
Varicella vaccine was licensed for general use in Japan and
Korea in 1988. It was licensed in the United States in 1995.
The virus was attenuated by sequential passage in human
embryonic lung cell culture, embryonic guinea pig fibroblasts,
and in WI-38 human diploid cells. The Oka/Merck vaccine
has undergone further passage through MRC-5 human
diploid cell cultures for a total of 3 1 passages.
The reconstituted vaccine contains small amounts of
sucrose, processed porcine gelatin, sodium chloride,
monosodium L-glutamate, sodium diphosphate, potassium
phosphate, and potassium chloride, and trace quantities of
residual components of MRC-5 cells (DNA and protein),
EDTA, neomycin, and fetal bovine serum. The vaccine does
not contain egg, ovalbumin, or preservative.
On September 6, 2005, the Food and Drug Administration
licensed a combined live attenuated measles-mumps-rubella
and varicella (MMRV) vaccine (ProQuad) for use in persons
12 months through 12 years of age. The attenuated measles,
mumps, and rubella vaccine viruses in MMRV are identical
and of equal titer to those in the measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR) vaccine. The titer of Oka/Merck varicella zoster
virus is higher in MMRV vaccine than in single-antigen
varicella vaccine, a minimum of 3.99 logjo plaque-forming
units (PFU) versus 1,350 PFU (-3.13 logio), respectively.
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Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
j
After one dose of single-antigen varicella vaccine, 97% of
children 12 months to 12 years of age develop detectable
antibody titers. More than 90% of vaccine responders
maintain antibody for at least 6 years. In Japanese studies,
97% of children had antibody 7 to 10 years after vaccination.
Vaccine efficacy is estimated to be 70%-90% against infection,
and 85%-95% against moderate or severe disease. In field
conditions, varicella vaccine is 80%-85% effective against
infection and more than 95% effective against severe disease.
Among healthy adolescents and adults, an average of 78%
develop antibody after one dose, and 99% develop antibody
after a second dose given 4 to 8 weeks later. Antibody has
persisted for at least 1 year in 97% of vaccinees after the
second dose given 4 to 8 weeks after the first dose. Studies
on the persistence of antibody and clinical efficacy in both
children and adults are ongoing.
MMRV vaccine was licensed on the basis of equivalence of
immunogenicity of the antigenic components rather than
the clinical efficacy. Clinical studies involving healthy
children age 12-23 months indicated that those who
received a single dose of MMRV vaccine developed similar
levels of antibody to measles, mumps, rubella and varicella
as children who received MMR and varicella vaccines
concomitantly at separate injection sites.
Immunity appears to be long-lasting, and is probably
permanent in the majority of vaccinees. Breakthrough
infection (i.e., varicella disease in a vaccinated person) is
significantly milder, with fewer lesions (generally fewer than
50), many of which are maculopapular rather than vesicular.
Most persons with breakthrough infection do not have fever.
Although findings of some studies have suggested otherwise,
most investigations have not identified time since vaccination
as a risk factor for breakthrough varicella. Some, but not all,
recent investigations have identified the presence of asthma,
use of steroids, and younger age (i.e., younger than 15 months)
risk factors for breakthrough varicella. However, because of
the inconsistency of these data, ACIP has not changed its
recommendations for use of varicella vaccine.
Breakthrough varicella infection could be a result of several
factors, including interference of vaccine virus replication
by circulating antibody, impotent vaccine resulting from
storage or handling errors or inaccurate recordkeeping.
Interference from live viral vaccine administered before
varicella vaccine could also reduce vaccine effectiveness.
A study in two health maintenance organizations found that
children who received varicella vaccine less than 30 days
after MMR vaccination had a 2. 5 -fold increased risk of
Breakthrough Infection
* Immunity appears to be
long-lasting for most recipients
* Breakthrough disease much
milder than in unvaccinated
persons
' No consistent evidence that risk
of breakthrough infection
increases with time since
vaccination
Breakthrough Infection
* Retrospective cohort study of 115,000
children vaccinated in 2 HMOs during
January 1995 through December 1999
* Risk of breakthrough varicella 2.5
times higher if varicella vaccine
administered less than 30 days
following MMR
* No increased risk if varicella vaccine
given simultaneously or more than
30 days after MMR
MMWR 2001 ;50(47):1 050-61
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breakthrough varicella compared with those who received
varicella vaccine before, simultaneously with, or more than
30 days after MMR. Inactivated vaccines (DTaP, Hih, IPV,
and hepatitis B) and OPV did not increase the risk of break'
through varicella if administered less than 30 days prior to
varicella vaccine.
Varicella Vaccine Recommendations
Children
• Routine vaccination at 12-18
months of age
* Recommended for all children
without evidence of varicella
immunity by the 13th birthday
Vaccination Schedule and Use
Varicella virus vaccine is recommended for all children
without contraindications at 12-18 months of age. The
vaccine may be given to all children at this age regardless of
prior history’ of varicella. However, vaccination is not
necessaty- for children with reliable histories of chickenpox.
Varicella vaccine is also recommended for all children
without evidence of varicella immunity (see below) by the
13th birthday. Children who have not been vaccinated
pre\’iously and who do not have a reliable history of chick-
enpox are considered susceptible. Efforts should be made to
ensure varicella immunity by this age, because after 13 years
of age varicella disease is more severe, complications are
more frequent, and two doses of vaccine are required.
MMRV vaccine is indicated for simultaneous vaccination
against measles, mumps, rubella and varicella in children
12 months through 12 years of age; persons outside of this
age group should not receive this vaccine. MMRV vaccine
can reduce the number of injections when administered to
children 12 months through 12 years of age for whom a) the
first dose of MMR and varicella vaccines are indicated, and
b) the second dose of MMR and either the first or the
second dose (i.e., during varicella outbreaks) of varicella
vaccines are indicated. Use of licensed combination vaccines,
such as MMRV vaccine, is preferred to separate injection of
their equivalent component vaccines. When used, MMRV
vaccine should be administered on or after the first birthday,
preferably as soon as the child becomes eligible for vaccina-
tion.
Varicella vaccine should be administered subcutaneously. It
has been shown to be safe and effective in healthy children
when administered at the same time as MMR vaccine at
separate sites and with separate syringes. If varicella and
MMR vaccines are not administered at the same visit, they
should be separated by at least 28 days. Varicella vaccine
may also be administered simultaneously (but at separate
sites with separate syringes) with all other childhood vaccines.
ACIP strongly recommends that varicella vaccine be
administered simultaneously with all other vaccines
recommended at 12—18 months of age.
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Children with a reliable history of typical chickenpox can
be assumed to be immune to varicella. Serologic testing of
such children prior to vaccination is not warranted because
I
the majority of children between 12 months and 12 years of
age without a clinical history of chickenpox are not immune,
j
Prior history of chickenpox is not a contraindication to
' varicella vaccination.
' Varicella vaccine should be administered to all adolescents
and adults who do not have evidence of varicella immunity.
Approximately 80% of adolescents and adults respond to a
I
single dose of varicella vaccine. In contrast, at least 97% of
healthy children will develop detectable antibody after a
single dose. As a result, persons 13 years of age and older
should receive two doses of varicella vaccine separated by
I
4-8 weeks. If there is a lapse of more than 8 weeks after the
I first dose, the second dose may be administered at any time
I
without repeating the first dose.
ij Assessment of varicella immunity status of all adolescents
' and adults and vaccination of those who lack evidence of
varicella immunity are desirable to protect these individuals
from the higher risk of complications from acquired varicella.
Vaccination may be offered at the time of routine health-
care visits. However, specific assessment efforts should be
focused on adolescents and adults who are at highest risk of
exposure and those most likely to transmit varicella to others.
Vaccination of Persons 1 3 Years of Age
and Older
Varicella vaccine was previously recommended for persons
13 years of age and older without evidence of immunity who
have close contact with persons at high risk for severe
disease (e.g., healthcare workers and family contacts of
immunocompromised persons) or who are at high risk for
exposure or transmission. The ACIP now recommends that
all other persons in this age group without evidence of
immunity be vaccinated with two doses of varicella vaccine
administered 4-8 weeks apart. The vaccine may be offered
during routine healthcare visits.
The ACIP recommends that all healthcare workers be
immune to varicella, either from a reliable history of varicella
disease or from vaccination. In healthcare settings, serologic
screening of personnel who are uncertain of their varicella
history, or who claim not to have had the disease is likely to
be cost-effective. Testing for varicella immunity following
two doses of vaccine is not necessary because 99% of
persons are seropositive after the second dose. Moreover,
available commercial assays are not sensitive enough to
detect antibody following vaccination in all instances.
Varicella Vaccine Recommendations
Adolescents and Adults
• All persons >13 years of age
without evidence of varicella
immunity
* Two doses separated by 4-8
weeks
Do not repeat first dose because
of extended interval between
doses
Vaccination of
Healthcare Workers
* Recommended for all susceptible
healthcare workers
• Prevaccination serologic
screening probably cost-effective
* Postvaccination testing not
necessary or recommended
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Seroconversion does not always result in full protection
against disease, although no data regarding correlates of
protection are available for adults. If a vaccinated health-
care worker is exposed to VZV, the employee should be
monitored daily from day 10 to day 21 after exposure
through the employee health program or infection control
nurse to determine clinical status (screen for fever, skin
lesions, and systemic symptoms). Of note, persons with
varicella may be infectious starting 2 days before rash onset.
In addition, the healthcare worker should he instructed to
immediately report fever, headache, or other constitutional
symptoms and any skin lesions (which may he atypical).
The person should be placed on sick leave immediately if
symptoms occur. Healthcare institutions may establish
protocols and recommendations for screening and vaccinating
healthcare workers and for management of healthcare
workers following exposures in the workplace.
The risk of transmission of vaccine virus from a vaccinated
person to a susceptible contact appears to be very low (see
Transmission of Varicella Vaccine Virus, below), and the
benefits of vaccinating susceptible healthcare workers clearly
outweigh this potential risk. Transmission of vaccine virus
appears to occur primarily if and when the vaccinee develops
a vaccine-associated rash. As a safeguard, institutions may
wish to consider precautions for personnel who develop a
rash following vaccination (e.g., avoidance of contact with
persons at high risk of serious complications, such as
immunosuppressed persons who do not have evidence of
varicella immunity).
Varicella Immunity
Written documentation of age-appropriate
vaccination
Born in the U.S. before 1966
History of typical varicella disease among:
—non-U.S. born persons born before 1966
—all persons born during 1966-1997
History of herpes zoster based on
healthcare provider diagnosis
Laboratory evidence of immunity or
laboratory confirmation of disease
Varicella Immunity
In 2005 the ACIP approved a revised definition for evidence !
of immunity to varicella. Evidence of immunity to varicella
j
includes any of the following: i
1 ) Written documentation of age-appropriate |
vaccination;
j
2) Bom in the United States before 1966; i
3) History of varicella disease based on healthcare
j
provider diagnosis or self or parental report of typical i
varicella disease for non-U.S.-born persons born
before 1966, and all persons born during 1966-1997.
j
For persons reporting a history of atypical mild I
disease, healthcare providers should seek either '
a) an epidemiologic link to a typical varicella case i
(e.g., case occurred in the context of an outbreak or
j
patient had household exposure in the previous
^
3 weeks), or b) evidence of laboratory confirmation, '
if it was performed at the time of acute disease.
When such documentation is lacking, persons should ji
not be considered as having a valid history of disease
because other diseases may mimic mild atypical varicella, i
Varicella
For persons bom during or after 1998, history of disease
is no longer considered as evidence of immunity,
unless the illness was laboratory confirmed.
4) History of herpes zoster based on healthcare provider
diagnosis; or
5) Laboratory evidence of immunity or laboratory
confirmation of disease.
Postexposure Prophylaxis
Data from the United States and Japan in a variety of settings
I
indicate that varicella vaccine is effective in preventing
illness or modifying the severity of illness if used within
3 days, and possibly up to 5 days, after exposure. ACIP
recommends the vaccine for use in persons who do not have
evidence of varicella immunity following exposure to varicella.
If exposure to varicella does not cause infection, postexposure
vaccination should induce protection against subsequent
exposure. If the exposure results in infection, there is no
evidence that administration of varicella vaccine during the
incubation period or prodromal stage of illness increases the
risk for vaccine-associated adverse reactions. Although post-
exposure use of varicella vaccine has potential applications
in hospital settings, preexposure vaccination of all healthcare
I
workers without evidence of varicella immunity is the
I
recommended and preferred method for preventing varicella
i
in healthcare settings.
Varicella outbreaks in some settings (e.g., child care facilities
and schools) can persist up to 6 months. Varicella vaccine
has been used successfully to control these outbreaks.
Varicella vaccine should be used for outbreak control by
advising exposed persons without evidence of varicella
immunity to contact their healthcare providers for vaccination
or by offering vaccination through the health department.
The ACIP now recommends a second dose of varicella
vaccine for outbreak control. During a varicella outbreak,
persons who have received one dose of varicella vaccine
should, resources permitting, receive a second dose, provided
the appropriate vaccination interval has elapsed since the
first dose (3 months for persons aged 12 months to 12 years
and at least 4 weeks for persons aged 13 years of age and older).
Varicella Vaccine
Postexposure Prophylaxis
* Varicella vaccine is recommended
for use in persons without
evidence of varicella immunity
after exposure to varicella
—70%-1 00®/o effective if given
within 72 hours of exposure
—not effective if >5 days but will
produce immunity if not
infected
Adverse Reactions Follomiing
Vaccination
The most common adverse reactions following varicella
vaccine are those at the injection site, such as pain, soreness,
redness, and swelling. Based on information from the
manufacturer’s clinical trials of varicella vaccine, local
reactions are reported by 19% of children, and by 24% of
adolescents and adults (33% following the second dose).
These local adverse reactions are generally mild and self-
limited. A varicella-like rash at injection site is reported by
Varicella Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
* Injection site complaints
19% (children)
24% (adolescents and adults)
* Rash - 3%-4%
—may be maculopapular rather
than vesicular
—average 5 lesions
* Systemic reactions not common
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Zoster Following Vaccination
* Most cases in children
* Risk from vaccine virus less than
from wild virus
* Usually a mild illness without
complications
3% of children, and by 1% of adolescents and adults following
the second dose. In both circumstances, a median of two
lesions have been present. These lesions generally occur
within 2 weeks, and are most commonly maculopapular
rather than vesicular.
A generalized varicella-like rash is reported by 4%-6% of
recipients of varicella vaccine (1% after the second dose in
adolescents and adults), with a median of five lesions. Most
of these generalized rashes occur within 3 weeks and most
are maculopapular.
Fever within 42 days of vaccination is reported by 15% of
children and 10% of adolescents and adults. The majority of
these episodes of fever have been attributed to intercurrent
illness rather than to the vaccine.
Varicella vaccine is a live virus vaccine and may result in
a latent infection, similar to that caused by wild varicella
virus. Consequently, zoster caused by the vaccine virus has
been reported, mostly among vaccinated children. Not all
these cases have been confirmed as having been caused by
vaccine virus. The risk of zoster following vaccination appears
to be less than that following infection with wild-type virus.
The majority of cases of zoster following vaccine have been
mild and have not been associated with complications such
as postherpetic neuralgia.
Contraindications and Precautions
to Vaccination
Varicella Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to
vaccine component or following
a prior dose
* Immunosuppression
* Pregnancy
* Moderate or severe acute illness
• Recent blood product
Varicella Vaccine
Use in Immunocompromised Persons
* Most immunocompromised
persons should not be
vaccinated
* Vaccinate persons with isolated
humoral immunodeficiency
* Consider varicella vaccination
for asymptomatic HIV-infected
children with CD4% >15% (CDC
class A1 and N1)
Contraindications and precautions to varicella vaccine are I
similar to those for other live attenuated vaccines. Persons
with a severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component or
j
following a prior dose of vaccine should not receive •
varicella vaccine. Varicella vaccine contains minute !
amounts of neomycin and gelatin but does not contain
|
egg protein or preservatives.
j
Persons with immunosuppression due to leukemia, lymphoma,
|
generalized malignancy, immune deficiency disease, or ;
immunosuppressive therapy should not be vaccinated.
However, treatment with low-dose (less than 2 mg/kg/day),
;
alternate-day, topical, replacement, or aerosolized steroid I
preparations is not a contraindication to varicella vaccination.
|
Persons whose immunosuppressive therapy with steroids has :i
been discontinued for 1 month (3 months for chemotherapy)
|
may be vaccinated. :
f
Varicella vaccine should not be administered to persons j
with cellular immunodeficiency. However, in 1999,
ACIP recommended that persons with isolated humoral f
immunodeficiency (e.g., hypogammaglobulinemia and i’
agammaglobulinemia) should be vaccinated.
j
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Persons with moderate or severe cellular immunodeficiency
resulting from infection with human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), including persons diagnosed with acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) should not receive
varicella vaccine. However, vaccination should be considered
for children with asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic
HIV infection (CDC class N1 or Al, age-specific
CD4+ T-lymphocyte percentage of 15% or higher). These
children should receive two doses of varicella vaccine with
a 3-month interval between doses. Because persons with
impaired cellular immunity are potentially at greater risk for
complications after vaccination with a live vaccine, these
vaccinees should be encouraged to return for evaluation if
they experience a postvaccination varicella-like rash.
Women known to be pregnant or attempting to become
pregnant should not receive varicella vaccine. To date, no
adverse outcomes of pregnancy or in a fetus have been
reported among women inadvertently vaccinated shortly
before or during pregnancy. Although the manufacturer’s
package insert states otherwise, ACIP and the American
Academy of Pediatrics recommend that pregnancy be
avoided for 1 month following receipt of varicella vaccine.
The ACIP now recommends prenatal assessment and post-
partum vaccination for varicella. Women should be assessed
during a prenatal healthcare visit for evidence of varicella
immunity. Upon completion or termination of pregnancy,
women who do not have evidence of varicella immunity
should receive the first dose of varicella vaccine before
discharge from the healthcare facility. The second dose
should be administered 4-8 weeks later at the postpartum or
other healthcare visit. Standing orders are recommended for
healthcare settings where completion or termination of
pregnancy occurs to ensure administration of varicella vaccine.
The manufacturer, in collaboration with CDC, has established
a Varicella Vaccination in Pregnancy registry to monitor
the maternal-fetal outcomes of pregnant women inadvertently
given varicella vaccine. The telephone number for the
Registry is 800-986-8999.
Vaccination of persons with moderate or severe acute
illnesses should be postponed until the condition has
improved. This precaution is intended to prevent complicating
the management of an ill patient with a potential vaccine
adverse event, such as fever. Minor illness, such as otitis
media and upper respiratory infections, concurrent antibiotic
therapy, and exposure or recovery from other illnesses are
not contraindications to varicella vaccine. Although there
is no evidence that either varicella or varicella vaccine
exacerbates tuberculosis, vaccination is not recommended
for persons known to have untreated active tuberculosis.
Tuberculosis skin testing is not a prerequisite for varicella
vaccination.
Varicella
Transmission of Varicella
Vaccine Virus
' Transmission of vaccine virus
not common
' Asymptomatic seroconversion
may occur in contacts without
evidence of varicella immunity
' Risk of transmission increased if
vaccinee develops rash
Varicella Vaccination
in Pregnancy Registry
800 .986.8999
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The effect of the administration of antibody-containing
blood products (e.g., immune globulin, whole blood or
packed red blood cells, intravenous immune globulin, or
varicella zoster immune globulin [VZIG]) on the response to
varicella vaccine virus is unknown. Because of the potential
inhibition of the response to varicella vaccination by
passively transferred antibodies, varicella vaccine should not
be administered for 3-1 1 months after receipt of antibody-
containing blood products. ACIP recommends applying the
same intervals used to separate antibody-containing products
and MMR to varicella vaccine (see chapter 2, General
Recommendations on Immunization, for additional details).
Immune globulin or VZIG should not be given for 3 weeks
following vaccination unless the benefits exceed those of
the vaccine. In such cases, the vaccinees should either be
revaccinated or tested for immunity at least 3 months later
(depending on the antibody-containing product administered)
and revaccinated if seronegative.
No adverse events following varicella vaccination related to
the use of salicylates (e.g., aspirin) have been reported to
date. However, the manufacturer recommends that vaccine
recipients avoid the use of salicylates for 6 weeks after receiving
varicella vaccine because of the association between aspirin
use and Reye syndrome following chickenpox.
Transmission off Variceiia
Vaccine Virus
Available data suggest that transmission of vaccine virus is a
rare event. Instances of suspected secondary transmission of
vaccine virus have been reported. However, in few instances
has the secondary clinical illness been shown to be caused
by vaccine virus. Several cases of suspected secondary
transmission have been determined to have been caused by
wild varicella virus. However, in studies of household contacts,
several instances of asymptomatic seroconversion have been
observed. It appears that transmission occurs mainly, and
perhaps only, when the vaccinee develops a rash. If a
vaccinated child develops a rash, it is recommended that
close contact with persons who do not have evidence of
varicella immunity and who are at high risk of complications
of varicella, such as immunocompromised persons, be avoided
until the rash has resolved.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Varicella Vaccine
• Store frozen at 5°F (-1 S^C ) or
lower
* Store diluent at room
temperature or refrigerate
* Discard if not used within 30
minutes of reconstitution
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Varicella vaccine is very fragile and must be handled with
extreme care. To maintain potency, the lyophilized vaccine
must be stored frozen at an average temperature of 5°F (-15°C)
Household freezers, including frost-free models, manufactured
since the mid-1990s are designed to maintain temperatures
as low as -4°F (-20°C) and are acceptable for storage of the
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ii' vaccine. Refrigerators with ice compartments that are not
I
tightly enclosed or are enclosed with unsealed, uninsulated
doors (i.e., small dormitory-style refrigerator/freezer combi-
I
nations) are not capable of maintaining the required storage
temperature. Regardless of the type of freezer, providers
should check the adequacy of their freezer storage before
i| obtaining vaccine by monitoring and verifying the
i! temperature of their freezer.
The vaccine diluent should be stored separately at room
' temperature or in the refrigerator. The vaccine should be
,
i reconstituted according to the directions in the package
II insert and only with the diluent supplied (or with the
'{ diluent supplied for MMR vaccine), which does not contain
I
preservative or other antiviral substances that might inacti-
I
! vate the vaccine virus. Once reconstituted, the vaccine
!
must be used immediately to minimize loss of potency. The
I
vaccine must be discarded if not used within 30 minutes of
j
reconstitution.
'
1
I If varicella vaccine is inadvertently placed in the refrigerator,
i
or if unreconstituted vaccine is left at room temperature for
a short time, it may still be potent enough to use.
' Mishandled vaccine should be clearly marked and replaced
in the freezer separate from properly handled vaccine. After
I the vaccine is stored this way, the manufacturer must be
;
contacted for recommendations before any of the mishandled
vaccine is used. The Merck Vaccine Division varicella
I information telephone number is 800-9VARIVAX
(800-982-7482). If the vaccine has been kept cold or has
I
been exposed to room temperature for a very short time, the
!i manufacturer may recommend that the expiration date be
! shortened and that the vaccine be used as quickly as possible.
Mishandled vaccine should never be destroyed until the
manufacturer has been consulted.
Varicella Vaccine
Information
800-9VARIVAX
V y
Because of the lability of varicella vaccine, transport of the
vaccine from a central clinic or storage area to an off-site
clinic can be difficult. If off-site transport is attempted, a
high-quality container should be used, the vaccine should
be transported on dry ice, and the temperature should be
monitored continuously, to ensure that the appropriate storage
temperature is maintained. The vaccine may be kept at
refrigerator temperature for up to 72 hours, but it must then
be discarded if not used. The vaccine should not be refrozen.
MMRV must be shipped to maintain a temperature of
-4F(-20C) or colder at all times. It must be stored at an
average temperature of 5 F (-15 C ) or colder at all times.
MMRV may not be stored at refrigerator temperature at any
time. MMRV must be administered within 30 minutes of
reconstitution.
MMRV
* Must be shipped to maintain a
temperature of <- 4°F (-20°C ) at all
times
* Must be stored at an average
temperature of <5°F (-15“C ) at all
times
• May NOT be stored at refrigerator
temperature at any time
Must be administered within 30
minutes of reconstitution
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Varicella Zoster Immune Globulin
Varicella Zoster Immune
Globulin (VZIG)
May modify or prevent disease if given within
96 hours after exposure
Indications
—immunocompromised persons
—newborn of mothers with onset 5 days before
to 48 hours after delivery
—premature infants with postnatal exposure
—susceptible adults and pregnant women
Supply of VZIG limited - may use IVIG or
acyclovir (see NIP website for details)
VZIG is a human blood product that contains high titers of
varicella zoster virus antibody. It was licensed in 1981 and is
available from the distributor (FFF Enterprises, Inc.,
Temecula, CA) by calling 800-843-7477. If administered
within 96 hours of exposure, VZIG can modify or prevent
clinical varicella and prevent complications or death,
especially in susceptible immunocompromised individuals.
The decision to administer VZIG should be based on
whether the patient does not have evidence of varicella
immunity, either by having a negative history of chickenpox
or by lacking documentation of vaccination; whether the
exposure is likely to result in infection; and, most impor-
tantly, whether the patient is at greater risk of complications
than the general population. VZIG is expensive ($400-$500
for the maximum dose for an adult) and provides only
temporary protection.
VZIG is indicated for use in persons without evidence of
varicella immunity who are at high risk for complications
and who have had a significant exposure (continuous
household contact; playmate contact of more than an hour;
hospital contact in the same 2- to 4-bed room; or prolonged
direct contact) to a person with varicella. It is most
commonly used for postexposure prophylaxis of immuno-
compromised children (immune deficiencies, neoplastic
disease, or receiving immunosuppressive therapy), and
newborns of mothers with varicella onset 5 days before to
48 hours after delivery. It is also recommended for premature
infants with postnatal exposure, including those born at less
than 28 weeks' gestation or who are less than 1 ,000 gram
birth weight (who may not have received adequate maternal
antibody regardless of whether the mother is immune), or
premature infants whose mother is not immune to varicella.
Healthy and immunocompromised adults and pregnant
women are at increased risk of complications of varicella.
VZIG should be considered if such persons do not have
evidence of varicella immunity. There is no evidence that
VZIG will prevent congenital varicella if given as postexpo-
sure prophylaxis to a pregnant woman.
VZIG is supplied in vials containing 125 or 625 units. The
recommended dose considered likely to prevent or modify
varicella is 125 units per 10 kilograms of body weight, up to
a maximum of 625 units, or five vials. Higher doses can be
considered for immunosuppressed persons. VZIG is given
intramuscularly and must never be given intravenously. It
should be given within 96 hours of exposure, preferably as
soon as possible. The administration of VZIG may prolong
the incubation period of varicella to 28 days or longer
postexposure.
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I:
j
More detailed information on the evaluation of a person
[
exposed to varicella and the use of VZIG can be found in
the varicella ACIP statement (available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/acip'list.htm).
As of December 2005, because of discontinuation of the
product by the manufacturer, the distributor has limited
supplies of VZIG (625-unit vials only) that are expected to
last until only until early 2006. In light of the VZIG shortage,
the ACIP approved recommendations for postexposure
prophylaxis of severe varicella during a VZIG shortage.
For postexposure prophylaxis of varicella of patients without
evidence of immunity who are at high risk for severe disease
and complications, VZIG is the preferred method. If VZIG
is not available, intravenous immune globulin (IGIV) can
be used. The recommendation for the use of IGIV is based
on “best judgment of experts” and is supported by reports
comparing VZV IgG antibody titers measured in both IGIV
and VZIG preparations and patients given IGIV and VZIG.
Licensed IGIV preparations contain anti-varicella antibodies
at varying levels. No clinical data demonstrating effective-
ness of IGIV for postexposure prophylaxis of varicella are
available.
Indications for the use of IGIV include 1 ) immunocompromised
patients; 2) neonates whose mothers develop signs and
symptoms of varicella around the time of delivery (5 days
before to 2 days after); 3) premature infants exposed during
the neonatal period whose mothers do not have evidence of
immunity; 4) premature infants who are less than 28 weeks’
gestation or who weigh less than 1 ,000 grams at birth and
who are exposed during the neonatal period, regardless of
maternal history of varicella; or 5) pregnant women. Clinicians
may choose either to administer IGIV or closely monitor
the pregnant woman for signs and symptoms of varicella and
institute treatment with acyclovir if illness develops.
Based on experience with VZIG, IGIV could be expected to
provide maximum benefit when administered as soon as
possible after the exposure and may be effective if administered
as late as 96 hours after exposure. IGIV should be adminis-
tered intravenously as directed by the manufacturer. The
recommended IGIV dose for postexposure prophylaxis of
varicella is 400 mg/kg. This dose is estimated to yield VZV
antibody titers in the recipients comparable to those
produced by the recommended VZIG dose (22.5 mg/kg).
The antiviral drug acyclovir is also recommended by some
experts for postexposure prophylaxis in a dosage of 40-80
mg/kg/day for children and 800 mg five times/day for adults.
The recommendation is for administration beginning from
day 7 to day 10 after exposure and for a total of 7 days of
therapy.
Varicella
Special Varicella Exposure Situations
Hospital Personnel
Healthcare workers who do not have evidence of varicella
immunity and have significant exposure to varicella should
be furloughed from day 10 after first exposure to day 21 after
last exposure. If workers develop chickenpox, varicella
lesions must be crusted before they return to direct patient
contact. Receipt of VZIG can prolong the incubation period
by one week; the period of furlough should he lengthened to
28 days after last exposure if VZIG is administered.
Newborns
Newborn whose mothers experience rash onset 5 days before
to 48 houts after delivery should receive VZIG. Since about
50% of infants who receive VZIG will develop varicella, if
these infants remain hospitalized beyond age 10 days, they
should be kept in strict isolation for the entire incubation
period (until day 28 or longer).
Varicella Antiviral Therapy
* Not recommended for routine use among
otherwise healthy infants and children with
varicella
* Consider for persons age >13 years
* Consider for persons with chronic cutaneous
or puimonary disorders, long-term salicylate
therapy, or steroid therapy
* IV in immunocompromised children and
adults with viral-mediated complications
Not recommended for postexposure
prophylaxis
2003 AAP Red Book
Antiviral Therapy
Several antiviral drugs are active against varicella zoster
virus, including acyclovir, valacyclovir, famciclovir, and
foscamet. Valacyclovir and famciclovir are approved for use
only in adults. Clinical studies indicate that these drugs may
be beneficial if given within 24 hours of onset of rash; they
have resulted in a reduction in the number of days new
lesions appeared, in the duration of fever, and in the severity
of cutaneous and systemic signs and symptoms. Antiviral
drugs have not been shown to decrease transmission of
varicella, reduce the duration of absence from school, or
reduce complications.
The decision to use antiviral therapy, and the duration and
route of therapy should be determined by specific host
factors, the extent of infection, and the initial response to
therapy. ACIP has not made recommendations regarding
|
the use of antiviral therapy for varicella. The American i
Academy of Pediatrics does not recommend routine antiviral
j
therapy for otherwise healthy infants or children with
varicella. Oral acyclovir can be considered for otherwise
healthy adolescents and adults or persons with secondary
cases in the household because of the increased risk of !
severe illness in these groups. Antiviral therapy may also be
;
considered for persons with a chronic cutaneous or pulmonary I
disorders, persons receiving long-term salicylate therapy, and
children receiving short, intermittent or aerosolized courses '
of corticosteroids. If the child is immunocompromised,
intravenous administration is indicated. Corticosteroids
should be discontinued, if possible, after exposure. Antiviral
drugs are not recommended for routine postexposure prophylaxis.
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llj Oral acyclovir is not routinely recommended for pregnant
ij adolescents or adults with uncomplicated varicella because
i
the risks and benefits to the fetus and mother are not
I known. However, some experts recommend oral acyclovir
for pregnant women with varicella, particularly during the
second and third trimesters.
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Hepatitis A
The first descriptions of hepatitis (epidemic jaundice) are
generally attributed to Hippocrates. Outbreaks of jaundice,
probably hepatitis A, were reported in the 17th and 18th
centuries, particularly in association with military campaigns.
Hepatitis A (formerly called infectious hepatitis) was first
differentiated epidemiologically from hepatitis B, which has
a long incubation period, in the 1940s. .Development of
serologic tests allowed definitive diagnosis of hepatitis B. In
the 1970s, identification of the virus, and development of
serologic tests helped differentiate hepatitis A from other
types of non-B hepatitis.
Until 2004, hepatitis A was the most frequently reported
type of hepatitis in the United States. In the prevaccine era,
the primary methods used for preventing hepatitis A were
hygienic measures and passive protection with immune
globulin (IG). Hepatitis A vaccines were licensed in 1995
and 1996. These vaccines provide long-term protection
against hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection. The similarities
between the epidemiology of hepatitis A and poliomyelitis
suggest that widespread vaccination of appropriate susceptible
populations can substantially lower disease incidence,
eliminate virus transmission, and ultimately, eliminate
HAV infection.
Hepatitis A Virus
Hepatitis A is caused by infection with HAV, a nonenveloped
RNA virus that is classified as a picornavirus. It was first
isolated in 1979. Humans are the only natural host, although
several nonhuman primates have been infected in laboratory
conditions. Depending on conditions, HAV can be stable in
the environment for months. The virus is relatively stable at
low pH levels and moderate temperatures but can be
inactivated by high temperature (185°F [85°C] or higher),
formalin, and chlorine.
Pathogenesis
HAV is acquired by mouth (through fecal-oral transmission)
and replicates in the liver. After 10-12 days, virus is present
in blood and is excreted via the biliary system into the feces.
Peak titers occur during the 2 weeks before onset of illness.
Although virus is present in serum, its concentration is several
orders of magnitude less than in feces. Virus excretion
begins to decline at the onset of clinical illness, and has
decreased significantly by 7-10 days after onset of symptoms.
Most infected persons no longer excrete virus in the feces by
the third week of illness. Children may excrete virus longer
than adults.
Hepatitis A
Epidemic jaundice described by
Hippocrates
Differentiated from hepatitis B in
1940s
Serologic tests developed in 1970s
Vaccines licensed in 1995 and 1996
Hepatitis A Virus
' Picornavirus (RNA)
' Humans are only natural host
' Stable at low pH
Inactivated by high temperature
(>185°F), formalin, chlorine
Hepatitis A Pathogenesis
Entry into mouth
’ Viral replication in the liver
' Virus present in blood and feces
10-12 days after infection
' Virus excretion may continue for
up to 3 weeks after onset of
symptoms
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* Incubation period 28 days
(range 15-50 days)
* Illness not specific for hepatitis A
* Likelihood of symptomatic illness
directly related to age
* Children generally asymptomatic,
adults symptomatic
Clinical Features
The incubation period of hepatitis A is approximately
28 days (range 15-50 days). TTie clinical course of acute
hepatitis A is indistinguishable from that of other types of
acute viral hepatitis. The illness typically has an abrupt
onset of fever, malaise, anorexia, nausea, abdominal
discomfort, dark urine and jaundice. Clinical illness usually
does not last longer than 2 months, although 10%-15% of
persons have prolonged or relapsing signs and symptoms for
up to 6 months. Virus may be excreted during a relapse.
The likelihood of symptomatic illness from HAV infection
is directly related to age. In children younger than 6 years
of age, most (70%) infections are asymptomatic. In older
children and adults, infection is usually symptomatic, with
jaundice occurring in more than 70% of patients. HAV
infection occasionally produces fulminant hepatitis A.
Complications
Fulminant hepatitis A causes about 100 deaths per year in
the United States. The case-fatality rate among persons of
all ages with reported cases is approximately 0.3% but can
be higher among older persons (approximately 2% among
persons 40 years of age and older).
Hepatitis A results in substantial morbidity, with associated
costs caused by medical care and work loss Hospitalization
rates for hepatitis A are ll%-22%. Adults who become ill
lose an average of 27 work days per illness, and health
departments incur the costs of postexposure prophylaxis for
an average of 1 1 contacts per case. Average direct and
indirect costs of hepatitis A range from $1,817 to $2,459 per
adult case and $433 to $1,492 per pediatric case. In 1989,
the estimated annual U.S. total cost of hepatitis A was more
than $200 million.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Hepatitis A cannot be distinguished from other types of
viral hepatitis on the basis of clinical or epidemiologic
features alone. Serologic testing is required to confirm the
diagnosis. Virtually all patients with acute hepatitis A have
detectable anti-HAV IgM antibody. Acute HAV infection is
confirmed during the acute or early convalescent phase of
infection by the presence of anti-HAV IgM antibody in
serum. IgM generally becomes detectable 5-10 days before
the onset of symptoms and can persist for up to 6 months.
Anti-HAV IgG antibody appears in the convalescent phase
of infection, remains present in serum for the lifetime of the
person, and confers enduring protection against disease. The
antibody test for total anti-HAV measures both anti-HAV
IgG and anti-HAV IgM. Persons who are total anti-HAV
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positive and anti-HAV IgM negative have serologic markers
indicating immunity consistent with either past infection or
vaccination.
I
Molecular virology methods such as polymerase chain
I
reaction (PCR)-based assays can be used to amplify and
j
sequence viral genomes. These assays are helpful to invest!
gate common-source outbreaks of hepatitis A. Providers
with questions about molecular virology methods should
: consult with their state health department or the Division
of Viral Hepatitis, CDC.
Medical Management
There is no specific treatment for hepatitis A virus infection.
J Treatment and management of HAV infection are supportive.
j
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Hepatitis A occurs throughout the world. It is highly endemic
in some areas
,
particularly Central and South America,
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Western Pacific.
Reservoir
Humans are the only natural reservoir of the virus. There
are no insect or animal vectors. A chronic HAV carrier state
has not been reported.
Hepatitis A Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
• Transmission Fecal-oral
• Temporal pattern None
• Communicability 2 weeks before to
1 week after onset
Transmission
HAV infection is acquired primarily by the fecal-oral route by
either person-to-person contact or ingestion of contaminated
food or water. Because the virus is present in blood during
the illness prodrome, HAV has been transmitted on rare
occasions by transfusion. Although HAV may be present in
saliva, transmission by saliva has not been demonstrated.
Waterborne outbreaks are infrequent and are usually
associated with sewage-contaminated or inadequately
treated water.
Temporal Pattern
There is no appreciable seasonal variation in hepatitis A
incidence.
Communicability
Viral shedding persists for 1 to 3 weeks. Infected persons are
most likely to transmit HAV 1 to 2 weeks before the onset
of illness, when HAV concentration in stool is highest. The
risk then decreases and is minimal the week after the onset
of jaundice.
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Risk Factors
Risk Factors
From 1 990 through 2000, the most frequently reported
source of infection was personal contact (sexual or house
hold) with an infected person (14%). Two percent of cases
involved a child or employee in child care; 6% occurred in a
contact of a child or employee in child care; 5% occurred
among persons reporting recent international travel; and 4%
occurred in the context of a recognized foodborne outbreak.
Injection-drug use was a reported risk factor in 6% of cases;
men who have sex with men represented 10% of cases.
Forty-five percent of reported hepatitis A case-patients
could not identify a risk factor for their infection.
Groups at increased risk for hepatitis A or its complications
include international travelers, men who have sex with
men, and users of illegal drugs. Outbreaks of hepatitis A
have also been reported among person working with
hepatitis A-infected primates. This is the only occupational
group known to be at increased risk for hepatitis A.
Persons with chronic liver disease are not at increased risk
of infection but are at increased risk of acquiring fulminant
hepatitis A. Persons with clotting factor disorders may be at
increased risk of HAV because of administration of
solvent/detergent-treated factor VIII and IX concentrates.
Foodhandlers are not at increased risk for hepatitis A
because of their occupation, but are noteworthy because of
their critical role in common-source foodborne HAV
transmission. Healthcare workers do not have an increased
prevalence of HAV infections, and nosocomial HAV
transmission is rare. Nonetheless, outbreaks have been
observed in neonatal intensive care units and in association
with adult fecal incontinence. Institutions for persons with
developmental disabilities previously were sites of high HAV
endemicity. But as fewer children have been institutionalized
and conditions within these institutions have improved,
HAV incidence and prevalence have decreased. However,
sporadic outbreaks can occur. Schools are not common sites
for HAV transmission. Multiple cases among children at a
school require investigation of a common source. Workers
exposed to sewage have not reported any work-related HAV
infection in the United States, but serologic data are not
available.
Children play an important role in HAV transmission.
Children generally have asymptomatic or unrecognized
illnesses, so they may serve as a source of infection,
particularly for household or other close contacts.
f
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Secular Trends in the United States
|j
In the United States, hepatitis A has occurred in large
nationwide epidemics approximately every 10 years, with
I the last increase in cases in 1989. However, between
epidemics HAV infection continues to occur at relatively
high rates. Hepatitis A became nationally reportable as a
distinct entity in 1966. The largest number of cases reported
^ in one year (59,606) was in 1971. A record low annual total
I' of 5,970 cases was reported in 2004. After adjusting for
I
underreporting, 20,000 infections are estimated to have
occurred in 2004, approximately half of which were
i symptomatic. Hepatitis A rates have been declining since
1995, and since 1998 have been at historically low levels.
The wider use of vaccine is probably contributing to this
marked decrease in hepatitis A rates in the United States.
Historically, children 2-18 years of age have had the
highest rates of hepatitis A (15-20 cases per 100,000
population in the early to mid 1990s). Since 2002, rates
among children have declined and the incidence of
hepatitis A is now similar in all age groups.
Based on testing from phase 1 of the Third National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III) conducted
during 1988-1994, the prevalence of total antibody to HAV
(anti'HAV) among the general U.S. population is 33%.
Seroprevalence of HAV antibody increases with age, from
9% among 6-1 1 -year-olds to 75% among persons 70 years
of age and older. Anti-HAV prevalence is highest among
Mexican-Americans (70%), compared with blacks (39%)
and whites (23%). Anti-HAV prevalence is inversely
related to income.
Prior to 2000, the incidence of reported hepatitis A was
substantially higher in the western United States than in
other parts of the country. From 1987 to 1997, 11 mostly
western states (Arizona, Alaska, Oregon, New Mexico,
Utah, Washington, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Idaho,
Nevada, California) accounted for 50% of all reported cases
but only 22% of the U.S. population. Many of these high-
incidence states began routine hepatitis A vaccination
programs for children in the late 1990s. Since 2002, rates
have been similar in all parts of the country.
Many hepatitis A cases in the United States occur in the
context of communitywide epidemics. Communities that
experience such epidemics can be classified as high-rate and
intermediate-rate communities. High-rate communities
typically have epidemics every 5-10 years that may last for
several years with substantial rates of disease (as high as 700
cases per 100,000 population annually during outbreaks) but
few cases among persons 15 years of age and older. These
communities often are relatively well-defined either
14
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geographically or ethnically and include Native American,
Alaska Native, Pacific Islander, and selected Hispanic
communities and certain religious communities. Experience
with hepatitis A vaccination programs in these high-rate
communities has shown that when relatively high
(65%-80%) first-dose vaccination coverage of preschool and
school-age children is achieved and routine vaccination of
young children is sustained, ongoing outbreaks of hepatitis A
could he interrupted. In these areas, sustained reduction in
HAV incidence has been achieved and subsequent outbreaks
have been prevented.
Case Definition
The case definition for hepatitis A was approved by the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) in
1997. It reflects a clinical diagnosis of hepatitis and, because
HAV cannot be differentiated from other types of viral
hepatitis on clinical or epidemiologic features alone, serologic
evidence of HAV-specific IgM antibody is necessary.
The clinical case definition for hepatitis A is an acute illness
with discrete onset of symptoms, and jaundice or elevated
serum aminotransferase levels. The laboratory criterion for
diagnosis is a positive anti-HAV IgM.
Hepatitis A Vaccine
Hepatitis A Vaccines
* Inactivated whole virus
* HAVRIX (GlaxoSmithKline)
* VAQTA (Merck)
* Pediatric and adult formulations
* Licensed for persons >12 months
of age
Hepatitis A Vaccine Immunogenicity
Adults
• >95% seropositive after one dose
• 100% seropositive after two doses
Children (>12 months) and Adolescents
• >97% seropositive after one
* 100% seropositive after 2 doses
Characteristics
Two inactivated whole-virus hepatitis A vaccines are
available: HAVRIX (GlaxoSmithKline) and VAQTA
(Merck). To produce each vaccine, cell culture-adapted
virus is propagated in human fibroblasts, purified from cell
lysates, inactivated with formalin, and adsorbed to an
aluminum hydroxide adjuvant. HAVRIX is prepared with a
preservative (2-phenoxyathanol); VAQTA does not contain
a preservative. Both vaccines are available in both pediatric
and adult formulations. Both vaccines were originally
licensed for children age 2 years and older. Based on the
results of testing among younger children, the Food and
Drug Administration approved a reduction to 1 2 months
of age for both vaccines in 2005.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Both vaccines are highly immunogenic. More than 95% of
adults will develop protective antibody within 4 weeks of a
single dose of either vaccine, and nearly 100% will serocon-
vert after receiving two doses. Among children and
adolescents, more than 97% will be seropositive within a
month of the first dose. In clinical trials, all recipients had
protective levels of antibody after two doses.
Hepatitis;
I
y' Both vaccines are highly effective in preventing clinical
j
hepatitis A. The efficacy of HAVRIX in protecting against
!
clinical hepatitis A was 94% among 40,000 Thai children
1-16 years of age who received two doses 1 month apart
while living in villages with high HAV disease rates. The
1 efficacy of VAQTA in protecting against clinical hepatitis A
I was 100% among 1,000 New York children 2-16 years of
i age who received one dose while living in a community
j
with a high HAV disease rate.
Hepatitis A Vaccine Efficacy
HAVRIX
- 40,000 Thai children 1-16 years of
age
- vaccine efficacy 94%
VAQTA
- 1,000 New York children 2-16
years of age
I - vaccine efficacy 100%
Data concerning the long-term persistence of antibody and
immune memory are limited because the current vaccines
have been available only since 1995—1996. Estimates of
antibody persistence derived from kinetic models of antibody
decline indicate that protective levels of anti-HAV could be
present for 20 years or longer. Other mechanisms (e.g., cellular)
may contribute to long-term protection, but this is unknown.
The need for booster doses will be determined by postmar-
keting surveillance studies.
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
Following its introduction in 1995, hepatitis A vaccine was
primarily targeted to persons at increased risk for HAV
infection, particularly international travelers. While this
strategy prevented infection in this group and in other
vaccinated individuals, it had little or no impact on the
incidence of HAV infection in the United States.
As a result of successful vaccination programs in areas with
a high incidence of HAV infection, the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) in 1999
recommended that routine vaccination of children 2 years
of age and older with hepatitis A vaccine be implemented
in states, counties or communities where the average annual
incidence of hepatitis A during 1987-1997 was 20 cases per
100,000 population or higher (i.e., at least twice the U.S.
average of 10 cases per 100,000 population). ACIP also
recommended that routine vaccination be considered for
states, counties or communities where the average annual
incidence of hepatitis A during 1987-1997 was 10 or more
cases but less than 20 cases per 100,000 population. These
strategies appear to have significantly reduced the incidence
of hepatitis A in these areas.
Based on the successful implementation of childhood
hepatitis A vaccination programs in high incidence areas,
ACIP recommended in 2005 that all children should
receive hepatitis A vaccine at 12-23 months of age.
Vaccination should be integrated into the routine childhood
vaccination schedule. Children who are not vaccinated by
2 years of age can be vaccinated at subsequent visits. ACIP
encourages states, counties, and communities with existing
hepatitis A vaccination programs for children 2 through 18
years of age to maintain these programs.
ACIP Recommendation for Routine
Hepatitis A Vaccination of Children*
* All children should receive hepatitis A
vaccine at 12-23 months of age
* Vaccination should be integrated into
the routine childhood vaccination
schedule
* Children who are not vaccinated by 2
years of age can be vaccinated at
subsequent visits
'endorsed by ACIP October 2005; unpublished as of January 2006
ACIP Recommendation for Routine
Hepatitis A Vaccination of Children*
* States, counties, and communities
with existing hepatitis A
vaccination programs for children
2 through 18 years of age should
maintain these programs
'endorsed by ACIP October 2005; unpublished of January 2006
199
Hepatitis
Persons at increased risk for HAV infection, or who
are at increased risk for complications of HAV infection,
should continue to be routinely vaccinated.
i!
HAVRIX is available in two formulations: pediatric
(720 ELISA units [EL.U.] per O-S-mL dose) and adult
(1,440 EL.U. per LO-mL dose). Children 1-18 years of
age should receive a single primary dose of the pediatric
formulation followed by a booster dose 6-12 months later.
Adults 19 years of age and older receive one dose of the
adult formulation followed by a booster 6-12 months later.
The vaccine should be administered intramuscularly into
the deltoid muscle. A needle length appropriate for the
vaccinee’s age and size (minimum of 1 inch) should be used.
Recommended Doses of Havrix® Hepatitis A Vaccine
Group Age Dose (U) Volume No. Doses Schedule*
Children and
Adolescents
2- 1 8 years 720 0.5 mL 2 0, 6-12
Adults >18 years 1,440 1.0 mL 2 0, 6-12
Months: 0 months represents timing of the initial dose; subsequent number(s) represent months after the initial dose.
VAQTA is quantified in units (U) of antigen and is available
in pediatric and adult formulations. Children 1-18 years of
age should receive one dose of pediatric formulation (25 U
per dose) with a booster dose 6-12 months later. Adults
19 years of age and older should receive one dose of adult
formulation (50 U per dose) with a booster dose 6-12 months
after the first dose. The vaccine should be administered
intramuscularly into the deltoid muscle. A needle length
appropriate for the vaccinee’s age and size should be used
(minimum of 1 inch).
Recommended Doses of VAQTA® Hepatitis A Vaccine
Group Age Dose (U) Volume No. Doses Schedule*
Children and
Adolescents
2- 1 8 years 25 0.5 mL 2 0, 6-18
Adults > 1 8 years 50 1.0 mL 2 0, 6-12
Months: 0 months represents timing of the initial dose; subsequent number(s) represent months after the initial dose.
Hepatitis A Vaccines
Adult
- 1 dose
- booster dose 6-18 months after
first dose
Limited data indicate that vaccines from different manufac-
turers are interchangeable. Completion of the series with
the same product is preferable. However, if the originally
used product is not available or not known, vaccination
with either product is acceptable.
I
Children and Adolescent
- 1 dose
booster dose 6-18 months after
first dose
For both vaccines, the booster dose given should be based i
on the person’s age at the time of the booster dose, not the
|
age when the first dose was given. For example, if a person I
received the first dose of the pediatric formulation of !
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VAQTA at 18 years of age, and returns for the booster dose
jj
at age 19 years, the booster dose should be the adult
I
formulation, not the pediatric formulation.
!
'I
The minimum interval between the first and booster doses
! of hepatitis A vaccine is 6 calendar months. If the interval
between the first and booster doses of hepatitis A vaccine
extends beyond 18 months, it is not necessary to repeat the
first dose.
Studies among adults do not indicate a decrease in immuno'
genicity or an increase in adverse events when hepatitis A
vaccine is administered at the same time as other vaccines.
Similar studies among infants are in progress.
Combination Hepatitis A and Hepatitis B
Vaccine
In 2001, the Food and Drug Administration approved a
combination hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccine (Twinrix,
GlaxoSmithKline). Each dose of Twinrix contains 720
EL.U. of hepatitis A vaccine (equivalent to a pediatric dose
of HAVRIX), and 20 meg of hepatitis B surface antigen protein
(equivalent to an adult dose of Engerix-B). The vaccine is
administered in a three-dose series at 0, 1, and 6 months.
Appropriate spacing of the doses must be maintained to
assure long-term protection from both vaccines. The first
and third doses of Twinrix should be separated by at least
6 months. The first and second doses should be separated by
at least 4 weeks, and the second and third doses should be
separated by at least 5 months. It is not necessary to restart
the series or add doses if the interval between doses is longer
than the recommended interval. Twinrix is approved for
persons aged 1 8 years and older and can be used in persons
in this age group with indications for both hepatitis A and
hepatitis B vaccines.
Twinrix
* Combination hepatitis A vaccine
(pediatric dose) and hepatitis B
(adult dose)
* Schedule: 0, 1, 6 months
• Approved for persons >1 8 years
Because the hepatitis B component of Twinrix is equivalent
to a standard dose of hepatitis B vaccine, the schedule is the
same whether Twinrix or single-antigen hepatitis B vaccine
is used.
Single-antigen hepatitis A vaccine may be used to complete
a series begun with Twinrix and vice versa. A person who
receives one dose of Twinrix may complete the hepatitis A
series with two doses of adult formulation hepatitis A vaccine
separated by at least 5 months. A person who receives two
doses of Twinrix may complete the hepatitis A series with
one dose of adult formulation hepatitis A vaccine or
Twinrix 5 months after the second dose. A person who
begins the hepatitis A series with single-antigen hepatitis A
vaccine may complete the series with two doses of Twinrix
or one dose of adult formulation hepatitis A vaccine.
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Hepatitis A
Vaccine Recommendations
• Travelers to high- or intermediate-
risk countries
• Protected by 4 weeks after dose
• Give concurrent IG for travel in
<4 weeks
Hepatitis A
Vaccine Recommendations
* Healthcare workers: not routinely
recommended
* Child care centers: not routinely
recommended
• Sewer workers or plumbers: not
routinely recommended
• Food handlers: may be considered
based on local circumstances
Vaccine Recommendations
* International travelers
p
• Men who have sex with men
1
* Persons who use illegal drugs
1
• Persons who have clotting-factor
1
disorders
1 * Persons with occupational risk
,
• Persons with chronic liver disease .
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Persons at Increased Risk for Hepatitis A or
Severe Outcomes of Infection
Persons at increased risk for hepatitis A should be identified
and vaccinated. Hepatitis A vaccine should be strongly
considered for persons 1 year of age and older who are
traveling to or working in countries where they would
have a high or intermediate risk of hepatitis A virus
infection. These areas include all areas of the world except
Canada, Western Europe and Scandinavia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Australia. Vaccinated persons can be assumed
to be protected by 4 weeks after receiving the first dose,
although the second dose 6 to 12 months later is necessary
for long-term protection.
Available data suggest that 40%-45% of vaccinated persons
might lack neutralizing antibody at 14 days after receiving
the first dose. No data are currently available regarding the
risk of hepatitis A among persons vaccinated 2-4 weeks
before departure. Because protection might not be complete
until 4 weeks after vaccination, persons traveling to a high-
risk area less than 4 weeks after receiving the initial dose
should also be administered immune globulin (0.02 mL/kg)
at a different anatomic injection site. Hepatitis A vaccine is
not approved for children younger than 1 year of age.
Children younger than 1 year of age should receive immune
globulin (0.02-0.06 mL/kg, depending on length of stay)
prior to travel to high-risk areas.
Other groups which should be offered vaccine include men
who have sex with other men, persons who use illegal
drugs, persons who have clotting factor disorders, and
persons with occupational risk of infection. Persons with
occupational risk include only those who work with
hepatitis A-infected primates or with hepatitis A virus in a
laboratory setting. No other groups have been shown to be
at increased risk of hepatitis A infection due to occupational
exposure.
Persons with chronic liver disease are not at increased risk
for HAV infection because of their liver disease alone.
However, these persons are at increased risk for fulminant
hepatitis A should they become infected. Susceptible persons
who have chronic liver disease should be vaccinated.
Susceptible persons who either are awaiting or have received
liver transplants should be vaccinated.
Hepatitis A vaccination is not routinely recommended for
healthcare workers, persons attending or working in child
care centers, or persons who work in liquid or solid waste
management (e.g., sewer workers or plumbers). These groups
have not been shown to be at increased risk of hepatitis A
infection. ACIP does not recommend routine hepatitis A
vaccination for food service workers, but vaccination may
be considered based on local epidemiology.
Prevaccination Seroiogic Testing
HAV infection produces lifelong immunity to hepatitis A,
so there is no benefit of vaccinating someone with serologic
evidence of past HAV infection. The risk for adverse events
following vaccination of such persons is not higher than the
risk for serologically negative populations. As a result, the
decision to conduct prevaccination testing should be based
chiefly on the prevalence of immunity, the cost of testing
and vaccinating (including office visit costs), and the likeli-
hood that testing will interfere with initiating vaccination.
Testing of children is not indicated because of their expected
low prevalence of infection. Persons for whom prevaccination
serologic testing will likely be most cost-effective include
adults who were either born in or lived for extensive periods
in geographic areas that have a high endemicity of HAV
infection (e.g.. Central and South America, Africa, Asia);
older adolescents and adults in certain populations (i.e..
Native Americans, Alaska Natives, and Hispanics); adults
in certain groups that have a high prevalence of infection
(see above); and adults 40 years of age and older.
Commercially available tests for total anti-HAV should be
used for prevaccination testing.
Postvaccination Seroiogic Testing
Postvaccination testing is not indicated because of the
high rate of vaccine response among adults and children.
Testing methods sufficiently sensitive to detect low
anti-HAV concentrations after vaccination are not
approved for routine diagnostic use in the United States.
Adverse Reactions Following
Ifaccination
For both vaccines, the most commonly reported adverse
reaction following vaccination is a local reaction at the site
of injection. Injection site pain, erythema, or swelling is
reported by 20% to 50% of recipients. These symptoms are
generally mild and self-limited. Mild systemic complaints
(e.g., malaise, fatigue, low-grade fever) are reported by fewer
than 10% of recipients. No serious adverse reactions have
been reported.
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
Hepatitis A vaccine should not be administered to persons
with a history of a severe allergic reaction to a vaccine
component or following a prior dose of hepatitis A vac-
cine, hypersensitivity to alum or, in the case of HAVRIX, to
the preservative 2-phenoxyethanol. Vaccination of persons
Hepatitis
Hepatitis A Serologic Testing
Prevaccination
- not indicated for children
- may be considered for some
adults and older adolescents
Postvaccination
- not indicated
Hepatitis A
Vaccine Adverse Reactions
* Pain at injection site
* Systemic reactions not common
* No serious adverse reactions
reported
Hepatitis A Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
’ Severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component or following a
prior dose
* Moderate or severe acute illness
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with moderate or severe acute illnesses should be deferred
until the person’s condition has improved.
The safety of hepatitis A vaccination during pregnancy has
not been determined. However, because it is an inactivated
vaccine, the theoretical risk to the fetus is low. The risk
associated with vaccination should be weighed against the
risk for HAV infection. Because hepatitis A vaccine is
inactivated, no special precautions are needed when
vaccinating immunocompromised persons.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Hepatitis A vaccine should be stored and shipped at
temperatures of 35°-46°F (2°-8°C) and should not be
frozen. However, the reactogenicity and immunogenicity
are not altered by storage for 1 week at 98.6°F (37°C).
Postexposure Management with
Immune Globulin
Standard immune globulin (IG; formerly called gamma
globulin) is a concentrated solution of antibodies prepared
from pooled human plasma. In the United States, only
plasma that has tested negative for hepatitis B surface
antigen, antibody to hepatitis C virus, and antibody to
human immunodeficiency virus is used to manufacture IG.
Severe adverse reactions from IG are rare. Anaphylaxis
has been reported after repeated administration to persons
who have known IgA deficiency; thus, IG should not be
administered to these persons. Pregnancy or lactation is not
a contraindication to IG use.
When administered intramuscularly before exposure to
HAV, or within 2 weeks after exposure, IG is more than
85% effective in preventing hepatitis A. Later administra-
tion of IG often only attenuates the clinical expression of
HAV infection.
An appropriately large muscle mass (e.g., the deltoid or
gluteal muscle) should be used as the site of the injection.
A single intramuscular dose of 0.02 mL/kg of IG confers
protection for less than 3 months; 0.06 mL/kg protects for
5 months. IG should be given to exposed persons who have
not previously received hepatitis A vaccine as soon as
possible, but not more than 2 weeks after the exposure.
Recipients may include persons who had close contact
(household or sexual) with a person with hepatitis A; staff
and attendees at child care centers where a hepatitis A case
has been recognized; and persons in certain common-source
exposure situations (e.g., patrons of a food establishment
with an HAV-infected food handler, if the risk of transmis-
sion is determined to be high). Persons who have received
one dose of hepatitis A vaccine at least 1 month before an
HAV exposure do not need IG.
IG can interfere with the response to live injected vaccines
(e.g., measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella vaccines).
Administration of live vaccines should be delayed for at
least 3 months after administration of IG (see Chapter 2,
General Recommendations on Immunization.) Conversely,
unless the benefits of IG prophylaxis exceed the benefits of
vaccination, IG should not be administered for at least 2
weeks after measles-, mumps-, and rubella-containing
vaccines, and for 3 weeks after vaccination with varicella
vaccine. If IG is given during this period, the person should
be revaccinated with the live vaccine, but not sooner than
3 months after administration of IG.
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Hepatitis B
Viral hepatitis is a term commonly used for several clinically
similar yet etiologically and epidemiologically distinct diseases.
Hepatitis A (formerly called infectious hepatitis) and
hepatitis B (formerly called serum hepatitis) have been
recognized as separate entities since the early 1940s and can
be diagnosed with specific serologic tests. Delta hepatitis is
an infection dependent on the hepatitis B virus (HBV). It
may occur as a coinfection with acute HBV infection or as
superinfection of an HBV carrier.
Epidemic jaundice was described by Hippocrates in the 5th
century BCE. The first recorded cases of “serum hepatitis,”
or hepatitis B, are thought to be those that followed the
administration of smallpox vaccine containing human
lymph to shipyard workers in Germany in 1883. In the early
and middle parts of the 20th century, serum hepatitis was
repeatedly observed following the use of contaminated
needles and syringes. The role of blood as a vehicle for virus
transmission was further emphasized in 1943, when Beeson
described jaundice that had occurred in seven recipients of
blood transfusions. Australia antigen, later called hepatitis B
surface antigen (HBsAg), was first described in 1965, and
the Dane particle (complete hepatitis B virion) was identified
in 1970. Identification of serologic markers for HBV infection
followed, which helped clarify the natural history of the
disease. Ultimately, HBsAg was prepared in quantity and
now comprises the immunogen in highly effective vaccines
for prevention of HBV infection.
Hepatitis B Virus
HBV is a small, double'shelled virus in the family
Hepadnaviridae. Other Hepadnaviridae include duck
hepatitis virus, ground squirrel hepatitis virus, and
woodchuck hepatitis virus. The virus has a small circular
DNA genome that is partially double-stranded. HBV contains
numerous antigenic components, including HBsAg, hepatitis B
core antigen (HBcAg), and hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg).
Humans are the only known host for HBV, although some
nonhuman primates have been infected in laboratory
conditions. HBV is relatively resilient and, in some
instances, has been shown to remain infectious on environ-
mental surfaces for at least a month at room temperature.
HBV is the most common known cause of chronic viremia,
with more than 200 million chronically infected persons
estimated worldwide. HBV infection is an established cause
of acute and chronic hepatitis and cirrhosis. It is the cause
of up to 80% of hepatocellular carcinomas, and is second
only to tobacco among known human carcinogens. More
than 250,000 persons die worldwide each year of hepatitis
B-associated acute and chronic liver disease.
Hepatitis B
Hepatitis B
* Epidemic jaundice described by
Hippocrates in 5th century BCE
* Jaundice reported among recipients
of human serum and yellow fever
vaccines in 1930s and 1940s
* Australia antigen described in 1965
• Serologic tests developed in 1970s
Hepatitis B Virus
* Hepadnaviridae family (DNA)
* Numerous antigenic components
Humans are only known host
May retain infectivity for at least
1 month at room temperature
Hepatitis B Virus Infection
* >200 million chronically infected
worldwide
* Established cause of chronic
hepatitis and cirrhosis
* Human carcinogen—cause of up
to 80% of hepatocellular
carcinomas
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HBcAg
HBeAg
Hepatitis B Virus
HBsAg
Several well-defined antigen-antibody systems are associated
with HBV infection. HBsAg, formerly called Australia
antigen or hepatitis-associated antigen, is an antigenic
determinant found on the surface of the virus. It also makes
up SLibviral 22-nm spherical and tubular particles. HBsAg
can be identified in serum 30 to 60 days after exposure to
HBV and persists for variable periods. HBsAg is not infectious.
Only the complete virus (Dane particle) is infectious.
However, when HBsAg is present in the blood, complete
virus is also present, and the person may transmit the virus.
During replication, HBV produces HBsAg in excess of that
needed for production of Dane particles.
HBcAg is the nucleocapsid protein core of HBV. HBcAg is
not detectable in serum by conventional techniques, but it
can be detected in liver tissue of persons with acute or
chronic HBV infection. HBeAg, a soluble protein, is also
contained in the core of HBV. HBeAg is detected in the
serum of persons with high virus titers and indicates high
infectivity. Antibody to HBsAg (anti-HBs) develops during
convalescence after acute HBV infection or following
hepatitis B vaccination. The presence of anti-HBs indicates
immunity to HBV. (Anti-HBs is sometimes referred to as
HBsAb, but use of this term is discouraged because of
potential confusion with HBsAg.) Antibody to HBcAg
(anti-HBc) indicates infection with HBV at an undefined
time in the past. IgM class antibody to HBcAg (IgM anti-HBc)
indicates recent infection with HBV. Antibody to HBeAg
(anti-HBe) becomes detectable when HBeAg is lost and is
associated with low infectivity of serum.
Hepatitis B Clinical Features
• Incubation period 60-150 days
(average 90 days)
• Nonspecific prodrome of malaise,
fever, headache, myalgia
• Illness not specific for hepatitis B
• At least 50% of infections
asymptomatic
Clinical Features
The clinical course of acute hepatitis B is indistinguishable
from that of other types of acute viral hepatitis. The incubation
period ranges from 60 to 150 days (average, 90 days).
Clinical signs and symptoms occur more often in adults than
in infants or children, who usually have an asymptomatic
acute course. However, approximately 50% of adults who
have acute infections are asymptomatic.
The preicteric, or prodromal phase from initial symptoms
to onset of jaundice usually lasts from 3 to 10 days. It is
nonspecific and is characterized by insidious onset of
malaise, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, right upper quadrant
abdominal pain, fever, headache, myalgia, skin rashes,
arthralgia and arthritis, and dark urine, beginning 1 to 2 days
before the onset of jaundice. The icteric phase is variable
but usually lasts from 1 to 3 weeks and is characterized by
jaundice, light or gray stools, hepatic tenderness and
hepatomegaly (splenomegaly is less common). During
convalescence, malaise and fatigue may persist for weeks or
months, while jaundice, anorexia, and other symptoms disappear.
Hepatitis B
I
Most acute HBV infections in adults result in complete
recovery with elimination of HBsAg from the blood and the
production of anti'HBs, creating immunity to future infection.
Complications
While most acute HBV infections in adults result in
complete recovery, fulminant hepatitis occurs in about
1% to 2% of acutely infected persons. About 200 to 300
Americans die of fulminant disease each year (case-fatality
rate 63% to 93%). Although the consequences of acute
HBV infection can be severe, most of the serious
complications associated with HBV infection are due to
chronic infection.
Chronic HBV Infection
Approximately 10% of all acute HBV infections progress to
chronic infection, with the risk of chronic HBV infection
decreasing with age. As many as 90% of infants who acquire
HBV infection from their mothers at birth become chronically
infected. Of children who become infected with HBV
between 1 year and 5 years of age, 30% to 50% become
chronically infected. By adulthood, the risk of acquiring
chronic HBV infection is approximately 5%.
Persons with chronic infection are often asymptomatic and
may not be aware that they are infected; however, they are
capable of infecting others and have been referred to as carriers.
Chronic infection is responsible for most HBV-related
morbidity and mortality, including chronic hepatitis,
cirrhosis, liver failure, and hepatocellular carcinoma.
Approximately 25% of persons with chronic HBV infection
die prematurely from cirrhosis or liver cancer. Chronic
active hepatitis develops in more than 25% of carriers and
often results in cirrhosis. An estimated 3,000 to 4,000 persons
die of hepatitis B-related cirrhosis each year in the United
States. Persons with chronic HBV infection are at 12 to 300
times higher risk of hepatocellular carcinoma than noncarriers.
An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 persons die each year in the
United States of hepatitis B-related liver cancer.
Hepatitis B Complications
* Fulminant hepatitis
* Hospitalization
* Cirrhosis
* Hepatocellular carcinoma
* Death
Chronic Hepatitis B
Virus Infection
• Chronic viremia
• Responsible for most mortality
• Overall risk 10%
• Higher risk with early infection
Laboratory Diagnosis
Diagnosis is based on clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic
findings. HBV infection cannot be differentiated on the
basis of clinical symptoms alone, and definitive diagnosis
depends on the results of serologic testing. Serologic
markers of HBV infection vary depending on whether the
infection is acute or chronic.
HBsAg is the most commonly used test for diagnosing acute
HBV infections or detecting carriers. HBsAg can be detected
as early as 1 or 2 weeks and as late as 1 1 or 1 2 weeks after
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exposure to HBV when sensitive assays are used. The
presence of HBsAg indicates that a person is infectious,
regardless of whether the infection is acute or chronic.
Anti'HBc (core antibody) develops in all HBV infections,
appears shortly after HBsAg in acute disease, and indicates
HBV infection at some undefined time in the past. Anti-HBc
only occurs after HBV infection and does not develop in
persons whose immunity to HBV is from vaccine. Anti-HBc
generally persists for life and is not a serologic marker for
acute infection.
IgM anti'HBc appears in persons with acute disease about
the time of illness onset and indicates recent infection with
HBV. IgM anti'HBc is generally detectable 4 to 6 months
after onset of illness and is the best serologic marker of acute
HBV infection. A negative test for IgM-anti'HBc together
with a positive test for HBsAg in a single blood sample
identifies a chronic HBV infection.
Interpretation of Hepatitis B Serologic Tests
Tests Results Interpretation
HBsAg Negative
anti-HBc Negative
anti-HBs Negative
Susceptible
HBsAg Negative
anti-HBc Negative
anti-HBs Positive with >10mIU/mL*
Immune due to vaccination
HBsAg Negative
anti-HBc Positive
anti-HBs Positive
Immune due to natural
infection
HBsAg Positive
anti-HBc Positive
IgM anti-HBc Positive
anti-HBs Negative
Acutely infected
HBsAg Positive
anti-HBc Positive
IgM anti-HBc Negative
anti-HBs Negative
Chronically infected
HBsAg Negative
anti-HBc Positive
anti-HBs Negative
Four interpretations possible^
Postvaccination testing, when it is recommended, should be performed 1-2 months following dose #3.
t 1 . May be recovering from acute HBV infection.
2. May be distantly immune and the test is not sensitive enough to detect a very low level of anti-HBs in serum.
3. May be susceptible with a false positive anti-HBc.
4. May be chronically infected and have an undetectable level of HBsAg present in the serum.
Hepatitis B
HBeAg is a useful marker associated strongly with the
number of infective HBV particles in the serum and a
higher risk of infectivity.
Anti'HBs (surface antibody) is a protective, neutralizing
antibody. The presence of anti-HBs following acute HBV
infection generally indicates recovery and immunity against
reinfection. Anti-HBs can also be acquired as an immune
response to hepatitis B vaccine or passively transferred by
administration of HBIG. When using radioimmunoassay
(RIA), a minimum of 10 sample ratio units should be used
to designate immunity. With enzyme immunoassay (ElA),
the manufacturer’s recommended positive should be
considered an appropriate measure of immunity. The level
of anti'HBs may also be expressed in milli-intemational
units/mL (mlU/mL). Ten mlU/mL is considered to indicate
a protective level of immunity.
Medical Management
There is no specific therapy for acute HBV infection.
Treatment is supportive. Interferon is the most effective
treatment for chronic HBV infection and is successful in
25% to 50% of cases.
Persons with acute or chronic HBV infections should
prevent their blood and other potentially infective body
fluids from contacting other persons. They should not
donate blood or share toothbrushes or razors with
household members.
In the hospital setting, patients with HBV infection should
be managed with standard precautions.
Epidemiology
Reservoir
Although other primates have been infected in laboratory
conditions, HBV infection affects only humans. No animal
or insect hosts or vectors are known to exist.
Transmission
The virus is transmitted by parenteral or mucosal exposure
to HBsAg-positive body fluids from persons who have
acute or chronic HBV infection. The highest concentrations
of virus are in blood and serous fluids; lower titers are found
in other fluids, such as saliva and semen. Saliva can be a
vehicle of transmission through bites; however, other types
of exposure to saliva, including kissing, are unlikely modes
of transmission. There appears to be no transmission of
HBV via tears, sweat, urine, stool, or droplet nuclei.
( Hepatitis B Epidemiology
• Reservoir Human
* Transmission Bloodborne
Subclinical cases
transmit
* Communicability
V
1-2 months before
and after onset of
symptoms
Chronic carriers J
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Hepatitis B Perinatal
Transmission*
• If mother positive for HBsAg and HBeAg
—70%-90% of infants infected
—90% of infected infants become
chronically infected
* If positive for HBsAg only
—10% of infants infected
—90% of infected infants become
chronically infected
*in the absence of postexposure prophylaxis
Global Patterns of
Chronic HBV Infection
* High (>8%): 45% of global population
-lifetime risk of infection >60%
—early childhood infections common
• Intermediate (2%-7%): 43% of global
population
-lifetime risk of infection 20%-60%
—infections occur in all age groups
• Low (<2%): 12% of global population
-lifetime risk of infection <20%
-most infections occur in adult risk groups
In the United States, the most important route of transmis'
sion is by sexual contact, either heterosexual or homosexual, [
with an infected person. Fecahoral transmission does not i
appear to occur. However, transmission occurs among men 1
1
1
who have sex with men, possibly via contamination from
, |
asymptomatic rectal mucosal lesions. 1
Direct percutaneous inoculation of HBV by needles during 1
injection-drug use is an important mode of transmission. |
Transmission of HBV may also occur by other percutaneous j
exposure, including tattooing, ear piercing, and acupuncture, I
as well as needlesticks or other injuries from sharp instruments I
sustained by medical personnel. These exposures account for I
only a small proportion of reported cases in the United |
States. Breaks in the skin without overt needle puncture,
j
such as fresh cutaneous scratches, abrasions, burns, or other
j
lesions, may also serve as routes for entry.
j
Contamination of mucosal surfaces with infective serum or
plasma may occur during mouth pipetting, eye splashes, or
other direct contact with mucous membranes of the eyes or
mouth, such as hand-to-mouth or hand-to-eye contact when
hands are contaminated with infective blood or serum.
Transfer of infective material to skin lesions or mucous
membranes via inanimate environmental surfaces may occur
by touching surfaces of various types of hospital equipment.
Contamination of mucosal surfaces with infective secretions
other than serum or plasma could occur with contact
involving semen.
Perinatal transmission from mother to infant at birth is
very efficient. If the mother is positive for both HBsAg and
HBeAg, 70%-90% of infants will become infected in the
absence of postexposure prophylaxis. The risk of perinatal
transmission is about 10% if the mother is positive only for
HBsAg. As many as 90% of these infected infants will
become chronically infected with HBV.
The frequency of infection and patterns of transmission vary
in different parts of the world. Approximately 45% of the
global population live in areas with a high prevalence of
chronic HBV infection (8% or more of the population is
HBsAg-positive), 43% in areas with a moderate prevalence
(2% to 7% of the population is HBsAg-positive), and 12%
in areas with a low prevalence (less than 2% of the
population is HBsAg-positive).
In China, Southeast Asia, most of Africa, most Pacific
Islands, parts of the Middle East, and the Amazon Basin,
8% to 15% of the population carry the virus. The lifetime risk
of HBV infection is greater than 60%, and most infections
are acquired at birth or during early childhood, when the
risk of developing chronic infections is greatest. In these
Hepatitis B
areas, because most infections are asymptomatic, very little
acute disease related to HBV occurs, but rates of chronic
liver disease and liver cancer among adults are very high.
In the United States, Western Europe, and Australia, HBV
infection is a disease of low endemicity. Infection occurs
primarily during adulthood, and only 0.1% to 0.5% of the
population are chronic carriers. Lifetime risk of HBV
infection is less than 20% in low prevalence areas.
Communicability
Persons with either acute or chronic HBV infection should
be considered infectious any time that HBsAg is present in
the blood. When symptoms are present in persons with
I acute HBV infection, HBsAg can be found in blood and body
I
fluids for 1-2 months before and after the onset of symptoms.
Secular Trends in the United States
Hepatitis has been reportable in the United States for many
years. Hepatitis B became reportable as a distinct entity during
the 1970s, after serologic tests to differentiate different types
of hepatitis became widely available.
The incidence of reported hepatitis B peaked in the mid-
1980s, with about 26,000 cases reported each year. Reported
cases have declined since that time, and fell below 10,000
cases for the first time in 1996. The decline in cases during
the 1980s and early 1990s is generally attributed to reduction
of transmission among men who have sex with men and
injection-drug users as a result of HIV prevention efforts.
During 1990-2004, incidence of acute hepatitis B in the
United States declined 75%. The greatest decline (94%)
occurred among children and adolescents, coincident with
an increase in hepatitis B vaccine coverage. A total of 6,741
cases of hepatitis B were reported in 2004-
Reported cases of HBV infection represent only a fraction
of cases that actually occur. In 2001, a total of 7,844 cases
of acute hepatitis B were reported to CDC. Based on these
reports, CDC estimates that 22,000 acute cases of hepatitis
B resulted from an estimated 78,000 new infections. An
estimated 1-1.25 million persons in the United States are
chronically infected with HBV, and an additional
5,000-8,000 persons become chronically infected each year.
HBV Disease Burden in the
United States*
New infections
Current carriers
New carriers
Death
78,000/yr
>1 million
>5,000/yr
5,000/yr
Age of Infection of Acute and
Chronic Hepatitis B Virus Infection
Before routine childhood hepatitis B vaccination was
recommended, more than 80% of acute HBV infections
occurred among adults. Adolescents accounted for approxi-
mately 8% of infections, and children and infants infected
through perinatal transmission accounted for approximately
4% each. Perinatal transmission accounted for a
disproportionate 24% of chronic infections.
Acute infection
CDC Sentinel
Children Perinatal Adult
Chronic infection
>. 1989 data.
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The most common risk factor for HBV infection in the
United States is sexual contact, either heterosexual (37%),
or among men who have sex with men (17%). Injection'
drug use accounts for 20% of cases, and 3% of cases occur by
household contact with a chronically infected person. In the
early 1990s, healthcare workers accounted for approximately
1% of HBV infections. With widespread use of hepatitis B
vaccine, HBV infection among healthcare workers is now
very uncommon.
Although HBV infection is uncommon among adults in the
general population (the lifetime risk of infection is less than
20%), it is highly prevalent in certain groups. Risk for
infection varies with occupation, lifestyle, or environment
(see table). Generally, the highest risk for HBV infection is
associated with lifestyles, occupations, or environments in
which contact with blood from infected persons is frequent.
In addition, the prevalence of HBV markers for acute or
chronic infection increases with increasing number of years
of high-risk behavior. For instance, an estimated 40% of
injection-drug users become infected with HBV after 1 year
of drug use, while more than 80% are infected after 10 years.
Prevalence of Hepatitis B in Various Population Groups
Population Group
Prevalence of Serologic Markers
of HBV Infection
HBsAg (%) All Markers (%)
High-Risk
Immigrants/refugees from areas of high HBV
endemicity.
13 70-85
Clients in institutions for the developmentally
disabled.
10-20 35-80
Users of illicit parenteral drugs. 7 60-80
Homosexually active men. 6 35-80
Patients of hemodialysis units. 3-10 20-80
Household contacts ofHBV carriers. 3-6 30-60
Intermediate-Risk
Prisoners (male). 1-8 10-80
Healthcare workers - frequent blood contact. 1-2 15-30
Staff of institutions for the mentally retarded. 1 10-25
Heterosexuals with multiple partners. 0.5 5-20
Low-Risk
Healthcare workers - no or infrequent blood
contact.
0.3 3-10
Healthy adults (first-time volunteer blood
donors). 0.3 3-5
Hepatitis B
Risk Factors for Hepatitis B
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Hepatitis B Prevention Strategies
Hepatitis B vaccines have been available in the United
States since 1981. However, the impact of vaccine on HBV
disease has been less than optimal.
The apparent lack of impact from the vaccine can be attrib-
uted to several factors. From 1981 until 1991, vaccination
was targeted to persons in groups at high risk of acquiring
HBV infection. A large proportion of persons with HBV
infection (25% to 30%) deny having any risk factors for the
disease. These persons would not be identified by a targeted
risk factor screening approach.
The three major risk groups (heterosexuals with contact
with infected persons or multiple partners, injection-drug
users, and men who have sex with men), are not reached
effectively by targeted programs. Deterrents to immuniza-
tion of these groups include lack of awareness of the risk
of disease and its consequences, lack of effective public or
private sector programs, and vaccine cost. Difficulty in
gaining access to these populations is also a problem.
Further, success in providing vaccine to persons in
high-risk groups has been limited because of rapid
acquisition of infection after beginning high-risk behaviors,
low initial vaccine acceptance, and low rates of completion
of vaccinations.
A comprehensive strategy to eliminate hepatitis B virus
transmission was recommended in 1991; it includes
prenatal testing of pregnant women for HBsAg to identify
newborns who require immunoprophylaxis for prevention
of perinatal infection and to identify household contacts
who should be vaccinated, routine vaccination of infants,
vaccination of adolescents, and vaccination of adults at
high risk for infection.
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Characteristics
A plasma-derived vaccine was licensed in the United
States in 1981. It was produced from 22-nm HBsAg
particles purified from the plasma of human carriers.
The vaccine was safe and effective but was not well
j
accepted, possibly because of unsubstantiated fears of
;
transmission of live HBV and other bloodbome pathogens
i
(e.g., human immunodeficiency virus). This vaccine was
I
removed from the U.S. market in 1992.
I
j
Recombinant hepatitis B vaccine was licensed in the
United States in July 1986, and was the first licensed
vaccine in the United States produced by recombinant
DNA technology. A second, similar vaccine was licensed
in August 1989.
Strategy to Eliminate Hepatitis B
Virus Transmission—United States
* Prevent perinatal HBV
transmission
* Routine vaccination of all infants
* Vaccination of children in high-
risk groups
* Vaccination of adolescents
* Vaccination of adults in high-risk
groups
Hepatitis B Vaccine
1965 Discovery of Australian antigen
1973 Successful HBV infection of chimpanzees
1981 Licensure of plasma-derived vaccine
1986 Licensure of recombinant vaccine
1991 Universal infant vaccination
1996 Universal adolescent vaccination
215
Hepatitis B
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Composition Recombinant HBsAg
Efficacy 95% (Range, 80%-100%)
Duration of
Immunity >15 years
Schedule 3 Doses
Booster doses not routinely recommended
Recombinant vaccine is produced by inserting a plasmid
containing the gene for HBsAg into common baker’s yeast
(Saccharomyces cerevisiae). Yeast cells then produce HBsAg,
which is harvested and purified. The recombinant vaccine
contains more than 95% HBsAg protein (5 to 40 mcg/mL);
yeast-derived proteins may constitute up to 5% of the final
product, but no yeast DNA is detectable in the vaccine.
HBV infection cannot result from use of the recombinant
vaccine, since no potentially infectious viral DNA or
complete viral particles are produced in the recombinant
system. Vaccine HBsAg is adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide.
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Formulations
• Recombivax HB (Merck)
- 5 mcg/0.5 mL (pediatric)
- 10 mcg/1 mL (adult)
- 40 mcg/1 mL (dialysis)
Engerix-B (GSK)
• 10 mcg/0.5 mL (pediatric)
- 20 mcg/1 mL (adult)
Hepatitis B vaccine is produced by two manufacturers in
the United States, Merck (Recombivax HB) and
GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals (Engerix-B). Both
vaccines are available in both pediatric and adult
formulations. Although the antigen content of the
vaccines differs, vaccines made by different manufacturers
are interchangeable, except for the two-dose schedule for
adolescents aged 11-15 years. Only Merck vaccine is
approved for this schedule. Providers must always follow
the manufacturer’s dosage recommendations.
Both the pediatric and adult formulations of Recombivax
HB are approved for use in any age group. For example, the
adult formulation of Recombivax HB may be used in children
(0.5 mL) and adolescents (0.5 mL). However, pediatric
Engerix-B is approved for use only in children and adolescents
younger than 20 years of age. The adult formulation of
Engerix-B is not approved for use in infants and children
but may be used in both adolescents (11-19 years of age)
and adults.
Engerix-B contains aluminum hydroxide as an adjuvant.
It does not contain thimerosal as a preservative but
contains a trace of thimerosal as residual from the
manufacturing process. The vaccine is supplied in single-
dose vials and syringes. Recombivax HB contains
aluminum hydroxyphosphate sulfate as an adjuvant. None
of the formulations of Recombivax HB contain thimerosal
or any other preservative. The vaccine is supplied in single
dose vials.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
After three intramuscular doses of hepatitis B vaccine, more
than 90% of healthy adults and more than 95% of infants,
children, and adolescents (from birth to 19 years of age)
develop adequate antibody responses. However, there is an
age-specific decline in immunogenicity. After age 40 years,
approximately 90% of recipients respond to a three-dose
series, and by 60 years, only 75% of vaccinees develop
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protective antibody titers. The proportion of recipients
who respond to each dose varies by age (see table).
Protection* by Age Group and Dose
Dose Infants** Teens and Adults***
1 16%
-
40% 20% - 30%
2 80% - 95% 75% - 80%
3 98% - 100% 90% - 95%
*anti-HBs antibody titer of 1 0 mlU/mL or higher
**pretenn infants less than 2kg have been shown to respond to vaccination less often
***factors that may lower vaccine response rates are age >40 years, male gender,
smoking, obesity, and immune deficiency
The vaccine is 80% to 100% effective in preventing infection
or clinical hepatitis in those who receive the complete |
course of vaccine. Larger vaccine doses (2 to 4 times the
normal adult dose) or an increased number of doses are
required to induce protective antibody in a high proportion
of hemodialysis patients and may also be necessary in other
|
immunocompromised persons.
The recommended dosage of vaccine differs depending on
the age of the recipient and type of vaccine (see table). ;
Hemodialysis patients should receive a dO-mcg dose in a i
series of three or four doses. Recombivax HB has a special
dialysis patient formulation that contains 40 mcg/mL. ;
Recommended doses of currently licensed formulations of hepatitis B vaccine, by age group and vaccine type
Single-Antigen Vaccine Combination Vaccine
Recombivax HB Engerix-B Comvax Pediarix Twinrix
Age Group
Dose
(ug)*
Volume
(mL)
Dose
(Mg)*
Volume
(mL)
Dose
(Mg)*
Volume
(mL)
Dose
(Mg)*
Volume
(mL)
Dose
(Mg)*
Volume
(mL)
Infants (<1 yr) 5 0.5 10 0.5 5 0.5 0 0.5 N/A** N/A
Children (1-10 yrs) 5 0.5 10 0.5 5 0.5 10 0.5 N/A N/A
Adolescents
11-15 yrs 10* 1.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
11-19 yrs 5 0.5 10 0.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Adults (>20 yrs) 10 1.0 20 1.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 20 1.0
Hemodialysis patients and other
immunocompromised persons
<20 yrs^ 5 0.5 10 0.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
>20 yrs 40’ 1.0 40* 2.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
* Recombinant hepatitis B surface antigen protein dose,
t Adult formulation administered on a 2-dose schedule.
§ Higher doses might be more immunogenic, but no specific recommendations have been made.
Dialysis formulation administered on a 3-dose schedule at age 0, 1 , and 6 months,
f Two 1 .0 ml doses administered at one site, on a 4-dose schedule at age 0, 1,2, and 6 months.
** Not applicable.
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The deltoid muscle is the recommended site for hepatitis B
vaccination in adults and children, while the anterolateral
thigh is recommended for infants and neonates.
Immunogenicity of vaccine in adults is lower when injections
are given in the gluteus. Hepatitis B vaccine should be
administered to infants using a needle of at least 7/8 inch
length and to older children and adults of at least 1 inch
length. Hepatitis B vaccine administered by any route or
site other than intramuscularly in the anterolateral thigh or
deltoid muscle should not be counted as valid and should be
repeated unless serologic testing indicates that an adequate
response has been achieved.
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Long-term Efficacy
• Immunologic memory
established following vaccination
• Exposure to HBV results in
anamnestic anti-HBs response
• Chronic infection rarely
documented among vaccine
responders
Available data show that vaccine-induced antibody levels
decline with time. Nevertheless, immune memory remains
intact for more than 15 years following immunization, and
both adults and children with declining antibody levels are
still protected against significant HBV infection (i.e., clinical
disease, HBsAg antigenemia, or significant elevation of liver
enzymes). Exposure to HBV results in an anamnestic anti-HBs
response that prevents clinically significant HBV infection.
Chronic HBV infection has only rarely been documented
among vaccine responders.
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Routine booster doses
are NOT routinely
recommended for any
group
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Routine Infant Schedule
Dose
Minimum
Usual Age Interval
Primary 1 Birth
Primary 2 1-2 months 4 weeks
Primary 3 6-18 months* 8 weeks**
Infants who mothers are HBsAg-t- or whose HBsAg status is
unknown should receive the third dose at 6 months of age
“ at least 16 weeks after the first dose
For adults and children with normal immune status, booster
doses of vaccine are not recommended, nor is routine |
serologic testing to assess immune status of vaccinees |
indicated. The need for booster doses after longer intervals j
will continue to be assessed as additional information 1
becomes available.
]
For hemodialysis patients, the need for booster doses should
j
be assessed by annual testing of vaccinees for antibody levels, j
and booster doses should be provided when antibody levels I
decline below 10 mlU/mL.
|
i
Vaccination Schedule and Use
|
i
Infants and Children
Hepatitis B vaccination is recommended for all infants
|
soon after birth and before hospital discharge. Infants and
I
children younger than 1 1 years of age should receive 0.5 mL i
(5 meg) of pediatric or adult formulation Recombivax HB
j
(Merck) or 0.5 mL (10 meg) of pediatric Engerix-B
|
(GlaxoSmithKline). Primary vaccination consists of three
|
intramuscular doses of vaccine. The usual schedule is 0, 1-2, !
and 6-18 months. Infants whose mothers are HBsAg positive
or whose HBsAg status is unknown should receive the third '
dose by 6 months of age.
Because the highest titers of anti-HBs are achieved when i
the last two doses of vaccine are spaced at least 4 months
|
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apart, schedules that achieve this spacing are preferable.
I
However, schedules with Z-month intervals between doses,
which conform to schedules for other childhood vaccines,
have been shown to produce good antibody responses and
may be appropriate in populations in which it is difficult to
ensure that infants will be brought back for all their vacci-
I
nations. However, the third dose must be administered at
least 8 weeks after the second dose, and should follow the
first dose by at least 16 weeks. For infants, the third dose
should not be given earlier than 24 weeks of age. It is not
necessary to add doses or restart the series if the interval
between doses is longer than recommended.
Preterm infants bom to HBsAg-positive women and
I
women with unknown HBsAg status must receive
j
immunoprophylaxis with hepatitis B vaccine and hepatitis B
immune globulin (HBIG) beginning at or shortly after birth.
Preterm infants with low birthweight (i.e., less than 2,000
grams) have a decreased response to hepatitis B vaccine
administered before 1 month of age. However, by chronologic
age 1 month, preterm infants, regardless of initial birthweight
or gestational age, are as likely to respond as adequately as
full'term infants. Preterm infants of low birthweight whose
mothers are HBsAg negative can receive the first dose of
the hepatitis B vaccine series at chronologic age 1 month.
Preterm infants discharged from the hospital before
chronologic age 1 month can also be administered hepatitis B
vaccine at discharge if they are medically stable and have
gained weight consistently. The full recommended dose should
be used. Divided or reduced doses are not recommended.
Comvax
Hepatitis B vaccine is available in combination with
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine as Comvax
(Merck). Each dose of Comvax contains 7.5 meg of
PRP'OMP Hib vaccine (PedvaxHIB), and 5 meg of
hepatitis B surface antigen. The dose of hepatitis B surface
antigen is the same as that contained in Merck’s pediatric
formulation. The immunogenicity of the combination
vaccine is equivalent to that of the individual antigens
administered at separate sites.
Comvax is licensed for use at 2, 4, and 12-15 months of
age. It may be used whenever either antigen is indicated
and the other antigen is not contraindicated. However, the
vaccine must not be administered to infants younger than
6 weeks of age because of potential suppression of the
immune response to the Hib component (see Chapter 9,
Haemophilus influenzae type b, for more details). Comvax
must not be used for doses at birth or 1 month of age for
a child on a 0, 1,6 month hepatitis B vaccine schedule.
Although it is not labeled for this indication by FDA, ACIP
recommends that Comvax may be used in infants whose
mothers are HBsAg positive or whose HBsAg status is unknown.
Third Dose of
Hepatitis B Vaccine
* Minimum of 8 weeks after second
dose, and
* At least 16 weeks after first dose,
and
* For infants, at least 24 weeks of age
Preterm Infants
* Birth dose and HBIG if mother
HBsAg positive
• Preterm infants <2,000 grams
have a decreased response to
vaccine administered before 1
month of age
* Delay first dose until chronologic
age 1 month if mother HBsAg
negative
COMVAX
Hepatitis B-Hib combination
Use when either antigen is indicated
* Cannot use <6 weeks of age
* May be used in infants whose
mothers are HBsAg positive or
status is unknown
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Pediarix
• DTaP - Hep B - IPV combination
• Approved for 3 doses at 2, 4 and
6 months
• Not approved for booster doses
• Licensed for children 6 weeks to
7 years of age
IS
Pediarix
• May be used interchangeably with
other pertussis-containing vaccines
if necessary
• Can be given at 2, 4, and 6 months to
infants who received a birth dose of
hepatitis B vaccine (total of 4 doses)
’ May be used in infants whose
mothers are HBsAg positive or
status unknown
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Adolescent Vaccination
• Routine vaccination recommended
through age 18 years
• Integrate into routine adolescent
immunization visit
• Flexible schedules
—
]'
In 2002, the Food and Drug Administration approved Pediarix i j’
(GlaxoSmithKline), the first pentavalent (5-component) i
combination vaccine licensed in the United States. Pediarix ( !
contains DTaP (Infanrix), hepatitis B (Engerix-B), and ‘
|
inactivated polio vaccines. In prelicensure studies, the ' I
proportion of children who developed a protective level 1
!
of antibody, and the titer of antibody, were at least as 1 ]
high among children receiving the vaccine antigens given l|
together as Pediarix as among children who received 1|;^
separate vaccines. If
The minimum age for the first dose of Pediarix is 6 weeks,
so it cannot be used for the birth dose of the hepatitis B
series. Pediarix is approved for the first three doses of the
DTaP and IPV series, which are usually given at about
2, 4, and 6 months of age; it is not approved for fourth or
fifth (booster) doses of the DTaP or IPV series. However,
Pediarix is approved for use through 6 years of age. A child
who is behind schedule can still receive Pediarix as long as
it is given for doses 1, 2, or 3 of the series, and the child is
younger than 7 years of age.
A dose of Pediarix inadvertently administered as the fourth
or fifth dose of the DTaP or IPV series does not need to be
repeated.
Pediarix may be used interchangeably with other pertussis-
containing vaccines if necessary (although ACIP prefers the
use of the same brand of DTaP for all doses of the series, if
possible). It can be given at 2, 4, and 6 months to infants
who received a birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine (total of
4 doses of hepatitis B vaccine). Although not labeled for
this indication by FDA, Pediarix may be used in infants
whose mothers are HBsAg positive or whose HBsAg status
is unknown.
Adolescents Cl 1-19 Years of Age]
Routine hepatitis B vaccination is recommended for all
children and adolescents through age 18 years. All children
not previously vaccinated with hepatitis B vaccine should
be vaccinated at 11-12 years of age with the age-appropriate
dose of vaccine. When adolescent vaccination programs are
being considered, local data should be considered to deter-
mine the ideal age group to vaccinate (i.e., preadolescents,
young adolescents) to achieve the highest vaccination rates.
The vaccination schedule should be flexible and should take
into account the feasibility of delivering three doses of
vaccine to this age group. Unvaccinated older adolescents
should be vaccinated whenever possible. Those in groups at
risk for HBV infection (e.g., Asian and Pacific Islanders,
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sexually active) should be identified and vaccinated in settings
serving this age group (i.e., schools, sexually transmitted
disease clinics, detention facilities, drug treatment centers).
Adolescents 11-19 years of age should receive 0.5 mL (5 meg)
of pediatric or adult formulation Recombivax HB (Merck)
or 0.5 mL (10 meg) of pediatric formulation Engerix-B
(GlaxoSmithKline). The adult formulation of Engerix-B
may be used in adolescents, but the approved dose is 1 mL
(20 meg).
Hepatitis B
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Adolescent and Adult Schedule
Dose
Usual Minimum
Interval Interval
Primary 1 — —
Primary 2 1 month 4 weeks
Primary 3 5 months 8 weeks*
The usual schedule for adolescents is two doses separated
by no less than 4 weeks, and a third dose 4-6 months after
the second dose. If an accelerated schedule is needed, the
minimum interval between the first two doses is 4 weeks,
and the minimum interval between the second and third
doses is 8 weeks. However, the first and third doses should
be separated by no less than 16 weeks. Doses given at less
than these minimum intervals should not be counted as
part of the vaccination series.
*third dose must be separated from
first dose by at least 1
6
weeks
In 1999, the Eood and Drug Administration approved an
alternative hepatitis B vaccination schedule for adolescents
11-15 years of age. This alternative schedule is for two
10-
mcg doses of Recombivax HB separated by 4-6 months.
Seroconversion rates and postvaccination anti-HBs
antibody titers were similar using this schedule or the
standard schedule of three 5-meg doses of RecombivaxHB.
This alternative schedule is approved only for adolescents
11—
15 years of age, and for Merck’s hepatitis B vaccine.
The 2'dose schedule should be completed by age 16 years.
Adults [20 Years of Age and Older]
Routine preexposure vaccination should be considered for
groups of adults who are at increased risk of HBV infection.
Adults 20 years of age and older should receive 1 mL
(10 meg) of pediatric or adult formulation Recombivax HB
(Merck) or 1 mL (20 meg) of adult formulation Engerix-B
(GlaxoSmithKline). The pediatric formulation of Engerix-B
is not approved for use in adults.
The usual schedule for adults is two doses separated by no
less than 4 weeks, and a third dose 4-6 months after the
second dose. If an accelerated schedule is needed, the
minimum interval between the first two doses is 4 weeks,
and the minimum interval between the second and third
doses is 8 weeks. However, the first and third doses should
be separated by no less than 16 weeks. Doses given at less
than these minimum intervals should not be counted as part
of the vaccination series. It is not necessary to restart the series
or add doses because of an extended interval between doses.
Alternative Adolescent
Vaccination Schedule
• Two 10 meg doses of
Recombivax HB separated by
4-6 months
• Approved only for adolescents
11-15 years of age
* Only applies to Merck hepatitis B
vaccine
221
Adult Hepatitis B
Vaccine Candidates
• Men who have sex with men
• Heterosexual with multiple partners
• Persons diagnosed with an STD
• Prostitutes
• Injection drug users
• Inmates of long-term correctional
facilities
• Persons receiving hemodialysis
Healthcare workers
Adults who are at increased risk of HBV infection from
sexual transmission include men who have sex with other
men, heterosexuals with multiple sex partners, persons
diagnosed with a recently acquired sexually transmitted
disease, and prostitutes.
Injection-drug users who share needles are at very high risk
for HBV infection. All injection-drug users who are suscep-
tible to HBV should be vaccinated as soon as possible after
their drug use begins.
Inmates of long-term correctional facilities are at increased
risk of HBV infection because of injection-drug use, homo-
sexual activity, or other factors. The prison setting provides
an access point for vaccination of inmates with histories of
high-risk behavior.
Persons undergoing hemodialysis are at increased risk of
HBV infection because of contact with large amounts of
blood. Although the hepatitis B vaccine is less effective in
these patients, it is recommended for all susceptible
hemodialysis patients.
The risk of healthcare workers contracting HBV infection
depends on how often they are exposed to blood or blood
products through percutaneous and permucosal exposures.
Any healthcare or public safety worker may be at risk for
HBV exposure, depending on the tasks performed. If those
tasks involve contact with blood or blood-contaminated
body fluids, such workers should be vaccinated. Risk is often
highest during training periods. Therefore, it is recommended
that vaccination be completed during training in schools of
medicine, dentistry, nursing, laboratory technology, and
other allied health professions.
Twinrix
• Combination hepatitis A vaccine
(pediatric dose) and hepatitis B
(adult dose)
• Schedule: 0, 1, 6 months
• Approved for persons >18 years
Twinrix
In 2001, the Food and Drug Administration approved a
combination hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccine (Twinrix,
GlaxoSmithKline). Each dose of Twinrix contains 720
ELISA units of hepatitis A vaccine (equivalent to a pediatric
dose of Havrix), and 20 meg of hepatitis B surface antigen
protein (equivalent to an adult dose of Engerix-B). The
vaccine is administered in a three-dose series at 0, 1
,
and 6
months. Appropriate spacing of the doses must be maintained
to assure long-term protection from both vaccines. The first
and third doses of Twinrix should be separated by at least
6 months. The first and second doses should be separated by
at least 4 weeks, and the second and third doses should be
separated by at least 5 months. It is not necessary to restart
the series or add doses if the interval between doses is longer
than the recommended interval.
Twinrix is approved for persons aged 18 years and older, and
can be used in persons in this age group with indications for
Hepatitis B
both hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccines. Because the
hepatitis B component of Twinrix is equivalent to a standard
dose of hepatitis B vaccine, the schedule is the same
whether Twinrix or single-antigen hepatitis B vaccine is
used. Single-antigen hepatitis A vaccine can be used to
complete a series begun with Twinrix and vice versa. See
the Chapter 14, Hepatitis A, for details.
Other Groups Who May Be Candidates
for Hepatitis B Vaccine
The special behavioral and medical problems encountered
in institutions for the developmentally disabled make this
a high-risk setting, and clients and staff should be vaccinated.
The risk of HBV infection in these institutions is related
to contact with blood and also with bites and contact with
skin lesions and other body fluids that contain HBV.
Clients and staff of group and foster homes where a
chronically infected person is known to be present should
also be vaccinated.
In certain U.S. populations, such as Alaska Natives, Pacific
Islanders, and immigrants and refugees from HBV-endemic
areas, HBV infection is highly endemic and transmission
occurs primarily during childhood. In such groups,
vaccination of all infants is particularly important.
Immigrants and refugees from areas with highly endemic
HBV disease should be screened for HBV upon resettlement
in the United States. If a chronically infected person (carrier)
is identified, all susceptible household members should be
vaccinated. Even if no carriers are found, vaccination is
recommended for susceptible children younger than 7 years
of age because of the high rate of interfamilial spread of HBV.
Adoptees, orphans, and unaccompanied minors from
countries of high or intermediate HBV endemicity should
be screened for HBsAg, and, if positive, their household
members should be vaccinated.
Household members and sex partners of HBV carriers
should be tested and, if susceptible (i.e., neither anti-HBs
positive limmune] or HBsAg positive [acutely or chronically
infected]), should be vaccinated.
Adults and children who plan to travel to areas outside
the United States that have high rates of HBV infection
should be vaccinated if they plan to stay in these areas for
more than 6 months and have close contact with the local
population. Persons traveling for shorter durations who may
have sexual contact with local persons in areas where HBV
infection is common should also he vaccinated. Persons
traveling abroad who will perform medical procedures in
areas where HBV infection is common are at very high risk.
Other Hepatitis B
Vaccine Candidates
* staff of institutions for developmentally
disabled
* Alaska Natives, Pacific Islanders
* Immigrants/refugees*
* Adoptees, orphans, unaccompanied minors*
* Household members and sex partners of HBV
carriers
* Extended travel to areas of high endemicity
* Recipients of certain blood products
*from countries of high or Intermediate HBV endemnicity
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Prevaccination Seroiogic Testing
• Not indicated before routine
vaccination of infants or children
• May be considered when vaccinating
adolescents in groups with high
rates of HBV infection
—Alaska Natives
—Pacific Islanders
—children of immigrants from endemic
countries
—family members of HBV carriers
Recipients of certain blood products, such as persons with
hemophilia, are at high risk of infection. Vaccination should
be initiated at the time their specific clotting disorder is
identified.
Persons who have casual contact with chronically infected
persons at schools and offices are at low risk of HBV infection
from such contact, and vaccine is not recommended for this
group. Unless special circumstances exist, such as behavior
problems (biting or scratching) or medical conditions
(severe skin disease) that might facilitate transmission,
vaccination of contacts of carriers in child care centers is
not indicated. However, routine vaccination of all persons
18 years of age and younger is recommended.
Serologic Testing of Vaccine
Recipients
Prevaccination Serologic Testing
The decision to screen potential vaccine recipients for prior
infection depends on the cost of vaccination, the cost of
testing for susceptibility, and the expected prevalence of
immune persons in the population being screened.
Screening is usually cost-effective, and should be considered,
in groups with a high risk of HBV infection (prevalence of
HBV markers 20% or higher) such as men who have sex
with men, injection-drug users, Alaska natives. Pacific
Islanders, children of immigrants from endemic-disease
countries, and family members of HBsAg-positive persons.
Screening is usually not cost-effective for groups with a low
expected prevalence of HBV serologic markers, such as
health professionals in their training years.
Serologic testing is not recommended before routine
vaccination of infants and children.
Postvaccination Seroiogic Testing
• Not routinely recommended
following vaccination of infants,
children, adolescents, or most adults
• Recommended for:
—hemodialysis patients
—infants born to HBsAg+ women
—sex partners of HBsAg+ person
—immunodeficient persons
—certain healthcare workers
Postvaccination Serologic Testing
Testing for immunity following vaccination is not
recommended routinely but should be considered for
persons whose subsequent management depends on knowing
their immune status, such as dialysis patients and staff, and
persons in whom a suboptimal response may be anticipated,
such as those who have received vaccine in the buttock.
Testing is also recommended for sex partners of HBsAg-positive
persons. When necessary, postvaccination testing should be
performed 1-2 months after completion of the vaccine series. 1
All infants born to HBsAg-positive women should be tested
3-12 months after their final (third or fourth) dose of
hepatitis B vaccine (i.e., at 9-18 months of age). If HBsAg
is not present and anti-HBs antibody is present, children
can be considered to be protected.
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t In 1997, ACIP and the Hospital Infection Control Practices
I !
Advisory Committee published comprehensive recommen-
1 1 dations for the immunization of healthcare workers. One of
I !
the recommendations was that healthcare workers who
1 1
have contact with patients or hlood and are at ongoing
I
risk for injuries with sharp instruments or needlesticks
I
I should he routinely tested for antibody after vaccination.
I
However, a catch-up program of serologic testing for
I
healthcare providers vaccinated prior to December 1997
I was not recommended. These persons should be tested as
[I necessary if they have a significant exposure to HBV (see
I
postexposure prophylaxis section below).
I
Routine postvaccination testing is not recommended for
t persons at low risk of exposure, such as public safety workers
I and healthcare workers without direct patient contact.
I
I
Vaccine Nonresponse
I Several factors have been associated with nonresponse to
I
hepatitis B vaccine. These include vaccine factors (e.g.,
I
dose, schedule, injection site) and host factors. Older age
I (40 years and older), male sex, obesity, smoking, and chronic
I
illness have been independently associated with nonresponse
I
to hepatitis B vaccine. Further vaccination of persons who
I
fail to respond to a primary vaccination series administered
I
in the deltoid muscle produces adequate response in 15% to
25% of vaccinees after one additional dose and in 30% to
50% after three additional doses.
Persons who do not respond to the first series of hepatitis B
vaccine should complete a second three-dose vaccine series.
The second vaccine series should be given on the usual
0, 1, 6-month schedule. A 0, 1, 4-month accelerated schedule
may also be used. Revaccinated healthcare workers and
others for whom postvaccination serologic testing is
recommended should be retested 1-2 months after completion
of the second vaccine series.
Fewer than 5% of persons receiving six doses of hepatitis B
vaccine administered by the appropriate schedule in the
deltoid muscle fail to develop detectable anti-HBs antibody.
Some persons who are anti-HBs negative following six doses
may have a low level of antibody that is not detected by
routine serologic testing (“hyporesponder”)- However, one
reason for persistent nonresponse to hepatitis B vaccine is
i that the person is chronically infected with HBV. Persons
who fail to develop detectable anti-HBs after six doses
should be tested for HBsAg. Persons who are found to be
HBsAg positive should be counseled accordingly. Persons
who fail to respond to two appropriately administered
three-dose series, and who are HBsAg negative should be
considered susceptible to HBV infection and should be
counseled regarding precautions to prevent HBV infection
and the need to obtain HBIG prophylaxis for any known or
Postvaccination Serologic Testing
Healthcare workers who have
contact with patients or blood
should be tested for antibody
after vaccination
Management of Nonresponse to
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Complete a second series of
three doses
* Should be given on the usual
schedule of 0, 1 and 6 months
• Retest 1 -2 months after
completing the second series
Persistent Nonresponse to
Hepatitis B Vaccine
* <5% of vaccinees do not develop
anti-HBsAg after 6 valid doses
* May be nonresponder or
"hyporesponder"
* Check HBsAg status
* If exposed, treat as nonresponder
with postexposure prophylaxis
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probable parenteral exposure to HBsAg'positive blood (see
postexposure prophylaxis table on page 228).
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of a negative anti-HBs
serologic response in a person who received hepatitis B
in the past and was not tested after vaccination. Without
postvaccination testing, it is not possible to determine if
persons testing negative years after vaccination represent
true vaccine failure (i.e., no initial response), or have
anti'HBs antibody that has waned to helow a level
detectable by the test. The latter is the most likely
explanation, because up to 60% of vaccinated people lose
detectable antibody (but not protection) 9-15 years after
vaccination.
One management option is to assume true vaccine failure
and administer a second series to these persons. Serologic
testing for anti'HBs antibody should be repeated 1-2
months after the sixth dose.
A second, probably less expensive option is to administer
a single dose of hepatitis B vaccine and test for hepatitis B
surface antibody in 4-6 weeks. If the person is anti-HBs
antibody positive, this most likely indicates a booster response
in a previous responder, and no further vaccination (or
serologic testing) is needed. If the person is anti-HBs antibody
negative after this “booster” dose, a second series should be
completed (i.e., two more doses). If the person is still
seronegative after six total doses, he or she should be managed
as a nonresponder (see Postexposure Management, below).
Postexposure Management
Hepatitis B vaccine is recommended as part of the therapy
used to prevent hepatitis B infection following exposure to
HBV. Depending on the exposure circumstance, the hepatitis B
vaccine series may be started at the same time as treatment
with hepatitis B immune globulin (HBIG).
HBIG is prepared by cold ethanol fraction of plasma from
selected donors with high anti-HBs titers; it contains an
anti-HBs titer of at least 1:100,000, by RIA. It is used for
passive immunization for accidental (percutaneous, mucous
membrane) exposure, sexual exposure to an HBsAg-positive
person, perinatal exposure of an infant, or household exposure
of an infant younger than 1 2 months old to a primary
caregiver with acute hepatitis B. Most candidates for
HBIG are, by definition, in a high-risk category and
should therefore be considered for vaccine as well.
Immune globulin (IG) is prepared by cold ethanol fractionation
of pooled plasma and contains low titers of anti-HBs.
Because titers are relatively low, IG has no valid current
use for HBV disease unless hepatitis B immune globulin is
unavailable.
Hepatitis B
Infants born to women who are HBsAg-positive (i.e.,
acutely or chronically infected with HBV) are at extremely
high risk of HBV transmission and chronic HBV infection.
Hepatitis B vaccination and one dose of HBIG administered
within 24 hours after birth are 85%—95% effective in pre-
venting both acute HBV infection and chronic infection,
i Hepatitis B vaccine administered alone beginning within
24 hours after birth is 70%-95% effective in preventing
perinatal HBV infection.
HBIG (0.5 mL) should be given intramuscularly (IM),
preferably within 12 hours of birth. Hepatitis B vaccine
should be given IM in three doses. The first dose should be
given at the same time as HBIG, but at a different site. If
i vaccine is not immediately available, the first injection
should be given within 7 days of birth. The second and
third doses should be given 1—2 months and 6 months,
j
respectively, after the first. Testing for HBsAg and anti-HBs
is recommended at 9-18 months of age (3-12 months after
the third dose) to monitor the success of therapy. If the
mother’s HBsAg status is not known at the time of birth,
the infant should be vaccinated within 12 hours of birth.
HBIG given at birth does not interfere with the
administration of other vaccines administered at 2 months
of age. Subsequent doses of hepatitis B vaccine do not
interfere with the routine pediatric vaccine schedule.
Infants born to HBsAg-positive women and who weigh less
than 2,000 grams at birth should receive postexposure
prophylaxis as described above. However, the initial vaccine
dose (at birth) should not be counted in the 3-dose schedule.
The next dose in the series should be administered when
the infant is chronologic age 1 month. The third dose
should be given 1-2 months after the second, and the
fourth dose should be given at 6 months of age. These
infants should be tested for HBsAg and anti-HBs at 9-18
months of age.
Women admitted for delivery whose HBsAg status is
unknown should have blood drawn for testing. While test
results are pending, the infant should receive the first dose
of hepatitis B vaccine (without HBIG) within 12 hours of
birth. If the mother is found to be HBsAg positive, the
infant should receive HBIG as soon as possible but not later
than 7 days of age. If the infant does not receive HBIG, it is
important that the second dose of vaccine be administered
at 1-2 months of age.
Preterm infants (less than 2,000 grams birthweight)
whose mother’s HBsAg status is unknown should receive
hepatitis B vaccine within 12 hours of birth. If the maternal
HBsAg status cannot be determined within 1 2 hours of
birth HBIG should also be administered because of the
Prevention of Perinatal
Hepatitis B Virus Infection
* Begin treatment within 12 hours
of birth
* Hepatitis B vaccine (first dose)
and HBIG at different sites
Complete vaccination series at 6
months of age
* Test for response at 9-18 months
of age
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immune response is less reliable in preterm infants weighing
less than 2,000 grams. As described above, the vaccine dose
administered at birth should not be counted as part of the
series, and the infant should receive three additional doses
beginning at age 1 month. The vaccine series should be
completed by 6 months of age.
Few data are available on the use of Comvax or Pediarix in
infants born to women who have acute or chronic infection
with hepatitis B virus (i.e., HBsAg-positive). Neither vaccine
is licensed for infants whose mothers are known to be acutely
or chronically infected with HBV. However, ACIP has
approved offdabel use of Comvax and Pediarix in children
whose mothers are HBsAg positive, or whose HBsAg status is
unknown (see http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vfc/acip_recs/1003hepb.pdf).
Comvax and Pediarix should never be used in infants
younger than 6 weeks of age. Either vaccine may be
administered at the same time as other childhood vaccines
given at 6 weeks of age or older.
After a percutaneous (needle stick, laceration, bite) or
permucosal exposure that contains or might contain HBV,
blood should be obtained from the person who was the
source of the exposure to determine their HBsAg status.
Management of the exposed person depends on the HBsAg
status of the source and the vaccination and anti'HBs
response status of the exposed person. Recommended
postexposure prophylaxis is described in the table below.
Recommended Postexposure Prophylaxis for Exposure to Hepatitis B Virus
Vaccination and antibody
status of exposed person*
Treatment
Source HBsAg** Positive Source HBsAg** Negative
Source unknown or not
available for testing
Unvaccinated
HBIG' X 1 and initiate HB
vaccine series
Initiate HB vaccine series Initiate HB vaccine series
Previously
Vaccinated
Known Responder ^ No treatment No treatment No treatment
Known nonresponder ^
HBIG X 1 and initiate
revaccination or HBIG X 2
No treatment
If known high-risk source,
treat as if source were HBsAg
positive
Antibody response
unknown
Test exposed person for anti-
HBs^
- If adequate ^ no treatment
is necessary
- If inadequate *. administer
HBIG X 1 and vaccine
booster
No treatment
Test exposed person for anti-
HBs’'
- If adequate ^ no treatment
is necessary
— If inadequate *, administer
vaccine booster and recheck
titer in 1-2 months
Persons who have previously been infected with HBV are immune to reinfection and do not require postexposure prophylaxis
Hepatitis B surface antigen
t Hepatitis B immune globulin; dose is 0.06 mL/kg administered intramuscularly
§ A responder is a person with adequate levels of serum antibody to HBsAg (i.e., anti-HBs >10 mlU/mL)
t A nonresponder is a person with inadequate response to vaccination (i.e., serum anti-HBs <10 mlU/mL)
1 1 The option of giving one dose of HBIG and reinitiating the vaccine series is preferred for nonresponders who have not completed a
second 3-dose vaccine series. For persons who previously completed a second vaccine series but failed to respond, two doses of HBIG
are preferred.
H Antibody to HBsAg
Source: MMWR 2001; 50(RR-1 1) pg 22
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Susceptible Sex Partners of Persons with
Acute or Chronic HBU Infection
For susceptible sex partners of persons with acute HBV
infection, a single dose of HBIG (0.06 mL/kg) given within
14 days of the last sexual contact is recommended. If the
last sexual contact was more than 14 days previously,
hepatitis B vaccination should be initiated, although the
amount of protection afforded by postexposure prophylaxis
given this late is not known. For sex partners of persons
with chronic HBV infection, postexposure prophylaxis with
hepatitis B vaccine alone is recommended. HBIG is not
recommended in this situation. Postvaccination anti-HBs
antibody testing should be considered for sex partners of
persons with chronic HBV infection.
Household Contacts of Persons with Acute
HBV Infection
Infants whose mother or primary caregiver has acute HBV
infection are at increased risk of developing chronic HBV
infection because of close contact. An unvaccinated infant
whose mother or primary caregiver has acute HBV infection
should receive HBIG (0.5 mL) along with the first dose of
the hepatitis B vaccine series. HBIG is not needed for
infants who have received two doses of vaccine or who are
scheduled to receive the second dose of vaccine. The second
vaccine dose should be given and/or vaccination should be
completed on schedule. Household contacts of persons with
acute HBV infection who have had a blood exposure to the
infected person (e.g., sharing a toothbrush or razor) should
receive HBIG and begin the vaccine series. Routine
hepatitis B vaccination should be considered for nonsexual
household contacts who do not have a blood exposure to
the infected person, especially for children and adolescents.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
The most common adverse reaction following hepatitis B
vaccine is pain at the site of injection, reported in
13%-29% of adults and 3%-9% of children. Mild systemic
complaints, such as fatigue, headache, and irritability, have
been reported in 11% to 17% of adults and 0% to 20% of
children. Fever (up to 99.9°F [37.7°C]) has been reported in
1% of adults and 0.4% to 6.4% of children. Serious systemic
adverse reactions and allergic reactions are rarely reported
following hepatitis B vaccine. There is no evidence that
administration of hepatitis B vaccine at or shortly after birth
increases the number of febrile episodes, sepsis evaluations,
or allergic or neurologic events in the newborn period.
Hepatitis B vaccine has been alleged to cause or exacerbate
multiple sclerosis (MS). A 2004 retrospective study in a
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
Pain at injection site
Adults
13%-29%
Infants and
Children
3%-9%
Mild systemic complaints
(fatigue, headache)
0%-20%
Temperature <99.9°F (37.7°C) 1% 0.4%-6%
1
— rare rare )
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British population found a slight increase in risk of MS
among hepatitis B vaccine recipients. However, large
population-based studies have shown no association
between receipt of hepatitis B vaccine and either the
development of MS or exacerbation of the course of MS
is persons already diagnosed with the disease.
Hepatitis B Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component or following
a prior dose
* Moderate or severe acute illness
IS
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
A severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component or
following a prior dose of hepatitis B vaccine is a
contraindication to further doses of vaccine. Such allergic
reactions are rare.
Persons with moderate or severe acute illness should not
be vaccinated until their condition improves. However, a
minor illness, such as an upper respiratory infection, is not
a contraindication to vaccination.
Specific studies of the safety of hepatitis B vaccine in
pregnant women have not been performed. However, more
than 20 years of experience with inadvertent administration
to pregnant women have not identified vaccine safety issues
for either the woman or the fetus. In contrast, if a pregnant
woman acquires HBV infection, it may cause severe disease
in the mother and chronic infection in the newborn baby.
Therefore, hepatitis B vaccine may be administered to a
pregnant woman who is otherwise eligible for it.
Hepatitis B vaccine does not contain live virus, so it may be
used in persons with immunodeficiency. However, response
to vaccination in such persons may be suboptimal.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Hepatitis B vaccines should be stored refrigerated at
35°^6°F (2°-8°C), but not frozen. Exposure to freezing
temperature destroys the potency of the vaccine.
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Influenza is a highly infectious viral illness. The name
“influenza” originated in 15th century Italy, from an epidemic
attributed to “influence of the stars.” The first pandemic, or
worldwide epidemic, that clearly fits the description of
influenza was in 1580. At least four pandemics of influenza
occurred in the 19th century, and three occurred in the
20th century. The pandemic of “Spanish” influenza in
1918-1919 caused an estimated 21 million deaths worldwide.
Influenza
* Highly infectious viral illness
* First pandemic in 1580
* At least 4 pandemics in 19th century
* Estimated 21 million deaths
worldwide in pandemic of 1918-1919
* Virus first isolated in 1933
Smith, Andrews, and Laidlaw isolated influenza A virus in
ferrets in 1933, and Francis isolated influenza B virus in
1936. In 1936, Burnet discovered that influenza virus could
be grown in embryonated hens’ eggs. This led to the study
of the characteristics of the virus and the development of
inactivated vaccines. The protective efficacy of these inacti-
vated vaccines was determined in the 1950s. The first live
attenuated influenza vaccine was licensed in 2003.
Influenza Virus
Influenza is a single-stranded, helically shaped, RNA virus
of the orthomyxovirus family. Basic antigen types A, B, and
C are determined by the nuclear material. Type A influenza
has subtypes that are determined by the surface antigens
hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N). Three types of
hemagglutinin in humans (HI, H2, and H3) have a role in
virus attachment to cells. Two types of neuraminidase (N
1
and N2) have a role in virus penetration into cells.
Influenza A causes moderate to severe illness and affects all
age groups. The virus infects humans and other animals.
Influenza A viruses are perpetuated in nature by wild birds,
predominantly waterfowl. Most of these viruses are not
pathogenic to their natural hosts and do not change or
evolve. Influenza B generally causes milder disease than type
A and primarily affects children. Influenza B is more stable
than influenza A, with less antigenic drift and consequent
immunologic stability. It affects only humans. Influenza C is
rarely reported as a cause of human illness, probably because
most cases are subclinical. It has not been associated with
epidemic disease.
The nomenclature to describe the type of influenza virus
is expressed in this order: 1) virus type, 2) geographic site
where it was first isolated, 3) strain number, 4) year of
isolation, and 5) virus subtype.
Antigenic Changes
Hemagglutinin and neuraminidase periodically change,
apparently due to sequential evolution within immune or
partially immune populations. Antigenic mutants emerge
Influenza Virus
• Single-stranded RNA virus
• Orthomyxoviridae family
• 3 types: A, B, C
• Subtypes of type A determined by
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase
Influenza Virus Strains
•Type A - moderate to severe illness
- all age groups
- humans and other animals
• Type B milder disease
primarily affects children
humans only
• Type C - rarely reported in humans
- no epidemics
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Influenza Antigenic Changes
* Hemagglutinin and neuraminidase
antigens change with time
* Changes occur as a result of point
mutations in the virus gene, or due to
exchange of a gene segment with
another subtype of influenza virus
* Impact of antigenic changes depend
on extent of change (more change
usually means larger impact)
V y
Influenza Antigenic Changes
• Antigenic Shift
—major change, new subtype
—caused by exchange of gene
segments
—may result in pandemic
Example of antigenic shift
—H2N2 virus circulated in 1957-1967
—H3N2 virus appeared in 1968 and
completely replaced H2N2 virus
Influenza Antigenic Changes
• Antigenic Drift
—minor change, same subtype
—caused by point mutations in gene
—may result in epidemic
• Example of antigenic drift
-in 2002-2003, A/Panama/2007/99
(H3N2) virus was dominant
-^Fuj ian/41 1/2002 (H3N2) appeared
in late 2003 and caused widespread
illness in 2003-2004
Influenza Type A Antigenic Shifts
Year SubtVDe
Severity of
Pandemic
1889 H3N2 Moderate
1918 H1N1 Severe
1957 H2N2 Severe
1968 H3N2 Moderate
1977 MINI Mild
and are selected as the predominant virus to the extent that
they differ from the antecedent virus, which is suppressed by
specific antibody arising in the population as a result of
infection. This cycle repeats continuously. In interpandemic
periods, mutants arise by serial point mutations in the RNA
coding for hemagglutinin. At irregular intervals of 10 to 40
years, viruses showing major antigenic differences from
prevalent subtypes appear and, because the population does
not have protective antibody against these new antigens,
cause pandemic disease in all age groups.
Antigenic shift is a major change in one or both surface
antigens (H or N) that occurs at varying intervals.
Antigenic shifts are probably due to genetic recombination
(an exchange of a gene segment) between influenza A viruses,
usually those that affect humans and birds. An antigenic
shift may result in a worldwide pandemic if the virus is
efficiently transmitted from person to person. The last major
antigenic shift occurred in 1968 when H3N2 (Hong Kong)
influenza appeared. It completely replaced the type A strain
(H2N2, or Asian influenza) that had circulated throughout
the world for the prior 10 years. There is concern among
some influenza experts that the increasingly wide geographic
distribution of a highly pathogenic avian virus (H5N1)
could increase the chance of another antigenic shift.
Although H5N 1 virus is known to infect humans who are
in contact with infected poultry, the virus is not efficiently
transmitted from one human to another. Efficient person-to-
person transmission is a necessary characteristic of an
influenza virus with pandemic potential.
Antigenic drift is a minor change in surface antigens that
results from point mutations in a gene segment. Antigenic
drift may result in an epidemic, since the protection that
remains from past exposures to similar viruses is incomplete.
Drift occurs in all three types of influenza virus (A,B,C). For
instance, during most of the 1997—1998 influenza season,
A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2) was the predominant influenza
strain isolated in the United States. A/Wuhan was a drifted
distant relative of the 1968 Hong Kong H3N2 strain. In the
last half of the 1997-1998 influenza season, a drifted variant
of A/Wuhan appeared. This virus, named A/Sydney/5/97,
was different enough from A/Wuhan (which had been
included in the 1997—1998 vaccine) that the vaccine did
not provide much protection. Both A/Wuhan and A/Sydney
circulated late in the 1997—1998 influenza season. A/Sydney
became the predominant strain during the 1998—1999
influenza season and was included in the 1998—1999 vaccine.
During the past 100 years, four occurrences of antigenic
shifts have led to major pandemics (1889-1891, 1918-1920,
1957-1958, and 1968-1969). A pandemic starts from a single
focus and spreads along routes of travel. Typically, there are
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high attack rates involving all age groups, and mortality is
usually markedly increased. Severity is generally not greater
in the individual patient (except for the 1918-1919 strain),
but because large numbers of persons are infected, the
number, if not the proportion, of severe and fatal cases
will be large. Onset may occur in any season of the year.
Secondary and tertiary waves may occur every period of
1-2 years, usually in the winter.
Typically in an epidemic, influenza attack rates are lower
than in pandemics. There is usually a rise in excess mortality.
The major impact is observed in morbidity, with high attack
rates and excess rates of hospitalization, especially for adults
with respiratory disease. Absenteeism from work and school
is high, and visits to healthcare providers increase. In the
Northern Hemisphere, epidemics usually occur in late fall
and continue through early spring. In the Southern
Hemisphere, epidemics usually occur 6 months before or
after those in the Northern Hemisphere.
Sporadic outbreaks can occasionally be localized to families,
schools, and isolated communities.
Pathogenesis
Following respiratory transmission, the virus attaches to
and penetrates respiratory epithelial cells in the trachea
and bronchi. Viral replication occurs, which results in the
destruction of the host cell. Viremia has rarely been docu-
mented. Virus is shed in respiratory secretions for 5-10 days.
Clinical Features
The incubation period for influenza is usually 2 days, but
can vary from 1 to 4 days. The severity of influenza illness
depends on the prior immunologic experience with anti-
genically related virus variants. In general, only about
50% of infected persons will develop the classic clinical
symptoms of influenza.
“Classic” influenza disease is characterized by the abrupt
onset of fever, myalgia, sore throat, nonproductive cough,
and headache. The fever is usually 101°-102°F, and
accompanied by prostration. The onset of fever is often so
abrupt that the exact hour is recalled by the patient.
Myalgias mainly affect the back muscles. Cough is believed
to be a result of tracheal epithelial destruction. Additional
symptoms may include rhinorrhea (runny nose), headache,
substernal chest burning and ocular symptoms (e.g., eye pain
and sensitivity to light).
Systemic symptoms and fever usually last from 2 to 3 days,
rarely more than 5 days. They may be decreased by such
Influenza Pathogenesis
’ Respiratory transmission of virus
‘ Replication in respiratory
epithelium with subsequent
destruction of cells
’ Viremia rarely documented
’ Viral shedding in respiratory
secretions for 5-10 days
Influenza Clinical Features
* Incubation period 2 days
(range 1-4 days)
* Severity of illness depends on
prior experience with related
variants
* Abrupt onset of fever, myalgia,
sore throat, nonproductive cough,
headache
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Influenza Complications
• Pneumonia
—secondary bacterial
—primary influenza viral
• Reye syndrome
• Myocarditis
• Death 0.5-1 per 1,000 cases
Impact of Influenza
•
-36,000 excess deaths per year
• >90% of deaths among persons
>65 years of age
• Higher mortality during seasons
when influenza type A (H3N2)
viruses predominate
Impact of Influenza
* Highest rates of complications and
hospitalization among young children
and person >65 years
Average of >200,000 influenza-related
excess hospitalizations
• 57% of hospitalizations among
persons <65 years of age
• Greater number of hospitalizations
during type A (H3N2) epidemics
medications as aspirin or acetaminophen. Aspirin should
not be used for infants, children, or teenagers because they
may be at risk for contracting Reye syndrome following an
influenza infection. Recovery is usually rapid, but some
patients may have lingering depression and asthenia (lack
of strength or energy) for several weeks.
Complications
The most frequent complication of influenza is pneumonia,
most commonly secondary bacterial pneumonia (e.g..
Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, or
Staphylococcus aureus). Primary influenza viral pneumonia
is an uncommon complication with a high fatality rate.
Reye syndrome is a complication that occurs almost
exclusively in children taking aspirin, primarily in association
with influenza B (or varicella zoster), and presents with
severe vomiting and confusion, which may progress to coma
due to swelling of the brain.
Other complications include myocarditis (inflammation of
the heart) and worsening of chronic bronchitis and other
chronic pulmonary diseases. Death is reported in 0.5-1 per
1,000 cases. The majority of deaths occur among persons
65 years of age and older.
Impact of Influenza
An increase in mortality typically accompanies an influenza
epidemic. Increased mortality results not only from influenza
and pneumonia but also from cardiopulmonary and other
chronic diseases that can be exacerbated by influenza.
In a recent study of influenza epidemics, approximately
19.000 influenza-associated pulmonary and circulatory
deaths per influenza season occurred during 1976-1990,
compared with approximately 36,000 deaths during
1990-1999. Persons 65 years of age and older account for
more than 90% of deaths attributed to pneumonia and
influenza. In the United States, the number of influenza-
associated deaths might be increasing, in part because the
number of older persons is increasing. In addition, influenza
seasons in which influenza A (H3N2) viruses predominate
are associated with higher mortality.
The risk for complications and hospitalizations from
influenza are higher among persons 65 years of age and
older, young children, and persons of any age with certain
underlying medical conditions. An average of more than
200.000 hospitalizations per year are related to influenza,
more than 57% of which are among persons younger than
65 years. A greater number of hospitalizations occur during
years that influenza A (H3N2) is predominant. In nursing
homes, attack rates may be as high as 60%, with fatality
Influenza
rates as high as 30%. The cost of a severe epidemic has been
estimated to be $12 billion.
Among children 0-4 years of age, hospitalization rates
have varied from 100 per 100,000 healthy children to as
high as 500 per 100,000 for children with underlying medical
conditions. Hospitalization rates for children 12 months of
age and younger are comparable to rates for persons 65 and
older. To reduce the risk of hospitalization from complications
of influenza, the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) and the American Academy of Pediatrics
recommend routine annual influenza vaccination of children
6-23 months of age.
An influenza pandemic could affect up to 200 million people
and result in up to 400,000 deaths. The 1918-1919 influenza
pandemic is believed to have resulted in the death of at
least 500,000 Americans in less than a year. Planning for
pandemic influenza is a critical component of public health
preparedness activities and should be conducted by all local
and state public health agencies. The federal pandemic plan
is available on the Department of Health and Human
Services website at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/
Laboratory Diagnosis
The diagnosis of influenza is usually suspected on the basis
of characteristic clinical findings, particularly if influenza
has been reported in the community.
Virus can be isolated from throat and nasopharyngeal
swabs obtained within 3 days of onset of illness. Culture is
performed by inoculation of the amniotic or allantoic sac
of chick embryos or certain cell cultures that support viral
replication. A minimum of 48 hours is required to demon-
strate virus, and 1 to 2 additional days to identify the virus
type. As a result, culture is helpful in defining the etiology
of local epidemics, but not in individual case management.
Serologic confirmation of influenza requires demonstration
of a significant rise in influenza IgG. The acute-phase
specimen should be taken less than 5 days from onset, and
a convalescent specimen taken 10-21 days (preferably 21
days) following onset. Complement fixation (CF) and
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) are the serologic tests
most commonly used. The key test is HI, which depends
on the ability of the virus to agglutinate human or chicken
erythrocytes and inhibition of this process by specific
antibody. Diagnosis requires at least a fourfold rise in antibody
titer. Rapid diagnostic testing for influenza antigen permits
those in office and clinic settings to assess the need for
antiviral use in a more timely manner.
Hospitalization Rates for Influenza
By Age and Risk Group*
Aae GrouD
Rate**
(hiah-risk)
Rate**
fnot hiah-hskl
0-11 mos 1900 496-1038
1-2 yrs 800 186
3-4 yrs 320 86
5-14 yrs 92 41
1 5-44 yrs 56-110 23-25
45-64 yrs 392-635 13-23
>65 yrs 399-518 125-228
’ Data from several studies 1972 - 1995
** Hospitalizations per 100,000 population
Influenza Diagnosis
* Clinical and epidemiological
characteristics
* Isolation of influenza virus from
clinical specimen (e.g., nasopharynx,
throat, sputum)
* Significant rise in influenza IgG by
serologic assay
* Direct antigen testing for type A virus
V y
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Details about the laboratory diagnosis of influenza are
available on the CDC influenza website at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/labdiagnosis.htm
Influenza Epidemiology
Reservoir
Transmission
Temporal pattern
Communicability
Human, animals
(type A only)
Respiratory
Probably airborne
Peak December - March
In temperate climate
May occur earlier or later
1 day before to 5 days
after onset (adults)
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Influenza occurs throughout the world.
Reservoir
Humans are the only known reservoir of influenza types B
and C. Influenza A may infect both humans and animals.
There is no chronic carrier state.
Transmission
Influenza is primarily transmitted from person to person via
large virus-laden droplets (particles more than 5 microns in
diameter) that are generated when infected persons cough
or sneeze. These large droplets can then settle on the
mucosal surfaces of the upper respiratory tracts of susceptible
persons who are near (within 3 feet) infected persons.
Transmission may also occur through direct contact or
indirect contact with respiratory secretions such as when
touching surfaces contaminated with influenza virus and
then touching the eyes, nose or mouth.
Temporal Pattern
Influenza activity peaks from December to March in
temperate climates, but may occur earlier or later. During
1976-2005, peak influenza activity in the United States
occurred most frequently in January (21% of seasons) and
February (45% of seasons). However, peak influenza activity
occurred in March, April, or May in 16% of seasons.
Influenza occurs throughout the year in tropical areas.
Communicability
Adults can transmit influenza from the day before symptom
onset to approximately 5 days after symptoms begin.
Children can transmit influenza to others for 10 or more
days.
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Secular Trends in the United States
There is a documented association between influenza and
increased morbidity in high-risk adult populations.
Hospitalization for adults with high-risk medical conditions
increases two- to fivefold during major epidemics.
The impact of influenza in the United States is quantified
by measuring pneumonia and influenza (P and I) deaths.
Death certificate data are collected from 122 U.S. cities
with populations of more than 100,000 (total of approxi-
mately 70,000,000). P and I deaths include all deaths for
which pneumonia is listed as a primary or underlying cause
or for which influenza is listed on the death certificate.
Month of Peak Influenza Activity
United States, 1976-2005
! An expected ratio of deaths due to P and I compared with
all deaths for a given period of time is determined. The
epidemic threshold for influenza seasons is generally
estimated at 1.645 standard deviations above observed
P and 1 deaths for the previous 5 -year period excluding
periods during influenza outbreaks. Influenza epidemic
activity is signaled when the ratio of deaths due to P and I
exceeds the threshold ratio for 2 consecutive weeks.
Pneumonia and Influenza Mortality
for 122 U.S. Cities
Week Ending 01/07/2006
Influenza Vaccine
Characteristics
Two types of influenza vaccine are available in the United
States. Trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV) has
been available since the 1940s. TIV is administered by the
intramuscular route and currently contains three inactivated
viruses: type A (HlNl), type A (H3N2), and type B. Only
split-virus and subunit inactivated vaccines are available in
the United States. Vaccine viruses are grown in chicken
eggs, and the final product contains residual egg protein.
Influenza Vaccines
* Inactivated subunit (TIV)
—intramuscular
—trivalent
* Live attenuated vaccine (LAIV)
—intranasal
—trivalent
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Transmission of LAIV Virus
LAIV replicates in the nasopharyngeal
mucosa
Mean shedding of virus 7.6 days - longer
in children
* One instance of transmission of vaccine
virus documented in a child care setting
• Transmitted virus retained attenuated,
cold-adapted, temperature-sensitive
characteristics
No transmission of LAIV reported in the
U.S.
The vaccine is available in both pediatric (0.25-mL dose)
and adult (0.5-mL dose) formulations. TIV is available with
thimerosal as a preservative (in multidose vials), and in
reduced and preservative free formulations.
For the 2005-2006 influenza season three manufacturers
provided TIV. Fluzone (sanofi pasteur) was available in
multidose vials, in a thimerosabfree pediatric formulation
(0.25 mb) in single-dose syringes, and in a thimerosabfree
adult formulation in single-dose syringes and vials. Fluzone
was the only TIV approved for use among children younger
than 48 months during the 2005-2006 season. Fluvirin
(Chiron) was available in multidose vials and reduced-
thimerosal (“preservative free”) single-dose syringes. Fluvirin
is approved only for persons 4 years of age and older. Fluarix
(GlaxoSmithKline) was available in a reduced-thimerosal
(“preservative free”) single-dose syringe for persons 18 years
of age and older. These manufacturers will probably supply
TIV to the U.S. market in 2006.
I
Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) was approved
for use in the United States in 2003. LAIV is administered
by the intranasal route and contains the same three influenza
viruses as TIV. The live attenuated influenza viruses in
LAIV are temperature-sensitive, so they do not replicate
effectively at core body temperature (100.4°—102.2°F
[38°-39° C]). The viruses are also cold-adapted, and replicate
effectively in the mucosa of the nasopharynx. The vaccine
viruses are grown in chicken eggs, and the final product
contains residual egg protein. The vaccine is provided in
a single-dose sprayer unit; half of the dose is sprayed into
each nostril. LAIV does not contain thimerosal or any other
preservative.
Vaccinated children can shed vaccine viruses in nasopha-
ryngeal secretions for up to 3 weeks. In one study in a child
care setting, 80% of vaccinated children 8-36 months of age
shed at least one virus strain for an average of 7.6 days. In
this study, one instance of transmission of vaccine virus to a
contact was documented. The transmitted virus retained its
attenuated, cold-adapted, temperature-sensitive characteristics.
The frequency of shedding of vaccine strains by persons
5-49 years of age has not been determined.
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Vaccine Efficacy
• 70%-90% effective among healthy
persons <65 years of age
• 30%-40% effective among frail
elderly persons
• 50%-60% effective in preventing
hospitalization
• 80% effective in preventing death
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
TIV
For practical purposes, immunity following inactivated
influenza vaccination is less than 1 year because of waning
of vaccine-induced antibody and antigenic drift of circulating
influenza viruses. Priming by prior infection with a closely
related strain or prior vaccination enhances immunologic
response after vaccination.
Influenza
Influenza vaccine efficacy varies by the similarity of the
vaccine strain(s) to the circulating strain and the age and
[j
health status of the recipient. Vaccines are effective in
j
protecting up to 90% of healthy vaccinees younger than
I
65 years of age from illness when the vaccine strain is
similar to the circulating strain. However, the vaccine is
: only 30%-40% effective in preventing illness among frail
persons 65 years of age and older.
I Although the vaccine is not highly effective in preventing
clinical illness among the elderly, it is effective in preventing
complications and death. Among elderly persons, the
vaccine is 50%-60% effective in preventing hospitalization
and 80% effective in preventing death. During a 1982-1983
influenza outbreak in Genesee County, Michigan, unvaccinated
nursing home residents were four times more likely to die
than were vaccinated residents.
LAIV
LAIV has been tested in groups of both healthy children
and healthy adults. A randomized, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trial among healthy children 60-84 months of
age assessed the efficacy of the trivalent LAIV against
culture-confirmed influenza during two influenza seasons.
In year 1, when vaccine and circulating virus strains were
well matched, efficacy was 87% against culture-confirmed
influenza. In year 2, when the type A component was not
well matched between vaccine and circulating virus strains,
efficacy was also 87%. Other results from this trial included
a 27% reduction in febrile otitis media and a 28% reduction
in otitis media with concomitant antibiotic use. Receipt of
LAIV also resulted in decreased fever and otitis media in
vaccine recipients who developed influenza.
A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial among
3,920 healthy working adults aged 18-49 years assessed
several endpoints and documented reductions in illness,
absenteeism, healthcare visits, and medication use during
influenza outbreak periods. This study was conducted
during the 1997-98 influenza season, when the vaccine and
circulating type A strains were not well matched. This study
did not include laboratory virus testing of cases. There is no
evidence that efficacy of LAIV is greater than that of TIV.
Influenza and Complications
Among Nursing Home Residents
Vaccinated* *Unvaccinated
Illness Hosp Pneu Death
’Inactivated Influenza vaccine. Genesee County, Ml, 1962*1983
LAIV Efficacy in Healthy
Children
• 87% effective against culture-
confirmed influenza in children
5-7 years old
* 27% reduction in febrile otitis media
(OM)
* 28% reduction in OM with
accompanying antibiotic use
• Decreased fever and OM in vaccine
recipients who developed influenza
LAIV Efficacy in
Healthy Adults
• 20% fewer severe febrile illness
episodes
• 24% fewer febrile upper respiratory
illness episodes
• 27% fewer lost work days due to
febrile upper respiratory illness
• 18%-37% fewer days of healthcare
provider visits due to febrile illness
' 41%-45% fewer days of antibiotic use
Vaccination Schedule and Use
TIV
Influenza activity peaks in temperate areas between late
December and early March. TIV is most effective when it
precedes exposure by no more than 2 to 4 months. It should
be offered annually, beginning in September for routine
Timing of Inactivated
Influenza Vaccine Programs
* Actively target vaccine available in
September and October to persons
at increase risk of influenza
complications, children <9 years,
and healthcare workers
* Vaccination of all other groups
should begin in November
' Continue vaccinating through
December and later, as long as
vaccine is available
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patient visits. Organized campaigns for persons in high-risk
groups who are routinely accessible are best undertaken in
October and November. The ACIP recommends that
high-risk populations, healthcare workers, and children
younger than 9 years of age being vaccinated for the first
time should begin vaccinations in October. All other groups
should begin vaccinations in November. Vaccine may be
given up to and even after influenza activity is documented
in a region. Although most influenza vaccination activities
should be completed by December (particularly for high-risk
groups), providers should continue to provide vaccine
throughout influenza season.
Inactivated Influenza Vaccine Dosage, by Age Group - United States
Age Group Dosage Number of Doses Route
6-35 months 0.25 mL 1* or 2 IM
3-8 years 0.50 mL 1* or 2 IM
>9 years 0.50 mL 1 IM
*Only one dose is needed if the child received influenza vaccine during a previous influenza season.
One dose of TIV may be administered annually for persons
9 years of age or older. Children 6 months to 9 years of age
receiving influenza vaccine for the first time should receive
two doses administered at least 1 month apart.
Inactivated influenza vaccine should be given by the
intramuscular (IM) route. Other methods, such as intradermal,
subcutaneous, topical, or mucosal should not be used unless
approved by the Food and Drug Administration or recom-
mended by ACIP.
TIV is recommended for all persons 50 years of age or
older and all children 6-23 months of age, regardless of
the presence of chronic illness. Other groups targeted for
TIV include residents of long-term care facilities, pregnant
women, and persons 6 months to 18 years of age receiving
chronic aspirin therapy (because of the risk of Reye syndrome
following influenza infection).
Persons 6 months of age and older with a chronic illness
should receive TIV annually. These chronic illnesses
include the following:
• pulmonary illnesses, such as emphysema, chronic
bronchitis, or asthma
• cardiovascular illnesses, such as congestive heart failure
• metabolic diseases, including diabetes mellitus
• renal dysfunction
• hemoglobinopathy, such as sickle cell disease
Inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Recommendations
• All persons 50 years of age or older
• Children 6-23 months of age
• Residents of long-term care facilities
• Pregnant women
• Persons 6 months to 18 years
receiving chronic aspirin therapy
• Persons >6 months of age with
chronic illness
Inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Recommendations
• Persons with the following chronic illnesses
should be considered for inactivated influenza
vaccine:
-pulmonary (e.g., asthma, COPO)
—cardiovascular (e.g., CHF)
—metabolic (e.g., diabetes)
—renal dysfunction
—hemoglobinopathy
-Immunosuppression, including HIV infection
—any condition that can compromise respiratory
function or the handling of respiratory
secretions
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'
• immunosuppression, including human immunodeficiency
I
virus (HIV) infection
j
• any condition (e.g., cognitive dysfunction, spinal cord
injury, seizure disorder, or other neuromuscular disorder)
that can compromise respiratory function or the handling
of respiratory secretions
i Case reports and limited studies suggest that pregnant
j
women may be at increased risk for serious medical
I complications of influenza as a result of increases in heart
rate, stroke volume and oxygen consumption; decreases in
lung capacity; and changes in immunologic function. A
recent study found that the risk of hospitalization for
influenza-related complications was more than four times
I
higher for women in the second or third trimester of
I
pregnancy than for nonpregnant women. The risk of
j
complications for these pregnant women was comparable
j
to that for nonpregnant women with high-risk medical
conditions, for whom influenza vaccine has been traditionally
recommended.
ACIP recommends vaccination of women who will be
pregnant during influenza season. Vaccination can occur
during any trimester. Influenza season in the United States
generally occurs in December through March. Only TIV
should be administered to pregnant women.
Available data suggest that persons with HIV infection
may have prolonged influenza illnesses and are at increased
risk of complications of influenza. Many persons with HIV
infection will develop protective antibody titers following
inactivated influenza vaccine. In persons who have
advanced HIV disease and low CD4+ T-lymphocyte cell
counts, TIV vaccine may not induce protective antibody
titers. A second dose of vaccine does not improve the
immune response in these persons.
Studies have examined the effect of inactivated influenza
vaccine on replication of HIV. Some studies have demon-
strated a transient increase in viral titer in the blood of
vaccinated persons infected with HIV. This phenomenon
has also been reported after other vaccines, such as tetanus
toxoid and pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccines. Not all
studies produced these findings; other investigators using
similar methods have not documented increased HIV titers
after influenza vaccination. Although HIV titers may
increase transiently, there is no evidence of deterioration in
CD4 counts or progression of clinical HIV disease. Because
influenza can result in serious illness and complications and
because influenza vaccination may result in protective
antibody titers, ACIP believes that influenza vaccination
will benefit many persons with HIV infection. LAIV
should not be administered to persons with HIV
infection.
Pregnancy and Inactivated
Influenza Vaccine
* Risk of hospitalization 4 times higher
than nonpregnant women
* Risk of compiications comparabie to
nonpreonant women with high-risk
medical conditions
• Vaccination (with TIV) recommended
if pregnant during influenza season
* Vaccination can occur during any
trimester
HIV Infection and Inactivated
Influenza Vaccine
* Persons with HIV at increased risk
of complications of influenza
* TIV induces protective antibody
titers in many HIV infected persons
* Transient increase in HIV replication
reported
• TIV will benefit many HIV-infected
persons
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Influenza Vaccine
Recommendations
• Healthcare providers, including
home care*
• Employees of long-term care
facilities
• Household contacts of high-risk
persons
‘LA/V •itewM not b« •dmM»t*r«d to hoatthcar* workon who have
contact w«h tavarafy Immurvoauppraaaad paraona who raquir#
hospftaiualton and can tn a prolacthra anvtronmtnl
Influenza Vaccine
Recommendations*
Providers of essential community
services
• Students
• Persons traveling outside the U.S.
• Anyone who wishes to reduce the
likelihood of becoming ill from
influenza
*th«M group* may racaiva TIV, and some may be
aligibia for LAIV
16
Influenza Vaccination
of Children
• Children <24 months at increased
risk of hospitalization
* Inactivated influenza vaccination of
healthy children 6-23 months is
recommended
• Vaccination of household contacts
and other caregivers of children <24
months of age is encouraged
Live Attenuated Influenza
Indications
• Healthy* persons 5-49 years of age
—close contacts of persons at high
risk for complications of influenza
(except immunosuppressed)
—persons who wish to reduce their
own risk of influenza
V
‘Persons who do not have medical conditions that
increase their risk tor complications of Influenza
Persons who have contact with high-risk persons should
receive TIV. These include healthcare workers, employees
of long-term care facilities, and household contacts of
high-risk persons. These individuals may be younger and
healthier and more likely to be protected from illness than
are elderly persons. All healthcare providers should receive
annual inactivated influenza vaccine. Groups that should
be targeted include physicians, nurses, and other personnel
in hospitals and outpatient settings who have contact with
high-risk patients in all age groups, and providers of home
care to high-risk persons (e.g., visiting nurses, volunteers).
LAIV may be administered to healthy healthcare workers
49 years of age or younger, except those who have contact
with severely immunosuppressed persons who require
hospitalization and care in a protective environment
(i.e., in isolation because of severe immunosuppression).
Persons who provide essential community services and
students or others in institutional settings (e.g., schools
and colleges) may be considered for vaccination to minimize
disruption of routine activities during outbreaks. Persons
traveling outside the United States should consider
influenza vaccination. The risk of exposure to influenza
during foreign travel varies, depending on season of travel,
the mode of travel (e.g., increased risk during cruises), and
destination. Influenza can occur throughout the year in the
tropics. In the Southern Hemisphere, influenza activity
peaks in April-September. If not vaccinated the previous
fall/winter, persons (especially those in high-risk groups)
preparing to travel to the tropics at any time of the year or
to the Southern Hemisphere during April-September
should be considered for influenza vaccination before travel.
The most current available vaccine should be used. Any
person who wishes to lessen his/her chance of acquiring
influenza infection may be vaccinated. These groups may
receive TIV, and some may be eligible for LAIV (see table).
Beginning in 2004, the ACIP recommended that healthy
children aged 6-23 months be vaccinated because of the
increased risk of influenza-related hospitalization in this age
group. Household contacts and other caregivers of children
younger than 24 months of age are also encouraged to
receive annual influenza vaccination.
LAIV
The optimum timing of LAIV has not been determined.
The vaccine can be administered to eligible persons as soon
as it becomes available in tbe late summer or fall.
Vaccination can continue throughout influenza season. One
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dose of LAIV may be administered by the intranasal route
to persons 9-49 years of age. Children 5-8 years of age
receiving influenza vaccine for the first time should receive
two doses administered 6-10 weeks apart.
Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine Dosage, by Age Group - United States
Age Group Number of Doses Route
5-8 years,
no previous influenza vaccine
2
(separated by 6-10 weeks)
Intranasal
5-8 years,
previous influenza vaccine*
1 Intranasal
9-49 years 1 Intranasal
*LAIV or inactivated vaccine
Live attenuated influenza vaccine is approved by the Food
and Drug Administration only for use among healthy
persons 5-49 years of age. Persons in this group, including
most persons in close contact with high-risk groups and
those wishing to reduce their risk of influenza, now have the
option of choosing either inactivated vaccine or LAIV.
Close contacts of persons at high risk for complications from
influenza should receive influenza vaccine. This reduces the
risk of transmission of wild-type influenza viruses to high-risk
persons. Contacts of persons at high risk of complications of
influenza may receive LAIV if they are otherwise eligible
(i.e., 5-49 years of age and healthy). Persons in close contact
with severely immunosuppressed persons who are hospitalized
and receiving care in a protected environment should not
receive LAIV.
The manufacturer’s package insert recommends that LAIV
not be administered concurrently with other vaccines,
because it is not known whether concurrent administration
of LAIV with other vaccines affects the safety or efficacy of
either LAIV or the simultaneously administered vaccine. In
the absence of specific data indicating interference, ACIP
recommends that providers follow the guidelines for
simultaneous administration published in the General
Recommendations on Immunization. Inactivated vaccines
do not interfere with the immune response to live vaccines.
Inactivated vaccines, such as tetanus and diphtheria toxoids,
can be administered either simultaneously or at any time
before or after LAIV. Other live vaccines can be administered
on the same day as LAIV. Live vaccines not administered
on the same day should be administered at least 4 weeks
apart when possible.
Simultaneous Administration of
LAIV and Other Vaccines
Inactivated vaccines can be
administered either simultaneously
or at any time before or after LAIV
Other live vaccines can be
administered on the same day as
LAIV
Live vaccines not administered on
the same day should be
administered >4 weeks apart
245
Influenza
/inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
Local reactions
Fever, malaise
Allergic reactions
Neurological
reactions
15%-20%
not common
rare
very rare
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
TIV
Local reactions are the most common adverse reactions
following vaccination with TIV. Local reactions include
soreness, erythema, and induration at the site of injection.
These reactions are transient, generally lasting 1 to 2 days.
Local reactions are reported in 15%-20% of vaccinees.
Nonspecific systemic symptoms, including fever, chills,
malaise, and myalgia, are reported in fewer than 1% of TIV
recipients. These symptoms usually occur in those with no
previous exposure to the viral antigens in the vaccine.
They usually occur within 6-12 hours of TIV vaccination
and last 1-2 days. Recent reports indicate that these systemic
symptoms are no more common than in persons given a
placebo injection.
Rarely, immediate hypersensitivity, presumably allergic,
reactions (such as hives, angioedema, allergic asthma, or
systemic anaphylaxis) occur after vaccination with TIV.
These reactions probably result from hypersensitivity to a
vaccine component. The majority are most likely related to
residual egg protein. Although current influenza vaccines
contain only a small quantity of egg protein, this protein
may induce immediate allergic reactions in persons with
severe egg allergy. Persons who have developed hives, had
swelling of the lips or tongue, or have experienced acute
respiratory distress or collapse after eating eggs should
consult a physician for appropriate evaluation to assist in
determining whether influenza vaccination may proceed
or should be deferred. Persons with documented
immunoglobulin E (IgEj-mediated hypersensitivity to
eggs—including those who have had occupational asthma
or other allergic responses from exposure to egg protein
—
may also be at increased risk for reactions from influenza
vaccines, and similar consultation should be considered.
Protocols have been published for influenza vaccination of
patients who have egg allergies and medical conditions that
place them at increased risk for influenza infection or its
complications.
The potential exists for hypersensitivity reactions to any
vaccine component. Although exposure to vaccines con-
taining thimerosal can lead to induction of hypersensitivity,
most patients do not develop reactions to thimerosal admin-
istered as a component of vaccines, even when patch or
intradermal tests for thimerosal indicate hypersensitivity.
When it has been reported, hypersensitivity to thimerosal
has usually consisted of local delayed-type hypersensitivity
reactions.
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Unlike the 1976 swine influenza vaccine, subsequent
inactivated vaccines prepared from other virus strains have
not been clearly associated with an increased frequency of
Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS). However, obtaining a
precise estimate of a small increase in risk is difficult for a
rare condition such as GBS, which has an annual background
incidence of only one to two cases per 100,000 adult
population. Among persons who received the swine influenza
vaccine in 1976, the rate of GBS exceeded the background
rate by less than one case per 100,000 vaccinations. Even if
GBS were a true adverse reaction in subsequent years, the
estimated risk for GBS was much lower than one per
100,000. Further, the risk is substantially less than that for
severe influenza or its complications, which could be pre-
vented by vaccination, especially for persons aged 65 years
or older and those with a medical indication for influenza
vaccine.
Although the incidence of GBS in the general population is
very low, persons with a history of GBS have a substantially
greater likelihood of subsequently developing GBS than do
persons without such a history, irrespective of vaccination.
As a result, the likelihood of coincidentally developing GBS
after influenza vaccination is expected to be greater among
persons with a history of GBS than among persons with no
history of GBS. Whether influenza vaccination might be
causally associated with this risk for recurrence is not known.
It seems prudent for persons known to have developed GBS
within 6 weeks of a previous influenza vaccination to avoid
subsequent influenza vaccination. For most persons with a
history of GBS who are at high risk for severe complications
from influenza, the established benefits of influenza
vaccination justify yearly vaccination.
Although influenza vaccination can inhibit the clearance
of warfarin and theophylline, studies have failed to show
any adverse clinical effects attributable to these drugs
among patients receiving influenza vaccine.
LAIV
The safety of the approved LAIV has been assessed in
20 prelicensure clinical trials. More than 6,000 study
participants were in the approved age range of 5-49 years.
Among healthy children, there were no significant differences
between vaccine and placebo recipients in the proportion
with upper respiratory symptoms such as runny nose and
nasal congestion, fever, or other systemic symptoms. These
symptoms were reported in 10%-40% of both vaccine and
placebo recipients. Data from an unpublished study suggested
a significantly increased risk of asthma or reactive airways
disease among children 12-59 months of age who received
LAIV. Because of this, LAIV is not approved for use in
Live Attenuated influenza Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
• Children
— no significant increase in URI symptoms, fever, or
other systemic symptoms
— significantly increased risk of asthma or reactive
airways disease in children 12-59 months of age
* Adults
—significantly increased rate of cough, runny nose,
nasal congestion, sore throat, and chills reported
among vaccine recipients
— no increase in the occurrence of fever
* No serious adverse reactions identified
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Inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component (e.g., egg) or
following a prior dose of vaccine
• Moderate or severe acute illness
Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
• Children <5 years of age*
• Persons >50 years of age*
• Persons with chronic medical
conditions*
• Children and adolescents
receiving long-term aspirin
therapy*
‘These persons should receive Inactivated Influenza vaccine
Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Immunosuppression from any cause
* Pregnant women*
* Severe (anaphylactic) allergy to egg
or other vaccine components
* History of Guillian-Barre syndrome
* Moderate or severe acute illness
*TheM p«rsons should receive inactivated influenza vaccine
children younger than 60 months of age, and it should not
be used in persons with asthma, reactive airways disease, or
other chronic pulmonary diseases.
Among healthy adults, a significantly increased rate of
cough, runny nose, nasal congestion, sore throat, and chills
was reported among vaccine recipients. These symptoms
were reported in 10%-40% of vaccine recipients, a rate
3%-10% higher than reported for placebo recipients. There
was no increase in the occurrence of fever among vaccine
recipients. No serious adverse reactions have been identified
in LAIV recipients, either children or adults.
No instances of Guillain-Barre syndrome have been reported
among LAIV recipients. However the number of persons
vaccinated to date is too small to identify such a rare vaccine
adverse reaction.
Few data are available concerning the safety of LAIV among
persons at high risk for development of complications of
influenza, such as immunosuppressed persons or those with
chronic pulmonary or cardiac disease. Until additional data
are available, persons at high risk of complications of
influenza should not receive LAIV. These persons should
continue to receive inactivated influenza vaccine.
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
TIV
Persons with a severe allergic reaction to a prior dose of
inactivated influenza vaccine, or to a vaccine component
(e.g., eggs) should not receive TIV. Persons with a moderate
or severe acute illness normally should not be vaccinated
until their symptoms have decreased. Pregnancy, breastfeeding,
and immunosuppression are not contraindications to
inactivated influenza vaccination.
LAIV
Persons who should not receive LAIV include children
younger than 5 years of age; persons 50 years of age and
older; persons with chronic medical conditions, including
asthma, reactive airways disease or other chronic pulmonary
or cardiovascular conditions, metabolic disease such as
diabetes, renal disease, or hemoglobinopathy, such as sickle
cell disease; and children or adolescents receiving long-term
therapy with aspirin or other salicylates, because of the
association of Reye syndrome with wild-type influenza
infection. Persons in these groups should receive inactivated
influenza vaccine.
Influenza
As with other live-virus vaccines, LAIV should not be given
to persons who are immunosuppressed because of disease,
including HIV, or who are receiving immunosuppressive
therapy. Pregnant women should not receive LAIV.
Immunosuppressed persons and pregnant women should
receive inactivated influenza vaccine. Since LAIV contains
residual egg protein, it should not be administered to persons
with a history of severe allergy to egg or any other vaccine
component. The manufacturer recommends that LAIV not
be administered to a person with a history of Guillain-Barre
syndrome.
As with all vaccines, LAIV should be deferred for persons
with a moderate or severe acute illness. If clinical judgment
indicates that nasal congestion might impede delivery of the
vaccine to the nasopharyngeal mucosa, deferral of adminis-
tration should be considered until the condition has
improved.
The effect on safety and efficacy of LAIV coadministration
with influenza antiviral medications has not been studied.
However, because influenza antiviral agents reduce replication
of influenza viruses, LAIV should not be administered until
48 hours after cessation of influenza antiviral therapy, and
influenza antiviral medications should not be administered
for 2 weeks after receipt of LAIV.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
TIV
Inactivated influenza vaccine is generally shipped in an
insulated container with coolant packs. Although some
brands of TIV vaccine can tolerate room temperature for a
few days, CDC recommends that the vaccine be stored at
refrigerator temperature (35°-46°F [2°-8°C]). Inactivated
influenza vaccine must not be frozen. Opened multidose
vials may be used until the expiration date printed on the
package if no visible contamination is present.
LAIV
LAIV must be stored at 5°F ('15°C) or colder. LAIV may
now be stored in a frost-free freezer that has a separate
door (i.e., not in a dormitory-style refrigerator-freezer unit).
LAIV can be thawed in a refrigerator and stored at
35°-46°F (2°-8°C) for up to 60 hours before use. It should
not be refrozen after thawing.
LAIV is intended for intranasal administration only and
should never be administered by injection. LAIV must be
thawed before administration. If the vaccine is not thawed
in a refrigerator, this can be accomplished by holding an
LAIV Storage and Handling
• Must be stored at < 5°F (-15°C )
• May be stored in a frost-free freezer
with a separate door
* May be thawed in a refrigerator and
stored at 35°-46°F (2°-8°C) for up to 60
hours before use
* Should not be refrozen after thawing
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individual sprayer in the palm of the hand until thawed
and then administering the vaccine immediately. LAIV is
supplied in a prefilled single-use sprayer containing 0.5 mL
of vaccine. Approximately 0.25 mL (i.e., half of the total
sprayer contents) is sprayed into the first nostril while the
recipient is in the upright position. An attached dose-
divider clip is removed from the sprayer to administer the
second half of the dose into the other nostril. If the vaccine
recipient sneezes after administration, the dose should not
be repeated.
Year 201 0 Objectives and Coverage
Levels
Year 2010 objectives are to increase influenza vaccination
levels to 60% or higher among high-risk populations
(90% in residents of chronic care facilities) and to reduce
epidemic-related pneumonia and influenza-related deaths
among persons 65 years of age and older. In 2003, 66% of
persons 65 years of age and older reported receiving influenza
vaccine in the previous year. Vaccination levels were lower
among black and Hispanic persons than among non-
Hispanic white persons.
Influenza Vaccine
Strategies to Improve Coverage
* Ensure systematic and automatic
offering of TIV to high-risk groups
* Educate healthcare providers and
patients
* Address concerns about adverse
events
* Emphasize physician
recommendation
Strategies for Improving Influenza
Vaccine Coverage
On average, fewer than 20% of persons in high-risk groups
receive influenza vaccine each year. This points to the need
for more effective strategies for delivering vaccine to
high-risk persons, their healthcare providers, and household
contacts. Persons for whom the vaccine is recommended
can be identified and immunized in a variety of settings.
In physicians’ offices and outpatient clinics, persons who
should receive inactivated influenza vaccine should be
identified and their charts marked. TIV use should be
promoted, encouraged and recommended beginning in
October and continuing through the influenza season.
Those without regularly scheduled visits should receive
reminders.
In nursing homes and other residential long-term care
facilities, immunization with TIV should be routinely
provided to all residents at one period of time immediately
preceding the influenza season; consent should be obtained
at the time of admission.
In acute care hospitals and continuing care centers, persons
for whom vaccine is recommended who are hospitalized
from October through March should be vaccinated prior to
discharge. In outpatient facilities providing continuing care
to high-risk patients (e.g., hemodialysis centers, hospital
specialty-care clinics, outpatient rehabilitation programs).
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!
all patients should be offered TIV shortly before the onset
I of the influenza season.
i
Visiting nurses and others providing home care to high-risk
persons should identify high-risk patients and administer
TIV in the home, if necessary.
In facilities providing services to persons 50 years of age
and older (e.g., retirement communities, recreation centers),
inactivated influenza vaccine should be offered to all
unvaccinated residents or attendees on site. Education and
publicity programs should also be conducted in conjunction
with other interventions.
For travelers, indications for influenza vaccine should be
reviewed prior to travel and vaccine offered, if appropriate.
Administrators of all of the above facilities and organizations
should arrange for influenza vaccine to be offered to all per-
sonnel before the influenza season. Additionally, household
members of high-risk persons and others with whom they
will be in contact should receive written information about
why they should receive the vaccine and where to obtain it.
Antiviral Agents for Influenza
In the United States, four antiviral agents are approved for
preventing or treating influenza: amantadine, rimantadine,
zanamivir, and oseltamivir. Amantadine and rimantadine
are effective against type A influenza only and are approved
by the Food and Drug Administration for both influenza A
prophylaxis and treatment of persons 1 year of age and older.
Zanamivir and oseltamivir are members of a new class of
drugs called neuraminidase inhibitors and are active against
both influenza type A and type B. Zanamivir is provided as
a dry powder that is administered by inhalation. It is
approved for treatment of uncomplicated acute influenza A
or B in persons 7 years of age and older who have been
symptomatic for no more than 48 hours. Oseltamivir is
provided as an oral capsule. It is approved for the treatment
of uncomplicated influenza A or B in persons 1 year of age
and older who have been symptomatic for no more than 48
hours. Oseltamivir is approved for prophylaxis of influenza
infection among persons 13 years of age and older.
Zanamivir is not approved for prophylaxis.
Antiviral agents for influenza are an adjunct to vaccine and
are not a substitute for vaccine. Vaccination remains the
principal means for preventing influenza-related morbidity
and mortality. Additional information on the use of influenza
antiviral drugs can be found in the current ACIP statement
on influenza vaccine and on the CDC influenza website at
www.cdc.gov/flu.
Influenza Antiviral Agents
* Amantadine and rimantadine
—effective against influenza A only
—approved for prophylaxis and
treatment
Zanamivir and oseltamivir
—neuraminidase inhibitors
—effective against influenza A and B
—oseltamivir approved for prophylaxis
‘see Influenza ACIP statement or CDC influertza website for details
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Influenza Surveillance
* Monitor prevalence of circulating
strains and detect new strains
* Estimate influenza-related
morbidity, mortality and economic
loss
* Rapidly detect outbreaks
* Assist disease control through
rapid preventive action
I
Nosocomial Influenza Control
Many patients in general hospitals, and especially in referral
centers, are likely to be at high risk for complications of
influenza. Hospitalized susceptible patients may acquire
influenza from patients, hospital employees, or visitors. The
preferred method of control is to administer inactivated
influenza vaccine to high-risk patients and medical personnel
prior to the outbreak.
During community influenza A activity, the use of antiviral
prophylaxis may be considered for high-risk patients who
were not immunized or were immunized too recently to
have protective antibody levels. Antiviral agents may also
be considered for unimmunized hospital personnel. Other
measures include restricting visitors with respiratory illness,
cohorting patients with influenza for 5 days following onset
of illness, and postponing elective admission of patients
with uncomplicated illness.
Influenza Surveillance
Influenza surveillance is intended to monitor the prevalence
of circulating strains and detect new strains necessary for
vaccine formulation; estimate influenza-related impact on
morbidity, mortality, and economic loss; rapidly detect out-
breaks; and assist disease control through rapid preventive
action (e.g., chemoprophylaxis of unvaccinated high-risk
patients).
CDC receives weekly surveillance reports from the states
showing the extent of influenza activity. Reports are classified
iiato four categories: no cases, sporadic, regional (cases
occurring in counties collectively contributing less than
50% of a state’s population), widespread (cases occurring in
counties collectively contributing 50% or more of a state’s
population).
Weekly surveillance reports are available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm
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Pneumococcal Disease
Streptococcus pneumoniae causes an acute bacterial infection.
The bacterium, also called pneumococcus, was first isolated
by Pasteur in 1881 from the saliva of a patient with rabies,
j
The association between the pneumococcus bacterium and
i
lobar pneumonia was first described by Friedlander and
Talamon in 1883, but pneumococcal pneumonia was
confused with other types of pneumonia until the discovery
of the Gram stain in 1884. From 1915 to 1945, the chemical
structure and antigenicity of the pneumococcal capsular
polysaccharide, its association with virulence, and the role
of bacterial polysaccharides in human disease were explained.
More than 80 serotypes of pneumococci had been described
by 1940.
Efforts to develop effective pneumococcal vaccines began as
early as 1911. However, with the advent of penicillin in the
1940s, interest in the vaccine declined, until it was observed
that many patients still died despite antibiotic treatment. By
the late 1960s, efforts were again being made to develop a
polyvalent pneumococcal vaccine. The first pneumococcal
vaccine was licensed in the United States in 1977. The first
conjugate pneumococcal vaccine was licensed in 2000.
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus pneumoniae bacteria are lancet-shaped, gram-
positive, facultative anaerobic organisms. They are typically
observed in pairs (diplococci) but may also occur singularly
or in short chains. Some pneumococci are encapsulated,
their surfaces composed of complex polysaccharides.
Encapsulated organisms are pathogenic for humans and
experimental animals, whereas organisms without capsular
polysaccharides are not. Capsular polysaccharides are the
primary basis for the pathogenicity of the organism. They
are antigenic and form the basis for classifying pneumococci
by serotypes. Ninety serotypes have been identified, based
on their reaction with type-specific antisera. Type-specific
antibody to capsular polysaccharide is protective. These
antibodies and complement interact to opsonize pneumococci,
which facilitates phagocytosis and clearance of the
organism. Antibodies to some pneumococcal capsular
polysaccharides may cross-react with related types as well as
with other bacteria, providing protection against additional
serotypes.
Most S
.
pneumoniae serotypes have been shown to cause
serious disease, but only a few serotypes produce the majority
of pneumococcal infections. The 10 most common serotypes
are estimated to account for about 62% of invasive disease
worldwide. The ranking and serotype prevalence differ by
patient age group and geographic area. In the United States,
the seven most common serotypes isolated from blood or
Pneumococcal Disease
* S. pneumoniae first isolated by
Pasteur in 1881
• Confused with other causes of
pneumonia until discovery of Gram
stain in 1884
* More than 80 serotypes described
by 1940
• First U.S. vaccine in 1977
Streptococcus pneumoniae
* Gram-positive bacteria
* 90 known serotypes
* Polysaccharide capsule
important virulence factor
•Type-specific antibody is
protective
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cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) of children younger than 6 years
of age account for 80% of infections. These seven serotypes
account for only about 50% of isolates from older children
and adults.
Pneumococci are common inhabitants of the respiratory
tract and may be isolated from the nasopharynx of 5% to 70%
of healthy adults. Rates of asymptomatic carriage vary with
age, environment, and the presence of upper respiratory
infections. Only 5%-10% of adults without children are
carriers. In schools and orphanages, 27%-58% of students
and residents may be carriers. On military installations, as
many as 50%-60% of service personnel may be carriers.
The duration of carriage varies and is generally longer in
children than adults. In addition, the relationship of carriage
to the development of natural immunity is poorly understood.
Pneumococcal Pneumonia
Clinical Features
Abrupt onset
' Fever
' Shaking chills
' Pleuritic chest pain
Productive cough
' Dyspnea, tachypnea, hypoxia
Pneumococcal Pneumonia
* Estimated 175,000 hospitalizations
per year in the United States
* Up to 36% of adult community-
acquired pneumonia and 50% of
hospital-acquired pneumonia
* Common bacterial complication of
influenza and measles
’ Case-fatality rate 5%-7%, higher in
elderly
Pneumococcal Bacteremia
* More than 50,000 cases per year
in the United States
* Rates higher among elderly and
very young infants
* Case-fatality rate ~20%; up to
60% among the elderly
Clinical Features
The major clinical syndromes of pneumococcal disease are
pneumonia, bacteremia, and meningitis. The immunologic
mechanism that allows disease to occur in a carrier is not
clearly understood. However, disease most often occurs when
a predisposing condition exists, particularly pulmonary disease.
Pneumococcal pneumonia is the most common clinical
presentation of pneumococcal disease among adults,
although pneumonia alone is not considered to be “invasive”
disease. The incubation period of pneumococcal pneumonia
is short, about 1 to 3 days. Symptoms generally include an
abrupt onset of fever and chills or rigors. Typically there is a
single rigor, and repeated shaking chills are uncommon.
Other common symptoms include pleuritic chest pain,
cough productive of mucopurulent, rusty sputum, dyspnea
(shortness of breath), tachypnea (rapid breathing), hypoxia
(poor oxygenation), tachycardia (rapid heart rate), malaise,
and weakness. Nausea, vomiting, and headaches occur less
frequently.
As many as 175,000 hospitalizations from pneumococcal
pneumonia are estimated to occur annually in the United
States. Pneumococci account for up to 36% of adult
community-acquired pneumonia and 50% of hospital-acquired
pneumonia. Pneumonia is a common bacterial complication
of influenza and measles. The case-fatality rate is 5%—7%
and may be much higher among elderly persons.
Complications of pneumococcal pneumonia include
empyema (i.e., infection of the pleural space), pericarditis
(inflammation of the sac surrounding the heart), and
endobronchial obstruction, with atelectasis and lung abscess
formation.
More than 50,000 cases of pneumococcal bacteremia occur
each year. Bacteremia occurs in about 25%-30% of patients
[I
I
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with pneumococcal pneumonia. The overall case-fatality
I rate for bacteremia is about 20% but may be as high as 60%
I
among elderly patients. Patients with asplenia who develop
j
bacteremia may experience a fulminant clinical course.
Pneumococci cause 13%-19% of all cases of bacterial
meningitis in the United States. An estimated 3,000 to
6,000 cases of pneumococcal meningitis occur each year.
One-fourth of patients with pneumococcal meningitis also
have pneumonia. The clinical symptoms, CSF profile and
neurologic complications are similar to other forms of
purulent bacterial meningitis. Symptoms may include
headache, lethargy, vomiting, irritability, fever, nuchal rigidity,
cranial nerve signs, seizures and coma. The case-fatality rate
of pneumococcal meningitis is about 30% but may be as
high as 80% among elderly persons. Neurologic sequelae are
common among survivors.
Pneumococcal Meningitis
* Estimated 3,000 - 6,000 cases per
year in the United States
• Case-fatality rate -30%, up to
80% in the elderly
* Neurologic sequelae common
among survivors
Pneumococcal Disease in Children
Bacteremia without a known site of infection is the most
common invasive clinical presentation of pneumococcal
infection among children 2 years of age and younger,
accounting for approximately 70% of invasive disease in this
age group. Bacteremic pneumonia accounts for 12%-16% of
invasive pneumococcal disease among children 2 years of
age and younger. With the decline of invasive Hib disease,
S
.
pneumoniae has become the leading cause of bacterial
meningitis among children younger than 5 years of age in
the United States. Before routine use of pneumococcal
conjugate vaccine, children younger than 1 year had the
highest rates of pneumococcal meningitis, approximately
10 cases per 100,000 population.
Pneumococci are a common cause of acute otitis media, and
are detected in 28%-55% of middle ear aspirates. By age
12 months, more than 60% of children have had at least
one episode of acute otitis media. Middle ear infections are
the most frequent reasons for pediatric office visits in the
United States, resulting in more than 20 million visits
annually. Complications of pneumococcal otitis media may
include mastoiditis and meningitis.
Before routine use of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, the
burden of pneumococcal disease among children younger
than 5 years of age was significant. An estimated 17,000
cases of invasive disease occurred each year, of which 13,000
were bacteremia without a known site of infection and
about 700 were meningitis. An estimated 200 children died
every year as a result of invasive pneumococcal disease.
Although not considered invasive disease, an estimated
5 million cases of acute otitis media occured each year
among children younger than 5 years of age.
Pneumococcal Disease in Children
* Bacteremia without known site of
infection most common clinical
presentation
* S. pneumoniae leading cause of
bacterial meningitis among
children <5 years of age
* Common cause of acute otitis
media
Burden of Pneumococcal
Disease in Children*
Svndrome Cases
Bacteremia 13,000
Meningitis 700
Death 200
Otitis media 5,000,000
*Prior to routine use of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine
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Children at Increased Risk of
Invasive Pneumococcal Disease
• Functional or anatomic asplenia,
especially sickle cell disease
• HIV infection
• Alaska Native, African American,
American Indian
• Child care attendance
Children with functional or anatomic asplenia, particularly
those with sickle cell disease, and children with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection are at very high
risk for invasive disease, with rates in some studies more
than 50 times higher than those among children of the
same age without these conditions (i.e., incidence rates of
5,000-9,000 per 100,000 population). Rates are also
increased among children of certain racial and ethnic groups,
in particular those of Alaska Native, African American, and
certain American Indian groups (Arizona, New Mexico, and
Navajo populations in Colorado and Utah). The reason for
this increased risk by race and ethnicity is not known with
certainty but was also noted for invasive Haemophilus
influenzae infection (also an encapsulated bacterium).
Attendance at a child care center has also been shown to
increase the risk of invasive pneumococcal disease and
acute otitis media 2-3 -fold among children younger than
59 months of age.
Laboratory Diagnosis
A definitive diagnosis of infection with S. pneumoniae
generally relies on isolation of the organism from blood or
other normally sterile body sites. Tests are also available to
detect capsular polysaccharide antigen in body fluids.
The appearance of lancet-shaped diplococci on Gram stain
is suggestive of pneumococcal infection, but interpretation
of stained sputum specimens may be difficult because of the
presence of normal nasopharyngeal bacteria. The suggested
criteria for obtaining a diagnosis of pneumococcal pneumonia
using Gram stained sputnum includes more than 25 white
blood cells and fewer than 10 epithelial cells per 100-power
field, and a predominance of gram-positive diplococci.
The quellung reaction (capsular swelling; capsular precipi-
tation reaction) is a test that provides rapid identification of
pneumococci in clinical specimens, including spinal fluid,
sputum, and exudates. The procedure involves mixing
loopfuls of bacteria in suspension, pneumococcal antiserum,
and methylene blue on the surface of a glass slide and
examining under oil immersion. If the reaction is positive,
the organism will be surrounded by a large capsule.
Several rapid tests for detection of pneumococcal polysac-
charide antigen in CSF and other body fluids are available.
These tests generally lack sufficient sensitivity or specificity
to assist in the diagnosis of invasive pneumococcal disease.
Medical Management
Resistance to penicillin and other antibiotics is common. In
some areas of the United States, up to 40% of invasive
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pneumococcal isolates are resistant to penicillin. Treatment
will usually include a broad-spectrum cephalosporin, and
often vancomycin, until results of antibiotic sensitivity
testing are available.
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Pneumococcal disease occurs throughout the world.
Reservoir
S
.
pneumoniae is a human pathogen. The reservoir for
pneumococci is presumably the nasopharynx of asymptomatic
human carriers. There is no animal or insect vector.
Transmission
Transmission of S
.
pneumoniae occurs as the result of direct
person-to-person contact via respiratory droplets and by
autoinoculation in persons carrying the bacteria in their upper
respiratory tract. The pneumococcal serotypes most often
responsible for causing infection are those most frequently
found in carriers. The spread of the organism within a family
or household is influenced by such factors as crowding,
season, and the presence of upper respiratory infections or
pneumococcal disease such as pneumonia or otitis media.
The spread of pneumococcal disease is usually associated
with increased carriage rates. However, high carriage rates
do not appear to increase the risk of disease transmission in
households.
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Epidemiology
Reservoir Human carriers
• Transmission Respiratory
Autoinoculation
* Temporal pattern Winter and early spring
* Communicability Unknown
Probably as long as
organism in respiratory
secretions
Temporal Pattern
Pneumococcal infections are more common during the
winter and in early spring when respiratory diseases are
more prevalent.
Communicability
The period of communicability for pneumococcal disease is
unknown, but presumably transmission can occur as long as
the organism appears in respiratory secretions.
Secular Trends in the United States
Estimates of the incidence of pneumococcal disease have
been made from a variety of population-based studies. More
than 40,000 cases and more than 5,500 deaths from invasive
pneumococcal disease (bacteremia and meningitis) are
estimated to have occurred in the United States in 2002.
More than half of these cases occurred in adults who had an
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Outbreaks
' Outbreaks not common
Generally occur in crowded
environments (jails, nursing
homes)
Persons with invasive disease
often have underlying illness
May have high fatality rate
Pneumococcal Vaccines
1977 14-valent polysaccharide
vaccine licensed
1983 23-valent polysaccharide
vaccine licensed (PPV23)
2000 7-valent polysaccharide
conjugate vaccine licensed
(PCVTO
indication for pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine. In
addition, there are thousands of cases of nonbacteremic
pneumonia, and millions of cases of otitis media, which
are considered noninvasive infections.
1/
The overall incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease
(bacteremia, meningitis, or other infection of a normally
sterile site) in the United States in 1998-1999 was estimated
to be approximately 24 cases per 100,000 population. f
However, incidence rates vary greatly by age group. The
highest rates of invasive pneumococcal disease occur |
among young children, especially those younger than
2 years of age. In 1998, the rate of invasive disease in this t
age group was estimated to be 188 per 100,000 population;
this age group accounted for 20% of all cases of invasive
pneumococcal disease. Incidence was lowest among persons
5-17 years of age, and increased to 61 per 100,000 population
among persons 65 years of age and older.
Data from the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs)
system suggest that the use of pneumococcal conjugate
vaccine is having an impact on the incidence of invasive
disease among young children. Data from 2003 indicate
that rates of invasive pneumococcal disease have declined
70%-80% among children younger than 2 years of age,
compared with 1998-1999 (prior to licensure of the
vaccine). Rates of invasive disease have also declined
among older age groups, although the decline is less than
among young children. The decline among older age groups
may indicate a reduction in transmission from vaccinated
children to their household and other close contacts.
Community-acquired pneumococcal pneumonia is usually a
sporadic disease in carriers who have a breakdown in their
pulmonary defense mechanisms. Outbreaks of pneumococcal
pneumonia are not common. When outbreaks occur, they
are usually in crowded environments, such as correctional
facilities and nursing homes. During outbreaks, persons with
invasive disease often have underlying illness and may have
a high fatality rate.
Pneumococcal Vaccines
Characteristics
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine is composed of purified
preparations of pneumococcal capsular polysaccharide. The
first polysaccharide pneumococcal vaccine was licensed in
the United States in 1977. It contained purified capsular
polysaccharide antigen from 14 different types of pneumo-
coccal bacteria. In 1983, a 23 -valent polysaccharide vaccine
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(PPV23) was licensed and replaced the H'valent vaccine,
which is no longer produced. PPV23 contains polysaccharide
antigen from 23 types of pneumococcal bacteria that cause
88% of bacteremic pneumococcal disease. In addition, cross-
reactivity occurs for several capsular types that account for
an additional 8% of bacteremic disease.
The polysaccharide vaccine currently available in the
United States (Pneumovax 23, Merck) contains 25 meg of
each antigen per dose and contains 0.25% phenol as a
preservative. The vaccine is available in a single-dose vial or
syringe, and in a 5-dose vial. Pneumococcal vaccine is given
by injection and may be administered either intramuscularly
or subcutaneously.
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine
The first pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) was
licensed in the United States in 2000. It includes purified
capsular polysaccharide of seven serotypes of S
.
pneumoniae
(4, 9V, 14, 19F, 23F, 18C, and 6B) conjugated to a nontoxic
variant of diphtheria toxin known as CRM 197. The serotypes
included in PCV7 accounted for 86% of bacteremia, 83% of
meningitis, and 65% of acute otitis media among children
younger than 6 years of age in the United States during
1978-1994. Additional pneumococcal polysaccharide
conjugate vaccines containing 9 and 1 1 serotypes of
S
.
pneumoniae are being developed. The vaccine is
administered intramuscularly. It does not contain thimerosal
as a preservative, and is available only in single-dose vials.
Immunogeiiicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
More than 80% of healthy adults who receive PPV23 develop
antibodies against the serotypes contained in the vaccine,
usually within 2 to 3 weeks after vaccination. Older adults,
and persons with some chronic illnesses or immunodeficiency
may not respond as well, if at all. In children younger than
2 years of age, antibody response to most serotypes is generally
poor. Elevated antibody levels persist for at least 5 years in
healthy adults but decline more quickly in persons with
certain underlying illnesses.
PPV23 vaccine efficacy studies have resulted in various
estimates of clinical effectiveness. Overall, the vaccine is
60%-70% effective in preventing invasive disease. The
vaccine may be less effective in preventing pneumococcal
infection in some groups, particularly those with significant
underlying illness. Although the vaccine may not be as
effective in some persons, especially those who do not have
normal resistance to infection, it is still recommended for
such persons because they are at high risk of developing
Pneumococcal
Polysaccharide Vaccine
* Purified capsular polysaccharide
antigen from 23 types of
pneumococcus
• Account for 88% of bacteremic
pneumococcal disease
* Cross-react with types causing
additional 8% of disease
Pneumococcai Conjugate
Vaccine
* Pneumococcal polysaccharide
conjugated to nontoxic
diphtheria toxin (7 serotypes)
Vaccine serotypes account for
86% of bacteremia and 83% of
meningitis among children <6
years of age
Pneumococcal
Polysaccharide Vaccine
Purified pneumococcal
polysaccharide (23 types)
Not effective in children <2 years
60%-70% against invasive
disease
Less effective in preventing
pneumococcal pneumonia
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severe disease. PPV23 has not been demonstrated to provide
protection against pneumococcal pneumonia. For this reason,
providers should avoid referring to PPV23 as “pneumonia
vaccine.”
Studies comparing patterns of pneumococcal carriage before
and after PPV23 vaccination have not shown clinically
significant decreases in carrier rates among vaccinees. In
addition, no change in the distribution of vaccine-type and
non-vaccine-type organisms has been observed as the result
of vaccination.
Pneumococcal Conjugate
Vaccine
* Highly immunogenic in infants
and young children, including
those with high-risk medical
conditions
* >90% effective against invasive
disease
Less effective against pneumonia
and acute otitis media
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine
After four doses of PCV7 vaccine, more than 90% of
healthy infants develop antibody to all seven serotypes
contained in the vaccine. PCV7 has been shown to be
immunogenic in infants and children, including those with
sickle cell disease and HIV infection. In a large clinical trial,
PCV7 was shown to reduce invasive disease caused by vaccine
serotypes by 97%, and reduce invasive disease caused by all
serotypes, including serotypes not in the vaccine, by 89%.
Efficacy against pneumonia varied depending on the
specificity of the diagnosis. The vaccine reduced clinically
diagnosed pneumonia by 11%, but reduced pneumonia
confirmed by x-ray with consolidation of 2.5 or more
centimeters by 73%. Children who received PCV7 had 7%
fewer episodes of acute otitis media and underwent 20%
fewer tympanostomy tube placements than did unvaccinated
children. The duration of protection following PCV7 is
currently not known. There is evidence that PCV7 reduces
nasopharyngeal carriage of pneumococcal serotypes included
in the vaccine.
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide
Vaccine Recommendations
• Adults >65 years of age
• Persons >2 years with
—chronic illness
—anatomic or functional asplenia
—immunocompromised (disease,
chemotherapy, steroids)
—HIV infection
-environments or settings with
increased risk
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine should be administered
routinely to all adults 65 years of age and older. The vaccine
is also indicated for persons 2 years of age and older with a
normal immune system who have a chronic illness,
including cardiovascular disease, pulmonary disease, diabetes,
alcoholism, cirrhosis, or cerebrospinal fluid leak.
Immunocompromised persons 2 years of age and older
who are at increased risk of pneumococcal disease or its
complications should also be vaccinated. This group includes
persons with splenic dysfunction or absence (either from
disease or surgical removal), Hodgkin disease, lymphoma,
multiple myeloma, chronic renal failure, nephrotic syndrome
(a type of kidney disease), or conditions such as organ
transplantation associated with immunosuppression. Persons
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immunosuppressed from chemotherapy or high-dose corti-
I
costeroid therapy (14 days or longer ) should be vaccinated.
Persons 2 years of age and older with asymptomatic or
symptomatic HIV infection should be vaccinated.
Ij
Pneumococcal vaccine should be considered for persons
i| living in special environments or social settings with an
j
identified increased risk of pneumococcal disease or its
I
complications, such as certain Native American (i.e.,
:j
Alaska Native, Navajo, and Apache) populations.
j
If elective splenectomy is being considered, the vaccine
1 should be given at least 2 weeks before the operation. If
I vaccination prior to splenectomy is not feasible, the vaccine
I
should be given as soon as possible after surgery. Similarly,
! there should also be a 2-week interval between vaccination
i
and initiation of cancer chemotherapy or other immunosup-
I
pressive therapy, if possible.
! Providers should not withhold vaccination in the absence of
an immunization record or complete record. The patient’s
I
verbal history may be used to determine vaccination status.
j
Persons with uncertain or unknown vaccination status
j
should be vaccinated.
' The target groups for pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine
and influenza vaccine overlap. These vaccines should be
given at the same time at different sites if indicated,
although most recipients need only a single lifetime dose of
PPV23 (see Revaccination below).
ji
'1
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine
All children younger than 24 months of age and children
age 24-59 months with a high-risk medical condition
should be routinely vaccinated with PCV7. The primary
series beginning in infancy consists of three doses routinely
given at 2, 4, and 6 months of age. A fourth (booster) dose
is recommended at 12-15 months of age. PCV7 should be
administered at the same time as other routine childhood
immunizations, using a separate syringe and injection site.
For children vaccinated at younger than 12 months of age,
the minimum interval between doses is 4 weeks. Doses
given at 1 2 months of age and older should be separated by
at least 8 weeks.
Unvaccinated children 7 months of age and older do not
require a full series of four doses. The number of doses a
child needs to complete the series depends on the child’s
current age. Unvaccinated children aged 7-1 1 months
should receive two doses of vaccine at least 4 weeks apart,
followed by a booster dose at age 12-15 months.
Unvaccinated children aged 12-23 months should receive
two doses of vaccine, at least 8 weeks apart. Previously
Pneumococcal Conjugate
Vaccine
* Routine vaccination of children
age <24 months and children 24'
59 months with a high-risk
medical condition
* Doses at 2, 4, 6, months of age,
booster dose at 12-15 months of
age
' Unvaccinated children >7 months
of age require fewer doses
Pneumococcal Conjugate
Vaccine
* Children aged 24-59 months at
high risk and previously
vaccinated with PPV23 should
receive 2 doses of PCV7
* Children at high risk who
previously received PCV7 should
receive PPV23 at age >2 years
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unvaccinated healthy children aged 24-59 months should
receive a single dose of PCV7. Unvaccinated children aged
24-59 months with sickle cell disease, asplenia, HIV infection,
chronic illness, or immunocompromising conditions should
receive two doses of PCV7 separated by at least 8 weeks.
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide
Vaccine Revaccination
* Routine revaccination of
immunocompetent persons is not
recommended
• Revaccination recommended for
persons age >2 years at highest
risk of serious pneumococcal
infection
• Single revaccination dose >5
years after first dose
PCV7 is not routinely recommended for persons older than
59 months of age.
Few data are available on the use of PCV7 among children
previously vaccinated with PPV23. Children 24-59 months
of age who have already received PPV23 and who are at
high risk of invasive pneumococcal disease (sickle cell disease,
asplenia, HIV infection or other immunocompromising
conditions or chronic diseases) could benefit from the
immunologic priming induced by PPV23. ACIP recommends
that these children receive two doses of PCV7 separated by
at least 8 weeks. The first dose of PCV7 should be given no
sooner than 2 months after PPV23. Similarly, children
24-59 months of age who have already received one or
more doses of PCV7 and who are at high risk of invasive
pneumococcal disease will benefit from the additional
serotypes included in PPV23. Vaccination with PPV23
should be considered for these high-risk children. PPV23
should be given no sooner than 2 months after the last
dose of PCV7. Routine administration of PPV23 to healthy
children 24-59 months of age is not recommended.
Revaccination
Pneumococcal Polysaccharitle Vaccine
Following vaccination with PPV23, antibody levels decline
after 5-10 years and decrease more rapidly in some groups
than others. However, the relationship between antibody
titer and protection from invasive disease is not certain
(i.e., higher antibody level does not necessarily mean better
protection), so the ability to define the need for revaccination
based only on serology is limited. In addition, currently
available pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccines elicit a
T-cell'independent response, and do not produce a sustained
increase (“boost”) in antibody titers. Available data do not
indicate a substantial increase in protection in the majority
of revaccinated persons.
Because of the lack of evidence of improved protection with
multiple doses of pneumococcal vaccine, routine revaccination
of immunocompetent persons previously vaccinated with
23-valent polysaccharide vaccine is not recommended.
However, revaccination is recommended for persons 2 years
of age and older who are at highest risk for serious pneumo-
coccal infection and for those who are likely to have a rapid
decline in pneumococcal antibody levels. Only one PPV23
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revaccination dose is recommended for high-risk persons.
The second dose should be administered 5 or more years
after the first dose. Revaccination 3 years after the previous
dose may be considered for children at highest risk for
severe pneumococcal infection who would be 10 years of age
or less at the time of revaccination, including children who
received PCV7.
Persons at highest risk include all persons 2 years of age and
older with functional or anatomic asplenia (e.g., from sickle
cell disease or splenectomy), HIV infection, leukemia,
lymphoma, Hodgkin disease, multiple myeloma, generalized
malignancy, chronic renal failure, nephrotic syndrome, or
other conditions associated with immunosuppression (e.g.,
organ or bone marrow transplantation) and those receiving
immunosuppressive chemotherapy, including long-term
corticosteroids. Persons aged 65 years and older should be
administered a second dose of pneumococcal vaccine if they
received the vaccine more than 5 years previously, and were
younger than 65 years of age at the time of the first dose.
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine
Revaccination after an age-appropriate primary series with
PCV7 is not currently recommended.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
The most common adverse reactions following either
pneumococcal polysaccharide or conjugate vaccine are local
reactions. For PPV23, 30%-50% of vaccinees report pain,
swelling, or erythema at the site of injection. These reactions
usually persist for less than 48 hours.
Local reactions are reported more frequently following a
second dose of PPV23 vaccine than following the first dose.
Moderate systemic reactions (such as fever and myalgia) are
not common (fewer than 1% of vaccinees), and more severe
systemic adverse reactions are rare.
A transient increase in HIV replication has been reported
following PPV23 vaccine. No clinical or immunologic
deterioration has been reported in these persons.
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
Candidates for Revaccination
• Persons >2 years of age with:
—functional or anatomic asplenia
—immunosuppression
—transplant
—chronic renal failure
—nephrotic syndrome
• Persons vaccinated at <65 years of
Pneumococcal Vaccines
Adverse Reactions
Local reactions
—polysaccharide 30%-50%
—conjugate 10%-20%
Fever, myalgia
—polysaccharide <1%
—conjugate 15%-24%
Severe adverse rare
reactions
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine
Local reactions following PCV7 occur in 10%-20% of
recipients. Fewer than 3% of local reactions are considered
to be severe (e.g., tenderness that interferes with limb
movement). Local reactions are more common with the
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fourth dose than with the first three doses. In clinical trials
of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, fever (higher than
100.4°F [38°C]) within 48 hours of any dose of the primary
series was reported for 15%-24% of children. However, in
these studies, whole-cell pertussis vaccine was administered
simultaneously with each dose, and some or most of the
reported febrile episodes may be attributable to the DTP. In
one study, acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) was given at
the same visit as the booster dose of PCV7. In this study,
1 1% of recipients had a temperature higher than 102.2°F
(39°C). No severe adverse events attributable to PCV7
have been reported.
Pneumococcal Vaccines
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to
vaccine component or following
prior dose of vaccine
* Moderate or severe acute illness
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
For both pneumococcal polysaccharide and conjugate
vaccines, a severe allergic reaction to a vaccine component
or following a prior dose is a contraindication to further
doses of vaccine. Such allergic reactions are rare. Persons
with moderate or severe acute illness should not be
vaccinated until their condition improves. However, minor
illnesses, such as upper respiratory infections, are not a
contraindication to vaccination.
The safety of PPV23 vaccine for pregnant women has not
been studied, although no adverse consequences have been
reported among newborns whose mothers were inadvertently
vaccinated during pregnancy. Women who are at high risk
of pneumococcal disease and who are candidates for
pneumococcal vaccine should be vaccinated before pregnancy,
if possible.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine should be shipped in
an insulated container with coolant packs. Although
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine can tolerate room
temperature for a few days, CDC recommends that the
vaccine be stored at refrigerator temperature (35°-46°F
[2°-8°C]).
Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine should be stored at
refrigerator temperature. Pneumococcal vaccines must
not be frozen.
Opened multidose vials may be used until the expiration
date printed on the package if they are not visibly
contaminated.
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Goals and Coverage Levels
The Healthy People 2010 goal is to achieve at least 90%
coverage for pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine among
persons 65 years of age and older. Data from the 2003
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS, a
population-based, random-digit-dialed telephone survey of
the noninstitutionalized U.S. population 18 years of age and
older) estimate that 64% of persons 65 years of age or older
had ever received pneumococcal polysaccharide.
Vaccination coverage levels were lower among persons
18-64 years of age with a chronic illness.
Opportunities to vaccinate high-risk persons are missed
both at the time of hospital discharge and during visits to
clinicians’ offices. Effective programs for vaccine delivery
are needed, including offering the vaccine in hospitals at
discharge and in clinicians’ offices, nursing homes, and
other long-term care facilities.
More than 65% of the persons who have been hospitalized
with severe pneumococcal disease had been admitted to a
hospital in the preceding 3-5 years, yet few had received
pneumococcal vaccine. In addition, persons who frequently
visit physicians and who have chronic conditions are more
likely to be at high risk of pneumococcal infection than those
who require infrequent visits. Screening and subsequent
immunization of hospitalized persons found to be at high risk
could have a significant impact on reducing complications
and death associated with pneumococcal disease.
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Pneumococcal Polysaccharide
Vaccine Coverage
• Healthy People 2010 goal: 90%
coverage for persons >65 years
• 2003 BRFSS: 64% of persons >65
years of age ever vaccinated
* Vaccination coverage levels were
lower among persons 18-64 years
of age with a chronic illness
Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
Missed Opportunities
• >65% of patients with severe
pneumococcal disease had been
hospitalized within preceding 3-5
years yet few had received
vaccine
* May be administered
simultaneously with influenza
vaccine
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Meningococcal Disease
Meningococcal disease is an acute, potentially severe
illness caused by the bacterium Neisseria meningitidis.
Illness believed to be meningococcal disease was first
reported in the 16th century. The first definitive description
of the disease was by Vieusseux in Switzerland in 1805. The
bacterium was first identified in the spinal fluid of patients
by Weichselbaum in 1887.
Neisseria meningitidis is a leading cause of bacterial meningitis
and sepsis in the United States. It can also cause focal
disease, such as pneumonia and arthritis. N. meningitidis is
also a cause of epidemics of meningitis and bacteremia in
sub'Saharan Africa. The World Health Organization has
estimated that meningococcal disease was the cause of
171,000 deaths worldwide in 2000.
Neisseria meningitidis
* Severe acute bacterial infection
* Cause of meningitis, sepsis, and
focal infections
* Epidemic disease in sub-Saharan
Africa
* Current polysaccharide vaccine
licensed in 1978
* Conjugate vaccine licensed in 2005
The first monovalent (group C) polysaccharide vaccine
was licensed in the United States in 1974. A quadrivalent
polysaccharide vaccine was licensed in 1978. Meningococcal
conjugate vaccine has been licensed in United Kingdom
since 1999 and has had a major impact on the incidence
of type C meningococcal disease. A quadrivalent conjugate
vaccine was first licensed in the United States in 2005.
Neisseria meningititlis
N. meningitidis, or meningococcus, is an aerobic, gram-negative
diplococcus, closely related to N. gonorrhoeae, and to several
nonpathogenic Neisseria species, such as N. lactamica. The
organism has both an inner (cytoplasmic) and outer
membrane, separated by a cell wall. The outer membrane
contains several protein structures that enable the bacteria
to interact with the host cells as well as perform other
functions.
The outer membrane is surrounded by a polysaccharide
capsule that is necessary for pathogenicity because it helps
the bacteria resist phagocytosis and complement-mediated
lysis. The outer membrane proteins and the capsular
polysaccharide make up the main surface antigens of the
organism.
Meningococci are classified by using serologic methods
based on the structure of the polysaccharide capsule.
Thirteen antigenically and chemically distinct polysaccharide
capsules have been described. Some strains, often those
found to cause asymptomatic nasopharyngeal carriage, are
not groupable and do not have a capsule. Almost all invasive
disease is caused by one of five serogroups: A, B, C, Y, and
W'135. The relative importance of each serogroup depends
on geographic location, as well as other factors, such as age.
Neisseria meningitidis
* Aerobic gram-negative bacteria
* At ieast 13 serogroups based on
characteristics of the polysaccharide
capsuie
* Most invasive disease caused by
serogroups A, B, C, Y, and W-135
Relative importance of serogroups
depends on geographic location and
other factors (e.g. age)
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Meningococcal Disease
Pathogenesis
* Organism colonizes nasopharynx
• In some persons organism invades
bloodstream and causes infection
at distant site
• Antecedent URI may be a
contributing factor
18
Neisseria meningitidis
Clinical Manifestations*
Meningococcal Meningitis
* Most common pathologic presentation
* Result of hematogenous dissemination
* Clinical findings
—fever
—headache
—stiff neck
Meningococcemia
* Bloodstream infection
* May occur with or without
meningitis
* Clinical findings
—fever
—petechial or purpuric rash
—hypotension
—multiorgan failure
,
For instance, serogroup A is a major cause of disease in
sub'Saharan Africa hut is rarely isolated in the United States.
Meningococci are further classified on the basis of certain
outer membrane proteins. Molecular subtyping using
specialized laboratory techniques (e.g., pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis) can provide useful epidemiologic information.
Pathogenesis
Meningococci are transmitted by droplet aerosol or secretions
from the nasopharynx of colonized persons. The bacteria attach
to and multiply on the mucosal cells of the nasopharynx. In
a small proportion (less than 1%) of colonized persons, the
organism penetrates the mucosal cells and enters the blood-
stream. The bacteria spread by way of the blood to many
organs. In about 50% of bacteremic persons, the organism
crosses the blood-brain barrier into the cerebrospinal fluid and
causes purulent meningitis. An antecedent upper respiratory
infection may be a contributing factor.
Clinical Features |
The incubation period of meningococcal disease is 3-4 days, B
with a range of 2-10 days. H
Meningitis is the most common presentation of invasive B
meningococcal disease and results from hematogenous
dissemination of the organism. Meningeal infection is similar
to other forms of acute purulent meningitis, with sudden
onset of fever, headache, and stiff neck, often accompanied
by other symptoms, such as nausea, vomiting, photophobia
(eye sensitivity to light), and altered mental status.
Meningococci can be isolated from the blood in up to 75%
of persons with meningitis.
Meningococcal sepsis (bloodstream infection or meningo-
coccemia) occurs without meningitis in 5%-20% of invasive
meningococcal infections. This condition is characterized
by abrupt onset of fever and a petechial or purpuric rash,
often associated with hypotension, shock, acute adrenal
hemorrhage, and multiorgan failure.
Less common presentations of meningococcal disease
include pneumonia (5%-15% of cases), arthritis (2%),
otitis media (1%), and epiglottitis (less than 1%).
The case-fatality rate of invasive meningococcal disease '
is 9%-12%, even with appropriate antibiotic therapy. The
fatality rate of meningococcemia is up to 40%. As many as 1
20% of survivors have permanent sequelae, such as hearing s
loss, neurologic damage, or loss of a limb.
|
1
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Risk factors for the development of meningococcal disease
include deficiencies in the terminal common complement
pathway and functional or anatomic asplenia. Persons with
HIV infection are probably at increased risk for meningococcal
disease. Certain genetic factors (such as polymorphisms in
the genes for mannose-binding lectin and tumor necrosis
factor) may also be risk factors.
Neisseria meningitidis
Risk Factors for Invasive Disease
• Host factors
—terminal complement pathway deficiency
— asplenia
— genetic risk factors
* Exposure factors
— household exposure
— concurrent upper respiratory tract Infection
Family members of an infected person are at increased for
meningococcal disease. Antecedent upper respiratory tract
infection, household crowding, and both active and passive
smoking also are also associated with increased risk. In the
United States, African Americans and persons of low
socioeconomic status have been consistently at higher risk;
however, race and low socioeconomic status are likely markers
for differences in factors such as household crowding rather
than risk factors. During outbreaks, bar or nightclub
patronage and alcohol use have also been associated with
higher risk for disease.
— demographic and socioeconomic factors and
crowding
— active and passive smoking
Cases of invasive meningococcal disease, including at least
two fatal cases, have been reported among microbiologists.
These persons have worked with N. meningitidis isolates
rather than patient specimens.
Studies have shown that college freshmen living in
dormitories are at modestly increased risk of meningococcal
disease. However, U.S. college students are not at higher risk
for meningococcal disease than other persons of similar age.
Meningococcal Disease Among Young
Adults, United States, 1998-1999
•18-23 years old 1.4 /1 00,000
•18-23 years old
not college student
•Freshmen
•Freshmen in dorm
1.4 /100,000
1.9 /1 00,000
5.1 /1 00,000
Bruce et al, JAMA 2001;2e6:68S-93
Laboratory Diagnosis
Invasive meningococcal disease is typically diagnosed by
isolation of N. meningitidis from a normally sterile site.
However, sensitivity of bacterial culture may be low, particularly
when performed after initiation of antibiotic therapy. A
Gram stain of cerebrospinal fluid showing gram-negative
diplococci strongly suggests meningococcal meningitis.
Kits to detect polysaccharide antigen in cerebrospinal fluid
are rapid and specific, but false-negative results are common,
particularly in serogroup B disease. Antigen tests of urine or
serum are unreliable.
Serologic testing (e.g., enzyme immunoassay) for antibodies
to polysaccharide may be used as part of the evaluation if
meningococcal disease is suspected but should not be used
to establish the diagnosis.
Meningococcal Disease
Laboratory Diagnosis
Bacterial culture
• Gram stain
• Non-culture methods
—antigen detection in CSF
—serology
18
271
Meningococcal Disease
Medical Management
Neisseria meningitidis
Medical Management
* Initial empiric antibiotic treatment
after appropriate cultures are
obtained
* Treatment with penicillin alone
recommended after confirmation
of N. meningitidis
The clinical presentation of meningococcal meningitis is
similar to other forms of bacterial meningitis. Consequently,
empiric therapy with broad-spectrum antibiotics (e.g., third-
generation cephalosporin, vancomycin) should be started
promptly after appropriate cultures have been obtained.
Many antibiotics are effective for N. meningitidis infection,
including penicillin. Few penicillin-resistant strains of
meningococcus have been reported in the United States.
Once N. meningitidis infection has been confirmed, penicillin
alone is recommended.
Meningococcal Disease
Epidemiology
Reservoir Human
'Transmission Respiratory droplets
* Temporal pattern Peaks in late winter
and early spring
* Communicability Generally limited
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Meningococcal disease occurs worldwide in both endemic
and epidemic form.
Reservoir
Humans are the only natural reservoir of meningococcus.
As many as 10% of adolescents and adults are asymptomatic
transient carriers of N. meningitidis, most strains of which are
not pathogenic (i.e., strains that are not groupable).
Transmission
Primary mode is by respiratory droplet spread or by direct
contact.
Temporal Pattern
Meningococcal disease occurs throughout the year.
However, the incidence is highest in the late winter and
early spring.
Communicability
The communicability of N. meningitidis is generally limited.
In studies of households in which a case of meningococcal
disease has occurred, only 3%-4% of households had secondary
cases. Most households had only one secondary case.
Estimates of the risk of secondary transmission are generally
2-4 cases per 1 ,000 household members at risk. However,
this risk is 500-800 times that in the general population.
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Secular Trends in the United States
Approximately 2,000 to 3,000 cases of meningococcal disease
are reported each year in the United States (0.8-1.3 cases
per 100,000 population). In 2004, an estimated 125 deaths
due to meningococcal disease occurred in the United States.
Infants younger than 12 months of age have the highest
rates of disease. Incidence of disease declines in early
childhood, increases during adolescence and early adulthood,
then declines among older adults. The rate of invasive
disease among persons 1 7-20 years of age is approximately
twice that of the overall U.S. population. Although incidence
is relatively low, more cases occur in persons 23-64 years of
age than in any other age group. The proportion of cases
among adolescents and young adults has increased in recent
years. During 1992-1998, 28% of reported case-patients
were 12-29 years of age.
The proportion of disease caused by different serogroups has
changed during the last 15 years. From 1988 to 1991, most
cases of meningococcal disease in the United States were
due to either serogroup C or B, and serogroup Y accounted
for only 2% of cases. Fiowever, during 1996-2001, serogroup
Y accounted for 21% of cases, with serogroups B and C
accounting for 31% and 42%, respectively. Nongroupable
strains accounted for 5% of cases. The proportion of cases
caused by each serogroup also varies by age group. In 2001,
65% of cases among infants aged less than 1 year were
caused by serogroup B, for which no vaccine is available in
the United States. Among persons 18-34 years of age, 41%
of cases were due to serogroup B, and 25% and 14% were
due to serogroups C and Y, respectively.
In the United States, meningococcal outbreaks account
for less than 5% of reported cases (95%-97% of cases are
sporadic). However, since 1991, the frequency of localized
outbreaks has increased. Most of these outbreaks have been
caused by serogroup C. Since 1997, localized outbreaks
caused by serogroups Y and B have also been reported. See
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr4605.pdf for additional
information on the evaluation and management of
meningococcal outbreaks.
Large outbreaks of serogroup A meningococcal disease occur
in the African “meningitis belt,” an area that extends from
Ethiopia to Senegal. Rates of endemic meningococcal disease
in this area are several times higher than in industrialized
countries. In addition, outbreaks occur every 8-12 years
with attack rates of 500-1000 cases per 100,000 population.
Meningococcal Disease, 1998
Incidence by Age Group
5-14 15-24 25-39 40-64
Age group (years)
'Rato per 100,000 population
Meningococcal Disease in
the United States
* Distribution of cases by serogroup
varies by time and age group
•In 1996-2001:
-jiVo serogroup
—42% serogroup C
—65% of cases among children <1
year of age due to serogroup B
Meningococcal Outbreaks in
the United States
• Outbreaks account for <5% of
reported cases
• Frequency of localized outbreaks
has increased since 1991
• Most recent outbreaks caused by
serogroup C
• Since 1997 outbreaks caused by
seroqroup Y and B organisms have
also been reported
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Meningococcal Vaccines
Characteristics
Meningococcal Polysaccharide
Vaccine (MPSV)
* Menomune (sanofi pasteur)
* Quadrivalent polysaccharide
vaccine (A, C, Y, W-135)
* Administered by subcutaneous
injection
* 10-dose vial contains thimerosal as
a preservative
Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine IMPSVJ
The first meningococcal polysaccharide vaccine
(Menomune, sanofi pasteur) was licensed in the United
States in 1974. The current quadrivalent A, C, Y, W-135
polysaccharide vaccine was licensed in 1978. Each dose
consists of 50 meg of each of the four purified bacterial
capsular polysaccharides. The vaccine contains lactose as
a stabilizer.
MPSV is administered by subcutaneous injection. The vac-
cine is available in single-dose and 10-dose vials. Fifty-dose
vials are no longer available. Diluent for the single-dose vial
is sterile water without preservative. Diluent for the 10-dose
vial is sterile water with thimerosal added as a preservative.
After reconstitution the vaccine is a clear colorless liquid.
No vaccine is available in the United States for serogroup B.
/ Meningococcal Conjugate \
Vaccine (MCV)
* Menactra (sanofi pasteur)
* Quadrivalent polysaccharide
vaccine (A, C, Y, W-135) conjugated
to diphtheria toxoid
* Administered by intramuscular
injection
Single dose vials do not contain a
preservative
Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine EMCVJ
Meningococcal conjugate vaccine (Menactra, sanofi
pasteur) was first licensed in the United States in 2005.
The vaccine contains N. meningiditis serogroups A, C, Y
and W-135 capsular polysaccharide antigens individually
conjugated to diphtheria toxoid protein. Each 0.5-mL dose
of vaccine is formulated in sodium phosphate buffered
isotonic sodium chloride solution to contain 4 meg each
of meningococcal A, C, Y, and W-135 polysaccharides
conjugated to approximately 48 meg of diphtheria toxoid
protein carrier.
MCV is administered by intramuscular injection. It is
supplied as a liquid in a single dose vial. The vaccine does
not contain a preservative.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
The characteristics of MPSV are similar to other polysac-
charide vaccines (e.g., pneumococcal polysaccharide).
The vaccine is generally not effective in children younger
than 18 months of age. The response to the vaccine is typical
of a T-cell independent antigen, with an age-dependent
response, and poor immunogenicity in children younger
than 2 years of age. In addition, no boost in antibody titer
occurs with repeated doses; the antibody which is produced
is relatively low-affinity IgM, and “switching” from IgM to
IgG production is poor.
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A protective level of antibody is usually achieved within
7-10 days of vaccination. Among infants and children
younger than 5 years of age, measurable levels of antibodies
against serogroup A and C polysaccharides decrease substan-
tially during the first 3 years following a single dose of vaccine.
In healthy adults, antibody levels also decrease, but antibod-
ies are detectable as long as 10 years after vaccination.
Although vaccine-induced protection likely persists in
school-aged children and adults for at least 3 years, the
efficacy of the group A vaccine in children younger than
5 years of age may decrease markedly within this period.
In one study, efficacy declined from more than 90% to less
than 10% 3 years after vaccination among children who
were younger than 4 years of age when vaccinated. Efficacy
was 67% among children who were older than 4 years of age
at vaccination.
Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine
The approval of MCV was based on studies that compared
the serologic response to a single dose the response of persons
of similar age who received a single dose of meningococcal
polysaccharide vaccine. In these studies a similar proportion
of recipients achieved at least a fourfold rise in serum bacte-
ricidal antibody titer assay following MCV as those who
received MPSV. The proportion of recipients in each group
that achieved a titer of 1:128 (the titer considered to predict
protection) was more than 98% in both groups.
Because the polysaccharides are conjugated to diphtheria
toxoid for MCV, it is believed that this vaccine will have a
longer duration of protection than for MPSV. In addition,
MCV is expected to reduce asymptomatic carriage of
N. meningiditis and produce “herd” immunity, as occurs for
Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus influenzae type b
following receipt of the respective vaccines. Pure polysac-
charide vaccines have little or no effect on carriage of the
vaccine organism.
Vaccination Scheduie And Use
Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
For children 2 years of age and older and adults, MPSV is
administered as a single 0.5-mL dose. The vaccine can be
administered at the same time as other vaccines but should
be given at a different anatomic site.
Routine vaccination of civilians with MPSV is not recom-
mended because of its relative ineffectiveness in children
younger than 2 years of age (the age group with the highest
risk for sporadic disease) and because of its relatively short
duration of protection. Use of MPSV should be limited to
persons 2-10 years and older than 55 years of age, or when
MPSV Recommendations
• Approved for persons >2 years of age
• Not recommended for routine
vaccination of civilians
* Should be used only for persons at
increased risk of N. meningiditis
infection who are 2-10 years or >55
years of age, or if MCV is not available
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MCV Recommendations
Routinely recommended for:
—all children at 11-12 years of age
—unvaccinated children at entry to high
school (age 15 years)
—all college freshmen living in a dormitory
—other persons 11-55 years of age at
increased risk of invasive meningococcal
disease
MMWR 20D5; S4(RR-7};1 -21
Meningococcal Vaccine
Recommendations
• Use of MCV is preferred for persons
1 1 -55 years of age for whom
meningococcal vaccine is
recommended
• MPSV should be used for persons 2-10
years and >55 years
* Use of MPSV is an acceptable
alternative for persons 11-55 years of
age if MCV is not available
MMWR 2005: S4(RR-7);1-21
Meningococcal Vaccine
Recommendations
Recommended for persons at increased
risk of meningococcal disease:
—microbiologists who are routinely
exposed to isolates of N. meningitidis
—military recruits
—persons who travel to and U.S. citizens
who reside in countries in which N.
meningitidis is hyperendemic or epidemic
—terminal complement component
deficiency
—functional or anatomic asplenia
MMWR 2005; 54(RR-7);1-21
I
I
MCV is not available. MPSV can be administered at the
same visit as other indicated vaccines. All vaccines should
be given at separate sites with separate syringes.
I
Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine
MCV should be administered to all children at 1 1-12 years
of age as well as to unvaccinated adolescents at high school
entry (age 15 years). Other adolescents who wish to
decrease their risk for meningococcal disease may also be
vaccinated. All college freshmen living in dormitories
should also be vaccinated.
MCV if preferred for routine vaccination of adolescents
and persons 1 1-55 years of age who are at increased risk of
meningococcal disease. MPSV is an acceptable alternative
for persons 11-55 years of age if MCV if not available.
Meningococcal vaccination is recommended for persons
at increased risk for meningococcal disease, including
microbiologists who are routinely exposed to isolates
of N. meningitidis, military recruits, persons who travel ^
to and U.S. citizens who reside in countries in which )
N. meningitidis is hyperendemic or epidemic, persons
j
with terminal complement component deficiency, and
persons with functional or anatomic asplenia.
For travelers, vaccination is especially recommended for
j
those visiting countries in the sub-Saharan Africa
j
“meningitis belt” (Ethiopia in the east to Senegal in the i
west). Epidemics in the meningitis belt usually occur during
the dry season (i.e., from December to June). Therefore,
vaccination is recommended for travelers visiting the region i
during this time. Vaccination is required by the government
of Saudi Arabia for all travelers to Mecca during the annual
Hajj. Information concerning geographic areas for which
vaccination is recommended can be obtained from the CDC
Travelers Health website at http://www.cdc.gov/travel.
MCV can be administered at the same visit as other
indicated vaccines. All vaccines should be given at separate
sites with separate syringes. i
Both MCV and MPSV are recommended for use in control
of meningococcal outbreaks caused by vaccine-preventable
serogroups (A, C, Y, and W-135). An outbreak is defined by
the occurrence of at least three confirmed or probable primary
cases of serogroup C meningococcal disease during a period
of 3 months or less, with a resulting primary attack rate of
10 or more cases per 100,000 population. Eor calculation of
this threshold, population-based rates are used, and not
age-specific attack rates, as have been calculated for college
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students. These recommendations are based on experience
with serogroup C meningococcal outbreaks, but these
principles may be applicable to outbreaks caused by the
other vaccine-preventable meningococcal serogroups.
Revaccination
Revaccination may be indicated for persons previously
vaccinated with MPSV who remain at increased risk for
infection (e.g., persons residing in areas in which disease is
epidemic), particularly for children who were first vaccinated
when they were younger than 4 years of age. Such children
should be considered for revaccination after 2-3 years if
they remain at high risk. Although the need for revaccination
of older children and adults after receiving MPSV has not
been determined, antibody levels rapidly decline in 2-3
years, and if indications still exist for vaccination, revacci-
nation may be considered 5 years after receipt of the first
dose. MCV is recommended for revaccination of persons
11-55 years of age. However, use of MPSV is acceptable.
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP) expects that MCV will provide longer protection
than MPSV. However, studies are needed to confirm this
assumption. More data will likely become available within
the next 5 years to guide recommendations on revaccination
for persons who were previously vaccinated with MCV. At
the present time, revaccination after receipt of MCV is not
recommended.
Meningococcal Vaccine
Recommendations
• Both MCV and MPSV recommended for
control of outbreaks caused by vaccine-
preventable serogroups
’ Outbreak definition:
—3 or more confirmed or probabie primary
cases
—period <3 months
—primary attack rate >10 cases per 100,000
population*
*Popul«tion>b«*ed rale* *t)ould be used rather
than age-epecific attack rate*
Meningococcal Vaccine
Revaccination
* Revaccination may be indicated for
persons at increased risk for infection*
* Revaccination may be considered 5
years after receipt of the MPSV
* MCV is recommended for revaccination
of persons 11-55 years of age although
use of MPSV is acceptable
* Revaccination after receipt of MCV is not
recommended at this time
disease Is endemic (does not Include college settings)
Adverse Reactions Folloiniing
Vaccination
Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
Adverse reactions to MPSV are generally mild. The most
frequent are local reactions, such as pain and redness at
the injection site. These reactions last for 1-2 days, and
occur in up to 48% of recipients. Fever (100°-103°F) within
7 days of vaccination is reported for up to 3% of recipients.
Systemic reactions, such as headache and malaise, within
7 days of vaccination are reported for up to 60% of recipients.
Fewer than 3% of recipients reported these systemic reactions
as severe.
Meningococcal Vaccines
Adverse Reactions
• Local reactions
for 1-2 days
• Fever >100°F
• Systemic reactions
(headache, malaise
fatigue)
MPSV MCV
4%-48% 11%-59%
3% 5%
3%-60% 4%-62%
Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine
Reported adverse reactions following MCV are similar to
those reported after MPSV. The most frequent are local
reactions, which are reported in up to 59% of recipients.
Fever (100°-103°F) within 7 days of vaccination is reported
for up to 5% of recipients. Systemic reactions, such as
headache and malaise are reported in up to 60% of recipients
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i I
with 7 days of vaccination. Less than 3% of recipients (
reported these systemic reactions as severe.
All severe adverse events that occur after receipt of any
|
vaccine should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Events
.
|
Reporting System (VAERS). For information on reporting,
j
see the VAERS website at http://www.vaers.hhs.gov. j
Meningococcal Vaccines
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to vaccine
component or following a prior
dose of vaccine
* Moderate or severe acute iliness
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
For both MCV and MPSV, a severe allergic (anaphylactic)
reaction to a vaccine component or following a prior dose
of either vaccine is a contraindication to receipt of further
doses. A moderate or severe acute illness is reason to defer
routine vaccination, but a minor illness is not. Breastfeeding
and immunosuppression are not contraindications to vacci- J;
nation. Studies of vaccination with MPSV during pregnancy J|i
have not documented adverse effects among either pregnant ^
women or newborns. No data are available on the safety of K
MCV during pregnancy. However, pregnancy is not considered
to be a contraindication to either MPSV or MCV.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Both MPSV and MCV should be shipped in insulated
containers to prevent exposure to freezing temperature.
Vaccine should be stored at refrigerator temperature
(35°-46° F, [2°-8° C]). The vaccines must not be exposed
to freezing temperature, and any vaccine exposed to freezing
temperature should not be used.
Single-dose vials of MPSV must be used within 30 minutes
of reconstitution, and multidose vials must be discarded 10
days after reconstitution. MCV should not be drawn into a
syringe until immediately before use.
Surveillance and Reporting of
Meningococcal Disease
Invasive meningococcal disease is a reportable condition in
most states. All healthcare workers should report any case
of invasive meningococcal disease to local and state health
departments.
Antimicrobial Chemoprophylaxis
In the United States, the primary means for prevention of
sporadic meningococcal disease is antimicrobial chemopro-
phylaxis of close contacts of infected persons. Close contacts
include household members, child care center contacts, and
anyone directly exposed to the patient’s oral secretions (e.g.,
through kissing, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, endotracheal
intubation, or endotracheal tube management).
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For travelers, antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis should be
considered for any passenger who had direct contact with
respiratory secretions from an index patient or for anyone
seated directly next to an index patient on a prolonged flight
(i.e., one lasting more than 8 hours). The attack rate for
household contacts exposed to patients who have sporadic
meningococcal disease was estimated to be four cases per
1,000 persons exposed, which is 500-800 times greater than
the rate for the total population. In the United Kingdom,
the attack rate among healthcare workers exposed to
patients with meningococcal disease was determined to be
25 times higher than among the general population.
Because the rate of secondary disease for close contacts
is highest immediately after onset of disease in the index
patient, antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis should be
administered as soon as possible, ideally less than 24 hours
after identification of the index patient. Conversely,
chemoprophylaxis administered more than 14 days after
onset of illness in the index patient is probably of limited
or no value. Oropharyngeal or nasopharyngeal cultures are
not helpful in determining the need for chemoprophylaxis
and might unnecessarily delay institution of this preventive
measure.
Rifampin, ciprofloxacin, and ceftriaxone are 90%-95%
effective in reducing nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningitidis
and are all acceptable antimicrobial agents for chemopro-
phylaxis. Systemic antimicrobial therapy for meningococcal
disease with agents other than ceftriaxone or other third-
generation cephalosporins might not reliably eradicate
nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningitidis. If other agents
have been used for treatment, the index patient should
receive chemoprophylactic antibiotics for eradication of
nasopharyngeal carriage before being discharged from the
hospital.
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Smallpox
Smallpox is an acute infectious disease caused by the variola
virus. Smallpox is believed to have emerged in human
populations about 10,000 BCE A description of smallpox
first appeared in a Chinese text in the 4th century. The
name variola was first used during the 6th century and is a
derivative of the Latin varius, meaning spotted, or varus,
meaning pimple. The first efforts to prevent smallpox
occurred in China and India sometime before the year 1000
and involved intentional inoculation of a susceptible person
with pustular or scab material from a person with smallpox.
The term smallpox was first used in Europe in the 15th
century to distinguish variola from the great pox (syphilis).
In 1796, Edward Jenner demonstrated that smallpox could
be prevented by inoculating a person with material from a
cowpox lesion; this led to the first smallpox vaccine. The
last case of smallpox in the United States was reported in
Texas in 1949. In 1966, the World Health Organization
initiated an intensified global smallpox eradication program.
The last indigenous case of smallpox on earth occurred in
Somalia in October 1977. The World Health Assembly
officially certified the global eradication of smallpox in
May 1980.
Smallpox
* First described in Chinese text in
4*'' century
* Vaccine developed in late 18'^
century
* Last case in U.S. in 1949
* Last indigenous case on earth
in 1977
Variola and Other Orthopoxviruses
Smallpox is caused by variola virus. Variola virus belongs to
the genus Orthopoxvirus, family Poxviridae. Poxviruses are
large brick'shaped viruses with a double stranded DNA
genome. They are different from most other DNA viruses in
that they replicate in the cytoplasm of the cell rather than
in the nucleus. To do this, they produce a variety of proteins
not produced by other DNA viruses (e.g., herpesvirus).
Pour orthopoxviruses are known to infect humans: variola,
vaccinia, cowpox, and monkeypox. Variola virus infects
only humans in nature, although primates and other animals
have been infected in a laboratory. Vaccinia, cowpox, and
monkeypox viruses can infect both humans and other animals
in nature.
Variola Virus
* Orthopoxvirus
* Infects only humans in nature
* May remain viable in crusts for
years at room temperature
* Rapidly inactivated by UV light,
chemical disinfectants
In laboratory experiments, 90% of aerosolized variola virus
is inactivated within 24 hours. In the presence of ultraviolet
light, this percentage would be even greater. In temperate
climates, crusts from the skin lesions from smallpox patients,
in which the virus is contained in a fibrin matrix, can retain
viable virus for several years when held at room temperature.
The virus survives longer at low temperature and humidity
than at higher temperature or humidity. All poxviruses are
rapidly inactivated by exposure to ultraviolet light, and
chemical disinfectants such as bleach or Lysol®.
Some persons infected with variola major virus have particularly
severe illnesses. This suggests that there could be differences
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in the virulence of strains of the virus. However, no laboratory
test has been devised that correlates virus strains with
virulence in humans. Physiologic factors in the host are
probably the more important determinant of severity of
the illness.
Smallpox vaccine contains vaccinia virus, not variola virus.
Vaccinia is rarely isolated from animals outside the laboratory.
There are multiple strains of vaccinia virus that have
different levels of virulence for humans and animals.
Vaccinia virus can also be genetically engineered to accept
DNA and express other antigens, and has been used as a
vector in laboratory experiments. Cowpox virus was probably
the virus that Edward Jenner originally used as a vaccine for
smallpox. The virus has many natural hosts, including cows,
rodents, cats, elephants, and is found in nature primarily in
Europe. Monkeypox was first found in monkeys and later in
other animals such as rats, rabbits, and squirrels. It was
reported in humans for the first time in 1970. It is found
primarily in western and central Africa, although a cluster
of monkeypox cases occurred in the United States in 2003
and was associated with pet prairie dogs from Africa.
Smallpox Pathogenesis
• Virus contact with oropharyngeal or
respiratory mucosa
* Virus replication in regional lymph
nodes
* Viremia on about 8"' day of infection
* Virus replication in oral and
pharyngeal mucosa and skin
Pathogenesis
Variola virus infection is initiated when the virus comes
into contact with the oropharyngeal or respiratory mucosa
of a susceptible person. The virus then multiplies in regional
lymph nodes. An asymptomatic viremia develops 3 or 4 days
after infection, which is followed by further virus replication,
probably in the bone marrow, spleen, and lymphatics. A
second viremia begins about 8-10 days after infection and is
followed by the first symptoms of illness (prodromal stage),
fever and toxemia. The virus localizes in small blood vessels
of the dermis and in the oral and pharyngeal mucosa. In the
skin, this results in the characteristic maculopapular rash,
which evolves into vesicles, then pustules.
Smallpox Clinical
Presentations
* Variola major
— severe illness
— case-fatality rate of >30%
'Variola minor
— less severe
— case-fatality rate of <1%
Clinical Features
Two clinical forms of smallpox have been described. While
both forms are caused by variola virus, they are caused by
different strains of the virus distinguishable by specific
biologic properties (such as growth characteristics in cell
culture and DNA structure). Variola major is the severe
form of smallpox, with a more extensive rash, higher fever,
and a greater degree of prostration. Variola major has a
case-fatality rate of 30% or more. The last case of variola
major occurred in Bangladesh in 1975. Variola minor was
first described in South Africa and the United States in the
late 19th century. Variola minor is a much less severe disease,
with a case-fatality rate of 1% or less. Variola minor was
endemic in some countries of Europe and of North and
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South America and in many parts of Africa. The last case of
j
variola minor occurred in Somalia in October 1977, and was
the last case of indigenous smallpox on earth.
There are four principal clinical presentations of variola
' major, based on the Rao classification (1972). The relative
vigor of the immune response to the infection probably
determined the clinical presentation of the infection,
j
The classification is based on the nature and evolution of
the lesions; ordinary (most frequent), modified (mild and
occurring in previously vaccinated persons), flat, and
hemorrhagic. Flat and hemorrhagic smallpox are severe,
uncommon forms and are usually fatal. In addition, variola
sine eruptione (smallpox without rash) is a febrile illness
occurring after the usual incubation period. It is seen
generally in vaccinated persons and can be confirmed only
by antibody studies or, rarely, by virus isolation. Subclinical
(asymptomatic) infections with variola virus also occurred,
but are not believed to be common.
The incubation period of smallpox averages 1 2 days, with a
range of 7 to 17 days. During this period the patient is well.
The prodrome or preeruptive stage of the illness then starts
abruptly, with fever (usually 101°-104°F (38.3°-40°C)]),
malaise, headache, muscle pain, prostration, and often
nausea and vomiting and backache. The person usually
appears quite ill. The prodrome usually lasts 2-4 days. The
person is not infectious until the end of the prodrome, when
lesions develop in the mouth.
Ordinary Smallpox
Ninety percent or more of smallpox cases among unvacci-
nated persons are of the ordinary type. The prodromal stage
varies in severity. By the third or fourth day of illness, the
temperature usually falls and the patient feels somewhat
better. At this point the rash appears. The rash appears first
as an enanthem—minute red spots on the tongue and oral
and pharyngeal mucosa—about 24 hours before the appearance
of rash on the skin. Lesions in the mouth and pharynx
enlarge and ulcerate quickly, releasing large amounts of
virus into the saliva about the time the cutaneous rash first
becomes visible. Virus titers in saliva are highest during the
first week of illness, corresponding with the period during
which patients are most infectious.
The exanthem (skin rash) usually appears 2-4 days after the
onset of fever as a few macules (known as “herald spots”) on
the face, particularly on the forehead. Lesions then appear
on the proximal portions of the extremities, then spread to
the distal extremities and the trunk. Usually the rash
appears on all parts of the body within 24 hours.
Clinical Presentations of
Variola Major
* Ordinary (>90% of cases in
unvaccinated persons)
* Modified (mild; occurs in
previously vaccinated persons)
* Flat (uncommon; usually fatal)
• Hemorrhagic (uncommon;
usually fatal)
Smallpox Prodrome
* Incubation period 12 days
(range 7-17 days)
• Prodrome
—abrupt onset of fever >1 01 °F
—malaise, headache, muscle pain,
nausea, vomiting, backache
—lasts 2-4 days
—not infectious until lesions
develop in mouth
Smallpox Rash
* Enanthem (mucous membrane
lesions) appears approx. 24 hours
before skin rash
* Minute red spots on the tongue and
oral/pharyngeal mucosa
* Lesions enlarge and ulcerate
quickly
Virus titers in saliva highest during
first week of illness
Smallpox Rash
* Exanthem (skin rash) appears
2-4 days after onset of fever
* First appears as macules,
usually on the face
* Lesions appear on proximal
extremities, spread to distal
extremities and trunk
Smallpox
Smallpox Rash Evolution
Stage
Days after
Rash Onset
Macules 0-1
Papules 2-3
Vesicles 3-5
Pustules 6-12
Crusts 13-20
All crusts
separated 21-28
By the second or third day of the rash, the macules become
raised papules. By the third or fourth day the lesions become
vesicular, containing first an opalescent fluid, which then
becomes opaque and turbid within 24-48 hours. The skin
lesions of smallpox typically are surrounded by a faint
erythematous halo. The distended vesicles often have a
central depression or dimple of varying size, referred to as
“umbilication.” Umbilication often persists into the pustular
stage, but as the lesion progresses it usually becomes
flattened because of adsorption of fluid. Umbilication is
less common in other vesicular or pustular rash illnesses,
particularly in varicella.
By the sixth or seventh day, all the skin lesions are pustules.
Between 7 and 10 days the pustules mature and reach their
maximum size. The pustules are sharply raised, typically
round, tense, and firm to the touch. The pustules are
deeply embedded in the dermis, giving them the feel of
a small bead in the skin. Fluid is slowly absorbed from the
pustules, and by the end of the second week the pustules
begin to form a crust. During the third week the crusts
separate, leaving depigmented skin and, frequently, pitted
scars. Fever usually rises again by the seventh or eighth day
of the illness and continues to remain high throughout the
vesicular and pustular stages, until crusts have formed over
all the lesions.
Smallpox Rash
* Vesicles often have a central
depression (“umbilication”)
• Pustules raised, round, firm to the
touch, deeply embedded in the skin
• Lesions in any one part of the body
are in same stage of development
* Most dense on face and distal
extremities (centrifugal distribution)
* Lesions on palms and soles (>50%
of cases)
The rash usually develops as a single crop. Consequently,
lesions in a particular part of the body are at about the
same stage of development, although they may be
different sizes. The distribution of the rash is centrifugal:
most dense on the face; more dense on the extremities than
on the trunk; and on the extremities, more dense on the
distal parts than on the proximal. The palms of the hands
and soles of the feet are involved in the majority of cases.
In general, the severity of the clinical picture parallels the
extent of the rash. In some cases, the pustular skin lesions
on the extensor surfaces of the extremities and face are so
numerous they became confluent. Patients with confluent
smallpox often remain febrile and toxic even after scabs
have formed over all the lesions. In one case series, the
case-fatality rate in confluent smallpox was 62%.
Modified Smallpox
'Occurs in previously vaccinated persons
•Prodrome may be less severe
'No fever during evolution of rash
'Skin lesions evolve more quickly
•Rarely fatal
'More easily confused with chickenpox
Modified Smallpox
Modified smallpox refers to the character of the eruption
and the rapidity of its development. This form of smallpox
occurs mostly in previously vaccinated patients. The prodromal
illness occurs but may be less severe than in ordinary-type
smallpox. Fever during evolution of the rash is usually
absent. The skin lesions tend to evolve more quickly,
are more superficial, and may not show the uniformity
Smallpox
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characteristic of more typical smallpox. The lesions are
often few in number, but even when they are numerous,
or even confluent, they usually evolve rapidly. Modified
smallpox is rarely, if ever, fatal. This form of variola major
is more easily confused with chickenpox.
Flat [Malignant] Smallpox
Flat-type smallpox is so called because the lesions remain
almost flush with the skin at the time when raised vesicles
form in ordinary-type smallpox. It is not known with cer-
tainty why some persons develop this type of disease. In a
large series of persons hospitalized with smallpox in India,
flat-type smallpox accounted for 5%-10% of cases, and the
majority (72%) were in children. The prodrome is severe
and lasts 3—4 days. Constitutional symptoms are severe and
continue after the appearance of the rash. The fever remains
elevated throughout and the patient has severe toxemic
symptoms. The rash on the tongue and palate is usually
extensive. The skin lesions mature very slowly. By the
seventh or eighth day the lesions are flat and appear to be
buried in the skin. Unlike ordinary-type smallpox, the
vesicles contain very little fluid and do not appear umbilicated.
The lesions are soft and velvety to the touch, and may
contain hemorrhages. Respiratory complications are
common. The prognosis for flat-type smallpox is grave
and most cases are fatal.
Flat Smallpox
• Severe prodrome
• Fever remains elevated
throughout course of illness
* Extensive enanthem
* Skin lesions soft and flat,
contain little fluid
* Most cases fatal
Hemorrhagic Smallpox
Hemorrhagic smallpox is a severe and uncommon form of
smallpox that is accompanied by extensive bleeding into the
skin, mucous membranes, and gastrointestinal tract. In the
large Indian series, hemorrhagic disease occurred in about
2% of hospitalized patients; the majority of cases were
among adults, and pregnant women appear to be at
increased risk. The prodromal stage, which can be prolonged,
is characterized by fever, intense headache and backache,
restlessness, a dusky flush or sometimes pallor of the face,
extreme prostration, and toxicity. There is little or no
remission of fever throughout the illness. Hemorrhagic
manifestations can occur early or late in the course of the
illness. In the early, or fulminating, form, hemorrhagic
manifestations appear on the second or third day as
subconjunctival bleeding, bleeding from the mouth or
gums and other mucous membranes, petechiae in the skin,
epistaxis, and hematuria. Death often occurs suddenly
between the fifth and seventh days of illness, when only a
few insignificant maculopapular cutaneous lesions are
present. In patients who survive for 8-10 days the hemor-
rhages appear in the early eruptive period, and the rash is
flat and does not progress beyond the vesicular stage.
Hemorrhagic Smallpox
• Prolonged severe prodrome
• Fever remains elevated
throughout course of illness
* Early or late hemorrhagic signs
* Bleeding into skin, mucous
membranes, Gl tract
* Usually fatal
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Smallpox Complications
• Bacterial infection of skin lesions
• Arthritis
• Respiratory
‘ Encephalitis
' Death
—30% overall for ordinary smallpox
—40%-50% for children <1 year
—>90% for flat and hemorrhagic
smallpox
Differential Diagnosis
The most important
differentiating feature
between smallpox and other
rash illnesses is the
presence of fever before rash
onset
Variola Sine Eruptions and Subclinical
Infection
Febrile illness sometimes occurs among vaccinated contacts
of smallpox patients, with the sudden onset of temperature
of about 102°F (39°C), headache and sometimes backache.
The attack often subsides within 48 hours and the tempera-
ture returns to normal. Although these symptoms could be
caused by other infections, laboratory investigation may
show a significant increase in variola antibody following
such an attack. There is evidence of true subclinical infection
with variola major virus (i.e., serologic evidence of infection
with no symptoms), typically in recently vaccinated house-
hold contacts of smallpox patients. Persons with subclinical
infections have not been shown to transmit the infection to
contacts.
Complications
Secondary bacterial infection of the skin is a relatively
uncommon complication of smallpox. When this occurs,
the fever usually remains elevated. Arthritis occurs in up
to 2% of cases, most commonly in children. Respiratory
complications (e.g., bronchitis, pneumonitis, or pneumonia)
sometimes develop on about the eighth day of the illness
and can be either viral or bacterial in origin. Encephalitis
occasionally occurs and is indistinguishable from the acute
perivascular demylination observed as a complication of
infection due to vaccinia, measles, or varicella.
In fatal cases, death usually occurs between the tenth and
sixteenth days of the illness. The cause of death from
smallpox is not clear, but the infection is now known to
involve multiple organs. Circulating immune complexes,
overwhelming viremia, or an uncontrolled immune response
may be contributing factors. The overall case-fatality rate for
ordinary-type smallpox is about 30%. However, the fatality
rate for children younger than 1 year of age is 40%-50%.
The fatality rate for flat-type and hemorrhagic smallpox is
90% or greater. The case-fatality rate for variola minor is
1% or less.
Sequelae of smallpox include scarring, which is most
common on the face, blindness resulting from corneal
ulceration and scarring, and limb deformities due to
arthritis and osteomyelitis. There is no evidence of
chronic or recurrent infection with variola virus.
Differential Diagnosis
The disease that most closely resembles smallpox is varicella
(chickenpox). The most important differentiating feature
between smallpox and varicella, as well as other rash
illnesses, is the presence of a prodrome with fever and
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other symptoms before rash onset. A person with smallpox
will have a severe, febrile prodrome that begins 1-4 days
before the onset of the rash. The fever is high, usually
102°-104°F (3.8.8°-40°C), but always at least 101°F
(38.3°C). Most children with varicella have a short, mild
prodrome or no prodrome at all before onset of the rash and
have little or no fever before rash onset. Adults, who may
develop more severe varicella, are more likely to have fever
or other symptoms before rash onset. If there is no history
of a febrile prodrome, smallpox is not likely. In addition
to fever, the prodrome of smallpox is associated with one or
more additional symptoms, such as prostration, headache,
backache, chills, abdominal pain or vomiting. Patients are
frequently too ill to engage in normal activities and typically
confine themselves to bed.
Smallpox
Differential Diagnosis A
Smallpox Varicella
* Severe, febrile * Mild or no prodrome
prodrome
* 1 <4 days before rash
• >101°F
* Little or no fever
* No associated
symptoms
* Other symptoms:
—prostration
—headache
—backache
-chills
—abdominal pain
—vomiting J
Another important differentiating feature of smallpox and
varicella is the appearance, evolution, and distribution of
the rash. Although there may be some similarity in the
appearance of the lesions, particularly early after rash onset,
classic smallpox looks very different from varicella.
Smallpox lesions are deep in the dermis and feel hard to
the touch, described as feeling like a pea under the skin.
They are round and well circumscribed. As they evolve,
they may become confluent or umbilicated. The varicella
rash is superficial, and the lesions appear to be delicate and
not as well circumscribed. Confluence and umbilication are
uncommon in varicella. Smallpox rash lesions appear in a
single crop, and lesions on any part of the body are in the
same stage of development. Lesions are more dense on the
extremities than on the trunk and often involve the palms
and soles (i.e., centrifugal distribution). In contrast, the rash
of varicella appears in several crops, so papules, vesicles, and
crusts are seen simultaneously on the same part of the body
and new lesions continue to appear for several days. Lesions
are typically more dense on the trunk than on the extremities.
In severe cases of varicella, rash distribution may not be a
useful differentiating feature and rash may occur everywhere
on the body, including the palms and soles.
For the first 2-3 days, the smallpox rash is maculopapular.
At this stage of the illness smallpox could be confused
with other febrile illnesses with maculopapular rash, such
as measles, rubella, and other evolving vesicular rashes
including varicella
Differential Diagnosis
Smallpox Varicella
* Deep, hard lesions * Superficial lesions
* Round, well
circumscribed
• Confluent or
umbilicated
* Not well circumscribed
* Confluence and
umbilication not
common
Lesions at same stage * Lesions at all stages of
of development development
Other common conditions that might be confused with
smallpox are summarized in the table below. As the United
States re-institutes smallpox vaccination, at least in limited
groups, generalized vesicular rashes (generalized vaccinia
and eczema vaccinatum) caused by vaccinia vaccine adverse
reactions could be seen among persons with a history of
recent smallpox vaccination or contact close with a vaccinee.
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In addition there are exceedingly rare causes of smallpox-
like rash, such as rickettsial pox and monkeypox. A small
percentage of smallpox cases present as hemorrhagic smallpox
or a flat-type rash. Both variants are highly lethal.
Hemorrhagic smallpox can be mistaken for meningococcemia.
Common Conditionsthat Might be Confusedwrm Smallpox
Condition Clinical Clues
Varicella (primary infection with
varicella-zoster virus)
Most common in children <10 years; children usually do
not have a viral prodrome
Disseminated herpes zoster Immunocompromised or elderly persons; rash looks like
varicella, usually begins in dermatomal distribution
Impetigo (Streptococcus pyogenes,
Staphylococcus aureus)
Honey-colored crusted plaques with bullae are classic but
may begin as vesicles; regional not disseminated rash; patients
generally not ill
Drug eruptions Exposure to medications; rash often generalized
Contact dermatitis Itching; contact with possible allergens; rash often localized in
pattern suggesting external contact
Erythema multiforme minor Target, “bull’s eye”, or iris lesions: often follows recurrent
herpes simplex virus infections; may involve hands & feet
(including palms & soles)
Erythema multiforme
(incl. Stevens -Johnson Syndrome)
Major form involves mucous membranes & conjunctivae;
may be target lesions or vesicles
Enteroviral infection esp. Hand,
Foot and Mouth disease
Summer & fall; fever & mild pharyngitis 1-2 days before rash
onset; lesions initially maculopapular but evolve into whitish-
grey tender, flat often oval vesicles; peripheral distribution
(hands, feet, mouth, or disseminated)
Disseminated herpes simplex Lesions indistinguishable from varicella; immunocompromised
host
Scabies; insect bites (incl. fleas) Itching is a major symptom; patient is not febrile & is other-
wise well
Molluscum contagiosum May disseminate in immunosuppressed persons
CDC has developed criteria that can be used to evaluate
suspected smallpox cases and to categorize patients into
high, moderate or low risk for smallpox. There are three
major and five minor smallpox criteria:
Major criteria
1. The patient has had a febrile prodrome (temperature
101°F [38.3°C]) or higher) 1-4 days before rash onset
and at least one of the following systemic complaints:
prostration, headache, backache, chills, vomiting or
abdominal pain.
2. Rash lesions are deep in the skin, firm or hard to the
touch, round and well circumscribed, and may become
umbilicated or confluent as they evolve.
3. On any one part of the body all the lesions are in the
same stage of development (i.e., all are vesicles or all
are pustules).
Smallpox Major Criteria
' Febrile prodrome 1-4 days before
rash onset; fever of >101®F, and
at least 1 additional symptom*
' Rash lesions are deep, firm/hard,
round and well circumscribed
’ On any one part of the body
lesions in same stage of
development
'Prostration, headache, backache, chills, vomiting
or severe abdominal pain
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1. The distribution of the rash is centrifugal (i.e., the
greatest concentration of lesions is on the face and
distal extremities with relative sparing of the trunk).
' 2. The first lesions of the rash appear on the oral mucosa
or palate, or on the face or forearms.
j
3. The patient appears toxic or moribund.
I
4. Lesions have progressed slowly (i.e., the individual
j
lesions evolved from macules to papules to pustules,
each stage lasting 1-2 days).
5. Lesions are present on the palms or soles.
A person is considered at high risk for smallpox if he or she
meets all three major criteria. Immediate action should be
taken to make sure that contact precautions and respiratory
isolation are implemented. These patients should be reported
to local and/or state health authorities immediately. Obtain
digital photographs if possible, and consult with dermatology
and/or infectious disease experts. Following such consultation,
if the patient is still considered to be at high risk, the state
health department will immediately report the case to CDC
and arrangements will be made for laboratory testing for
smallpox virus.
A person considered at moderate risk for smallpox must
have a febrile prodrome and either one other major criterion
or four or more minor criteria. These patients should be
isolated and be evaluated urgently to determine the cause of
the illness. Persons classified as high or moderate risk should
be seen in consultation with a specialist in infectious diseases
and/or dermatology whenever possible. Any person who did
not have a febrile prodrome is considered at low risk, as are
persons who had a febrile prodrome and fewer than four
minor criteria. These patients should be managed as clinically
indicated.
A case investigation worksheet and a poster that includes
the rash illness algorithm, and information on differential
diagnosis is available from the CDC smallpox website at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
Laboratory and Pathology Diagnosis
If a case is classified as high risk after evaluation using the
algorithm, it fits the clinical case definition for smallpox
and therefore should be considered a probable smallpox case
until smallpox virus laboratory results are completed. For
such a case, do not perform other laboratory testing for
other diagnoses.
Currently, laboratory procedures for isolation of variola
virus in clinical specimens should be done only by CDC in
Smallpox Minor Criteria
* Greatest concentration of lesions
on face and distal extremities
* Lesions first appear on oral
mucosa/palate, face, or forearms
* Patient appears toxic or moribund
* Lesions evolve from macules to
papules to pustules
* Lesions on palms and soles
Risk of Smallpox by Clinical
History and Examination
• High risk
— febrile prodrome
— classic smallpox lesions
— same stage of development
* Moderate risk
— febrile prodrome
— 1 major OR >4 minor criteria
• Low risk
—no febrile prodrome
—febrile prodrome and <4 minor criteria
Laboratory Confirmation
* Rapid diagnostic testing for
varicella zoster virus (DFA, IFA,
PCR)
* Electron microscopy (may
identify Orthopoxvirus but not
specific for variola)
* Culture
* Nucleic acid-based testing
* Serologic testing
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Atlanta. If the patient's clinical characteristics indicate a
high risk for smallpox, the state health department should
be contacted immediately. The diagnosis of an Orthopoxvirus
infection can be made rapidly by electron microscopic
examination of pustular fluid or scabs. Orthopox generic
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests are available but do
not distinguish between vaccinia, variola and other poxvirus
infections. Differentiation of orthopoxviruses is made by
nucleic acid-based testing, such as PCR. Serologic tests
have also been developed to assist in the diagnosis of acute
Orthopoxvirus infection, and direct antigen detection tests
for variola virus are under development.
For a patient who meets the criteria for moderate risk, the
most important laboratory procedure is rapid diagnostic
testing for varicella zoster virus (VZV). Laboratory testing
should be done in consultation with an infectious disease or
dermatology specialist. Smallpox virus testing is not indicated
for cases that do not meet the clinical case definition. In the
absence of smallpox (disease prevalence of zero), the
predictive value of a positive laboratory test is extremely
low (close to zero). Limiting requests for smallpox testing to
cases that fit the clinical case definition will minimize the
risks of a false-positive laboratory result, which would have
extremely serious consequences.
Since varicella was the most common disease confused with
smallpox in the past and the most common diagnosis in
smallpox false alarms in the immediate posteradication era,
rapid VZV diagnostic tests are important for evaluation of
suspected smallpox cases. A variety of rapid methods are
available for detecting VZV in clinical material. The most
useful is direct fluorescent antibody (DFA). This method
detects VZV directly in cells using anti-VZV antibody con-
jugated to fluorescein dye. DFA is very sensitive and specific
but is critically dependent on careful collection of material
from a lesion. Detection of VZV DNA by PCR testing of
vesicular fluid or scabs can also be used for rapid detection
of VZV in clinical material. Real time PCR assays take 4-6
hours to perform. Virus particles consistent with VZV can
be detected using electron microscopy. Rapid diagnostic
testing for VZV is generally available in at least one facility
(private laboratories, academic hospital centers) in all large
cities and in some local and in all state health department
facilities. Other testing should be done as clinically indicated
and may include testing for herpes simplex viruses (HSV),
enteroviruses and syphilis.
Tzanck smear, although not diagnostic of VZV infection,
is a rapid and easily performed test in hospitals with a
pathology laboratory and is frequently available at the local
level. A positive Tzanck smear confirms an alphaherpesvirus
infection (either VZV or HSV).
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Skin biopsies, if clinically indicated, can assist with a diagnosis
on the basis of histopathology or can be confirmatory if
iminunohistochemistry tests are available.
Medical Management
A suspected case of smallpox is a public health and medical
emergency. Any person whose clinical characteristics meet
the clinical case definition for smallpox must be isolated
and reported immediately to the local and/or state health
department.
Strict respiratory and contact isolation of confirmed or
suspected smallpox patients is critical to limit the exposure
to the virus. Smallpox patients are infectious until all crusts
have separated. Although droplet spread is the major mode
of person-tO'person smallpox transmission, airborne trans-
mission through fine particle aerosol can occur. Therefore,
airborne precautions using a negative air pressure room with
high-efficiency particulate air filtration should be initiated
immediately for hospitalized high-risk or confirmed smallpox
patients. This is the same isolation precaution that is taken
for other infectious diseases with respiratory transmission,
such as varicella.
All personnel who have contact with a patient with suspected
or confirmed smallpox should use appropriate protective
equipment. This includes properly fitted respirators (masks)
of N95 quality or higher. In addition, personnel should use
disposable gloves, gowns and shoe covers for all contact
with patients. This precaution is to prevent inadvertent
transmission of variola virus from clothing or other
contaminated items to susceptible persons. Personnel
should remove and correctly dispose of all protective clothing
before contact with other people. Reusable bedding and
clothing can be autoclaved or laundered in hot water with
bleach to inactivate the virus. Persons such as laundry
handlers, housekeepers, and laboratory personnel, who come
into contact with materials potentially contaminated with
smallpox virus, should use appropriate protective equipment.
If a case of smallpox is confirmed, these personnel should be
vaccinated before handling contaminated materials.
Medical management of a person with smallpox is primarily
supportive. No antiviral drug is currently approved by the
Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of smallpox.
Recent studies suggest that the antiviral drug cidofovir
might be useful as a therapeutic agent. However, the drug
must be administered intravenously and can cause serious
renal toxicity. Cidofovir administered for the treatment of
smallpox would be an off-label use. Antiviral therapy with
cidofovir or other drugs subsequently found to have antivariola
activity might be considered but should be used under an
investigational new drug (IND) protocol and by an infec-
tious diseases specialist.
Smallpox Medical Management
* Notify public health authorities
immediately for suspected case
* Strict respiratory and contact
isolation
* Supportive care
* Antiviral agents?
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Epidemiology
Smallpox Epidemiology
Reservoir Human (before eradication)
Transmission Respiratory by large particles
Can be airborne
Communicability From onset of rash until
all crusts separate
Smallpox Epidemiology
* Most transmission results from
face-to-face contact with
infected person (household and
hospital contacts)
• Transmission most frequent
during first week of rash
Reservoir
Although animals can be infected with variola in laboratory
conditions, humans are the only natural host. There is no
chronic carrier state and no known animal reservoir. Since
the early 1980s (i.e., following global smallpox eradication),
the only known locations of variola virus are at CDC in
Atlanta and at the State Research Center of Virology and
Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia.
Transmission
Transmission of smallpox occurs through inhalation of
airborne variola virus, usually droplets expressed from the
oral, nasal, or pharyngeal mucosa of an infected person.
Most transmission results from direct face-to-face contact
with an infected person, usually within a distance of 6 feet,
or from physical contact with a person with smallpox or
with contaminated articles. Although variola virus could
remain viable for years in dried crusts of skin lesions,
transmission from crusts is uncommon, probably because
virus is enmeshed in a fibrin matrix.
Communicability
A person infected with variola virus is not infectious during
the incubation period or the first day or two of the prodromal
stage of the illness. The patient becomes infectious with the
first appearance of the rash, which is often accompanied by
lesions in the mouth and pharynx. The virus can be trans-
mitted throughout the course of the illness (i.e., until all
crusts separate). Transmission is most frequent during the
first week of the rash, while most skin lesions are intact
(i.e., vesicular or pustular). Virus is present in material
draining from ruptured pustules and in crusts for a longer
period, but infection from this source appears to be less
frequent. In general, persons with a severe rash and
involvement of the mouth and pharynx, and those with
a cough are more infectious than those with a slight rash. I
Secondary attack rates among household members are f
generally 50%-60%.
Natural transmission of smallpox in a population is relatively
slow. There is an interval of 2 to 3 weeks between each
generation of cases. Smallpox generally spreads less widely
and less rapidly than does varicella or measles, probably
because transmission of variola virus does not occur until
the onset of rash and generally requires close face-to-face
contact for spread. At the time of rash onset, most patients
are already confined to bed because of the high fever and
toxemia of the prodromal stage of the illness. However,
persons with severe prodromal illness may seek medical
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i attention; therefore, hospitals are a frequent source of
I
infection because of transmission from hospitalized persons
with unrecognized cases.
! Secondary cases of smallpox are usually limited to those who
come in contact with the infected person in the household
i
or hospital. During the global eradication program, the
chain of transmission of smallpox was interrupted by
isolating smallpox patients in a setting in which they had
contact only with adequately vaccinated or previously
infected persons. This limited the next potential generation
of cases to the household and close contacts of the index
patient or patients. Contacts were identified and immediately
vaccinated. Contacts who became ill were also isolated to
establish a barrier to further transmission. This strategy was
found to be effective even if community vaccination levels
were low.
Temporal Pattern
In temperate areas, the seasonality of smallpox was similar
to that of measles and varicella, with incidence highest
during the winter and spring. In tropical areas, seasonal
variation was less evident and the disease was present
throughout the year.
Secular Trends
The last case of smallpox in the United States was reported
in 1949. In the early 1950s, an estimated 50 million cases of
smallpox occurred worldwide each year. Ten to 15 million
cases occurred in 1966, when the disease had already been
eliminated in 80% of the world.
Smallpox Eradication
The intensified global smallpox eradication program began
in 1966. The initial campaign was based on a twofold strategy:
1 ) mass vaccination campaigns in each country, using
vaccine of ensured potency and stability, that would reach
at least 80% of the population; and 2) development of sut'
veillance systems to detect and contain cases and outbreaks.
The program had to surmount numerous problems, including
lack of organization in national health services, epidemic
smallpox among refugees fleeing areas stricken by civil war
and famine, shortages of funds and vaccine, and a host of
other problems posed by difficult terrain, climate, and
cultural beliefs. In addition, it was soon learned that even
when 80% of the population was vaccinated, smallpox often
persisted. Soon after the program began, it became apparent
that by isolating persons with smallpox and vaccinating
their contacts, outbreaks could be more rapidly contained,
even in areas where vaccination coverage was low. This
strategy was called surveillance and containment, and it
became the key element in the global eradication program.
Smallpox Eradication
* Intensified Global Eradication
program begun in 1966
• Initial strategy was mass
vaccination
• Strategy evolved to
“surveillance and containment”
* Last indigenous case in Somalia
in October 1977
Although setbacks occurred, the surveillance and contain
ment strategy was an enormous success. The last case of
smallpox in Brazil was reported in 1971, and Indonesia's last
case occurred in 1972. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with
a population at that time of more than 700 million, were a
particular challenge. But with intensive house-to-house
searches and strict containment, the last case of variola
major—the most deadly type of smallpox—occurred in
Bangladesh in October 1975.
By the end of 1975, smallpox persisted only in the Horn
of Africa. Conditions were very difficult in Ethiopia and
Somalia, where there were few roads. Civil war, famine, and
refugees made the task even more difficult. An intensive
surveillance and containment and vaccination program was
undertaken in the spring and summer of 1977. As a result,
the world's last person with indigenous smallpox was a
hospital cook in Merka, Somalia, on October 26, 1977.
Searches for additional cases continued in Africa for more
than 2 years, during which time thousands of rash illnesses
were investigated. None proved to be smallpox.
The last cases of smallpox on earth occurred in an outbreak
of 2 cases (one of which was fatal) in Birmingham, England
in 1978. This outbreak occurred because variola virus was
carried by the ventilation system from a research laboratory
to an office one floor above the laboratory. In 1980 the
World Health Assembly certified the global eradication of
smallpox and recommended that all countries cease vaccina-
tion. The World Health Organization also recommended
that all laboratories either destroy their remaining stocks of
variola virus or transfer them to one of two WHO reference
laboratories, the Institute of Viral Preparations in Moscow
or CDC in Atlanta. All laboratories were believed to have
complied with this request.
Case Definition
A clinical case of smallpox is defined as an illness with
acute onset of fever (101°E [38.3°C] or higher) followed by
a rash characterized by firm, deep-seated vesicles or pustules in
the same stage of development without other apparent cause.
This case definition will not detect an atypical presentation
of smallpox such as hemorrhagic or flat-type disease. In
addition, given the extremely low likelihood of smallpox
occurring, the case definition provides a high level of
specificity (i.e., vesicular rash illness) rather than a high
level of sensitivity (i.e., maculopapular rash illness). In the
event of a smallpox outbreak, the case definition would be
modified to increase sensitivity.
Smallpox
Smallpox [Vaccinia] Vaccine
The first attempts to prevent smallpox were in China and
India before the year 1000 century, and involved either
nasal insufflation of powdered smallpox scabs, or scratching
material from a smallpox lesion into the skin. This procedure
was known as variolation and, if successful, produced lasting
immunity to smallpox. However, because the person was
infected with variola virus, a severe infection could result,
and the person could transmit smallpox to others.
j
In 1796 Edward Jenner, a doctor in rural England, discovered
! that immunity to smallpox could be produced by inoculating a
I person with material from a cowpox lesion. Cowpox is a
poxvirus in the same family as variola. Jenner called the
I
material used for inoculation vaccine, from the root word
j
vacca, which is Latin for cow. The procedure was much safer
j
than variolation, and did not involve a risk of smallpox
j
transmission. Vaccination to prevent smallpox was soon
I
practiced all over the world.
At some time during the 19th century, the cowpox virus
used for smallpox vaccination was replaced by vaccinia
I
virus. Vaccinia is in the same family as cowpox and variola
but is genetically distinct from both. TTie origin of vaccinia
I
virus and how it came to be in the vaccine are not known.
Characteristics
The smallpox vaccine currently available in the United States
(Dryvax, produced by Wyeth) is a live virus preparation of
infectious vaccinia virus. Smallpox vaccine does not
I
contain smallpox (variola) virus. The current vaccine was
prepared in the early 1980s from calf lymph with a seed
virus derived from the New York City Board of Health
(NYCBOH) strain of vaccinia virus. The vaccine is provided
as a lyophylized (freeze-dried) powder in a 100-dose vial and
contains the antibiotics polymyxin B, streptomycin, tetracy-
cline and neomycin. The diluent used to reconstitute the
vaccine is 50% glycerin and contains a small amount of
phenol as a preservative.
Approximately 15 million doses of vaccine are available
now in the United States. Testing has shown that existing
supplies of vaccine could be diluted by a 1:5 ratio and still
remain as effective and safe as full-strength vaccine. An
I additional 85 million doses of vaccine based on the
i
NYCBOH strain have been found to be immunogenic at
1:5 or 1:10 dilution. This could potentially provide an
additional 850 million doses.
The vaccine is administered by using a multiple puncture
technique with a special bifurcated needle. Detailed
information concerning reconstitution and administration
Smallpox Vaccine
1796 Edward Jenner develops vaccine
1805 Use of cows to produce vaccine
1940s Freeze-drying technology
1965 Licensure of bifurcated needle
1972 Routine vaccination stopped in U.S.
1983 Vaccine removed from civilian market
Smallpox Vaccine
* Live vaccinia virus in caif iymph
* Contains trace amounts of
polymyxin B, streptomycin,
tetracyciine, and neomycin
* Diiuent contains glycerin and
phenoi
* New vaccine produced using ceii
culture technology does not
contain antibiotics
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of smallpox vaccine are available on the CDC smallpox
website at http://www.cdc.gov/smallpox.
Response to Smallpox
Vaccination
• Neutralizing antibody develops
— 10 days after primary vaccination
— 7 days after revaccination
• >95% of primary vaccinees
develop detectable neutralizing
antibody
• Antibody persists >10 years
Smallpox Vaccine Efficacy
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
Neutralizing antibodies induced by vaccinia vaccine are
genuS'Specific and cross-protective for other orthopoxviruses
(e.g., monkeypox, cowpox, and variola viruses). Neutralizing
antibodies are detectable 10 days after primary vaccination,
and 7 days after revaccination. Although the level of antibody
that protects against smallpox infection is unknown, after
percutaneous administration of a standard dose of vaccinia
vaccine, more than 95% of primary vaccinees (i.e., persons
receiving their first dose of vaccine) will develop neutralizing
or hemagglutination inhibition antibody at a titer of higher
than 1:10. Neutralizing antibody titers of higher than 1:10
persist in 75% of persons for 10 years after receiving second
doses and up to 30 years after receiving three doses of vaccine.
• Clinical efficacy estimated in
household contact studies
• 91%-97% reduction in cases
among contacts with
vaccination scar
* Studies did not consider time
since vaccination or potency of
vaccine
Duration of Immunity Following
Smallpox Vaccination
• High level of protection (~100%)
for up to 5 years following
vaccination
* Substantial but waning
immunity for >10 years
* Reduction in disease severity
among previously vaccinated
persons
Smallpox Fatality Rate by Time Since
Vaccination—Europe, 1950-1971*
<10 11-20 20-*^ Never
Years since vaccination
The efficacy of smallpox vaccine has never been measured
precisely in controlled trials. However, protection has
been determined in studies of persons exposed to a smallpox
patient in their household. These studies indicated a
91%-97% reduction in smallpox among contacts with a
vaccination scar compared with contacts without a scar.
However, these studies did not always consider the time
since vaccination or potency of vaccine, so they may
underestimate protection.
Epidemiologic studies demonstrated that a high level of
protection (nearly 100%) against smallpox persists for up
to 5 years after primary vaccination, and substantial but
waning immunity for 10 years or more. Antibody levels after
revaccination can remain high longer, conferring a greater
period of immunity than occurs after primary vaccination
alone. Although smallpox vaccination received in the
remote past may not completely protect against smallpox,
vaccinated persons appear to have less severe disease.
Studies of smallpox cases imported into Europe in the 1950s
and 1960s demonstrated fewer fatalities among vaccinated
persons compared with those who were unvaccinated. The
fatality rate among persons vaccinated less than 10 years
before exposure was 1.3%; it was 7% among those vaccinated
11 to 20 years prior, and 11% among those vaccinated 20
or more years prior to infection. In contrast, 52% of unvac-
cinated persons died.
•MackTW. J/fTfecf 0/s 1972;125:161-9. Smallpox vaccination also provides protection if administered
after an exposure to smallpox. Postexposure efficacy has
been estimated in household contact studies in Pakistan and
India. These studies indicate that rates of secondary cases in
Smallpox
households were up to 91% lower than rates among unvac-
cinated persons. The lowest secondary attack rates occurred
in persons vaccinated less than 7 days after exposure. In
these studies, smallpox was generally less severe (i.e., modified
type) in persons who received postexposure vaccination.
Following vaccination, vaccinia virus replicates in the
basal cells of the epidermis, resulting in the development
of a lesion at the site of vaccination. A papule develops at
the inoculation site 3-4 days after primary vaccination.
Approximately 7 days following primary vaccination, a
vesicle (a blister containing clear fluid) surrounded by
erythema (a “Jennerian vesicle”) forms at the site. The
vesicle becomes pustular by 7-1 1 days after vaccination.
Maximum erythema occurs 8-12 days after vaccination.
The erythema then subsides, the pustule dries, and a crust
develops 2—3 weeks after vaccination. In the third week, the
crust separates, leaving a permanent scar at the vaccination
site. This response to vaccination is called a major reaction,
and indicates that virus replication has taken place and
vaccination was successful. A person is considered protected
with the development of a major reaction at the vaccination
site. A revaccinated person often develops a skin reaction
similar to that after primary vaccination, but the lesion
progresses faster than after primary vaccination.
Some persons do not develop a typical skin lesion after
vaccination. All responses other than major reactions are
referred to as equivocal. There are several possible causes of
equivocal reactions. The person may be sufficiently immune
to suppress viral replication or may be allergic to a compo-
nent of the vaccine, leading to a hypersensitivity reaction
at the site. An equivocal reaction could also be caused by
insufficiently potent vaccine or incorrect administration
technique. In general, a person who has an equivocal
response to vaccination should be revaccinated using
vaccine from another vial if possible. More information on
interpretation of response to vaccination is available in the
ACIP recommendations for smallpox vaccine, available at
http ://WWW.cdc
.
gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr50 1 0
.
pdf
.
Live vaccinia virus is present at the vaccination site
beginning 3 to 4 days after vaccination and remains until the
crust separates from the skin. Since the developing vaccinia
lesion usually itches, care must be taken to avoid scratching,
then touching other parts of the body, such as the eye, or
other people. This could transfer the vaccine virus to these
sites or individuals. Washing hands immediately after
touching the vaccination site or dressing is very important
in preventing this type of transmission.
* Secondary attack rates reduced up
to 91% compared to unvaccinated
contacts
* Lowest disease rates among
persons vaccinated <7 days after
exposure
* Disease generaily iess severe
(modified-type) in persons
receiving postexposure vaccination
Clinical Response to
Smallpox Vaccination*
Symptom/Sign
Papule
Vesicle
Pustule
Maximum erythema
Scab
Scab separation
Time after vac
3-4 days
5-6 days
7-
11 days
8-
12 days
14 days
21 days
‘typical response in a nonimmune person
Clinical Response to
Smallpox Vaccination
• Major (primary) reaction
—indicates viral replication has occurred and
vaccination was successful
—considered to be protected with the
development of a major reaction
• Equivocal reaction
—indicates immune suppression of viral
replication, allergic reaction without
production of immunity, incorrect
vaccination technique, or impotent vaccine
-revaccinate immediately
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Evolution of U.S. Smallpox
Vaccine Recommendations
• 1972 Discontinue routine vaccination
• 1 976 Discontinue vaccination of HCWs
•1980 Vaccine recommended for lab
workers
• 1990 Discontinue vaccination of miiitary
• 1 991 Consider vaccine for HCWs
exposed to recombinant vaccinia
• 2001 Bioterrorism guideiines
• 2002 Smallpox Response Teams
Smallpox Vaccine
Indications in Nonemergency Situations
* Laboratory workers who handle cultures
or animals infected with non-highly
attenuated vaccinia
* Laboratory workers exposed to other
Orthopoxviruses that infect humans
* Consider for other heaithcare workers
with contact with contaminated material
* Public health, hospital, and other
personnel who may need to respond to a
smallpox case or outbreak
Persons who vaccinate others
Smallpox Vaccine
Indications in Emergency Situations*
* Persons exposed to initial release
* Close contact with confirmed or suspected
case
* Direct care or transportation of confirmed or
suspected case-patient
* Laboratory personnel
* Persons with risk of contact with infectious
materials from patient
* Other groups as recommended by public
health authorities
’following conflnnation of a case of smallpox
Vaccination Schedule and Use
Routine childhood smallpox vaccination was discontinued
in the United States in 1972. Routine vaccination of
healthcare workers was discontinued in 1976, and among
military recruits in 1990. In 1980, smallpox vaccine was rec-
ommended for laboratory workers who were at occupational
risk for exposure to vaccinia or other orthopoxviruses. In
1991, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
recommended that other healthcare workers who could be
exposed to vaccinia or recombinant vaccinia be considered
for vaccination. Guidelines for use of smallpox vaccine in
the event of an intentional release of smallpox virus were
first published in 2001.
For routine nonemergency use (i.e., in the absence of
smallpox disease) vaccination is recommended for
laboratory workers who directly handle cultures or animals
contaminated or infected with non-highly attenuated
vaccinia viruses (e.g., the NYCBOH, Temple of Heaven,
Copenhagen, or Lister vaccinia strains), and recombinant
vaccinia viruses derived from non-highly attenuated vaccinia
strains. Vaccination is also recommended for laboratory
workers exposed to other orthopoxviruses that infect
humans (e.g., monkeypox or cowpox). Vaccination can be
considered for other healthcare workers who come into
contact with materials such as dressings that may be
contaminated with vaccinia or recombinant vaccinia.
This could occur, for example, in the course of a clinical trial
in which humans were administered vaccines containing
recombinant vaccinia viruses. Vaccination is also recom-
mended for public health, hospital, and other personnel
who may need to respond to a smallpox case or outbreak,
and for persons who administer the vaccine to others.
In the event of an intentional release of variola virus,
vaccination would be recommended for those exposed to
the initial release, contacts of persons with smallpox, and
others at risk of exposure. Persons at risk of exposure
would include those involved in the direct medical or public
health evaluation, care or transportation of confirmed or
suspected smallpox patients; laboratory personnel who
collect or process clinical specimens from confirmed or
suspected smallpox patients; persons who may have contact
with infectious materials, such as those responsible for
medical waste disposal, linen disposal or disinfection, and
room disinfection in a facility where smallpox patients are
present; and other groups (e.g., medical, law enforcement,
emergency response, or military personnel) as recommended
by public health authorities.
The schedule for smallpox vaccine is one successful dose
(i.e., a dose that results in a major reaction at the vaccination
site). In routine circumstances the vaccine should not be
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administered to persons younger than 18 years of age. In an
emergency (postrelease) situation, there would be no age
limit for vaccination of persons exposed to a person with
confirmed smallpox.
Smallpox Vaccine
Schedule
—1 successful dose
Persons with occupational exposure to non-highly attenuated
vaccinia viruses, recombinant viruses derived from
non-highly attenuated vaccinia viruses, or other nonvariola
orthopoxviruses should be revaccinated at least every
10 years. To ensure an increased level of protection against
more virulent nonvariola orthopoxviruses (e.g., monkeypox),
empiric revaccination every 3 years can be considered.
• Revaccination
—10 years (non-highly attenuated
vaccinia and recombinants)
—3 years (more virulent
Orthopoxviruses)
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
A vesicular or pustular skin lesion at the site of inoculation
indicates a successful vaccination, or “take.” In a 2002 study
of old and new vaccines given to unvaccinated adults, the
average size of the pustule at 2 weeks after vaccination was
12 millimeters. The average size of erythema surrounding
the pustule was 16-24 millimeters, and average induration
was 11—15 millimeters.
Some vaccinees may have larger degrees of erythema and
induration that can be mistaken for cellulitis. These reactions
generally improve within 24 to 48 hours without specific
therapy but may require clinical evaluation to rule out
bacterial cellulitis.
Forty to 47 percent of vaccinees reported mild pain at the
site of inoculation. But 2%-3% reported the pain as severe.
Axillary lymphadenopathy was reported in about one-third
of recipients. Most lymphadenopathy was mild, but in
3%-7% it was considered moderate, i.e., bothersome to the
vaccinee but not otherwise interfering with normal activities.
Fever is common after administration of smallpox vaccine.
In a recent study of Dryvax given to unvaccinated adults,
5%-9% reported a temperature of 100°F (37.7°C) or higher,
and 3% reported temperature of 102°F (38.8°C) or higher.
Fever is most common 7-12 days after vaccination. In addition
to fever, adult vaccinees also report a variety of constitutional
symptoms, including headache, myalgias, chills, nausea, and
fatigue on or about the eighth or ninth day after vaccination.
One or 2 percent of recipients reported these symptoms as
severe.
Historically, fever was more common among children. In
past studies, about 70% of children experienced 1 or more
days of temperature 100°F (37.7°C) or higher after primary
vaccination. Fifteen to 20 percent of children experienced
temperatures 102°F (38.8°C) or higher.
Smallpox Vaccine Local Reactions
Among Susceptible Adults
* Pain, swelling, erythema at
vaccination site
* Regional lymphadenopathy
—begins 3-10 days after
vaccination
—can persist for 2-4 weeks after
vaccination site heals
Smallpox Vaccine Reactions
Among Susceptible Adults
* Elevated temperature
-5%-9% >100°F
-3% >102°F
* Systemic symptoms (malaise,
myalgia)
* 36% sufficiently ill to miss work,
school, or recreational activities
or had trouble sleeping
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Smallpox Vaccine Adverse
Reaction Rates*
Reaction
Primary
Vaccination
Inadvertent inoculation 25-529
Generalized vaccinia 23-242
Eczema vaccinatum 10-39
Progressive vaccinia 0.9-1 .5
Postvaccinial encephalitis 3-12
Death 1
ptr million primary vaccmatlor^s
inadvertent Inoculation
* Caused by transfer of vaccinia
virus from site of vaccination to
other areas of the body
* Most commonly on face, eyelid,
nose, mouth, rectum, genitalia
* Most lesions heal spontaneously
without specific treatment
Generalized Vaccinia
* Results from viremia with
implantations in the skin
* Occurs in the absence of
eczema or other preexisting
skin diseases
* Vesicles or pustules on normal
skin distant from vaccination site
* Usually minor illness with little
residual damage
Vaccinia virus is present at the site of vaccination beginning
about 4 days after vaccination. Maximum viral shedding
from the vaccination site occurs 4-14 days after vaccination,
but vaccinia can be recovered from the site until the crust
separates from the skin. Inadvertent inoculation (i.e., trans-
fer of vaccinia from the vaccination site to another part of
the body) is the most frequent complication of smallpox
vaccination and accounts for approximately half of all
complications of primary vaccination and revaccination.
Studies in 1968 estimated the rate of inadvertent inoculation
to be 529 cases per million primary vaccinations. The most
common sites involved are the face, eyelid, nose, mouth,
genitalia, and rectum. Most lesions heal without specific
treatment. Involvement of the eye may result in scaring of
the cornea and significant impairment of vision.
A variety of erythematous or urticarial rashes can occur
approximately 10 days after primary vaccination. The
vaccinee is usually afebrile with this reaction, and the rash
resolves spontaneously within 2-4 days. In rare instances,
bullous erythema multiforme (Stevens-Johnson syndrome)
occurs.
Generalized vaccinia is another type of rash following
smallpox vaccination. This condition is believed to result
from a vaccinia viremia with implantations in the skin in
persons without eczema or other preexisting skin disease.
It consists of vesicles or pustules appearing on normal skin
distant from the vaccination site. Most rashes labeled as
generalized vaccinia produce only minor illness with little
residual damage. The rash is generally self limited and
requires minor or no therapy except among patients whose
conditions might be toxic or who have serious underlying
immunosuppressive illnesses. In the 1968 studies, rashes
diagnosed as generalized vaccinia occurred at a rate of 242
per million primary vaccinations.
Moderate and severe complications of vaccinia vaccination
include eczema vaccinatum, progressive vaccinia, and post-
vaccinial encephalitis. These complications are rare but
occur at least 10 times more often among primary vaccinees
than among revaccinees and are more frequent among
infants than among older children and adults. It is estimated
that 14-52 persons per million primary vaccinations will
experience potentially life-threatening adverse reactions.
Myopericarditis is the inflammation of heart muscle and/or
the membrane that surrounds the heart. There were reports
of this condition following smallpox vaccination in the
1950s and 1960s, but these cases were associated with
vaccine strains not currently used. Myopericarditis was not
an anticipated adverse reaction to the smallpox vaccine
when the National Smallpox Vaccination Program began in
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December 2002. During January-October 2003, 31 serious
cardiac adverse events were reported among approximately
38,000 civilian recipients of smallpox vaccine (21 myoperi-
carditis and 10 ischemic events).
Eczema vaccinatum is a localized or systemic dissemination
of vaccinia virus in persons who have eczema or atopic
dermatitis or a history of either of these conditions, or among
contacts of vaccinees with eczema or atopic dermatitis or a
history of these skin conditions. Eczema vaccinatum can
occur regardless of whether the skin disease is active or
quiescent. Usually the illness is mild and self limited, but it
can be severe or fatal. The most serious cases among vaccine
recipients occur among primary vaccinees. Severe cases
have been observed after recently vaccinated persons have
been in contact with persons who have active eczema or
atopic dermatitis or a history of these skin conditions. In the
1968 studies, eczema vaccinatum was estimated to occur in
10-39 persons per million primary vaccinations.
Progressive vaccinia, also known as vaccinia necrosum,
is a severe illness characterized by progressive necrosis in
the area of vaccination, often with metastatic lesions. It
occurs almost exclusively among persons with cellular
immunodeficiency, but it can occur in persons with humoral
immunodeficiency. In the 1968 studies, it occurred in
approximately 1-2 persons per million primary vaccinations.
Progressive vaccinia was almost always fatal before the
introduction of vaccinia immune globulin and antiviral
agents. Progressive vaccinia may be more common now, with
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and post-transplant
immunosuppression widely prevalent. Therapy includes
aggressive treatment with vaccinia immune globulin and
possibly antiviral drugs.
Postvaccinial encephalitis has been reported in 3-12 persons
per million primary vaccinations. In the majority of cases,
postvaccinal encephalitis affects primary vaccinees younger
than 12 months of age or adolescents and adults receiving a
primary vaccination. It presents with any of a variety of
central nervous system signs, such as ataxia, confusion,
paralysis, seizures, or coma. Most cases are believed to result
from autoimmune or allergic reactions rather than direct
viral invasion of the nervous system. Approximately
15%-25% percent of affected vaccinees with this complica-
tion die, and 25% develop permanent neurologic sequelae.
There is no specific therapy for postvaccinial encephalitis.
Fetal vaccinia is a rare complication of smallpox vaccination.
Fewer than 50 cases of fetal vaccinia infection have been
reported, usually after primary vaccination of the mother in
early pregnancy. Fetal vaccinia usually results in stillbirth or
death of the infant soon after delivery. Smallpox vaccine is
not known to cause congenital malformations.
Eczema Vaccinatum
* Generalized spread of vaccinia
on skin of patients with eczema
or atopic dermatitis, or past
history of eczema or atopic
dermatitis
* Occurs in vaccinees and
contacts
* Can occur whether eczema is
active or quiescent
• May be severe or fatal
Progressive Vaccinia
• Progressive necrosis at site of
vaccination, often with metastatic
lesions
* Occurs in patients with impaired
immunologic function, particularly
cellular immunodeficiency
• Frequently fatal
Postvaccinal Encephalitis
* Highest risk among children
<12 months of age and older
persons receiving primary
vaccination
* Believed to result from
autoimmune or allergic reaction
* Frequently fatal or neurologic
sequelae
Fetal Vaccinia
* <50 fetal vaccinia cases
reported in world literature
* Most result from primary
vaccination of mother early in
pregnancy
* Usually results in stillbirth or
death of infant soon after
delivery
* Congenital malformations not
reported
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Smallpox Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
(Nonemergency Situations)
* Severe allergic reaction to a vaccine
component or following a prior dose
* Immunosuppression in the recipient or
household contact
* Physician-diagnosed heart disease or
risk factors for heart disease
* Pregnancy in the recipient or household
contact
* Breastfeeding
Death resulting from smallpox vaccination is rare, with
approximately one death per million primary vaccinations
and one death per 4 million revaccinations. Death is most
often the result of postvaccinial encephalitis or progressive
vaccinia.
Guidelines for the evaluation and management of adverse
reactions following smallpox vaccine were published in
2003 in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR).
These guidelines are available on the CDC smallpox website
at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
Contraindications and Precautions to
Vaccination
As with all vaccines, smallpox vaccine is contraindicated
for persons who have experienced a severe allergic reaction
to a prior dose of vaccine or to a vaccine component.
Calf lymph vaccine (Dryvax) contains trace amounts of
polymyxin B, streptomycin, tetracycline, and neomycin.
The diluent contains glycerin and phenol. The vaccine
does not contain sulfa-type antibiotics or penicillin. The
new cell-culture vaccines do not contain antibiotics.
Persons with significant immunosuppression or those who
have an immunosuppressed household contact should not
receive smallpox vaccine in a nonemergency situation.
Replication of vaccinia virus can be enhanced among people
with immunodeficiency diseases and immunosuppression.
Significant immunosuppression can be caused by many
diseases, including leukemia, lymphoma, or generalized
malignancy; solid organ or stem cell transplantation; and
cellular or humoral immunity disorders, including HIV
infection. Some autoimmune conditions and/or drugs used
to treat autoimmune conditions may cause significant
immunosuppression. Therapies that can cause immunosup-
pression include alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation,
or high-dose corticosteroid therapy. Many experts suggest
that prednisone doses of 2 milligrams per kilogram of body
weight per day or higher, or 20 milligrams per day or higher
for 14 days or more be considered immunosuppressive for
the purpose of live virus vaccination. As with other live
vaccines, those receiving high levels of these drugs should
not be immunized for 3 months after their last dose.
Persons with physician-diagnosed heart disease should not
receive the smallpox vaccine. This recommendation is
based on findings of cardiac symptoms such as chest pain,
palpitations and shortness of breath that were first detected
in late March 2003, and is further supported by the recognition
of myopericarditis as an adverse reaction. In addition to
physician-diagnosed heart disease, persons with three of the
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five heart disease risk factors (hypertension, hyperlipidemia,
current smoker, diabetes or a first degree relative with a
heart condition before the age of 50) are contraindicated
from receiving the smallpox vaccine.
Live viral vaccines are contraindicated during pregnancy.
For nonemergency indications, smallpox vaccine should not
be administered to pregnant women or persons with a
pregnant household contact. Pregnancy should also be
avoided for at least 4 weeks after vaccination. Women
who are breastfeeding should not be vaccinated because the
close contact that occurs during this activity could increase
the chance of transmission of the vaccine virus to the
breastfeeding infant.
Because of the increased risk for eczema vaccinatum, smallpox
vaccine should not be administered to persons with eczema
or atopic dermatitis or a past history of these conditions.
Persons who have a household contact with eczema or
atopic dermatitis or a history of these conditions should also
not be vaccinated.
Persons with other types of acute, chronic, or exfoliative
skin conditions (e.g., bums, varicella, herpes zoster, impetigo,
severe acne, or psoriasis) may be at increased risk of inad-
vertent inoculation. People with exfoliative skin conditions
should not be vaccinated until the condition is controlled or
resolves. In addition, persons with household contacts with
acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions should not be
vaccinated until the skin condition in the household contact
is controlled or resolves.
Smallpox Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
(Nonemergency Situations)
* Eczema or atopic dermatitis
(current or past history) in the
recipient or household contact
* Acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin
conditions (until improved or
resolved) in the recipient or
household contact
• Children <12 months of age
* Moderate or severe acute illness
Children younger than 1 2 months of age should not be
vaccinated. All vaccinated persons should take precautions
to prevent virus transmission to young children and other
household contacts. Since smallpox vaccine is currently
recommended only for persons with occupational risk of
exposure to vaccinia or recombinant vaccinia viruses, and
for healthcare and public health response team members,
vaccination is not indicated for infants or children younger
than 18 years of age.
As with all vaccines, vaccination should be deferred for
persons with moderate or severe acute illnesses.
In the event of an exposure to smallpox, there would be no
contraindications to vaccination. In this situation, the benefit
of vaccination would outweigh the risk of a complication
from the vaccine. In a postrelease situation, contraindications
and precautions for use of smallpox vaccine in a person who
has not been exposed to smallpox would be the same as
those in a nonemergency situation.
Smallpox Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
Emergency (Postrelease) Situations
• Exposed persons—no
contraindications
• Unexposed persons—same as
nonemergency situations
Smallpox
Vaccinia Immune Globulin
intravenous
* Immunoglobulin fraction of plasma
from persons vaccinated with
vaccinia vaccine
• Effective for treatment of eczema
vaccinatum, progressive vaccinia,
severe generalized vaccinia, and
ocular vaccinia
* Not effective in postvaccinial
encephalitis
Vaccinia Immune Globulin Intravenous
Vaccinia immune globulin intravenous (VIGIV) is the only
product currently available for treatment of complications of
vaccinia vaccination. VIGIV is a solvent/detergent-treated
sterile solution of purified gamma globulin (IgG) fraction of
human plasma containing antibodies to vaccinia virus. It is
manufactured from plasma collected from healthy, screened
donors with high titers of anti-vaccinia antibody. Each plas-
ma donation used for the manufacture of VIGIV is tested for
the presence of hepatitis B virus and antibodies to human
immunodeficiency viruses 1 and 2 and hepatitis C virus.
VIGIV is indicated for treatment or modification of eczema
vaccinatum, progressive vaccinia, and severe generalized
vaccinia. It should also be used for vaccinia infections in
persons who have skin conditions such as burns, impetigo,
varicella zoster, or poison ivy; or for persons who have
eczematous skin lesions when it is warranted because of
either the activity or extensiveness of such lesions. It is also
indicated for aberrant infections induced by vaccinia virus,
which include its accidental implantation in eyes (except in
cases of isolated keratitis), mouth, or other areas where
vaccinia infection would constitute a special hazard. Since
postvaccinial encephalitis is not due to virus multiplication,
VIGIV is not likely to be effective in treating this adverse
reaction. Immune globulin products have no role in the
treatment of smallpox.
Supplies of VIGIV are stored in the Strategic National
Stockpile. All releases of VIGIV from the stockpile must be
approved by GDC.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
• Stable indefinitely at -4°F (-20°C)
• Store unreconstituted vaccine
at 35-46°F (2°-8X)
• Reconstituted vaccine must be
used within 90 days
• Avoid contamination after
opening vial
Antiviral Drugs
Cidofovir is an antiviral medication that is currently
licensed for the treatment of retinitis. In vitro and animal
studies with this drug have shown some activity against
vaccinia virus, but it is unclear how well it would work in
treating vaccinia infections in humans. Because it is not
licensed for this indication, use of cidofovir for treating vac-
cinia infections should be done through an investigational
new drug (IND) protocol with careful monitoring. Cidofovir
is a second-line treatment for complications of smallpox
vaccination. VIGIV is still considered the standard treatment.
CDC is developing the investigative protocol for use of this drug.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
Lyophylized smallpox vaccine is stable indefinitely at
temperatures of -4°F (-20°C) or less. Unreconstituted vaccine
should be stored at refrigerator temperature 35°-40°F
(2°-8°C). The vaccine should be used within 90 days of
reconstitution. Because the vaccine vial must be opened in
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order to prepare a dose for administration (i.e., the bifurcated
needle is dipped into the vaccine), care must be taken to
avoid contamination. A needle should never contact the
vaccine in a vial more than once.
Smallpox Preparedness and Response
Planning
A smallpox response plan has been in place in the United
States since the early 1970s. In 1999, efforts were begun to
update the response plan in the context of an intentional
release of smallpox virus as an act of terrorism. Following
the anthrax attacks in 2001, the plan was revised further to
provide detailed information on surveillance and response
to a smallpox virus release.
The interim plan is intended to assist with local and state
response planning by identifying actions that must be taken
in the event of a suspected smallpox case. The key elements
of preparedness for smallpox response are surveillance and
diagnosis to achieve early detection of an introduced case;
isolation of the case or cases; and identification and
vaccination of the contacts of the case-patient or patients.
Sections of the plan provide detailed information on these
critical aspects of the plan, including surveillance and
contact tracing, smallpox vaccine, isolation guidelines for
both confirmed and suspected cases and febrile contacts of
patients, specimen collection and transport, decontamination,
and communication.
Smallpox Response Plan
• Key elements:
—surveillance and investigation of
cases
—contact tracing
—isolation guidelines
—specimen collection and handling
—communications
—decontamination
Smallpox Response Teams
• Emergency, healthcare workers and other
critical personnel may be asked to
volunteer to receive the vaccine
* Department of Defense will also vaccinate
certain personnel who are or may be
deployed in high threat areas
* Some personnel assigned to certain
overseas embassies may be offered
vaccination
Does not include a recommendation for
vaccination of the general public
In December 2002, the President announced a plan to
better protect the American people against the threat of
smallpox attack. The Department of Health and Human
Services will work with state and local governments to form
volunteer Smallpox Response Teams, which can provide
critical services in the event of a smallpox attack. To ensure
that Smallpox Response Teams can mobilize immediately in
an emergency, healthcare workers and other critical personnel
may be asked to volunteer to receive the vaccine. The
Department of Defense will also vaccinate certain military
and civilian personnel who are or may be deployed in
high-threat areas. Some U.S. personnel assigned to certain
overseas embassies may also be offered vaccination. The
plan does not include a recommendation for vaccination of
the general public.
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Anthrax
Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the spore-forming
bacterium Bacillus anthracis. The term anthrax is derived
from the Greek word for coal, anthrakis, because of the black
skin lesions characteristic of the disease. A disease that
appears to have been anthrax was described in the biblical
book of Exodus as the fifth plague in about 1490 BCE.
Descriptions of anthrax affecting both animals and humans
are found in early Indian and Greek writings. An epidemic
of anthrax in 17th century Europe caused an estimated
60,000 human deaths. The contagious nature of anthrax was
described in 1823. Bacillus anthracis was first described in
1849, and in 1876, Robert Koch definitively established a
microbial origin for anthrax making this the first disease
for which this was done. A live attenuated animal vaccine
was developed and tested by Louis Pasteur in 1881. An
improved animal vaccine containing a suspension of an
avirulent, nonencapsulated live strain of B . anthracis was
developed in 1939. The role of toxin in the pathogenesis
of anthrax was demonstrated in 1954. A human vaccine
composed of cell-free culture filtrate was developed in 1954,
and in 1970 an improved cell-free vaccine was licensed in
the United States. Anthrax was first used effectively as a
bioterrorist agent in 2001.
Anthrax
Zoonotic disease caused by
Bacillus anthracis
Described in biblical times
First animal vaccine developed
by Louis Pasteur in 1881
Used for bioterrorism in 2001
BacSUus anthracis
B. anthracis is a large aerobic, spore-forming, gram-positive
bacillus that grows well on common culture media, such as
blood agar. Stained B . anthracis from culture media appears
as long parallel chains of organisms with square ends,
referred to as “boxcars.” B. anthracis spores can remain
viable and infective in the soil for many years, even decades.
During this time, they are a potential source of infection for
grazing livestock, but they generally do not represent a
direct infection risk for humans. Animals become infected
when they ingest or inhale the spores while grazing. Humans
can become infected with B . anthracis by skin contact,
ingestion, or inhalation of B . anthracis spores originating
from products of infected animals or from inhalation of
spores from the environment. Spores can be inactivated
with sufficient contact with paraformaldehyde vapor, 5%
hypochlorite or phenol solution, or by autoclaving.
Anthrax spores germinate when they enter an environment
rich in amino acids, nucleosides, and glucose, such as the
blood or tissues of an animal. The replicating bacteria produce
at least three proteins
—
protective antigen (PA), lethal
factor (LF), and edema factor (EE). These proteins combine
to form two toxins known as lethal toxin and edema toxin.
PA and LF form lethal toxin, a protease that is believed to
be responsible for tissue damage, shock, and death, although
Bacillus anthracis
* Gram-positive aerobic bacteria
Spores may remain viable in soil
for years
* Spores inactivated by
paraformaldehyde vapor,
hypochlorite, phenol, or autoclave
Toxins responsible for tissue
damage and edema
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the mechanism is not clear. PA and EF form edema toxin,
an adenylate cyclase that upsets controls on ion and water
transport across cell membranes and causes extensive edema.
PA binds to receptors on mammalian cells and then binds
with LF or EF. The toxin complexes are internalized to the
endosome of the cell and then transported to the cytosol,
where they exert their effect.
Anthrax Pathogenesis
• Spores enters through broken
skin or mucous membranes
• Germinate in macrophages,
replicate in lymph nodes and
intracellular space
* Bacteria produce antiphagocytic
capsule
* Production of toxins cause tissue
destruction and edema
Anthrax Pathogenesis A
* Inhaled spores may reside in alveoli
without germination for weeks
* Antibiotics effective against
vegetative form but not spores
* Disease may develop after
antibiotics discontinued
* Delayed onset not described for
cutaneous or gastrointestinal forms
20
Anthrax Clinical Features
Pathogenesis
After wound inoculation or ingestion, B . anthracis spores
are engulfed by macrophages, where they germinate. The
vegetative bacterium produces a capsule that allows it to
evade the immune system by resisting phagocytosis and
protects the organism from lysis by cationic proteins in the
serum. Lethal toxin and edema toxin are produced. If not
contained, the bacteria can spread to draining lymph nodes
and intracellular space, leading to further production of toxins.
The toxins result in necrosis of lymphatic tissue, which
leads to the release of large numbers of bacteria. Bacteremia
may ensue and lead to overwhelming septicemia, widespread
tissue destruction, organ failure, and death. In inhalation
anthrax, spores are transported from the alveoli to the
tracheobronchial and mediastinal lymph nodes. Lethal toxin
and edema toxin are produced and cause tissue necrosis and
extensive edema. Production of toxins leads to the massive
hemorrhagic lymphadenitis and mediastinitis characteristic
of inhalational disease.
Studies in animals indicate that inhaled spores may not
immediately germinate within the alveoli but reside there
potentially for weeks, perhaps months, until taken up by
alveolar macrophages. Spores then germinate and begin
replication within the macrophages and lymphatic tissue.
Antibiotics are effective against germinating or vegetative
B . anthracis but are not effective against the nonvegetative
or spore form of the organism. Consequently, disease
development can be prevented as long as a therapeutic level
of antibiotics is maintained to kill germinating B . anthracis
organisms. After discontinuation of antibiotics, if the
remaining nongerminated spores are sufficiently numerous
to evade or overwhelm the immune system when they
germinate, disease will then develop. This phenomenon of
delayed onset of disease is not recognized to occur with
cutaneous or gastrointestinal exposures.
• Three clinical forms
—cutaneous (most common in
natural exposure situations)
—gastrointestinal (rare)
— inhalation
Clinical Features
There are three clinical forms of anthrax: cutaneous,
gastrointestinal, and inhalation. The symptoms and
incubation period of human anthrax are determined by
the route of transmission of the organism.
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Most (more than 95%) naturally occurring B. anthracis
infections are cutaneous and occur when the bacterium
enters a cut or abrasion on the skin (e.g., when handling
B . anthrads-contaminated animals, animal products, or
other objects). The reported incubation period for cutaneous
anthrax ranges from 1 to 1 2 days. Skin infection begins as a
small papule that may be pruritic, progresses to a vesicle in
1—2 days, and erodes leaving a necrotic ulcer (eschar) with
a characteristic black center. Secondary vesicles around the
primary lesions may develop. The lesion is usually painless.
Other symptoms may include swelling of adjacent lymph
nodes, fever, malaise, and headache. The diagnosis of cuta-
neoLis anthrax is suggested by the presence of the eschar,
the presence of edema out of proportion to the size of the
lesion, and the lack of pain during the initial phases of the
infection. The case-fatality rate of cutaneous anthrax is
5%-20% without antibiotic treatment and less than 1%
with antibiotic treatment.
Anthrax
Cutaneous Anthrax
• Incubation period 1-12 days
* Papule, then vesicle, then
necrotic ulcer (eschar) with
black center
* Usually painless
• Case-fatality:
—without antibiotics - 5%-20%
—with antibiotics - <1%
Gastrointestinal Anthrax
The intestinal form of anthrax usually occurs after eating
contaminated meat. The incubation period for intestinal
anthrax is believed to be 1-7 days. Involvement of the
pharynx is characterized by lesions at the base of the tongue
or tonsils, with sore throat, dysphagia, fever, and regional
lymphadenopathy. Involvement of the lower intestine is
characterized by acute inflammation of the bowel. Initial
signs of nausea, loss of appetite, vomiting, and fever are
followed by abdominal pain, vomiting of blood, and bloody
diarrhea. The case-fatality rate of gastrointestinal anthrax is
unknown but is estimated to be 25%-60%.
Gastrointestinal Anthrax
* Incubation period 1-7 days
* Pharyngeal involvement includes
oropharyngeal ulcerations with
cervical adenopathy and fever
* Intestinal involvement includes
abdominal pain, fever, bloody
vomiting or diarrhea
Case-fatality estimated at 25%-60%
Inhalation Anthrax
Originally known as woolsorter's disease, inhalation
anthrax results from inhalation of 8,000-50,000 spores
of B. anthracis. This form of anthrax would be expected
to be the most common following an intentional release of
B. anthracis. The incubation period for inhalation anthrax
for humans appears to be 1-7 days, but may be as long as
43 days. The median incubation period for the first 10
bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax cases in 2001 was
4 days, with a range of 4-6 days. However, the incubation
period for inhalation anthrax may be inversely related to the
dose of B. anthracis. Data from studies of laboratory animals
suggest that B . anthracis spores continue to vegetate in the
host for several weeks after inhalation, and antibiotics can
prolong the incubation period for developing disease.
Inhalation Anthrax
• Incubation period: 1-7 days (range up to
43 days)
• Prodrome of cough, myalgia, fatigue,
and fever
• Rapid deterioration with fever, dyspnea,
cyanosis and shock, often with
radiographic evidence of mediastinal
widening
Case-fatality:
—without antibiotic treatment - 85%- 97%
—with antibiotic treatment - 75% (45% in 2001)
Initial symptoms of inhalation anthrax can include a non-
productive cough, myalgia, fatigue, and fever. Profound,
Anthrax
often drenching sweat was a prominent feature of the first
10 bioterrorism-related cases in 2001. A brief period of
improvement has been reported following the prodromal
symptoms, but was not seen in the 2001 cases. Rapid
deterioration then occurs, with high fever, dyspnea, cyanosis,
and shock. Chest x-ray often shows pleural effusion and
mediastinial widening due to lymphadenopathy. Meningitis,
often hemorrhagic, occurs in up to half of patients with
inhalation anthrax. Prior to the bioterrorist attacks in
2001, the case-fatality estimates without antibiotics were
85%-97%. With antibiotics, the case-fatality rate is estimated
to be 75%. For inhalation anthrax cases in 2001, the case-
fatality rate with intensive therapy was 45% (5 of 11 cases).
Death sometimes occurs within hours of onset.
Initial symptoms of an influenza-like illness (ILl) could be
similar to early symptoms of inhalation anthrax. ILl is a
nonspecific respiratory illness characterized by fatigue, fever,
cough, and other symptoms. Most cases of ILl are not caused
by influenza but by other viruses, such as rhinovirus and
adenovirus. Nasal congestion and rhinorrhea (runny nose)
are common with ILl, but not common with inhalation
anthrax. Shortness of breath is common with inhalation
anthrax but not common with ILL Most persons with
inhalation anthrax have abnormalities on chest x-ray,
whereas most persons with ILI do not have abnormal chest
x-rays (although primary influenza pneumonia or secondary
bacterial pneumonia may occur in persons with influenza).
Anthrax Laboratory Diagnosis
* Gram stain of clinical samples (skin
lesion, blood, pleural fluid, CSF)
* Culture
* Adjunct Assays
-PCR
—serology (PA-based ELISA)
—immunohistochemistry
Laboratory Diagnosis
The diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax should be suspected by
the characteristic painless, shallow ulcer with a black crust.
Gram stain of vesicular fluid will reveal typical gram-positive
bacteria. Diagnosis can be confirmed by culture.
Gastrointestinal anthrax is difficult to diagnose because of
its similarity to other severe gastrointestinal diseases. A
history of ingesting potentially contaminated meat and
presence of typical symptoms may be helpful. Diagnosis of
inhalation anthrax can also be difficult. Mediastinal widening
on chest x-ray is a useful clinical finding. The bacterial
burden may be so great in advanced infection that bacteria
are visible on Gram stain of unspun peripheral blood.
Gram-positive bacteria may be present in other clinical
specimens, such as pleural fluid, skin biopsy lesion material,
oropharyngeal ulcers, or cerebrospinal fluid. Diagnosis is
usually confirmed with a positive culture for B. anthracis.
Standard blood cultures should show growth in 6-24 hours.
Other laboratory tests that may assist in the diagnosis are
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which detects B. anthracis
DNA in pleural fluid or blood, serology (PA-based ELISA),
and tissue immunohistochemistry, in which tissue is stained
with specific cell wall and capsular antibodies.
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Medical Management
Antibiotics are the most important therapeutic intervention
in any form of anthrax and should he started as soon as
the disease is suspected. Naturally occurring strains of
B . anthracis are typically sensitive to several antibiotics,
including penicillin, tetracycline, and oral fluoroquinolones
(ciprofloxacin and ofloxacin). B. anthracis produces a
cephalosporinase that inhibits the antibacterial activity of
cephalosporins such as ceftriaxone. Consequently,
cephalosporins should not be used for treatment of anthrax.
Naturally occurring B. anthracis may also be resistant to
other commonly used antibiotics, such as sulfamethoxazole,
trimethoprim, and aztreonam.
All patients with bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in
2001 received combination antimicrobial therapy with more
than one agent active against B. anthracis. The survival rate
among these patients was higher (55%) than in previous
descriptions. The apparent improvement in survival suggests
that the antibiotic combinations used in these patients may
have therapeutic advantage compared with previous regimens.
Limited data on treatment suggest that early intravenous
treatment with a fluoroquinolone (e.g., ciprofloxacin) and
at least one other active drug may improve survival.
Treatment should initially be intravenous, then oral (PO)
when clinically appropriate. Antibiotics should be continued
for 30-60 days, or longer. In addition to antibiotics, aggressive
supportive care, such as draining of pleural effusions,
correction of electrolyte and acid-base disturbances, and
early mechanical ventilation appear to increase the likelihood
of survival for inhalation anthrax.
For cutaneous anthrax, ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is
recommended as first-line therapy. Intravenous therapy with
a multidrug regimen is recommended for cutaneous anthrax
with signs of systemic involvement, for extensive edema, or
for lesions on the head and neck. Cutaneous anthrax is
typically treated for 7—10 days. However, in the setting of
a bioterrorism attack, the risk for simultaneous aerosol
exposure may be high. As a result, persons with cutaneous
anthrax associated with a bioterrorism attack should be
treated for 60 days. Even if promptly treated with appropriate
antibiotics, cutaneous anthrax will continue to progress
through the eschar phase.
The most current recommendations on treatment of
anthrax can be found on the CDC Public Health
Emergency Preparedness and Response website at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov.
Anthrax Medical Management
* Antibiotics
—ciprofloxacin or doxycycline and
>1 additional drug active against
B. anthracis*
-IV, then PO
—30-60 days duration
• Aggressive supportive care
* rifampin, vancomycin, penicillin, ampicillin,
chloramphenicof, imipenem, clindamycin, clarithromycin
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Anthrax Epidemiology
* Reservoir Infected animals, soil
* Transmission Direct contact (cutaneous)
Ingestion (gastrointestinal)
Inhalation
• Temporal pattern None
* Communicability Not communicable (inhalation)
Very rare (cutaneous)
Anthrax Epidemiology
Persons at Risk
* Agricultural exposure to
animals (rare)
* Laboratorians exposed to
B. anthracis spores (rare)
• Processors of wool, hair, hides,
bones or other animal products
(extremely rare)
Biological terrorism
Epidemiology
Occurrence
Anthrax occurs worldwide and is most common in agricul-
tural regions with inadequate control programs for anthrax
in livestock. These regions include South and Central
America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Middle East. Prior to 2001, anthrax was
very rare in the United States, with no human cases reported
during 1993-1999.
Reservoir
The main reservoirs of anthrax are infected animals and
soil. Anthrax spores are highly resistant to physical and
chemical agents and persist in the environment for many
years. The spores may remain dormant in certain types of
soil for decades.
Transmission
The most common method of transmission of anthrax is
through direct contact with an infected animal. B . anthracis
may enter the body through a preexisting skin lesion or may
be inadvertently introduced through an injury from a con-
taminated object. The result of this source of transmission is
cutaneous anthrax. Vectors such as flies and vultures may
mechanically spread the organism in some circumstances,
but vectors are not believed to be important in human
infection. Meat from an infected animal can transmit B.
anthracis if the infected meat is eaten undercooked.
B . anthracis can also be transmitted by inhalation of
airborne or aerosolized spores. In nature, B. anthracis
spores are 2-6 microns in diameter. If aerosolized by industrial
processing of contaminated products, or as a result of a
bioterrorist attack, particles larger than 5 microns in
diameter quickly fall from the atmosphere and bond to any
surface. These particles are difficult to resuspend in the air,
but may remain in the environment for years. Spores 2-5
microns in diameter behave as a gas and move through the
environment without settling. Spores of this size are able to
pass through the pores in paper, as occurred in mail processing
facilities subsequent to the anthrax attacks in 2001.
Particles smaller than 5 microns in diameter, if inhaled, are
small enough to reach the lower respiratory tract and can
lead to inhalation anthrax.
Naturally-occurring anthrax is extremely rare in the United
States (see Secular Trends). Persons at risk of anthrax are
primarily those who have contact with infected animals.
However, although animal anthrax occurs in the United
States, this mode of transmission is rare. Laboratory personnel
312
Anthrax
or other persons who come into contact with B . anthracis
spores could be at increased risk, although only two
laboratory-associated anthrax cases have been reported
(both were inhalation anthrax). In the past, persons
involved in processing wool, hair, hides, and/or bones from
infected animals could be infected. However, improvements
in animal husbandry and strict importation requirements for
animal products have made this source of infection extremely
rare. Exposure to B. anthracis through an effective bioterrot'
ist attack occurred for the first time in 2001.
Temporal Pattern
Anthrax may occur throughout the year. Animal-related
cases occur primarily in the spring and summer.
Communicability
Persons with inhalation anthrax are not contagious.
Human-to-human transmission of cutaneous anthrax
has been reported but is very rare.
Secular Trends
Anthrax most commonly occurs in herbivores, which
are infected by ingesting or inhaling spores from the soil.
Humans are infected naturally following contact with
anthrax-infected animals or anthrax-contaminated animal
products. Estimation of the true incidence of human
anthrax worldwide is difficult because reporting of anthrax
cases is unreliable. The largest recent epidemic of human
anthrax occurred in Zimbabwe during 1978-1980; 9,445
cases were reported, including 141 (1.5%) deaths.
In the United States, the annual incidence of human
anthrax declined from approximately 130 cases annually
in the early 1900s to no cases during 1993-1999. Most cases
reported in the United States have been cutaneous. A single
case of cutaneous anthrax was reported in 2000, and two
cases were reported in 2002. During the 20th century, only
18 cases of inhalation anthrax were reported, the most
recent in 1976. Gastrointestinal anthrax has not been
reported in the United States.
Anthrax continues to be reported among domestic and
wild animals in the United States. The incidence of anthrax
in U.S. animals is not known. However, reports of animal
infection have occurred in the Great Plains states from
Texas to North Dakota.
Except for the single case in 2000 and two cases in 2002, all
other cases of anthrax in the United States since 1993 were
related to intentional exposure from a bioterrorist attack.
Most infected persons were exposed in mail-sorting facilities
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or had direct contact with a contaminated envelope. The
source of the B . anthracis used in these attacks has not been
determined.
Case Definition
A confirmed case of anthrax is defined as a clinically
compatible case of cutaneous, respiratory, or gastrointestinal
illness that is laboratory confirmed by isolation of B. anthracis
from an affected tissue or site, or other laboratory evidence
of B. anthracis infection based on at least two supportive
laboratory tests. A suspect case of anthrax is a clinically
compatible case of illness without isolation of B. anthracis
and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence
of B . anthracis by one supportive laboratory test, or a clinically
compatible case of anthrax epidemiologically linked to a
confirmed environmental exposure, but without corroborative
laboratory evidence of B . anthracis infection.
Any person suspected of having any type of anthrax
must be reported immediately to the local or state health
department.
Anthrax Vaccines
> 1881 Pasteur develops first live attenuated
veterinary vaccine for livestock
• 1939 Improved live veterinary vaccine
• 1954 First cell-free human vaccine
• 1970 Improved cell-free vaccine licensed
Anthrax Vaccine
* Cell-free culture filtrate of toxigenic
strain of 6. anthracis
* Filtrate contains protective antigen
(PA) and other cellular products
* Adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide as
an adjuvant
* Contains small amounts of
benzethonium chloride (preservative)
and formaldehyde (stabilizer)
Anthrax Vaccine
Louis Pasteur successfully attenuated B. anthracis and
produced the first live attenuated bacterial vaccine for
animals in 1881. An improved live vaccine containing an
unencapsulated avirulent variant of B. anthracis (the Stem
vaccine) was developed for livestock in 1939. This vaccine
continues to be used as the principal veterinary vaccine in
the Western Hemisphere. The use of livestock vaccines was
associated with occasional death in the animal, and live
vaccines were considered unsuitable for humans. In the
early 20th century, filtrates of artificially cultivated
B . anthracis were explored as potential vaccines. The first
human culture filtrate vaccine was developed in 1954. This
vaccine used alum as an adjuvant. It provided protection in
monkeys, caused minimal reactivity and short-term adverse
reactions in humans, and was used in the only efficacy study
of human vaccination against anthrax in the United States.
In the late 1950s the vaccine was improved through the
selection of a B . anthracis strain that produced a higher
fraction of protective antigen, the production of a protein-
free medium, and the use of aluminum hydroxide rather
than alum as the adjuvant. This vaccine—anthrax vaccine
adsorbed (AVA)—was licensed for use in the United States
in 1970.
Characteristics
AVA is the only FDA-licensed human anthrax vaccine in
the United States. It is prepared from a cell-free culture fil-
trate of a toxigenic, nonencapsulated strain of B. anthracis.
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The vaccine does not contain dead or live bacteria. The
filtrate contains a mix of cellular products and contains all
three toxin components (LF, EF, and PA). The vaccine is
adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide as an adjuvant. AVA
contains no more that 0.83 mg aluminum per 0.5-mL dose,
0.0025% benzethonium chloride as a preservative, and
0.0037% formaldehyde as a stabilizer.
Immunogenicity and Vaccine Efficacy
The principal antigen responsible for producing immunity
is PA. Approximately 83% of recipients of AVA develop
detectable antibody to PA by 2 weeks after the first dose,
and 91% after two or more doses. Approximately 95% of
vaccinees seroconvert with a fourfold rise in anti-PA IgG
titers after three doses. However, the precise correlation
between antibody titer (or concentration) and protection
against infection is not known with certainty.
Anthrax Vaccine Efficacy
* 95% seroconversion following
3 doses
* One controlled human trial using
earlier vaccine
—92.5% efficacy (cutaneous and
inhalation disease combined)
* Animal models suggest protection
against inhalation anthrax
The only controlled clinical human trial of anthrax was
performed among mill workers in 1955-1959 using the
alum-precipitated vaccine (the PA-based precursor to the
currently licensed AVA). In this controlled study, 379
employees received the vaccine, 414 received a placebo,
and 340 received neither the vaccine nor the placebo.
The study documented a vaccine efficacy of 92.5% for
protection against anthrax (cutaneous and inhalation
combined). During the study, an outbreak of inhalation
anthrax occurred among the study participants. Overall,
five cases of inhalation anthrax occurred in persons who
were either placebo recipients or did not participate in the
controlled part of the study. No cases occurred in anthrax
vaccine recipients. No data are available regarding the
efficacy of anthrax vaccine for persons younger than 18 years
or older than 65 years of age.
• Duration of immunity unknown
Anthrax Vaccine Efficacy in Macaques
Year Vaccine Challenge
1954 alum SOxLDj,
1954 alum lOOxED^
1956 alum 100 x LD;,
1995 alum. hyd. 200xLD„
1995 alum. hyd. 200 x LD„
Time Survival
16 d 7 of 7
16 d 4 of 4
34 d 4 of 4
7d 10 of 10
1 yrs 10 of 10
2 yrs 6 of 7
8 wks 10 of 10
38 wks 3 of 3
100 wks 7 of 8
12 wks 10 of 10
The protective efficacy of the alum-precipitated vaccine
(the earlier form of the PA filtrate vaccine) and AVA has
been demonstrated in several animal studies using different
routes of spore exposure. Inhalation anthrax in macaque
(Rhesus) monkeys is believed to best reflect human disease,
and AVA has been shown to be protective for up to 100
weeks after pulmonary challenge with B. anthracis.
The duration of immunity in humans following vaccination
with AVA is unknown. Data from animal studies suggest
that the duration of efficacy after two inoculations might be
1-2 years.
Vaccination Scheduie and Use
Primary vaccination with AVA consists of three subcuta-
neous (SC) injections at 0, 2, and 4 weeks, followed by
Anthrax Vaccine Schedule
* Initial doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks
* Additional doses at 6, 12, and
18 months
* Annual booster doses thereafter
* Alternative schedules being
investigated
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doses at 6, 12, and 18 months. To maintain immunity,
the manufacturer recommends an annual booster dose. The
basis for the schedule of vaccinations at 0, 2, and 4 weeks,
and 6, 12, and 18 months followed by annual boosters is not
well defined.
As with other licensed vaccines, no data indicate that
increasing the interval between doses adversely affects
immunogenicity or safety. Interruption of the vaccination
schedule does not require restarting the entire series of
anthrax vaccine or the addition of extra doses.
Because of the complexity of a six-dose primary vaccination
schedule and frequency of local injection-site reactions (see
Adverse Reactions), studies are being conducted to assess
the immunogenicity of schedules with a reduced number of
doses and with intramuscular (IM) rather than subcutaneous
administration. Preliminary results indicate that schedules
using fewer doses at longer intervals, and IM rather than
SC route, produce similar concentrations of antibody to PA.
However, no alternate schedule has yet been approved for
use by the FDA.
Anthrax Vaccine
Preexposure Vaccination
• Persons working with production of
quantities or concentrations of
B. anthracis cultures
* Persons engaged in activities with a
high potential for production of
aerosols containing B. anthracis
• Persons with increased risk of
exposure to intentional release of
6. anthracis (e.g., certain military
personnel)
Preexposure Vaccination
Routine preexposure vaccination with AVA is indicated for
persons engaged in work involving production of quantities
or concentrations of B. anthracis cultures and in activities
with a high potential for aerosol production. Laboratory
personnel using standard Biosafety Level 2 practices in
routine processing of clinical samples are not at increased
risk for exposure to B . anthracis spores. The risk for persons
who come in contact in the workplace with imported
animal hides, furs, bone meal, wool, animal hair, or bristles
has been reduced by changes in industry standards and
import restrictions. Routine preexposure vaccination is
recommended only for persons in this group for whom these
standards and restrictions are insufficient to prevent exposure
to anthrax spores. Routine vaccination of veterinarians in
the United States is not recommended because of the low
incidence of animal cases. However, vaccination might be
indicated for veterinarians and other persons handling
potentially infected animals in areas with a high incidence
of anthrax cases.
Preexposure vaccination may be indicated for certain
military personnel and other select groups who may be
exposed to an intentional release of B. anthracis.
Preexposure vaccination is not currently recommended for
emergency first responders, federal responders, medical
practitioners, or private citizens.
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Postexposure Vaccination
Limited data are available regarding the postexposure efficacy
of AVA. Studies in nonhuman primates indicate that post-
exposure vaccination alone is not protective. However,
studies have shown that antibiotics in combination with
postexposure vaccination are effective at preventing
disease in animals after exposure to B. anthracis spores.
The current vaccine is approved by FDA only for preexposure
vaccination. The optimal number of doses for postexposure
prophylaxis use of the vaccine is not known. An estimated
83% of human vaccinees develop a vaccine-induced
immune response after two doses of the vaccine, and more
than 95% develop a fourfold rise in antibody titer after
three doses. Although the precise correlation between
antibody titer and protection against disease is not clear,
these studies of postexposure vaccine regimens used in
combination with antibiotics in nonhuman primates have
consistently documented that one or two doses of vaccine
were sufficient to prevent development of disease once
antibiotics were discontinued.
Adverse Reactions Following
Vaccination
The most common adverse reactions following AVA are
local reactions. In AVA prelicensure evaluations, minor
local reactions (defined as erythema, edema, and induration
less than 30 mm) occurred after 20% of vaccinations, moderate
local reactions (edema and induration of 30-120 mm)
occurred after 3% of vaccinations, and severe local reactions
(edema or induration more than 120 mm) occurred after 1%
of vaccinations. Local reactions usually occur within 24 hours
and subside within 48 hours. Subcutaneous nodules occur at
the injection site in 30%-50% of recipients and persist for
several weeks. In multiple Department of Defense studies,
systemic reactions (i.e., chills, muscle aches, malaise, or
nausea) occurred in 5%-35% of vaccine recipients. Systemic
reactions are usually mild and transient. Fever is not common
following AVA. Severe (e.g., allergic) reactions are rare.
Adverse reactions following anthrax vaccination have been
assessed in several studies conducted by the Department of
Defense in the context of the routine anthrax vaccination
program. In one of these studies, 1.9% of vaccine recipients
reported limitations in work performance or had been placed
on limited duty due to a local reaction. Only 0.3% reported
more than 1 day lost from work; 0.5% consulted a clinic for
evaluation; and one person (0.02%) required hospitalization
for an injection-site reaction. Adverse reactions were reported
more commonly among women than among men.
No studies have documented occurrence of chronic diseases
(e.g., cancer or infertility) following anthrax vaccination.
Anthrax Vaccine
Postexposure Vaccination
* No efficacy data for postexposure
vaccination of humans
• Postexposure vaccination alone
not effective in primates
* Combination of vaccine and
antibiotics appears effective in
animal model
Anthrax Postexposure Prophylaxis
Vaccine Combined with Antibiotics
* Henderson, et al (1956): earlier PA-based vaccine
—Methods: 5 days of penicillin compared to penicillin
plus postexposure vaccination
—Results: 9 of the 10 receiving just penicillin died,
while all of the macaques receiving both penicillin
and vaccine survived
* Friedlander et al (1993): aluminum hydroxide PA
filtrate vaccine (current FDA-licensed vaccine)
—Methods: 30 days of various antibiotics compared to
30 days of doxycycline plus postexposure
vaccination
-Results; 9 of the 10 animats in the doxycycline-alone
arm survived, while all receiving doxycycline and
vaccine survived
Anthrax Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
* Local reactions
— minor 20%-50%
— severe 1%
* Systemic symptoms 5%-35%
* Severe reactions rare
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In an assessment of the safety of anthrax vaccine, the
Institute of Medicine (lOM) noted that published studies
reported no significant adverse effects of the vaccine, but
the literature is limited to a few short-term studies. One
published follow-up study of laboratory workers at Fort
Detrick, Maryland, concluded that during the 25-year
period following receipt of anthrax vaccine, the workers did
not develop any unusual illnesses or unexplained symptoms
associated with vaccination. The lOM found no evidence
that people face an increased risk of experiencing life-
threatening or permanently disabling adverse reactions
immediately after receiving AVA, when compared with the
general population. Nor did it find any convincing evidence
that an elevated risk of developing long-term adverse health
effects is associated with receiving AVA, although data are
limited in this regard (as they are for all vaccines).
CDC has conducted two epidemiologic investigations of
the health concerns of Persian Gulf War (PGW) veterans
that examined a possible association with several factors,
including anthrax vaccination. Current scientific evidence
does not support an association between anthrax vaccine
and PGW illnesses.
No data are available regarding the safety of anthrax vaccine
for persons younger than 1 8 years and older than 65 years
of age. Adverse reactions can occur in persons who must
complete the anthrax vaccination series because of high
risk of exposure or because of employment requirements.
Several protocols have been developed to manage specific
local and systemic adverse reactions (available at
www.anthrax.osd.mil). However, these protocols have not
been evaluated in randomized trials.
Anthrax Vaccine
Contraindications and Precautions
* Severe allergic reaction to a
vaccine component or
following a prior dose
* Previous anthrax disease
* Moderate or severe acute
illness
Contraindications And Precautions
As with all vaccines, AVA is contraindicated for persons
who have experienced a severe allergic (anaphylactic)
reaction to a vaccine component or following a prior dose
of AVA. Anthrax vaccine is contraindicated for persons
who have recovered from anthrax because of observations
of more severe adverse reactions among recipients with a
history of anthrax disease. A moderate or severe acute illness
is a precaution, and vaccination should be postponed until
recovery. This prevents superimposing the adverse reactions
from the vaccine on the underlying illness or mistakenly
attributing a manifestation of the underlying illness to the
vaccine. Vaccine can be administered to persons who have
mild illnesses with or without low-grade fever.
No studies have been published regarding use of anthrax
vaccine among pregnant women. The vaccine is neither
licensed nor recommended during pregnancy. Pregnant
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women should be vaccinated against anthrax only if the
potential benefits of vaccination outweigh the potential
risks to the fetus. No data suggest increased risk for side
effects or temporally related adverse events associated with
receipt of anthrax vaccine by breastfeeding women or
breastfed children. AVA may be administered to an
immunosuppressed person if necessary, but response to the
vaccine may be suboptimal.
Postexposure Prophylaxis With
Antibiotics
Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and procaine penicillin G,
are approved by FDA for the treatment of anthrax and are
considered the drugs of choice for the treatment of naturally
occurring anthrax. In addition, ofloxacin has also demon-
strated in vitro activity against B. anthracis. Although
naturally occurring B . anthracis resistance to penicillin is
rare, such resistance has been reported.
Antibiotics are effective against the germinated form of
B . anthracis but are not effective against the spore form of
the organism. Following inhalation exposure, spores can
survive in tissues for months without germination in non-
human primates. This phenomenon of delayed vegetation
of spores resulting in prolonged incubation periods has not
been observed for routes of infection other than inhalation.
In one study, macaques were exposed to four times the LD50
dose of anthrax spores (the dose of spores that will result in
the death of 50% of the exposed animals). The proportion
of spores that survived in the lung tissue was estimated to be
15%-20% at 42 days, 2% at 50 days, and less than 1% at 75
days. Spores have been detected in animals up to 100 days
following exposure. Although the LD50 dose for humans is
believed to be similar to that for nonhuman primates, the
length of persistence of B . anthracis spores in human lung
tissue is not known. The length of persistence probably
depends on the dose inhaled. The prolonged incubation
period reported in an outbreak of inhalation anthrax in the
former Soviet Union suggests that lethal amounts of spores
might have persisted up to 43 days after initial exposure.
Anthrax Postexposure ^
Antibiotic Prophylaxis
• Ciprofloxicin, doxycycline, and
procaine penicillin G approved for
postexposure prophylaxis after
aerosol exposure to B. anthracis
• Due to latency of spores in lung,
antibiotics should continue for 30-60
days or more
Discontinue antibiotics after third
dose of vaccine
Postexposure Prophylaxis Following Inhalation
Exposure
Postexposure prophylaxis against B . anthracis with antibiotics
is recommended following an aerosol exposure to B . anthracis
spores. Such exposure might occur following an inadvertent
exposure in a laboratory setting or a biological terrorist
incident. Inhalation anthrax in humans has not been
reported to result from contact with naturally occurring
anthrax among animals. Currently, ciprofloxacin, doxycycline,
and procaine penicillin G are approved by FDA for use as
Recommended Postexposure Prophylaxis
to Prevent Inhalational Anthrax
initial Therapy
Adults Ciprofloxacin
(including pregnant 500 mg PO BID
women and OR
immunocompromised) Doxycycline
100 mg PO BID
Duration
60 days
Children Ciprofloxacin 60 days
10-15 mg/kg POQ12hrs*
OR
Doxycycline;
>8 yrs and >45 kg: 100 mg PO BIO
>8 yrs and 545 kg: 2.2 mg^g PO BID
<8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg PO BID
'Ciprofloxacin dose should not exceed 1 gram per day in children.
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antibiotic prophylaxis for inhalation B . anthracis infection.
Because of concern about the possible antibiotic resistance
of B. anthracis, ciprofloxacin or doxycycline should be used
initially for antibiotic prophylaxis until organism suscepti-
bilities are known. Antibiotic chemoprophylaxis can be
switched to penicillin VK or amoxicillin, particularly for
children, once antibiotic susceptibilities are known and the
organism is found to be penicillin susceptible with minimum
inhibitory concentrations (MlCs) attainable with oral therapy.
Because of the potential persistence of spores following an
aerosol exposure, antibiotic therapy should be continued
for at least 60 days if used alone. If vaccine is available,
antibiotics can be discontinued after three doses of vaccine
have been administered according to the standard schedule
(0, 2, and 4 weeks). Although the shortened (3-dose) vaccine
regimen has been effective when used in a postexposure
regimen that includes antibiotics, the duration of protection
after vaccination is not known. Therefore, if subsequent
exposures occur, additional vaccinations might be required.
Postexposure Antibiotic Prophyiaxis Foiiowing
Cutaneous or Gastrointestinal Exposure
No controlled studies have been conducted in animals or
humans to evaluate the use of antibiotics alone or in
combination with vaccination following cutaneous or
gastrointestinal exposure to B. anthracis. Cutaneous and rare
gastrointestinal exposures of humans are possible following
outbreaks of anthrax in livestock. In these situations, on the
basis of pathophysiology, reported incubation periods, current
expert clinical judgment, and lack of data, postexposure
prophylaxis might consist of antibiotic therapy for 7-14
days. Antibiotics could include ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin,
doxycycline, penicillin, or amoxicillin.
Vaccine Storage and Handling
AVA must be stored at 35°-46°F (2°-8°C). The vaccine
should not be frozen. The manufacturer (Bioport
Corporation, Lansing, Michigan 1877-BIO-THRAX])
should be contacted for advice should the vaccine be
exposed to freezing temperature or a prolonged period at
room temperature.
Bioterrorism Preparedness
Research on anthrax as a biological weapon began more
than 90 years ago. In 1999, at least 17 nations were believed
to have offensive biological weapons programs; it is not
known how many are working with anthrax. Iraq has
acknowledged producing and weaponizing anthrax. One
terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, dispersed aerosols of
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Biological Terrorism
B. anthracis considered likely
biological terrorism threat
—aerosolized stable spore form
—human LD50 8,000-40,000 spores
(one deep breath at site of release)
—acute illness with high fatality rate
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anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo, Japan, on at least
eight occasions. For unknown reasons the attacks failed to
produce illness.
B . anthracis is considered one of the most likely biological
warfare agents because of the ability of B . anthracis spores to
be transmitted by the respiratory route, the high mortality of
inhalation anthrax, and the greater stability of B. anthracis
spores compared with other potential biological warfare
agents. The World Health Organization estimates that 50 kg
of B. anthracis released upwind of a population center of
500,000 could result in 95,000 deaths and 125,000 hospital-
izations, far more deaths than predicted in any other scenario
of agent release.
A total of 22 anthrax cases in four states and the District of
Columbia occurred in October and November 2001 as a
result of a series of bioterrorist attacks with B. anthracis.
Eleven cases were inhalation anthrax, of which five were
fatal. The organism was sent through the U.S. postal system.
Nine of the cases of inhalation anthrax occurred in persons
with direct exposure to an envelope containing B. anthracis.
The envelopes contaminated several office buildings and
mail processing centers. Cross-contamination of mail in the
processing centers is suspected as the source of exposure in
those cases without known direct exposure to a contaminat-
ed letter. Several thousand persons required postexposure
antibiotic prophylaxis because of exposure to contaminated
buildings. Information on the 2001 anthrax attacks,
recommendations for management of anthrax infection
and exposure, and information on bioterrorism preparedness
is available on the CDC Public Health Emergency
Preparedness and Response website at http://www.bt.cdc.gov.
Anthrax Bioterrorism Attacks-
United States, 2001
• 22 cases (11 inhalation, 11
cutaneous) in 4 states and DC
* B. anthracis sent through
U.S. mail
Most exposures occurred in
mail sorting facilities and
sites where mail was opened
Bioterrorism Information
CDC Emergency Preparedness
and Response Website
www.bt.cdc.gov
Selected References
Brachman PS, Friedlander AM, Grabenstein JD. Anthrax
vaccine. In: Plotkin SA, Orenstein WA, eds. Vaccines. 4th
ed. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders; 2003:887—904.
CDC. Use of anthrax vaccine in the United States:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices. MMWR 2000;49(No. RR- 15): 1-20.
CDC. Update: investigation of anthrax associated with
intentional exposure and interim public health guidelines,
October 2001. MMWR 2001;50:889-93.
CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related
anthrax and interim guidelines for exposure management
and antimicrobial therapy, October 2001.
MMWR 2001;50:909-19.
321
Anthrax
CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related
anthrax—Connecticut, 2001. MMWR 2001;50:1077—9.
Cieslak TJ, Eitzen EM. Clinical and epidemiologic
principles of anthrax. Emerg Infect Dis 1999;5:552-5.
Demicheli V, Rivetti D, Deeks JJ, et al. The effectiveness
and safety of vaccines against human anthrax: a systematic
review. Vaccine 1998;16:880-4.
Ingleshy TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. Anthrax as
a biological weapon. JAMA 1999;281:1735-45.
Jernigan JA, Stephens DS, Ashford DA. Bioterrorism-related
inhalational anthrax: the first 10 cases reported in the
United States. Emerg Infect Dis 2001;7:933-44.
Joellenbeck LM, Zwanziger L, Dutch JS, Storm BE, (eds).
The anthrax vaccine: is it safe? Does it work? Washington DC:
National Academies Press, 2002. (Institute of Medicine Report).
LaForce ME Anthrax. Clin Infect Dis 1994;19:1009-14.
Turnbull PCB. Guidelines for the surveillance and control of
anthrax in humans and animals. Geneva, Switzerland: World
Health Organization, Department of Communicable
Diseases Surveillance and Response, 1998; publication
no.WHO/EMC/ZDI./98.6.
Young JAT, Collier RJ. Attacking anthrax. Sci Am
2002;286:48-59.
322
Appendix
APPENDIX A
Schedules and Recommendations
Immunization Schedules on the Web A^l
Childhood Immunization Schedule 2006 A-2
Adult Immunization Schedule 2005*2006 A*6
Recommended Minimum Ages and Intervals A«10
Summary Recommendations for Childhood
& Adolescent Immunization A«12
Summary of Recommendations for Adult Immunization A«15
Antibody'Live Vaccine Interval Table A*18
Healthcare Worker Vaccination Recommendations A*19
Immunization of Immunocompromised Patients Tables A'20

Appendix
Immunization Schedules on the Web
Childhood and Adolescent Immunization Schedule
Schedule: http://www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/child-schedule.htm
Contains:
- English and Spanish versions
- Color and black & white versions
- 4-page, 2-page, and pocket-size versions
- Palm OS and Pocket PC Handheld versions
- Screenreader accessible version
- Downloadable files for office printing or commercial printing
- Link to past years’ schedules
- Interactive childhood vaccine scheduler
- more . . .
Adult Immunization Schedule Schedule:
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/adult-schedule.htm
Contains:
- Color and black & white versions
- 4-page, 2-page, and pocket-size versions
- Downloadable files for office printing or commercial printing
- Screenreader accessible version
- Summary of changes since last year’s version
- Adult vaccination screening form
- Adult and adolescent vaccine “quiz”
- more . . .
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Appendix A
Recommended and minimum ages and intervals between vaccine doses*
Vaccine and dose number
Recommended
age
for this dose
Minimum age
for this dose
Recommended
interval
to next dose
Minimum interval
to next dose
Hepatitis B-1' Birth Birth 1-4 months 4 weeks
Hepatitis B-2 1-4 months 4 weeks 2-17 months 8 weeks
Hepatitis B-3' 6-18 months 24 weeks - -
DTaP-1’ 2 months 6 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
DTaP-2 4 months 10 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
DTaP-3 6 months 14 weeks 6-12 months 6 months’*
DTaP-4 15-18 months 12 months 3 years 6 months’
DTaP-5 4-6 years 4 years - -
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib)-I’" 2 months 6 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
Hib-2 4 months 10 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
Hib-3" 6 months 1 4 weeks 6-9 months 8 weeks
Hib-4 12-15 months 12 months - -
Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV)-I' 2 months 6 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
IPV-2 4 months 10 weeks 2-14 months 4 weeks
IPV-3 6-18 months 14 weeks 3-5 years 4 weeks
IPV-4 4-6 years 1 8 weeks - -
Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV)-I " 2 months 6 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
PCV-2 4 months 1 0 weeks 2 months 4 weeks
PCV-3 6 months 14 weeks 6 months 8 weeks
PCV-4 12-15 months 12 months - -
MMR-1** 12-15 months^ 12 months 3-5 years 4 weeks
MMR-2» 4-6 years 13 months - -
Varicella *• 12-18 months 12 months 4 weeks " 4 weeks **
Hepatitis A-1 12-23 months 12 months 6-18 months'* 6 months’
Hepatitis A-2 18-41 months 18 months - -
Influenza Vaccine (TIV)*" 6-23 months 6 months 1 month 4 weeks
Influenza Vaccine (LAIV)"* - 5 years 6-10 weeks 6 weeks
Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine (MCV) 11-12 years 11 years - -
Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine (MPSV)-I - 2 years 5 years 5 years
MPSV-2 - 7 years - -
Tdapn-d >1 1 years 11 years 10 years 5 years
Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPV)-1 - 2 years 5 years 5 years
PPV-2 - 7 years'’’^ - -
DTaP = Diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine
MMR = Measles, mumps and rubella
TIV = Trivalent (inactivated ) influenza vaccine
LAIV = Live, attenuated (intranasal) influenza vaccine
Td = Tetanus and reduced diphtheria toxoids.
Tdap = Tetanus toxoid, reduced dipththeria toxoid, and reduced acellular pertussis vaccine
A^IO
Appendix
* Combination vaccines are available. Using licensed combination vaccines is preferred over separate injections of their
equivalent component vaccines (Source: CDC. Combination vaccines for childhood immunization: recommendations of
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP). MMWR 1999;48(No. RR-5);5). When administering combination
vaccines, the minimum age for administration is the oldest age for any of the individual components; the minimum
interval between doses is equal to the greatest interval of any of the individual components.
t Combination vaccines containing the Hepatitis B component are available (HepB-Hib, DTaP-HepB-IPV, HepA-HepB).
These vaccines should not be administered to infants less than 6 weeks old because of the other components (i.e
,
Hib
DTaP, IPV, and HepA).
§ Hepatitis B-3 should be administered at least 8 weeks after Hepatitis B-2 and at least 16 weeks after Hepatitis B-1
,
and
it should not be administered before age 24 weeks.
^1 Calendar months.
J The minimum recommended interval between DTaP-3 and DTaP-4 is 6 months. However. DTaP-4 needn’t be repeated
if administered at least 4 months after DTaP-3.
•* For Hib and PCV, children receiving the first dose of vaccine at age 7 months or older require fewer doses to complete
the series (see CDC. Haemophilus b conjugate vaccines for prevention of Haemophilus influenzae, type b disease
among infants and children two months of age and older: recommendations of the ACIP. MMWR 1991
;
40(No. RR-1]:1-
7, and CDC. Preventing pneumococcal disease among infants and young children: recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR 2000; 49(No. RR-9);1-35).
tT For a regimen of only PRP-OMP (Pedvax-Hib®. manufactured by Merck), a dose administered at age 6 months is not
required.
§§ Combination MMR-varicella can be used if the child is younger than 13 years old. Also see footnote
During a measles outbreak, if cases are occurring among infants younger than 12 months of age. measles vaccination
of infants aged 6 months and older can be undertaken as an outbreak control measure. However, doses administered
before the first birthday should not be counted as part of the series. (Source: CDC. Measles, mumps, and rubella -
vaccine use and strategies for elimination of measles, rubella, and congenital rubella syndrome and control of mumps:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 1998;47[No. RR-8]:1-57).
Children aged 12 months through 12 years require only one dose of varicella vaccine. Persons aged 13 years and older
should receive two doses separated by at least 4 weeks. Children younger than 13 years old can receive a second
dose of varicella vaccine during a varicella outbreak if it has been 3 months or more since the first dose.
Two doses of influenza vaccine are recommended for children younger than 9 years of age who are receiving the
vaccine for the first time. Children younger than 9 years who have previously received influenza vaccine, and persons 9
years of age and older, require only one dose per influenza season.
ttt A second dose of meningococcal vaccine is recommended for people previously vaccinated with MPSV who remain at
high risk of meningococcal disease. MCV is preferred when revaccinating persons aged 11-55 years, but a second
dose of MPSV is acceptable. (Prevention and Control of Meningococcal Disease Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2005; 54: RR-07.)
§§§ Only one dose of Tdap is recommended. Subsequent doses should be given as Td. If vaccination to prevent tetanus
and/or diphtheria disease is required during the ages 7 through 10 years, Td should be given (minimum age for Td is 7
years). The preferred interval between Tdap and a previous dose of Td is 5 years. For management of a tetanus-prone
wound, the minimum interval after a previous dose of any tetanus-containing vaccine is 5 years.
A second doses of PPV is recommended for persons at highest risk for serious pneumococcal infection and those who
are likely to have a rapid decline in pneumococcal antibody concentration. Revaccination 3 years after the previous
dose can be considered for children at highest risk for severe pneumococcal infection who would be younger than 10
years of age at the time of revaccination. (See CDC. Prevention of pneumococcal disease: recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 1997;46[No. RR-8]:1-24).
Adapted from Table 1, ACIP General Recommendations on Immunization: MMWR 2002;51(No. RR-2) January 2006
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Appendix
Healthcare Worker Vaccination Recommendations
Vaccine Recommendations in brief
Hepatitis B Give 3-dose series (dose #1 now, #2 in 1 month, #3 approximately 5 months after #2). Give IM. Obtain
anti-HBs serologic testing 1-2 months after dose #3.
Influenza Give 1 dose of TIV or LAIV annually. Give IM or intranasally, respectively.
MMR For persons born in 1957 or later without serologic evidence of immunity or prior vaccination, give
2 doses of MMR, 4 weeks apart. Give SC.
Varicella
(chickenpox)
For persons who have no serologic proof of immunity, prior vaccination, or history of varicella disease,
give 2 doses of varicella vaccine, 4 weeks apart. Give SC.
Tetanus/
diphtheria
All adults need a Td booster dose every 10 years, following the completion of the primary 3-dose
series. Give IM. Note: As of Aug. 2005, CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
is in discussion about the u,se of acellular pertussis vaccine in healthcare workers (HCWs).
Meningococcal Give 1 dose to microbiologists who are routinely exposed to isolates of N. meningitidis.
Hepatitis A, typhoid, and polio vaccines are not routinely recommendedfor HCWs who may have on-the-joh exposure to fecal material.
Hepatitis B
Healthcare workers (HCWs) who perform tasks that may involve exposure
to blood or body fluids should receive a 3-dose series of hepatitis B vaccine
at 0-, 1-, and 6-month intervals. Test for hepatitis B surface antibody (anti-
HBs) to document immunity 1-2 months after dose #3.
•If anti-HBs is at least 10 mlU/mL (positive), the patient is immune. No
further serologic testing or vaccination is recommended.
•If anti-HBs is le.ss than 10 mlU/mL (negative), the patient is unpro-
tected from HBV infection; revaccinate with a 3-dose series. Retest
anti-HBs 1-2 months after dose #3.
-If anti-HBs is positive, the patient is immune. No further testing or
vaccination is recommended.
-If anti-HBs is negative following 6 doses of vaccine, the patient is a
non-responder.
For non-responders; Persons who are non-responders should be consid-
ered susceptible to HBV and should be counseled regarding precautions to
prevent HBV infection and the need to obtain HBIG prophylaxis for any
known or probable parenteral exposure to hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg)-positive blood.* It is also possible that non-responders are per-
sons who are HBsAg positive. Testing should be considered. Persons found
to be HBsAg positive should be counseled and medically evaluated.
Note; Anti-HBs testing is not recommended routinely for previously vacci-
nated HCWs who were not tested 1-2 months after their original vaccine
series. These HCWs should be tested for anti-HBs when they have an expo-
sure to blood or body fluids. If found to be anti-HBs negative, the HCW
should be protected.*
Influenza
Trivalent (Inactivated) Influenza Vaccine (TIV); May give to any HCW.
Live, Attenuated Influenza Vaccine (LAIV): May give to any non-preg-
nant healthy HCW age 49 years and younger.
1. All HCWs should receive annual influenza vaccine. Groups that should
be targeted include all personnel (including volunteers) in hospitals, out-
patient. and home-health settings who have any patient contact.
2. TIV is preferred over LAIV for HCWs who are in close contact with
severely immunosuppres.sed persons (e.g., stem cell transplant patients)
when patients require a protective environment.
Measles, Mumps, Rubella (MMR)
Persons who work in medical facilities should be immune to measles and
rubella. Immunity to mumps is highly desirable.
• Persons born in 1957 or later can be considered immune to measles,
mumps, or rubella only if they have documentation of (a) physician-diag-
nosed measles or mumps disease; or (b) laboratory evidence of measles,
mumps, or rubella immunity (persons who have an “indeterminate" or
"equivocal” level of immunity upon testing should be considered
nonimmune); or (c) appropriate vaccination against measles, mumps, and
rubella (i.e., administration on or after the first birthday of two doses of live
measles vaccine separated by 28 days or more, at least one dose of live
mumps vaccine, and at least one dose of live rubella vaccine).
• Although birth before 1957 generally is considered acceptable evidence
of measles and rubella immunity, healthcare facilities should consider rec-
ommending a dose of MMR vaccine to unvaccinated HCWs bom before
1957 who are in either of the following categories: (a) do not have a history
of measles disease or laboratory evidence of measles immunity and (b) do
not have laboratory evidence of rubella immunity.
Varicella
It is recommended that all HCWs be immune to varicella, either from a
reliable history of varicella disease or vaccination. Serologic screening for
varicella immunity need not be done before vaccinating unless the healthcare
institution considers it co.st effective. Routine po.sivaccination testing of
HCWs for antibodies to varicella is not recommended because commercial
tests are often not sensitive enough to measure vaccine-induced immunity.
Tetanus/Diphtheria (Td)
All persons should receive aTd booster every 10 years. A 3-dose primary
series of a tetanus/diphtheria-containing product (DTP, DTaP. DT, Td) is
necessary before a booster dose is given. Note; As ofAug. 2005, ACIP is in
discussion about the use of acellular pertussis vaccine in HCWs.
Meningococcal
Vaccination is recommended for microbiologists who are routinely exposed
to isolates of N. meningitidis. Use of MCV4 is preferred among persons
ages 1 1-55 years; give IM. If MCV4 is unavailable. MPSV4 is an accept-
able alternative for persons ages 1 1-55 years. Use of MPSV4 is recom-
mended for persons older than age 55; give SC.
References
•Table 3: "Updated U.S. Public Health Service Guidelines for the Management of
Occupational Exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV and Recommendations for
Postexposure Prophylaxis,” MMWR. June 29, 2001, Vol. 50, RR-1 1.
For additional specific ACIP recommendations, refer to the otTicial ACIP state-
ments published in MMWR. To obtain copies, visit CDC's website at www.cdc.gov/
nip/publications/ACIP-list.htm; or visit the Immunization Action Coalition (lAC)
website at www.immunize.org/acip.
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Immunization Action Coalition • 1 573 Selby Ave. • St. Paul. MN 55 1 04 • (651)647-9009 • wwrw.immunize.org • www.vaccineinformation.org
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OPV
is
no
longer
recommended
for
routine
use
in
the
United
States.
^
Live
bacterial
vaccines:
BCG,
and
Ty21a
Salmonella
typhi
vaccine.
^
Live
viral
vaccines:
MMR,
OPV,
LAIV,
yellow
fever,
varicella,
and
vaccinia
(smallpox).
Smallpox
vaccine
is
not
recommended
for
children.
*
Pneumococcal
vaccine
is
not
indicated
for
children
with
chronic
granulomatous
disease.
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Appendix B
U.S. Vaccines
Vaccine Name Manufacturer Type Route Comments
Anthrax BioThrax BioPort Inactivated Bacterial SC
DTaP
Daptacel sanofi Inactivated Bacterial IM
Toxoids (tetanus &
diphtheria) + Vaccine
(pertussis). Not licensed for
5''’ dose.
Infanrix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated Bacterial IM
Toxoids (tetanus &
diphtheria) + Vaccine
(pertussis).
Tripedia sanofi Inactivated Bacterial IM
Toxoids (tetanus &
diphtheria) + Vaccine
(pertussis).
DT (Generic) sanofi Inactivated
Bacterial
Toxoids
IM Pediatric formulation
DTaP/Hib TriHIBit sanofi Inactivated Bacterial IM
ActHIB reconstituted with
Tripedia. Licensed for 4“’
dose of DTaP & Hib series
(not primary series).
DTaP/IPV/HepB Pediarix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated Bacterial
& Viral
IM
Approved for doses at 2, 4, 6
months (through 6 years of
age). Not licensed for
boosters.
Haemophilus
influenzae type b
(Hib)
HibTITER Wyeth Inactivated Bacterial IM
HbOC. Polysaccharide
conjugate (diphtheria protein
carrier). 4-dose schedule.
PedvaxHIB Merck Inactivated Bacterial IM
PRP-OMP. Polysaccharide
conjugate (mening. protein
carrier). 3-dose schedule.
ActHIB sanofi Inactivated Bacterial IM
PRP-T. Polysaccharide
conjugate (tetanus toxoid
carrier). 4-dose schedule.
Hepatitis A
Havrix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated Viral IM
Pediatric (<18) and adult
formulations.
Pediatric = 720 EL.U., O.SmL
Adult = 1,140 EL.U., I.OmL
Minimum age = 1 year.
Vaqta Merck Inactivated Viral IM
Pediatric (<18) and adult
formulations.
Pediatric = 25 U, O.SmL
Adult = 50 U. I.OmL
Minimum age = 1 year.
Hepatitis B
Engerix-B GlaxoSmithKline
Inactivated Viral
(recombinant)
IM
Pediatric (<19) and adult
formulations. Pediatric
formulation is not licensed for
adults.
Recombivax HB Merck
Inactivated Viral
(recombinant)
IM
Pediatric (£19), adult, and
dialysis formulations. Two
pediatric doses may be
substituted for an adult dose.
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HepA/HepB Twinrix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated Viral IM
Pediatric dose of HepA +
adult dose of HepB.
Minimum age = 18 years.
HepB/Hib Comvax Merck
Inactivated Bacterial
& Viral
IM
Should not be used for HepB
birth dose.
Fluarix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated Viral IM
Trivalent Types A & B.
Minimum age = 18 years.
Fluvirin Chiron Inactivated Viral IM
Trivalent Types A & B
Purified surface antigen.
Minimum age = 4 years.
Influenza
Fluzone sanofi Inactivated Viral IM
Trivalent Types A & B
Subvirion.
Minimum age multidose vial =
6 months.
Age range 0.25ml prefilled
syringe = 6-35 months.
Minimum age 0.5ml prefilled
syringe = 3 years.
FluMist Medimmune Live attenuated viral Intra-
nasal
Trivalent Types A & B.
Age range 5-49 years.
Japanese
Encephalitis
JE-Vax sanofi Inactivated viral SC
MMR M-M-R II Merck Live attenuated viral SC Measles, mumps, rubella.
MMRV ProQuad Merck Live attenuated viral SC Measles, mumps, rubella,
varicella.
Measles Attenuvax Merck Live attenuated viral SC Edmonston-Enders strain
Mumps Mumpsvax Merck Live attenuated viral SC Jeryl Lynn strain
Rubella Meruvax II Merck Live attenuated viral SC RA 27/3 strain
Menomume sanofi Inactivated bacterial SC Polysaccharide, containing
serogroups A, C, Y, & W-135.
Meningococcal
Menactra sanofi Inactivated bacterial IM
Polysaccharide conjugate
(diphtheria toxoid carrier),
containing serogroups A, C,
Y, & W-135. Age range 11-
49.
Pneumovax 23 sanofi Inactivated bacterial SC or IM Polysaccharide. Contains 23
strains.
Pneumococcal
Prevnar Wyeth Inactivated bacterial IM
Polysaccharide conjugate
(diphtheria protein carrier).
Contains 7 strains.
Polio Ipol sanofi Inactivated viral SC or IM Trivalent, Types 1, 2, & 3.
BioRab BioPort Inactivated viral IM
Rabies Imovax Rabies sanofi Inactivated viral IM
RabAvert Chiron Inactivated viral IM
Appendix B
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Td
Decavac sanofi
Inactivated bacterial
toxoids
IM
Tetanus/diphtheria toxoids.
Adult formulation
(Generic)
Massachusetts
Biological Labs
Inactivated bacterial
toxoids
IM
Tetanus/diphtheria toxoids.
Adult formulation
Tdap
Boostrix GlaxoSmithKline Inactivated bacterial IM
Tetanus & diphtheria toxoids
& pertussis vaccine. Licensed
for ages 10-18.
Adacel sanofi Inactivated bacterial IM
Tetanus & diphtheria toxoids
& pertussis vaccine. Licensed
for ages 11-64.
TT (Generic) sanofi
Inactivated bacterial
toxoid
IM
Tetanus toxoid. May be used
for adults or children.
Typhoid
Typhim Vi sanofi Inactivated bacterial IM Polysaccharide.
Vivotif Berna Berna Live bacterial Oral Ty21a strain.
Varicella Varivax Merck Live viral SC
Vaccinia
(Smallpox)
Dryvax Wyeth Live viral
Percu-
taneous
Yellow Fever YF-Vax sanofi Live viral SC
November 2005
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Vaccine Excipient & Media Summary
This section begins with a summary of the excipients included in licensed vaccines in the
United States, as of the revision date at the bottom of the page.
Excipients are inactive ingredients of a drug product necessary for production of a finished
pharmaceutical formulation.
After the list of excipients is a list of culture media used in the manufacturing process of vac-
cines licensed in the United States.
Growth media are culture materials used to produce mass quantities of a microorganism anti-
body, or other immunologic agent, suitable for further processing into a finished pharma-
ceutical product.
All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of this information, but manu-
facturers may change product contents before that information is reflected here.
Excipients Included in US Licensed Vaccines*
Excipient Use Vaccine
Albumin, egg (Ovalbumin) Growth medium Rabies (RabAvert)
Albumin, human serum Component of growth medium,
protein stabilizer
Measles (Attenuvax), MMR
{MMR-II), Mumps (Mumpsvax),
Rabies (Imovax), Rubella {Mem-
vox IP)
Albumin or serum, bovine Component of growth medium,
protein stabilizer
Hepatitis A (Havrix, Vaqta),
Measles {Attenuvax), MMR
{MMR-II), Mumps {Mumpsvax),
Rabies {Imovax, RabAvert),
Rubella {MAruvax II), Vaccinia
{Dryvax), Varicella {Varivax)
Aluminum hydroxide Adjuvant Anthrax {BioThrax), DTaP {Infan-
rix), DTaP-Hep B-IPV {Pedi-
arix), DT (Massachusetts), Td
(Massachusetts), Hepatitis A
{Havrix), Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B
{Twinrix), Hepatitis B {Engerix-
B), Tdap {Boostrix)
Aluminum phosphate Adjuvant DTaP {Daptacel), Td (Aventis
Pasteur, Massachusetts), Hepa-
titis A-Hepatitis B {Twinrix),
Pneumococcal {Prevnar), Rabies
{BioRab)
Aluminum potassium sulfate Adjuvant DTaP {Daptacel, Tripedia), DTaP-
Hib {TriHIBit), DT (Aventis Pas-
teur)
Amino acids Component of growth medium Anthrax {BioThrax), Hepatitis A
{Havrix), Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B
{Twinrix), Td (Aventis Pasteur),
Typhoid oral {Vivotif)
Ammonium sulfate Protein fractionation DTaP-Hib {TriHIBit), Hib {Act-
HIB)
Amphotericin B Antibacterial Rabies {RabAvert)
Ascorbic acid Antioxidant Typhoid oral {Vivotif)
Bactopeptone Component of growth medium Influenza (varies seasonally)
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Excipients Included in US Licensed Vaccines*
Excipient Use Vaccine
Beta-propiolactone Viral inactivator Influenza (Fluvirin), Rabies
{Imovax, RabAvert)
Benzethonium chloride Preservative Anthrax (BioThrax)
Brilliant green Dye Vaccinia (Dryvax-historic)
Chlortetracycline Antibacterial Rabies (RabAvert), Vaccinia
(Dryvax)
DNA Manufacturing residue Hepatitis A (Vaqta)
Ethylenediannine-tetraacetic
acid sodium (EDTA)
Preservative Rabies (RabAvert), Varicella
(Varivax)
Egg protein Manufacturing residue Influenza (all brands). Yellow
fever (YF-Vax)
Formaldehyde, formalin Antimicrobial, preservative Anthrax (BioThrax), DTaP (all
brands), DTaP-Hep B-IPV (Pedi-
arix), DTaP-Hib (TriHlBit), DT
(all brands), Td (all brands).
Hepatitis A (Havrix, Vaqta),
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B (Twin-
rix), Hib (ActHIB), Hib-Hepatitis
B (Comvax), Influenza (Fluzone),
Japanese encephalitis (JE-Vax),
Poliovirus inactivated (Ipol),
Tdap (Boostrix)
Gelatin Stabilizer in freeze-drying,
solvent
DTaP (Tripedia), DTaP-Hib (Tri-
HlBit), Influenza (Fluzone), Japa-
nese encephalitis (JE-Vax),
Measles (Attenuvax), Mumps
(Mumpsvax), Rubella (Meruvax
II), MMR (MMR-ID, Rabies
(RabAvert), Typhoid oral (Vivo-
tif). Varicella (Varivax), Yellow
fever (YF-Vax)
Gentamicin Antibacterial Influenza (FluMist)
Glutaraldehyde Toxin detoxifier DTaP (Infanrix), DTaP-Hep
B-IPV (Pediarix), Tdap (Boost-
rix)
Glycerin Solvent Vaccinia (DryVax)
Glycine Protein stabilizer DT (most brands), Td (most
brands)
Hydrochloric acid Adjust pH DTaP (most brands), DT (most
brands)
Lactose Stabilizer in freeze-drying, filling BCG (Tice), Hib (some pack-
ages), Meningococcal (Meno-
mune). Typhoid oral (Vivotif)
Magnesium stearate Lubricant for capsule filling Typhoid oral (Vivotif)
Monosodium glutamate Stabilizer Influenza (FluMist), Varicella
(Varivax)
Mouse serum protein Manufacturing residue Japanese encephalitis (JE-Vax)
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Excipients Included in US Licensed Vaccines*
Excipient Use Vaccine
MRC-S cellular protein Manufacturing residue Hepatitis A (Havrix, Vaqta),
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B {Twin-
rix). Rabies {Imovax), Poliovirus
inactivated (Poliovax), Varicella
(Varivax)
Neomycin Antibacterial DTaP-Hep B-IPV (Pediarix),
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B (TWin-
rix), Influenza (Fluvirin), Meas-
les (Attenuvax), Mumps
(Mumpsvax), Rubella (Meruvax
If), MMR (MMR-II), Poliovirus
inactivated (Ipol), Rabies
(Imovax, RabAvert), Vaccinia
(DryVax), Varicella (Varivax)
Phenol Preservative, antibacterial Pneumococcal (Pneumovax-23),
Typhoid inactivated (Typhim M)
Vaccinia (Dryvax)
Phenol red (phenolsulfonphtha-
lein)
pH indicator, dye Rabies (Imovax)
2-Phenoxyethanol Preservative DTaP (Infanrix, Daptacel), DTaP-
Heb B-IPV (Pediarix), Hepatitis
A (Havrix), Hepatitis A-Hepatitis
B (Twinrix), Poliovirus inacti-
vated (Ipol), Td (Aventis Pasteur)
Phosphate buffers (eg, disodium,
monosodium, potassium,
sodium dihydrogenphosphate)
Adjust pH DTaP (most brands), DT (most
brands), Hib (Act-Hib), Hepatitis
A (Havrix), Hepatitis A-Hepatitis
B (Twinrix), Hepatitis B (Engerix-
B), Influenza (FluMist), Measles
(Attenuvax), Meningococcal
(Menactra), Mumps
(Mumpsvax), Poliovirus inacti-
vated (Ipol), Rabies (BioRab),
Rubella (Meruvax II), MMR
(MMR-If), Typhoid inactivated
(Typhim Vi), Varicella (Varivax)
Polydimethylsilozone Antifoaming agent Typhoid inactivated (Typhim Vt)
Polyethylene glycol p-isooctyl-
phenyl ether (Triton X-100)
Nonionic surfactant (viral inacti-
vation)
Influenza (Fluzone)
Polymyxin B Antibacterial DTaP-Heb B-IPV (Pediarix),
Influenza (Fluvirin), Poliovirus
inactivated (Ipol), Vaccinia
(Dryvax)
Polyoxyethylene9- 10 nonyl
phenol (Triton N-101,
octoxynol 9)
Nonionic surfactant (viral inacti-
vation)
Influenza (Fluvirin)
Polysorbate 20 Surfactant Hepatitis A (Havrix), Hepatitis
A-Hepatitis B (Twinrix)
Polysorbate 80 Surfactant DTaP (Infanrix, Tripedia), DTaP-
Heb B-IPV (Pediarix), DTaP-Hib
(TriHIBit), Td^ (Boostrix)
Potassium glutamate Stabilizer Rabies (RabAvert)
Appendix B
Vaccine Excipient & Media Summary
Excipients Included in US Licensed Vaccines*
Excipient Use Vaccine
Sodium acetate Adjust pH DT (some brands), Td (some
srands)
Sodium borate Adjust pH Hepatitis A (Vacjta), Hib-Hepa-
titis B (Comvax)
Sodium chloride Adjust tonicity Most vaccines, including
Anthrax, BCG, Measles, Menin-
gococcal (Menactra), Mumps,
MMR, Pneumococcal, Polio
inactivated. Rabies. Rubella,
Typhoid inactivated. Varicella,
Yellow fever, Tdap (Boostrix)
Sodium hydroxide Adjust pH DT (most brands), Td (most
brands)
Sorbitol Stabilizer, solvent Measles (Attenuvax), Mumps
{Mumpsvax), Rubella (Meruvax
If), MMR (MMR-II), Yellow
fever (YF-Vax)
Streptomycin Antibacterial Poliovirus inactivated {Ipol), Vac-
cinia (Dryvax)
Sucrose Stabilizer DTaP-Hib (TriHIBit), Hib {Act-
HIB), Influenza (FluMist), Meas-
les (Attenuvax), Mumps
(Mumpsvax), MMR (MMR-II),
Typhoid oral (Vivotif), Varicella
(Varivax)
Thimerosal Preservative in some multi-dose
containers (see package labeling
for precise content)
DTaP (some multidose contain-
ers), DTaP-Hib (TriHIBit), DT
(some multidose containers), Td
(some multidose containers).
Hepatitis B (some multidose con-
tainers), Hib (some multidose
containers). Influenza (some mul-
tidose containers), Japanese
encephalitis (JE-Vax), Meningo-
coccal (Menomune), Rabies (Bio-
Rab). Some single-dose
containers contain trace amounts
of thimerosal from the production
process, but substantially lower
concentrations than if used as a
preservative. Consult product
monographs and labeling for
details.
Urea Stabilizer Varicella vaccine (Varivax, refrig-
erator stable)
Vitamins unspecified Component of growth medium Anthrax (BioThrax), Rabies
(Imovax), Td (Aventis Pasteur)
Yeast protein Component of growth medium DTaP-Heb B-IPV (Pediarix).
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B (Twin-
rix). Hepatitis B (Engerix-B,
Recombivax-HB), Hib (HibTiter),
Hib-Hepatitis B (Comvax)
* Proprietary names appear in italics.
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Vaccine-Production Media*
Vaccine Culture Media Vaccine(s)
Bovine protein DTaP-Hep B-IPV (poliovirus component, Pedi-
arix). Pneumococcal {Pneumovax-23), Typhoid
oral (Vivotif)
Calf skin Vaccinia (Dryvax)
Chick embryo fibroblast tissue culture Measles (Attenuvax), Mumps (Mumpsvax), combi-
nation vaccines containing them. Rabies (RabA-
vert)
Chick kidney cells Influenza (master viruses for FluMist)
Chicken embryo (fertilized egg) Influenza (all brands). Yellow fever (YF-Vax)
Cohen-Wheeler, modified (pertussis components) DTaP (alternate is Stainer-Scholte media)
Fenton media containing bovine casein Tdap (Boostrix)
Human diploid tissue culture, MRC-5 Hepatitis A (Havrix, Vaqta), Hepatitis A-Hepatitis
B (Twinrix), Poliovirus inactivated (Poliovax),
Rabies {Imovax), Varicella (Varivax)
Human diploid tissue culture, WI-38 Rubella (Meruvax II), combination vaccines con-
taining it. Varicella (Varivax)
Lathan medium derived from bovine casein DTaP (Infanrix, tetanus component), DTaP-Hep
B-IPV (Pediarix), Tdap (Boostrix)
Linggoud-Fenton medium containing bovine
extract
DTaP (Infanrix diphtheria component), DTaP-Hep
B-IPV (Pediarix), Tdap (Boostrix)
Monkey kidney tissue culture, Vero (Vervet or
African green monkeys)
DTaP-Hep B-IPV (poliovirus component, Pedi-
arix), Poliovirus inactivated (Ipol)
H Mouse brain Japanese encephalitis (JE-Vax)
^ Mueller-Hinton agar medium Meningococcal conjugate (Menactra)
Mueller-Miller medium Diphtheria and tetanus vaccines (most brands),
meningococcal conjugate (Menactra)
Rhesus fetal lung tissue culture Rabies (BioRab)
Stainer-Scholte medium DTaP (Daptacel, Infanrix, pertussis component),
DTaP-Hep B-IPV (Pediarix), Tdap (Boostrix)
Soy peptone broth Pneumococcal (Prevnar)
Synthetic/semi-synthetic Anthrax (BioThrax), BCG (Tice), DT (all brands),
Td (all brands), Hib (all brands). Meningococcal
(Menomune), Pneumococcal (Pneumovax-23),
Typhoid inactivated (Typhim Vi)
Watson-Scherp medium Meningococcal conjugate (Menactra)
Yeast or yeast extract (typically Saccharomyces
cerevisiae)
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B (Twinrix), Hepatitis B
(Engerix-B, Recombivax-HB), Hib (HibTiter), Hib-
Hepatitis B (Comvax), Medium for growing Coryne-
bacterium diphtheriae strain C7 (bl97) to obtain
CRM
, 97 protein for conjugation to polysaccharides
(HibTiter, Prevnar).
Proprietary names appear in italics.
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References: Canadian National Advisory Committee on Immunization. Statement on thi-
merosal. Can Comm Dis Rep. 2003;29(ACS-1):1-10.
CDC. Thimerosal in vaccines; a joint statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics and
the Public Health Service. MMWR. 1999;48:563-565.
Grabenstein JD. Immunologic necessities; Diluents, adjuvants, and excipients. Hosp Pharm.
1996;31:1387-92,1397-1401.
Grabenstein JD. Clinical management of hypersensitivities to vaccine components. Hosp
Pharm. 1997;32;77-84,87.
Offit PA, Jew RK. Addressing parents’s concerns; Do vaccines contain harmful preserva-
tives, adjuvants, additives, or residuals. Pediatrics. 2003; 11 2; 1394- 1401.
Reprinted courtesy of Grabenstein JD. ImmunoFacts:
Vaccines & Immunologic Drugs. St. Louis, MO: Wolters
Kluwer Health, Inc.; 2006.
Vaccine Excipient & Media Summary, Part 2
Excipients Included in U.S. Vaccines, by Vaccine
Vaccine Contains
Anthrax (BioThrax) Aluminum Hydroxide, Amino Acids, Benzethonium Chloride, Formaldehyde or
Formalin, Sodium Chloride, Vitamins (unspecified)
BCG (Tice) Lactose, Sodium Chloride
DTaP (DAPTACEL) Aluminum Phosphate, Aluminum Potassium Sulfate, Formaldehyde or
Formalin, 2-Phenoxyethanol
DTaP (Infanrix) Aluminum Hydroxide, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Glutaraldhyde, 2-
Phenoxyethanol, Polysorbate 80
DTaP (Tripedia) Aluminum Potassium Sulfate, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Gelatin, Polysorbate
80, Thimerosal*
DTaP (Most brands) Hydrochloric Acid, Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium,
sodium dihydrogen phosphate)
DTaP/Hib (TriHlBit) Aluminum Potassium Sulfate, Ammonium Sulfate, Formaldehyde or Formalin,
Gelatin, Polysorbate 80, Sucrose, Thimerosal*
DTaP/HepB/IPV (Pediarix) Aluminum Hydroxide, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Glutaraldhyde, Neomycin,
2-Phenoxyethanol, Polymyxin B, Polysorbate 80, Thimerosal*, Yeast Protein
DT (Aventis) Aluminum Potassium Sulfate, Formaldehyde or Formalin
DT (Massachusetts) Aluminum Hydroxide, Formaldehyde or Formalin
DT (Some brands) Glycine, Hydrochloric Acid, Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium,
potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate). Sodium Acetate, Sodium
Hydroxide, Thimerosal (some multidose containers)
Hib (ACTHib) Ammonium Sulfate, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Phosphate Buffers (e.g.,
disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate). Sucrose
Hib (PedvaxHib) Aluminum Hydroxyphosphate Sulfate, Sodium Chloride
Hib (HibTITER) Yeast Protein
Hib (Some packages) Lactose
Hib/Hep B (Comvax) Formaldehyde or Formalin, Sodium Borate, Yeast Protein
Hep A (Havrix) Bovine Albumin or Serum, Aluminum Hydroxide, Amino Acids, Formaldehyde
or Formalin, MRC-5 Cellular Protein, 2-Phenoxyethanol, Phosphate Buffers
(e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate),
Polysorbate 20
Hep A (Vaqta) Bovine Albumin or Serum, DNA, Formaldehyde or Formalin, MRC-5 Cellular
Protein, Sodium Borate
Hep B (Engerix-B) Aluminum Hydroxide, Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium,
potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate), Thimerosal*, Yeast Protein
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Hep B (Recombivax) Yeast Protein
HepA/HepB (Twinrix) Aluminum Hydroxide, Aluminum Phosphate, Amino Acids, Formaldehyde or
Formalin, MRC-5 Cellular Protein, Neomycin, 2-Phenoxyethanol, Phosphate
Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate), Polysorbate 20, Thimerosal*, Yeast Protein
Influenza (Fluarix) Egg Albumin (Ovalbumin), Egg Proteiin, Formaldehyde or Formalin,
Gentamicin, Hydrocotrisone, OctoxynoI-10, a-Tocopheryl Hydrogen Succinate,
Polysorbate 80, Sodium Deoxycholate, Thimerosal*
Influenza (Fluvirin) Beta-Propiolactone, Egg Protein, Neomycin, Polymyxin B, Polyoxyethylene 9-
10 Nonyl Phenol (Triton N-101, Octoxynol 9), Thimerosal ( multidose
containers)
Influenza (Fluzone) Egg Protein, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Gelatin, Polyethylene glycol p-
isooctylphenyl ether (Triton X-100), Thimerosal (multidose containers)
Influenza (FluMist) Egg Protein, Gentamicin, Monosodium Glutamate, Phosphate Buffers (e.g.,
disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate). Sucrose
Influenza (varies seasonally) Bactopeptone
IPV (Ipol) Formaldehyde or Formalin, Neomycin, 2-Phenoxycthanol, Phosphate Buffers
(e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate).
Polymyxin B, Sodium Chloride, Streptomycin
Japanese Encephalitis
(JE-Vax)
Formaldehyde or Formalin, Gelatin, Mouse Serum Protein, Thimerosal
Measles (Attenuvax) Human Serum Albumin, Bovine Albumin or Serum, Gelatin, Neomycin,
Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol, Sucrose
Meningococcal (Menactra) Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate). Sodium Chloride
Meningococcal (Menomune) Lactose, Thimerosal (10-dose vials only)
Mumps (Mumpsvax) Human Scrum Albumin, Bovine Albumin or Serum, Gelatin, Neomycin,
Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogcn
phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol, Sucrose
MMR(MMR-II) Human Serum Albumin, Bovine Albumin or Serum, Gelatin, Neomycin,
Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol, Sucrose
MMRV (ProQuad) Sucrose, Gelatin, Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol, Monosodium L-glutamate, Human
Serum Albumin, MRC-5 Cellular Protein, Neomycin, Bovine Albumin or
Serum, Sodium Phosphate Dibasic, Sodium Bicarbonate, Potassium Phosphate
Monobasic, Potassium Chloride, Potassium Phosphate Dibasic
Pneumococcal (Pneumovax) Phenol, Sodium Chloride
Pneumococcal (Prevnar) Aluminum Phosphate, Sodium Chloride
B'll
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Rabies (Biorab) Aluminum Phosphate, Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium,
potassium, sodium dihydrogen phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Thimerosal
Rabies (Imovax) Human Serum Albumin, Bovine Albumin or Serum, Beta-Propiolactone,MRC-
5 Cellular Protein, Neomycin, Phenol Red (Phenolsulfonphthalein), Sodium
Chloride, Vitamins (unspecified)
Rabies (RabAvert) Egg Albumin (Ovalbumin), Bovine Albumin or Serum, Amphotericin B, Beta-
Propiolactone, Chlortetracycline, Ethylenediamine-Tetraacetic Acid Sodium
(EDTA), Gelatin, Neomycin, Potassium Glutamate, Sodium Chloride
Rubella (Meruvax II) Human Scrum Albumin, Bovine Albumin or Serum, Gelatin, Neomycin,
Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol
Td (Decavac) Aluminum Phosphate, Amino Acids, Formaldehyde or Formalin, 2-
Phcnoxyethanol, Thimerosal (some multidose containers). Vitamins
(unspecified)
Td (Massachusetts) Aluminum Hydroxide, Aluminum Phosphate, Formaldehyde or Formalin,
Thimerosal (some multidose containers)
Td (Some Brands) Glycine, Sodium Acetate, Sodium Hydroxide
Tdap (Adacel) Aluminum Phosphate, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Glutaraldehyde, 2-
Phenoxyethanol, Sodium Chloride
Tdap (Boostrix) Aluminum Hydroxide, Formaldehyde or Formalin, Glutaraldehyde, Polysorbate
80
Typhoid (inactivated -
Typhim Vi)
Phenol, Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium
dihydrogen phosphate), Polydimethylsilozone, Sodium Chloride
Typhoid (oral - TY21a) Amino Acids, Ascorbic Acid, Gelatin, Lactose, Magnesium Stearate, Sucrose
Vaccinia (DryVax) Bovine Albumin or Serum, Brilliant Green (historic), Chlortetracycline,
Glycerin, Neomycin, Phenol, Polymyxin B, Streptomycin, Urea (refrigerator-
stable formulation only)
Varicella (Varivax) Bovine Albumin or Serum, Ethylenediamine-Tetraacetic Acid Sodium (EDTA),
Gelatin, Monosodium Glutamate, MRC-5 Cellular Protein, Neomycin,
Phosphate Buffers (e.g., disodium, monosodium, potassium, sodium dihydrogen
phosphate). Sodium Chloride, Sucrose
Yellow Fever (YF-Vax) Egg Protein, Gelatin, Sodium Chloride, Sorbitol
*Where “thimerosal” is marked with an asterisk (*) it indicates that the product should be considered equivalent to
thimerosal-free products. This vaccine may contain trace amounts (<3 meg) of mercury left after post-production
thimerosal removal, but these amounts have no biological effect.
JAMA \999\2^2{\%) and JAMA 2000;283(16)
Adapted from Grabenstein JD. ImmunoFacts: Vaccines & Immunologic Drugs. St. Louis, MO: Wolters Kluwer
Health Inc.; 2006 with additional content from individual products’ package inserts.
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Thimerosal Content in Some US Licensed Vaccines
updated September 13, 2005
1 Thimerosal Mercury 1
1 Vaccine Brand Name Manufacturer Concentration(l) mcg/0.5 ml I
Anthrax Biothrax BioPort Corp 0 0
DTaP Tripedia sanofi pasteur . .
Infanrix GlaxoSmithKline 0 0
Oaptacel sanofi pasteur 0 0
DTaP-HepB-IPV Pediarix GlaxoSmithKline .
DTaP-Hib TriHIBit sanofi pasteur . .
DTwP All Products
.01% 25
DT Diphtheria & Telanus Toxoids mulli-dose
.01% 25
Adsorbed USP
.
,
.
single dose . .
Td Tetanus and Diphtheria Toxoids Adsorbed sanofi pasteur . .
Tdap ADACEL sanofi Pasteur 0 0
Boostrix GlaxoSmithKline 0 0
Tetanus Toxoid Tetanus Toxoid Adsorbed USP
.01% 25
Tetanus Toxoid Adsorbed Adult Use sanofi pasteur
.01% 25
Booster
.01% 25
Hib ActHIB /OmniHib sanofi pasteur 0 0
HibTITER Wyeth-Ayerst 0 0
PedvaxHIB liquid (2) Merck 0 0
Hib-HepB Comvax (3) Merck 0 0
Hepatitis A Havrix GlaxoSmithKline 0 0
Vaqta adult/pediatric Merck 0 0
Hepatitis B Engerix-B preservative free GlaxoSmithKline • .
Recombivax HB preservative free Merck 0 0
Hep A-B Twinrix GlaxoSmithKline . .
influenza 2004 15
Formula
prefilled syringe (0.25 mL) * •
Fluzone prefilled syringe (O.SmL) sanofi pasteur
.01% 25
multi-dose (5 mL) .01% 25
Fluvirin preservative free • .
Fluvirin
.01% 25
FluMist Medimmune 0 0
2005.6 Formula Fluarix GlaxoSmithKline * •
IPV IPOL sanofi pasteur 0 0
Meningococcal Menactra sanofi Pasteur 0 0
.01% 25
single dose • •
MMR M-M-R II Merck 0 0
MMR-Varicella ProQuad Merck 0 0
Pneumococcal Prevnar Wyeth-Ayerst 0 0
Pneumovax 23 Merck 0 0
Rabies RabAvert Chiron 0 0
IMOVAX sanofi pasteur 0 0
Typhoid Fever Typhim Vi sanofi pasteur 0 0
Vivotif Berna Biotch 0 0
Varicella Varivax Merck 0 0
Yellow Fever YF-VAX sanofi pasteur 0 0
1 . A concentration of 1 : 10,000 Is equivalent to a 0.01% concentration. Thimerosal Is approximately 50% Hg by weight. A 1:10,000 Institute for Vmccine Selety
concentration contains 25 micrograms of Hg per 0.5 mL.
2. A previously marketed lyophiMzed preparation contained 0.005% thimerosai.
3. COMVAX Is not approved for use under 6 weeks of age because of decreased response to the Hib component.
* This product should be considered equivalent to thimerosal-free products. The trace amounts (<0.3 meg) of mercury left after post-
production thimerosal removal have no biological effect. JAMA 1999;282(18) and JAMA 2000;283(16).
Johns Hopkins Univorwty
www.vmccinoaafetv.od u
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Pediatric/VFC Vaccine Price List - 1 1/8/05
CDC
Private
Sector
Brandname/ Cost/ Cost/ Contract
Vaccine Tradename Packaging Dose Dose End Date Manufacturer
DTaP/ Tripedia© 10 pack - 1 dose vials $12.25 $21.40
'
3/31/06 sanofi pasteur
DAPTACEL® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $12.75 $22.04
DTaP/ Infanrix® 10 pack - 1 dose vials
' $12.75 $20.96 3/31/06
'
GlaxoSmithKline
5 pack - 1 dose T-L $12.75 $21.44
syringes. No Needle
I
DTaP-Hep B-IPV* Pediarix® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $38.34 $70.72 3/31/06 GlaxoSmithKline
5 pack - 1 dose T-L
syringes. No Needle
$38.34 $70.72
DTaP-Hib # TriHIBit® 5 pack - 1 dose vials $24.62 $41.72 3/31/06 sanofi pasteur
e-IPV« IPOL® 10 dose vials $10.42 $21.80 3/31/06 sanofi pasteur
Hepatitis B-Hib'^ COMVAX® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $24.50 $43.56 3/31/06 Merck
Hepatitis A Pediatric* VAQTA® 10 pack - 1 dose vials
'
$12.15 $30.37 3/31/06 Merck
Hepatitis A Pediatric* Havrix® 1 dose vials $12.10 $28.63 3/31/06 GlaxoSmithKline
10 pack - 1 dose vials $12.10 $27.41
5 pack - 1 dose T-L
syringes. No Needle
$12.10 $27.41
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B 18 Twinrix® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $36.91 $78.16 3/31/06 GlaxoSmithKline
only'' 5 pack - 1 dose T-L $36.91 $78.42
syringes, No Needle
Hepatitis B* ENGERIX B®
1
,
1 dose vials $9.00 $21.37 3/31/06 GlaxoSmithKline
Pediatric/Adolescent 10 pack - 1 dose vials $9.00 $21.37
5 pack - 1 dose T-L $9.00 $21.37
syringes. No Needle
1
Hepatitis B* RECOMBIVAX
.
10 pack - 1 dose vials $9.00 $23.20 3/31/06 Merck '
Pediatric/Adolescent HB®
Hepatitis B 2 dose* RECOMBIVAX 10 pack - 1 dose vials $24.25 $59.09 3/31/06 Merck
Adolescent (11-15) HB®
Hib* PedvaxHIB® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $10.22 $2Z77 3/31/06 Merck
Hib* ActHIB®
1
5 pack - 1 dose vials $7,664 $22.53 3/31/06 sanofi pasteur j
' '
'
'
!
Hib* HibTITER® 5 pack - 1 dose vials $7.86 $22.86 3/31/06 Wyeth Vaccines
'
Meningococcal Conjugate ' Menactra'" 1 dose vials $68.00 $82.00 3/31/06 i sanofi pasteur '
(Groups A, C, Y and W- 5 pack - 1 dose vials $68.00 $82.00
135)
1
MMR/ MMRII® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $16.67 $40.37 3/31/06 Merck j
Pneumococcal Prevnar® 5 pack - 1 dose vials $54.12 $65.95 3/31/06 Wyeth/Lederle
7-valent* (Pediatric)
.
1
Tetanus & Diphtheria DECAVAC'" 10 pack - 1 dose syringes $15.90 $17.50 3/31/06
1
sanofi pasteur
Toxoids'' No Needle
J
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'1
Brandname/
Tradename
'
1
'
Packaging
CDC
Cost/
Dose
Private
Sector
Cost/
Dose
Contract
End Date
t
'
Manufacturer
Tetanus Toxoid, Reduced
Diphtheria Toxoid and
Acellular Pertussis/
BOOSTRIX 10 pack - 1 dose vials
5 pack - 1 dose TL syringes.
No Needle
$28.75'
$28.75
$35.25
$35.25
3/31/06 GlaxoSmithKline
Tetanus Toxoid, Reduced
Diphtheria Toxoid and
Acellular Pertussis/
ADACEL 10 pack - 1 dose vials $30.75 $35.75 3/31/06 sanofi pasteur
Varicella* Varivax® 10 pack - 1 dose vials $52.25 $66.81 3/31/06 Merck
/ Vaccine cost includes $2.25 dose Federal Excise Tax
# Vaccine cost includes $3.00 per dose Federal Excise Tax
Vaccine cost includes $1.50 per dose Federal Excise Tax
* Vaccine cost includes $3.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
• Vaccine cost includes $0.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
H Vaccines which contain Thimerosal as a preservative
Find current Vaccine Price Lists online at
www.cdc.gov/nip/vfc/cdc_vac_price_list.htm
m
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Adult Vaccine Price List - 1 1/8/05
Vaccine
Brandname/
Tradename Packaging
CDC
Cost/
Dose
Private
Sector
Cost/
Dose
Contract
End
Date Manufacturer
Hepatitis A Adult*
' VAQTA® 1 dose vials
10 pack - 1 dose
vials
$18.50
$18.50
$63.51
$59.99
6/30/06 Merck
Hepatitis A Adult* Havrix® 1 dose vials
5 pack - 1 dose
T-L syringes, No
Needle
$18.50
$18.50
$56.17
$54.98
6/30/06 GlaxoSmithKline
Hepatitis A-Hepatitis B
Adult''
J
TwinrixCg)
1
10 pack - 1 dose
vials
5 pack - 1 dose
T-L syringes, No
Needle
$36.91
$36.91
$78.16
$78.42
6/30/06 GlaxoSmithKline
Hepatitis B-Adult* RECOMBIVAX HB®
--J
1 dose vials
10 pack - 1 dose
vials
$19.36'
$21.23
$59.70 '
$59.09
6/30/06 Merck
Hepatitis B-Adult* ENGERIX-B® 1 dose vials
5 pack - 1 dose
T-L syringes. No
Needle
j
$24.25
$24.25
$51.38
$50.35
6/30/06 GlaxoSmithKline
Pneumococcal
Polysaccharide (23
Valent)
Pneumovax®
J
10 pack of 5
dose vials
$14.00 $24.19 6/30/06 Merck
Tetanus & Diphtheria
Toxoidsn''
Tetanus & Diphtheria
Toxoids Adsorbed for
Adults
15 dose vials $9.75 $14.99 6/30/06 Massachusetts Biologic
Labs (Henry Schein Inc.)
/ Vaccine cost includes $2.25 dose Federal Excise Tax
# Vaccine cost includes $3.00 per dose Federal Excise Tax
'' Vaccine cost includes $1.50 per dose Federal Excise Tax
Vaccine cost includes $3.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
• Vaccine cost includes $0.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
H Vaccines which contain Thimerosal as a preservative
Influenza Vaccine Price List - 1 1/8/05
Vaccine
Brandname/
Tradename Packaging
CDC
Cost/
Dose
Private
'
Sector Cost/
Dose
Contract
End
Date Manufacturer
Influenza « * Fluzone® 10 dose vials $9.71
'
$10.70
'
2/2^06
i
sanofi pasteur
Influenza * Fluzone®
Pediatric dose
Preservative-free
10 pack - 1 dose syringes $12.02 $13.00
!
2/28/06 ; sanofi pasteur
|
Influenza * FluMist® J 10 pack - 1 dose sprayers $17.^J $18.95 to $19.95 2/28/06 Medimmune
/ Vaccine cost includes $2.25 dose Federal Excise Tax
* Vaccine cost includes $3.00 per dose Federal Excise Tax
'' Vaccine cost includes $1.50 per dose Federal Excise Tax
* Vaccine cost includes $3.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
* Vaccine cost includes $0.75 per dose Federal Excise Tax
H Vaccines which contain Thimerosal as a preservative
Appendix B
Translations of Foreign-Language Terms
Table 1: Vaccines and Biologies Used in the U.S. and Foreign Markets. This table
lists many vaccine products that are (or have been) used in the U.S. and in
international markets. It is organized alphabetically by product or trade name.
Products known to be no longer in use are marked with an asterisk (*).
Table 2: Translation of Vaccine-Related Terms. This table contains many terms
found on immunization records of persons vaccinated in foreign countries,
along with their English equivalents. In many cases the term refers to the
name of the disease.
Table 3: Vaccine-Related Terms using the Cyrillic Alphabet. This table lists
Russian and Ukranian words using the Cyrillic alphabet. Transliteration of
Cyrillic characters into Latin letters is difficult, because there is no
international agreement among experts on a unified system of converting
from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.
Table 4: Translation of Disease Terms into Several Indo-European Languages
and Somali.
Table 5: Translation of Disease Terms into Western European and Scandinavian
Languages.
These tables were originally developed by the Minnesota Department of Health Immunization Program,
and are now maintained and available online through the Immunization Action Coalition
(http://www.immunize.org/izpractices/p51 20.pdf and
http://www.immunize.org/izpractices/p51 21 .pdf).
Thanks also to the Washington State Department of Health’s Immunization Manual
(http://www.doh.wa.gov/cfh/immunize/documents/schmanul.pdf), Appendix E.
These lists are not comprehensive and, although we have checked and rechecked
our sources, we do not claim complete accuracy.
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Table 1: Vaccines and Biologies Used in U.S. and International Markets
This table lists many vaccine products that are (or have been) used in the U.S. and in international markets. While we have
checked and rechecked our sources for this information, we do not claim complete accuracy. November 2004
Product or
Trade name
Antigen(s) Manufacturer (country)
A.D.T. Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) Commonwealth (Australia)
A.K.D.S. Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (U.K.)
AC Vax Meningococcus (polysaccharide) GSK (U.K.)
Acel-lmune
* Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis WYE (U.S.)
Acelluvax Pertussis (acellular) Chiron (Italy)
ACTAcel Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, Hib AVP (Argentina)
ActHIB Haemophilus influenzae type b (PRP-T) AVP (U.S.)
Adimvira A+B Influenza (whole virus) Imuna
Admun Influenza (whole virus) Duncan
Admune GP Influenza (whole virus) Duncan
Agrippal Influenza Socopharm
Aimmunogen Hepatitis A (inactivated) Chemo-Sero-Therapeutic Resh Inst (Japan)
Aldiana Diphtheria (absorbed) Sevac (Czechoslovakia)
Alditeana Diphtheria, tetanus (absorbed) Sevac (Czechoslovakia)
Alditerpera Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed), pertussis Sevac (Czechoslovakia)
Alorbat Influenza (whole virus) Asia Pharma
Alteana Sevac Tetanus Institute of Sera and Vaccines
Amaril Yellow fever AVP (France)
AMC Haemophilus influenzae, type b (Cuba)
Anadifterall Diphtheria (adsorbed) CHIR (Italy)
Anatetall Tetanus (adsorbed) CHIR (Italy)
Arilvax Yellow fever MEDI (U.K.)
Attenuvax * Measles (live, further attenuated) MRK (U.S.)
AVAC-1, AVA Anthrax (for U.S. military use)
AVAXIM Hepatitis A AVPf )
B-CAPSA * Haemophilus influenzae type b
(polysaccharide, 1987 to 1989)
Mead Johnson (U.S.)
BayGam Human immunoglobulin Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
BayHep B Hepatitis B immune globulin (human) Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
BayRab Rabies immune globulin Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
BayTet Tetanus immune globulin (human) Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
*
= product r>o longer distributed in U.S.
B^8
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Product or
Trade name
Antigen(s) Manufacturer (country)
B-CAPSA Haemophilus influenzae type b (1987-1989) Mead Johnson
BCG Tuberculosis Multiple manfacturers and countries
Begrivac Influenza (split virus) CHIR (Germany)
Betagen Hepatitis B AVP
B-Hepavac II Hepatitis B Merck
Biaflu Zonale Influenza (whole virus) Farmabiagini
Biavax II * Rubella, mumps (live) MRK (U.S.)
Biavax * Rubella, mumps (live) MRK (U.S.)
BIG Botulism immune globulin (not a vaccine)
Biken-HB Hepatitis B (recombinant) BIK (Japan)
Bimmugen Hepatitis B (recombinant, adsorbed, yeast
derived)
Chemo-Sero-Therapeutic Resh Inst (Japan)
BioThrax Anthrax (adsorbed) BPT (U.S.)
Biviraten Bema Measles, mumps (live) BER (Switzerland)
BVAC Botulinum antitoxin (for U.S. military use)
C.D.T. Diphtheria, tetanus (pediatric, adsorbed) Commonwealth (Australia)
Celluvax Pertussis (acellular) CHIR (Italy)
Cendevax * Rubella (live) 3/70 to 1976 RIT/SmithKIine & French (U.S.)
Certiva * Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis Baxter Hyland (U.S.)
Cocquelucheau Pertussis (adsorbed) AVP (France)
Comvax Hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenza type b MRK (U.S.)
Daptacel Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis AVP (U.S.)
D.S.D.P.T. Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (adsorbed) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
D.T. Bis Rudivax Diphtheria, tetanus, rubella AVP (France)
Di Te Per Pol Impfstoff Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio BER (Switzerland)
Di-Te-Pol Diphtheria, tetanus, polio Statens Seruminstitut (Denmark)
Dif-Tet-AII Diphtheria, tetanus CHIR (Italy)
DIFTAVAX Diphtheria, tetanus AVPf )
DiTe Anatoxal Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) BER (Switzerland)
Ditoxim Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
Double Anigen B.l. Diphtheria, tetanus Bengal Immunity Co (India)
Dryvax Smallpox WYE (U.S.)
DT Diphtheria, tetanus (for pediatric use) AVP (U.S.)
DT’ Diphtheria, tetanus (for pediatric use) WYE (U.S.)
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
Appendix B
Product or
Trade name
Antigen(s) Manufacturer (country)
DTPolio Diphtheria, tetanus, polio AVP
DT TAB Diphtheria, tetanus, Salmonella typhi,
Paratyphi A&B
AVP (France)
DTaP (generic) Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis AVP, WYE, GSK (U.S.)
DTwP (generic) * Diphtheria, tetanus, (whole-cell) pertussis AVP, WYE, GSK (U.S.)
Dual Antigen Sll Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) Serum Institute of India (India)
Ecolarix * Measles, rubella (live) RIT/SmithKIine (U.S.)
elPV Polio (inactivated, enhanced potency) AVP (U.S.)
Elvarix Influenza (split virus) VEB Sachsesches Serumwerk Dresden
Encepur Tick-borne encephalitis Chiron (Europe)
Engerix-B Hepatitis B GSK (U.K., U.S.)
Enivac-HB Hepatitis B (Recombinant DNA) Centro de Ingenieria Genetica Y Biotecnologia
(Cuba)
Enterovaccino Typhoid (IM) Isi
Epaxal Berna Hepatitis A - virosomal vaccine BER (Switzerland)
Ervax Rubella (live) GSK (Mexico)
Ervevax RA 27/3 Rubella (live) GSK (Belgium)
Esavalenti Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio. Hib,
hepatitis B
(Italy)
Euvax-B Hepatitis B (recombinant DNA) LG Chemical (South Korea)
Flu Shield * Influenza WYE (U.S.)
Fluad, Agrippal-SI Influenza CHIR (Italy)
Fluarix Influenza GSK
Flubron Influenza (whole virus) Pfizer
FluMist Influenza (live, attenuated, intranasal) MEOI (U.S.)
Fluogen * Influenza PD (U.S.)
Fluvirin Influenza EVN (U.S.)
Fluvirine Influenza CellTech Pharma SA
Fluzone Influenza AVP (U.S.)
FOH-M Polio (Inactivated) (Russia)
FrocuoOke Polio (Inactivated) (Russia)
FSME-IMMUNE Tick-borne encephalitis Baxter (Austria)
Funed-CEME Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Belo Horizonte (Brazil)
Gen H-B-Vax Hepatitis B Merck-Behringwerke
GenHevac B Pasteur Hepatitis B AVP ( )
*
= product no longer distributed in U S.
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Antigen(s) Manufacturer (country)
Gripax Influenza (whole virus) Hebrew University
Gripe Influenza (whole virus) (Spain)
Gripovax Influenza (whole virus) GSK
Gunevax Rubella CHIR (Italy)
HAVpur Hepatitis A Chiron (Germany)
Havrix Hepatitis A GSK (U.K., U.S.)
H-BIG Hepatitis B immune globulin NABI, Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
HB Vax Pro Hepatitis B AVP
HbOC Chemical abbreviation for HibTlTER WYE (U.S.)
HBY Hepatitis B (recombinant) KGC (Japan)
Hepacare Hepatitis B (recombinant) Medeva
Hepaccine-B Hepatitis B (plasma derived) Chiel Jedang (South Korea)
Hepavax-B Hepatitis B (plasma derived) Korea Green Cross (South Korea)
Hepavax-Gene Hepatitis B (recombinant DNA) Korea Green Cross (South Korea)
Heprecomb Hepatitis B (yeast derived) BER (Switzerland)
Heptavax B * Hepatitis B (plasma-derived) 1982 to MRK (U.S.)
Hevac B Hepatitis B (plasma derived) AVP (France)
Hexavac Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, hepatitis
B, Hib
AVP (Europe)
Hiberix Hib conjugate
HIBest Haemophilus influenzae type b AVP
HibTlTER Haemophilus influenzae type b (HbOC) WYE (U.S.)
Hinkuys karokoe Pertussis (adsorbed) Natl. Public Health Institute (Finland)
HPV-77; DK-5 Rubella (live) 1969-1979 MRK (U.S.)
HPV-77; DK-12 Rubella (live) 1970-1973 MRK (U.S.)
HRIG Rabies immune globulin AVP; Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
Humotet-anti Tetanus Tetanus Wellcome (U.K.)
Hyper-Tet (now called
"BayTet")
Tetanus immune globulin Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
IBV Polio (inactivated) Statens Seruminstitut (Denmark)
Immugrip Influenza Pierre Fabre Medicament
Immune Globulin
Intramuscular (Human)
Broad-spectrum immune globulins MA, BPT, New York Blood Ctr, Bayer
Corporation, CEN (U.S.)
Immunil Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) Sidus
Imogam Rabies - HT Rabies immune globulin AVP (U.S.)
= product rto longer distributed in U.S.
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Imovax Rabies AVP (U.S.)
Imovax Parotiditis Mumps AVP (France)
Imovax Polio Polio AVP (France)
Imovax Sarampion Measles AVP (France)
Imovax D.T. Diphtheria, tetanus AVP( )
Imovax Gripe Influenza AVPf )
Imovax R.O.R. Measles, rubella, mumps (live) AVP (France)
Imovax Rubeola Measles AVP (International)
Imovax Mumps Mumps AVPf )
Imovax Oreillons Mumps AVP (France)
Imovax Rabies I.D. Rabies vacxine (HDCV) AVP (U.S.)
Imovax Rabies I.M. Rabies vaccine (HDCV) AVP (U.S.)
Infanrix Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis GSK (Belgium. U.S.)
Infanrix Hexa DTaP. polio, Hib, hepatitis B GSK (France)
Infanrix Quinta DTaP, polio, Hib GSK (France)
Infanrix Tetra DTaP, polio GSK (France)
Inflexal Influenza Swiss Serum and Vaccine Institute
Influmix Influenza (whole virus) Schiapparelli
Influpozzi Zonale Influenza (whole virus) Ivp
Influsplit SSW Influenza (split virus) VEB Sachsecsches Serumwerk Dresden
Influvac Influenza Solvay-Pharma
Invirin Influenza (whole virus) GSK
Ipad TP Tetanus, polio AVP (France)
IPOL Polio (enhanced potency, inactivated) AVP (U.S.)
IPV Polio (inactivated) General term for inactivated polio vaccine
Isiflu Zonale Influenza (whole virus) Isi
Istivac Influenza AVPf )
JE-VAX Japanese encephalitis AVP (U.S.)
Kaksoisrokote
Dubbelvaccin
Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) Natl. Public Health Institute (Finland)
Kikhoste-Vaksine Pertussis Statens Institutt for Folkehelse (Nonway)
Krztuscowi Pertussis (Poland)
Ksztu Pertussis (Poland)
LancyVaxina ’ Smallpox Swiss Serum and Vaccine Institute (Switzerland)
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
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Lavantuu tirokote Typhoid Central Pub Health Lab (Finland)
Liovax * Smallpox CHIR (Italy)
Lirubel * Measles, rubella (live) 4/74 to 6/78 Dow/PitneyMoore (U.S.)
Lirugen Measles AVP (Infl)
Lirugen * Measles (live) 2/65 to 6/78 Dow (U.S.)
LM - 3 RIT Measles, mumps, rubella (live) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
LM - 2 RIT Measles, mumps (live) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
LTEANAS Imuna Tetanus (adsorbed) Imuna sp. (Slovakia)
LYMErix * Lyme disease GSK (U.S.)
Lyovac Attenuvax * Measles (live, attenuated) MRK (U.S.)
Lyovac Meruvax * Rubella (live) MRK (U.S.)
M-RVaxll * Measles, rubella (live) MRK (U.S.)
M-Vax ‘ Measles (live) 5/63 to 1979 WYE (U.S.)
Masern-Impfstoff SSW Measles (live) (Germany)
Measles Vaccine DK3 * Measles (live) 1 964 to 1 972 Philips Roxane, Inc. (U.S.)
Measles * Measles (inactivated) 1963 to 1966
Measles (live) 12/64 to 1974
Eli Lilly (U.S.)
Mencevax A Meningococcus (polysaccharide) (Group A) SmithKIine/RIT (Belgium)
Mencevax AC Meningococcal quadravalent
Meningitec Meningococcus (conjugate) (Group C) WYE (U.K., Australia)
Meninvact Meningococcus (conjugate) (Group C) AVP
Menjugate Meningococcus (conjugate) (Group C) Socopharm
Menomune-A/CA'AiV-1 35 Meningococcus (polysaccharide)
(Groups A,C, Y.W-135)
AVP (U.S.)
Menpovax 4 Meningococcus (polysaccharide)
(Groups A & C)
CHIR (Italy)
Menpovax A+C Meningococcus (Groups A & C) CHIR (Italy)
Meruvax * Rubella (live) 6/69 to MRK (U.S.)
Meruvax II Rubella (live) MRK (U.S.)
Mevilin-L * Measles (live) Glaxo Operations
MFV Influenza (whole virus) Servier
MFV-Ject Influenza (whole virus) AVP
MMR * Measles, mumps, rubella (live) 6/71 to MRK (U.S.)
MMR (generic) * Measles, mumps, rubella (live) 4/74 to 6/78 Dow Chemical (U.S.)
M-M-R II Measles, mumps, rubella (live) MRK (U.S.)
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
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Moniarix Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) SmithKIine/RIT (Belgium)
Monovax BCG AVP
Mopavac Sevac Measles, mumps (live, attenuated) Institute of Sera and vaccines (Czechoslovakia)
MOPV * Polio (live, Sabin, monovalent types 1, II, III) WYE (U.S.)
Morbilvax Measles (live, attenuated) CHIR (Italy)
Morubel Measles, rubella (live, attenuated) CHIR (Italy)
Moruman Berna Measles immunglobulin BER (Switzerland)
Morupar Measles, mumps, rubella (live, attenuated) CHIR (Italy)
Movivac Measles (live, attenuated) (Czechoslovakia)
M-RVAX * Measles, rubella (live) 7/71 to MRK (U.S.)
Munnalen Berna Mumps (live) BER (Switzerland)
Mumps (generic) * Mumps (live) 4/74 to 6/78 Dow Chemical (U.S.)
Mumps (generic) * Mumps (inactivated) 1950 to 1978 WYE (U.S.)
Mumps (generic) * Mumps (inactivated) 1950 to 1977 Eli Lilly (U.S.)
Mumpsvax * Mumps (live) MRK (U.S.)
Munevan Influenza (whole virus) Medeva
Mutagrip Influenza AVP( )
Nabi-HB Hepatitis B immune globulin NABI (U.S.)
Neis Vac-C Meningococcus (conjugate) (Group C) Shire Biologies (Canada)
Neotyf Typhoid (oral) Biocine
Nivgrip Influenza (whole virus) Nicolau Institute of Virology
NorHOMHerHTA Polio (inactivated) (Russia)
Nothav Hepatitis A CHI (Italy)
Okarix Varicella, live attenuated AVP
OmniHIB * Haemophilus influenzae type b (PRP-T) GSK, AVP (U.S.)
OPV General term for oral polio vaccine
Orecchioni Mumps (Italy)
Orimune * Polio vaccine (oral, trivalent) WYE (U.S.)
Ospa Smallpox (Poland)
Pariorix Mumps (live) SmithKIine/RIT (Belgium)
Passjura Mumps (Sweden)
Pavivac-Sevac Mumps (live) Institute of Immunology (Croatia)
PCV, PCV7 General term for pneumococcal conjugate (7-
valent)
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
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Pediacel DTaP, Hib, IPV (Europe)
Pediarix Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis,
hepatitis B, IPV
GSK (U.S.)
PedvaxHIB Haemophilus influenzae type b (PRP-OMP) MRK (U.S.)
Penta Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis, Hib,
IPV
AVP (Canada)
PENT-HIBest Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP
Pentacel Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP (Canada)
Pentacoq Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP ( )
PENTAct-HIB Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP ( )
Pentavac Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP ( )
Pentavalente Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, Hib (Mexico)
Pentavalenti
•
Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib OR
Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, hepatitis
B
(Italy)
Pfizer Vax-Measles K * Measles (inactivated) 3/63 to 1970 Pfizer (U.S.)
Pfizer Vax-Measles L * Measles (live) 2/65 to 1970 Pfizer (U.S.)
Pluserix Measles, mumps, rubella GSK( )
Pneumopur Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) Chiron (Germany)
Pneumovax 23 Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) MRK (U.S.)
PNU-IMUNE23 * Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) WYE (U.S.)
POLIAcel Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, HIB AVP (Argentina)
PPV, PPV23 General term for pneumococcal
polysaccharide (23-valent)
Prevenar Pneumococcal (7-valent, conjugate) WYE (France)
Previgrip Influenza Chiron France
Prevnar Pneumococcal (7-valent, conjugate) WYE (U.S.)
Priorix Measles, mumps, rubella (live) GSK (U.K.)
ProHIBiT * Haemophilus influenzae type b (PRP-D) AVP (U.S.)
PRP-OMP Chemical abbreviation for PedvaxHIB
PRP-T Chemical abbreviation for ActHIB
Pulmovax Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) Merck
Purivax * Polio (inactivated) 1956 to 1965 MRK (U.S.)
QUADRAcel Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio AVP (Argentina)
QUADRAceiyHibest Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, Hib AVP (Argentina)
Quadravax DTP + polio GSK
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
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Quadrigen * DTP + polio (1959-1968) PD (U.S.)
Quatro-Virelon Diphtheria, tetanus, polio CHI (Germany)
Quintuple Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, Hib, Polio GSK (Mexico)
R-HB Vaccine Hepatitis B (recombinant) Mitsubishi Chem Corp (Japan)
R-VAC Rubella (live) Serum Institute (India)
RA27/3 Rubella (live) MRK (U.S.)
RabAvert Rabies (PCEC) CHI (U.S.)
Rabdomune Rabies Impdfstofwerke
Rabipur Rabies Chiron
Rabivac Rabies Chiron
Rasilvax Rabies Chiron
RDCV Rabies
Recombivax HB Hepatitis B (recombinant) MRK (U.S.)
Repevax DTaP, IPV AVP
Respigam, RSV-IVIG Respiratory syncytial virus immune globulin
(not a vaccine)
MEDI (U.S.)
Revaxis Td, IPV AVP
RIG (generic) Rabies immune globulin Bayer Corporation, AVP (U.S.)
Rimevax Measles (live) SmithKIine/RIT (Belgium)
Rimparix Measles (live) SmithKIine/RIT
RIT - LM-2 Measles, mumps (live) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
RIT - LM-3 Measles, mumps, rubella (live) Dong Shin Pharm (Korea)
RotaShield. RRV-TV * Rotavirus— 8/98 to 7/99 WYE (U.S.)
Rouvax Measles (live, attenuated) AVP (France)
Rubeaten Bema Rubella (live) BER (Switzerland)
Rubella (generic) ' Rubella (live) 12/69 to 1972 Philips Roxane (U.S.)
Rubellovac Rubella CHIR (Germany)
Rubelogen * Rubella (live) 12/69 to 1972 PD (U.S.)
Rubeovax * Measles (live) 2/63 to 1971 MRK (U.S.)
Rudi-Rouvax Measles, rubella (live) AVP (France)
Rudivax Rubella (live, attenuated) AVP (France)
RVA (generic) Rabies vaccine adsorbed BP (U.S.)
Sabin General term for oral (live) polio vaccine
Sahia Polio (live, oral) Multiple manufacturers
= product rx) longer distributed in U.S.
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Salk General term for injectable (inactivated) polio
vaccine
Sandovac Influenza Sandoz (Germany)
Serobacterin * Pertussis - 1945 to 1954 MRK (U.S.)
Sii Triple Antigen Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Serum Institute (India)
Stamaril Yellow fever (live, attenuated) AVP (France)
Streptopur Pneumococcal (polysaccharide) Chiron (Italy)
Subinvira Influenza (split virus) Imuna
Synagis (palizivumab) Respiratory syncytial virus immune globulin
(not a vaccine)
MEDI (U.S.)
T. Polio Tetanus toxoid, polio AVP (Canada)
TAB. Typhoid, paratyphoid (A & B) - Institute Pasteur (Tunisia)
(Egypt)
- Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. (Burma)
T-lmmun Tetanus (adsorbed) (Austria)
Td (generic) Tetanus, diphtheria (adult formulation) AVP, BP (U.S.)
Te/Vac/Ptap Tetanus fYuqoslavia)
Te Anatoxal Tetanus BER (Europe)
Telvaciptap Tetanus (Yugoslavia)
Tet-Aktiv Tetanus Tropon-Cutter
Tetagrip Tetanus, influenza AVP (France)
Tetamun SSW Tetanus (fluid, nonadsorbed) Veb Sachsisches Serumwerk (Germany)
Tetamyn Tetanus Bioclon, S.A. De C.V. (Mexico)
Tetanol Tetanus (adsorbed) CHIR (Germany)
Tetasorbat SSW Tetanus (adsorbed) Veb Sachsisches Serumwerk (Germany)
Tetavax Tetanus (adsorbed) AVP (France)
Tetracoq 05 Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio AVP (France)
TetrAct-HIB Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, Hib AVPf )
Tetramune * Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, Hib WYE (U.S.)
Tetravac Acellulaire Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio AVP
Tetravalenti Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B ..._ (Italy)
Tetravax * Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio - 1959 to
1965
MRK (U.S.)
Tice BCG Bacillus Calmette-Guerin vaccine (for TB) OTC (U.S.)
Ticovac Tick-borne encephalitis Baxter SA
TIG Tetanus immune globulin (generic) Bayer Corporation (U.S.)
= product rK3 longer distributed in U.S.
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Tifovax Typhoid
TOPV Trivalent oral polio vaccine Multiple manufacturers and countries
Titifica Typhoid and para typhoid (Italy)
Tresivac Lyopholized Measles, mumps, rubella Serum Institute (India)
Triacel Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis AVPf )
Triacelluvax Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis CHIR (Europe)
TriHIBit Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis, Hib AVP (U.S.)
Tii-lmmunol * Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis WYE (U.S.)
Trimovax Measles, mumps, rubella (live) AVP (France)
Trinivac * Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis- 1952 to 1964 MRK (U.S.)
Tripacel Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis AVPf )
Tripedia Diphtheria, tetanus, (acellular) pertussis AVP (U.S.)
Triple antigen Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis - Chowgule & Co. (India)
- CSL Limited (Australia)
Triple Sabin Polio (live, oral) fMexicot
Triple Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (Cuba, Mexico)
Triple Viral Measles, mumps, rubella (Mexico)
Tritanrix DTwP GSK
Tritanrix-HB DTwP/hepatitis B GSK
Tritanrix-HB-Hib DTwP/hepatitis B/Hib GSK
Trivacuna Leti Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed), pertussis Laboratory Leti (Spain)
Trivax Diphtheria, tetanus (plain), pertussis Wellcome (U.K.)
Trivax-ad Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed), pertussis - EVN (UK)
- Wellcome (UK)
Trivax-Hib Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, Hib GSK (UK)
Trivb Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Brazil ( )
Triviraten Measles, mumps, rubella (live, attenuated) BER (Switzerland)
Trivivac * Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis MRK (U.S.)
Trivivac Sevac Measles, mumps, rubella (live, attenuated) Institute of Sera & Vaccines (Czechoslovakia)
TT Tetanus toxoid (generic) AVP (U.S.)
TT vaccine Tetanus toxoid (adsorbed) (India)
Tussitrupin Forte Pertussis Staatliches Institut (Germany)
Twinrix Hepatitis A & B (adult formulation) GSK (U K.. U.S.)
Twinrix Junior Hepatitis A & B (pediatric formulation) GSK (U.S.)
Ty21a (Vivotif Bema) Typhoid (live, oral, lyophilized) BER (Switzerland)
Tyne Tuberculosis (BCG) Sweden
Typherix Typhoid GSK (U.K.)
Appendix B
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Typhim Vi (ViCPs) Typhoid (parenteral, injectable) AVP (U.S., France)
Typhoid Vaccine * Typhoid (inactivated, parenteral) WYE (U.S.)
Typhopara-typhoidique Typhoid and para typhoid (France)
VA-Mengoc-BC Meningococcal (Groups B & C) Finlay Vacunas y Sueros Centro de Investigation
(Cuba)
Vaccin Difteric Adsorbit Diphtheria toxoid (adsorbed) Cantacuzino Institute (Romania)
Vaccin Rabique Pasteur Rabies Pasteur Vaccins
Vaccin Combinat Diftero-
Tetanic
Diphtheria, tetanus (adsorbed) Cantacuzino Institute (Romania)
Vaccinum Morbillorum
Vivum
Measles (live) Moscovir Research Institute (Russia)
Vacina Tripiice Viral Measles, mumps, rubella (Brazil)
Vacina Tripiice Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Institute Butantan (Brazil)
Vacina Dupla Diphtheria, tetanus Institute Butantan (Brazil)
Vaksin Cacar Smallpox (Indonesia)
Vaksin Serap Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Perum Bio Farma (Indonesia)
Vaksin Campak Kerig Measles (live, attenuated) Pasteur Institute (Indonesia)
Vaksin Kotipa Cholera, typhoid and paratyphoid A, B & C Perum Bio Farma (Indonesia)
Vamoavax Measles, mumps (live) Institute of Immunology (Croatia)
Vaqta Hepatitis A (inactivated) MRK (U.S.)
Varicellon Varicella zoster immunoglobulin Behring\werke Aktiengesellischaft (Germany)
Vane Smallpox (lyophilized) Institute of Sera and Vaccine (Czechoslovakia)
Varilrix Varicella (live. Oka strain) GSK (Australia, Belgium)
Varivax Varicella (live) MRK (U.S.)
Vaxem-Hib Haemophilus influenzae type b CHIR (Italy)
Vaxicoq Pertussis (adsorbed) AVP (France)
Vaxigrip Influenza AVP ( )
Vaxipar Mumps (live) CHIR (Italy)
VCDT Diphtheria, tetanus Cantacuzino Institute (Romania)
VDA Vaccin Difteric
Adsorbit
Diphtheria Cantacuzino Institute (Romania)
ViCPs (Typhim Vi) Typhoid (inactivated, injectable) AVP (U.S.)
VIG Variola (smallpox) immune globulin
(not a vaccine)
Distributed by CDC
Virelon C Polio (Inactivated) Chiron (Germany)
Virelon T 20 Polio (live, oral, trivalent) Behringserke Aktiengesellischaft (Germany)
*
= product no kjnger distributed in U.S.
B'29
Appendix B
Product or
Trade name
Antigen(s) Manufacturer (country)
Virovac Massling,
Perotid, Rubella
Measles, mumps, rubella fSwedent
Vivotif Berna (Ty21a) Typhoid (oral, live) BER (Switzerland)
VT (Vacina Triplice) Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Instituto Butantan (Brazil)
VTV (Vacina Triplice
Viral)
Measles, mumps, rubella (Brazil)
WR Measles (live, attenuated) Cantucuzino Institute (Romania)
VZIG Varicella zoster immune globulin (generic) MA (U.S.)
Welltrivax trivalente Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (Spain)
YF-VAX Yellow fever AVP (U.S.)
Zaantide Diphtheria anti-toxin Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zaantite Tetanus anti-toxin Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zaditeadvax Diphtheria, tetanus Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zaditevax Diphtheria, tetanus Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zamevax A+C Meningococcus (polysaccharide. Groups A &
C)
Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zamovax Measles (live) Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zamruvax Measles, rubella (live) Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zaruvax Rubella (live) Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zatetravax Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, parapertussis Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zatevax Tetanus Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zatribavax Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
Zatrivax Measles, rubella, mumps (live) Inst, of Immunology (Croatia)
*Abbreviations: AVP = Aventis Pasteur (includes Connaught Laboratories and Pasteur Merieux Connaught); BER = Berna Products
Corporation (includes Swiss Serum and Vaccine Institute Berne): BIK = The Research Foundation for Microbial Diseases of Osaka
University; BPT = BioPort (successor entity for Michigan Biologic Products Institute); CEN = Centeon L.L.C. (includes Armour
Pharmaceutical Company); CHIR = Chiron Corporation (includes Sclavo); EVN = Evans Medical Limited; KGC = Korea Green Cross
Corporation; GSK = GlaxoSmithKline (includes
...); MA = Massachusetts Public Health Biologic Laboratories; MEDI = Medimmune
(purchased Aviron); MRK = Merck & Co., Inc.; NABI = Nabi Pharmaceuticals (formerly North American Biologicals, Inc.); OTC =
Organon Teknika Corporation; PJP = PowderJect Pharmaceuticals; PD = Parke Davis; WYE = Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, (includes
Wyeth-Lederle, Wyeth Laboratories, Lederle Laboratories, Praxis Biologies).
= product no longer distributed in U.S.
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Table 2: Translation of Vaccine-Related Terms
The table below lists many of the terms you will find on immunization records of persons born outside of the
U.S., along with their translation into English. In most cases, the term refers to the name of a disease against
which the person may have been vaccinated. While we have checked and rechecked our sources for this
information, we do not claim complete accuracy. November 2004
Term English Translation Language
(Anti) (Against) name of disease Multiple languages
Alhasiba Rubella Arabic
Antipolio inattivato IPV Italian
AR Measles Romania
As’al addeekee Pertussis Arabic
Athab Mumps Arabic
Bach Hau Diphtheria Vietnamese
Ban Do Rubella Vietnamese
Batok rejan Pertussis Malay
Batuk rejan Pertussis Indonesian
Beguk Mumps Indonesian
Beke Mumps Tagalog
Beseze BCG Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Biring Peluh Rubella Indonesian
Btonicy, Bionica Diphtheria Polish
BMR Measles, Mumps, Rubella Dutch
Bof Mumps Dutch
Bornelammelse Polio Danish
Bus-buska Varicella Somali
Cachumba (papeira) Mumps Portuguese
Cagaarshowga A, B Hepatitis A, B Somali
Campak Measles Indonesian
Chripka Influenza Slovak
Cierny kasel Pertussis Slovak
Colera Cholera Spanish
Coqueluche Pertussis French, Portuguese, Spanish
Cufaa Tetanus Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Cuno xanuun Diphtheria Somali
Dabayl r oiiomyciiiis 1 Idfl
Davivy Kasel Whooping Cough Czech
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Term English Translation Language
Detepe DTP Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Difteeriyaa Diphtheria Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Difteri Diphtheria Swedish, Norwegian, Haitian
Creole, Indonesian
Difteria Diphtheria Albanian, Arabic, Spanish,
Romanian, Portuguese
Difteria Diphtheria Slovak
Difterie Diphtheria Czech, Dutch
Difteriei Diphtheria Romanian
Difterija Diphtheria Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Difterite Diphtheria Italian
Difteritis Diphtheria Danish
(La) Diphterie (The) Diphtheria French
Diphtherie Diphtheria German
Dipterya Diphtheria Tagalog
Di Te DT Romanian
DiTePe DTP Slovak
Di-Te-Per DTP Romanian
Djecja paraliza Poliomyelitis Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
DKTP Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis,
Inactivated Polio
Dutch
DTC, DT Coq DTP French
DTCP DTP-IPV French
Duf Polio Somali
Duple Diphtheria, Tetanus Spanish (Cuba)
Duplex Diphtheria, Tetanus Swedish
Dyfteria Diphtheria Polish
El Safra Hepatitis Arabic
Emofilo b Hib Italian
Epatit A, B Hepatitis A, B Haitian Creole
Epatite A, B Hepatitis A, B Italian
Faaresyge Mumps Danish
Febra Galbena Yellow Fever Romanian
Fievre jaune Yellow Fever French
Flou Influenza Haitian Creole
B-32
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Term English Translation Language
Fruthi Measles Albanian
Furuq Smallpox Somali
Fushin Rubella Japanese
Gelekoorts Yellow Fever Dutch
Gifira Measles Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Gifira farangli Rubella Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Gordelroos Varicella Dutch
Gowracato Diphtheria Somali
Griep Influenza Dutch
(Anti) Gripa (Against) influenza Romanian
Gripa Influenza (flu) Bosnian, Croatian, Romanian,
Serbian
(La) Gripe (The) influenza Portuguese, Spanish
Grippe Influenza French, German
Gruziica Tuberculosis Polish
Grypa Influenza Polish
Gula Febern Yellow Fever Swedish
Gurra dhaabsis Mumps Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Hablobaas Varicella Somali
Haemophilus nooca b Haemophilus influenzae type b Somali
Has ‘ba Measles Arabic
Hashika Measles Japanese
Hashofu Tetanus Japanese
Hawb pob Pertussis Hmong
Hemofilo tipo b Haemophilus influenzae type b Spanish
Hepatita A, B Hepatitis A, B Romanian
(Anti) Hepatite A, B (Against) hepatitis A, B Portuguese
Hepatite A, B Hepatitis B French, Portuguese
Hepatitei A, B Hepatitis A, B Romanian
Hepatitida Hepatitis Czech, Slovak
Hepatitis tipo A, B Hepatitis A, B Spanish
Hinkuyska Pertussis Finnish
Ho Ga Pertussis Vietamese
Holera Cholera Romanian
Hri pavac Pertussis Serbo-Croatian
Hyakaseki Pertussis Japanese
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Term English Translation Language
Infilowense Influenza Somali
Jadeeco Measles Somali
Jadeeca Been,
Jadeeco Been Rubella Somali
Jadeeco jarmalka Rubella Somali
Jaykkakouristus Tetanus Finnish
Jifuteria Diphtheria Japanese
Joonis A Hepatitis A Somali
Joonis B Hepatitis B Somali
Kabmob siab horn B Hepatitis B Hmong
Kasalj hripavac Pertussis Croatian
Keuchhusten Pertussis German
Kighoste Pertussis Danish
Kikhosta Pertussis Swedish
Kikhoste Pertussis Norwegian
Kinderlahmung Poliomyelitis German
Kinderverlamming Polio Dutch
Kinkhoest Pertussis Dutch
Kix Pertussis Somali
Koklich Pertussis Haitian Creole
Koklusz Pertussis Polish
Kolera Cholera Swedish
Kopper Smallpox Norwegian
Krzamak Measles Slovak
Krztuscowi, Krztusiec Pertussis Polish
Kub cer Diphtheria Hmong
Kurkkumata Diphtheria Finnish
Kusma Mumps Norwegian
I'Haemophilus b Haemophilus influenzae, type b French
Laamsheesaa Polio Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Lapsihalvaus Polio Finnish
Lawoujol, Laroujol Measles Haitian Creole
Leverbetaendelse Hepatitis Danish
Leverbetennelse Hepatitis Norwegian
Longontsteking Pneumonia Dutch
Male boginie Rubella Bosnian, Serbian
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Term English Translation Language
Malmouton Mumps Haitian Creole
Mami Mumps Samoan
(Die) Masern (The) Measles German
Massling,
Masslingormerly
Measles Swedish
Mazelen Measles Dutch
Meslinger Measles Norwegian, Danish
Misela Measles Samoan
Morbiilo Measles Italian
MPR (morbiilo, parotote,
rosolia)
Measles, Mumps, Rubella Italian
(La) Numonia (The) Pneumonia Spanish
Odra Measles Polish
(Les) Oreillons (The) Mumps French
Oreion, Oreionului Mumps Romanian
Ospa Smallpox Polish
Ospice Measles Bosnian
Osypky Measles Slovak
Otafukukuaze Mumps Japanese
Paperas Mumps Spanish
Paralisia infantil Poliomyelitis Portuguese
Paraliz dzieciecy Polio Polish
Parotidite epidemica Mumps Portuguese
Parotiditis Mumps Spanish
Parotite Mumps Italian
Parotitida Mumps Czech
Parotitis Mumps Slovak
Passjura Mumps Swedish
Penyaakit bengok Mumps Malay
Penyakit lumpuh Polio Indonesian
Perlosse Pertussis Italian
Pertosse acellulare Acellular Pertussis Italian
Pertuse Pertussis Czech
Pertusis Pertussis Tagalog
Pertusisi Pertussis Albanian
Pirquet’s Reaction Reaction to TB Skin Test Multiple
B*35
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Pljuskavice, Kozice Varicella Serbian
Pneumoniei Pneumonia Romanian
Pocken Smallpox German
Podstawowe Primary Polish
Pojar German Rubella Romanian
Pojarul, Pojarului Measles Romanian
Pokken Smallpox Dutch
Polio Polio Swedish
Poliomielite Poliomyelitis Italian, Portuguese
Poliomielitic Poliomyelitis Romanian
Poliomielitis Poliomyelitis Spanish
Poliomyelite Polio French
Poliomyelitis Polio Czech
Poliomyelitt Polio Norwegian
Polmonite Pneumonia Italian
Polyo Polio Haitian Creole, Tagalog
Polyomyelitida Polio Slovak
Priusnica Mumps Slovak
Przypominajace Booster Polish
Pulmonia Pneumonia Spanish
Qaamow-Qashiir Mumps Somali
Qaaxo-Tiibii Tuberculosis Somali
Qakkee Pertussis Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Qanja Barar Mumps Somali
Qhua Maj Rubella Hmong
Qhua Pias Measles Hmong
Qog Mumps Hmong
Quai 6i Mumps Vietnamese
Radang hati Hepatitis Indonesian
Ribeyol Rubella Haitian Creole
Rode bond Rubella Dutch
Roda Hund Rubella Swedish
Rode Hunde Rubella Danish
Rode bunder Rubella Norwegian
ROR Measles, Mumps, Rubella French
Rosolia Rubella Italian
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Rotein Rubella German
(La) Rougeole (The) Measles French
Rozyczka Rubella Polish
Rubeola Rubella Bosnian
Rubeola Rubella Spanish
Rubeola Rubella Portuguese
Rubeole Rubella French
Rubeolei, Rubeola Rubella Romanian
Rujeola, Rujeolei Measles Romanian
Rupela Rubella Samoan
Ruzienka Rubella Slovak
Sai Don Van Tetanus Vietamese
Sakit champak Measles Malay
Sakit rengkong Diphtheria Malay
Sambabaha Pneumonia Somali
(Anti) Sarampion (Against) measles Spanish
Sarampion Aleman Rubella Spanish
Sarampion Comun Measles Spanish
Sarampo Measles Portuguese
Saranpyon Varicella (Chickenpox) Haitian Creole
Si rubeolei Rubella Romanian
Sikotauti Mumps Finnish
Sh niamahi Polio Japanese
Shel’el Polio Arabic
Shimbiraa Hepatitis Oromiffaa (Ethiopia)
Smittkoppor Smallpox Swedish
Spalnicky Measles Czech
So’i Measles Vietnamese
Sot Te Li§t Polio Vietnamese
Starrkramph Tetanus German
Stelkramp Tetanus Swedish
Stijfkramp Tetanus Dutch
Stivkrampe Tetanus Danish, Norwegian
Subinuira Influenza Czech
Swinka Mumps Polish
Tallaakla Qaaxada BCG Somali
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Taytano Tetanus Somali
Tering Tuberculosis Dutch
Tetanica Tetanus Spanish
Tetanica Tetanus Portuguese
Tetano Tetanus Italian, Tagalog
Tetano Tetanus Portuguese, Spanish
Tetanos Tetanus Romanian
(Anti) Tetanos (or AT) (Against) tetanus Spanish
Tetanos Tetanus French
Tetanos Tetanus Haitian Creole
Tetanosul, Tetanosului Tetanus Romanian
Tetanozi Tetanus Albanian
Tezec, Tfzcowi Tetanus Polish
Tigdas Measles Tagalog
Tos Ferina Whooping Cough Spanish
Tosse Asinina Whooping Cough Italian
Triplice DTP Portuguese
Trippel Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis Sweden
Tuag tes tuag taw Polio Hmong
Tubercolosi Tuberculosis Italian
Tuberculose Tuberculosis French
(Die) Tuberkulose (The) tuberculosis German
Tuhkarokko Measles Finnish
Tuse convulsive,
Tusei convulsive
Pertussis Romanian
Ua npuag Tetanus Hmong
Upala pluca Pneumonia Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
VAHB Hepatitis B Portuguese
VAP Polio Portuguese
VAS Measles Portuguese
VASPR MMR Portuguese
VAT Tetanus Portuguese
Vaioloso Smallpox Italian
Vannkopper Varicella Norwegian
(La) Varicela (The) chickenpox Spanish
Varicela, Varicelei Varicella (chickenpox) Romanian
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Variola, Variolei Smallpox Romanian
(La) Variole (The) Smallpox French
Veliki boginje Smallpox Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Veliki kasalj Pertussis Bosnian, Serbian
Viem Gan B Hepatitis B Vietnamese
Vihurirokko Rubella Finnish
Viruela Smallpox Spanish
Vodene kozice Varicella Croatian
Wareento Pneumonia Somali
Wundstarrkrampf Tetanus German
Xiiqdheer Pertussis Somali
Zapar plilic Pneumonia Slovak
Zapaljenje Hepatitis Serbo-Croatian
Zapalenie pluc Pneumonia Polish
Zapalenie watroby Hepatitis Polish
Zardenky Rubella Czech
Zaskrt Diphtheria Czech
Zauske Mumps Bosnian
ZauSnjaci Mumps Croatian, Serbian
Zei Genpeter Mumps German
Zutica A, B Hepatitis A, B Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
B
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Table 3: Vaccine-Related Terms Using Cyrillic Alphabet
BCG Russian
Ai-mc DTP Russian
JlH^TepHT, J^H^irepHa Diphtheria Russian
reMOH<i)Jl£OC HH4)Jn03HUbI THOa B Haemophilus influenzae type b Russian
FenaxHT A, B Hepatitis A, B Russian
FpHnn Influenza Russian
Kopb Measles Russian
Kip Measles Ukrainian
CBHHK3, FlapOTHT Mumps Russian
Kokjiioiu Pertussis Russian
Bocnajie jierKHx IlHeBMOHHK Pneumonia Russian
nOJIHOMHCJIHT Polio, Poliomyelitis Russian
Flojiio Polio Ukrainian
Kpaciiyxa Rubella Russian
Ocna Smallpox Russian
Cto;i6hhk, CTOJi6HHKa Tetanus Russian
Ctobohhk Tetanus Ukrainian
Ty6epKyjie3 Tuberculosis Russian
BerpHHKa Varicella Russian
Manx}' Mantoux Russian
BaKiiHHa Vaccine Russian
BaKUHnauHH Series Russian
PeBaKUHHauHH Booster Russian
la
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APPENDIX C
Vaccine Storage & Handling
Vaccine Storage & Handling Recommendtions (2005) C'l
Manufacturer Quality Control Phone Numbers C*12
Checklist for Safe Vaccine Handling and Storage
Vaccine Handling Tips C-14
Sample Refrigerator Warning Signs C«15
Announcement: Storage & Handling Toolkit C«16
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Dl Td
DTaR DTaP/Hib, DTaP/HepB/IPV
Tdap
HBIG
Hepatitis Vaccines: Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis A/B, Hepatitis B/Hib
Hib
IPV
TIV
LAIV
MMR, MR, Measles Virus Vaccine, Mumps Virus Vaccine, Rubella Virus Vaccine
MCV4
MPSV4
PCV
PPV
Varicella (Chickenpox) Vaccine
DT: Diphtheria, Tetanus Toxoids—Pediatric
Td: Tetanus, Diphtheria Toxoids—^Aduit
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed
to freezing temperatures. Refrigerate
upon arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival.
Store at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not
freeze or expose to freezing
temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container
Instructions for Use
Shake vial vigorously before withdrawal
and use.
Shelf Life After Opening
The vaccine should be administered
shortly after withdrawal from the vial.
Unused portions of multidose vials may
be refrigerated at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C)
and used until outdated, if not
contaminated.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer ;
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
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DTaP: Diphtheria Toxoid, Tetanus Toxoid,
Acellular Pertussis Vaccine—Pediatric
DTaP/Hib: Diphtheria Toxoid, Tetanus Toxoid,
Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Combined with Haemophilus
influenzae type b Conjugate Vaccine*—Pediatric
DTaP/HepB/IPV: Diphtheria Toxoid, Tetanus Toxoid,
Acellular Pertussis Vaccine, Hepatitis B Vaccine,
Inactivated Polio Vaccine—Pediatric
Tdap: Tetanus Toxoid, Diphtheria Toxoid,
Acellular Pertussis Vaccine—^Adult
Shipping Requirements Shelf Life After Reconstitution*
Should be shipped in insulated container. or Opening
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F Single-Dose Vials; The vaccine should be
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to administered shortly after withdrawal from
freezing temperatures. the vial.
Condition upon Arrival**
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Manufacturer-Filled Syringes: The
vaccine should be administered shortly
after the needle is attached to the syringe.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial, container, or
manufacturer- filled s>Tinge.
Instructions for Reconstitution*
or Use
Shake well before withdrawal and use. Do
not use if resuspension does not occur with
vigorous shaking.
* ActHIB® (sanofi pasteur) should be used within 24 hours of reconstitution if used alone. If sanofi pasteur DTaP
is used to reconstitute ActHIB®, the TriHibit® vaccine must be used within 30 minutes of reconstitution. Only
sanofi pasteur DTaP-Tripedia® or the diluent shipped with the product may be used to reconstitute the sanofi
pasteur ActHIB® product. Sanofi pasteur DAPTACEL® is not licensed for use in reconstitution
of ActHIB®.
** If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you shoidd 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Contro l office at the vaccine manufacturer;
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
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HBIG: Hepatitis B Immune Globulin
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Reconstitution
or Use
Shake vial vigorously before withdrawal and
use.
Shelf Life After Reconstitution
or Opening
Use until outdated, if not contaminated.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
Hepatitis Vaccines:
Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis A/B,
Hepatitis B/Ha&mophNus influenzae type b
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatxu-es.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial, container or
manufacturer-filled syringe.
Instructions for Use
Shake vial vigorously before withdrawal and
use.
Shelf Life After Opening
Single-Dose Vials: The vaccine should be
administered shortly after withdrawal from
the vial.
Manufacturer-Filled Syringes: The
vaccine should be administered shortly
after the needle is attached to the syringe.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that tlae earliest dated
material is used first.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer :
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
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Hib: Haemophilus influenzae type b
Conjugate Vaccine
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Reconstitution**
or Use
Shake vial vigorously before withdrawal and
use. Do not use if resuspension does not
occur with vigorous shying.
Shelf Life After Reconstitution**
or Opening
The vaccine should be administered shortly
after withdrawal from the vial.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
IPV: Inactivated Polio Vaccine
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Use
Multidose Vials: Shake vial vigorously
before withdrawal and use. Withdraw 0.5
mL of vaccine into separate sterile needle
and syringe for each immunization.
Shelf Life After Opening
The vaccine should be administered shortly
after withdrawal from the vial. Doses
remaining in the vial may be used until
outdated if not contaminated.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2} notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer ;
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vacdne.
**ActHIB® (sanofi pasteur) should be used within 24 hours of reconstitution if used alone. If sanofi pasteur DTaP
is used to reconstitute ActHIB®, the TriHibit® vaccine must be used within 30 minutes of recorwtitution. Only
sanofi pasteur DTaP-Tripedia® or the diluent shipped with the product may be used to reconstitute the sanofi
pasteur ActHIB® product. Sanofi pasteur DAPTACEL® is not licensed for use in reconstitution
of ActHIB®.
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container:
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
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TIV: Trivalent Inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35® to 46°F
(2° to 8®C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35® to 46°F (2® to 8®C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Formulated for use during current
influenza season.
Instructions for Use
Shake vial vigorously before withdrawal and
use.
Shelf Life After Opening
Multidose Mals: The vaccine should be
administered shortly after withdrawal from
the vial.
Manufacturer-Filled Syringes: Sterile
until removal ofhub cap.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer :
and 3) notify your state health departmerrt immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
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LAIV: Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped frozen in insulated
container with dry ice. at 4°F (-20°C) or
colder: Shipment includes WarmMark”
temperature indicator.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should be frozen at 4°F (-20° C) or colder;
mast not have thawed in shipment (All
windows in WarmMark™ indicator should
be white. If any indicator windows are red,
do not use the product. Call the
manufacturer for further instructions.)
Storage Requirements
Upon arrival, immediately store the vaccine
in a freezer with its own exterior door.
Must be maintained in a continuously
frozen state at 5°F ('15°C) or colder. No
freeze/thaw cycles are permitted with
this vaccine. May be stored in either a
manual defrost freezer or in a frost-free
freezer compartment.
In order to maintain the temperature of 5“F
(-IS'C) or colder in the freezer, it will be
necessary in most refrigerator/freezer
models to turn the temperature dial down
to the coldest setting. This may result in the
refrigerator compartment temperature
being lowered as well. Careful monitoring
of the refrigerator temperatures will be
necessary to avoid freezing killed or
inactivated vaccines.
NOTE; The manufacturer supplied freezer
box is no longer required for storage of
LAIV vaccine in a frost-free freezer: This
new storage requirement applies to the
2005-2006 influenza season, not the 2004-
2005 LAIV vaccine supply.
Shelf Life
Formulated for use during current
influenza season.
Inetructions for Use
Thaw sprayer in palm of hand before
administering. Do not roll the vaccine
sprayer in your hand, as this may dislodge
the dose divider clip. May also be thawed in
a refrigerator and stored at 35® to 46®F
(2° to 8®C) for no more than 60 hours prior
to use. Do not refreeze after thawing.
Shelf Life After Thawing
The vaccine should be administered shortly
after thawing. Vaccine thawed in the
refrigerator and stored at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C) that is not used within 60 hours
must be discarded in an impenetrable
sharps container.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the eariiest dated
material is used first.
NOTE: all materials used for administering live
virus vaccines should be burned, boiled, or
autoclaved prior to disposal.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at.tho yaspirie nianufacturer;
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vacane.
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MMR: Measles/Mumps/Rubella Vaccine,
MR: Measles/Rubella Vaccine,
Measles Virus Vaccine, Mumps Virus Vaccine,
Rubella Virus Vaccine
Shipping Requirements
Vaccine: Use insulated container. Must be
shipped with refrigerant. Maintain at 50'F
(10°C) or less. If shipped with dry ice,
diluent must be shipped separately.
Diluent: May be shipped with vaccine, but
do not place in container with dry ice.
Condition upon Arrival*
Maintain at 50°F (10° C) or less. If above
this temperature, see instructions (*) below.
Do not use warm vaccine. Refrigerate
upon arrival.
Storage Requirements
Vaccine may be stored separately from
dRuent. Store as follows:
Vaccine: Refrigerate immediately upon
arrival. Store at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C).
Protect from light at all times, since such
exposure may inactivate the virus.
Diluent: May be refrigerated or stored at
room temperature (68° to 77°F [20° to
25°C]). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
NOTE: Freeze-dried (lyophilized) MMR vaccine
may be maintained at freezer temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on container or vial.
Instructions for Reconstitution
and Use
Reconstitute just before using. Use only the
diluent supplied to reconstitute the vaccine.
Inject diluent into the vial of lyophilized
vaccine and agitate to ensure thorough
mixing. Withdraw entire contents into
syringe and inject total volume of vaccine
subcutaneously.
Shelf Life After Reconstitution,
Thawing or Opening
After reconstitution, use immediately or
store in a dark place at 35° to 46°F (2° to
8°C). Discard ifnot used within 8 hours.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the eadiest dated
material is used fiist.
NOTE: all materials used for administering live
virus vaccines should be burned, boiled, or
autoclaved prior to disposal.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1 ) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer :
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
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MCV4: Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine,
Groups A, C, Y, W-135
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46 °F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures. Protect
from light
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Use
Follow manufacturer's directions.
Shelf Life After Opening
The vaccine should be administered shortly
after withdrawal from the vial.
Special Instructions
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first. Vaccine should be
injected by the intramuscular route. Do not
inject intradermally, subcutaneously, or
intravenously.
MPSV4; Meningococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine,
Groups A, C, Y, W-135
I .i
I
•'
I
I
I
ij
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Reconstitution
and Use
Reconstitute gently. This is a white powder
that yields a dear, colorless liquid when
reconstituted with 0.6 ml (single-dose vial)
or 6 ml (10-dose vial) of sterile
distilled water.
Shelf Life After Reconstitution
or Opening
Single-Dose Vials: Use within 30 minutes
of reconstitution.
Multidose Vials: Unused portions of
multidose vials may be refrigerated at
35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C) and used up to
35 days after reconstitution.
Special Instructions
Diluent to be used is sterile, distilled water
for injection; diluent for 10-dose vial also
contains 0.01% thimerosal. Reconstituted
vaccine should be injected subcutaneously.
Do not inject intradermally,
intramuscularly, or intravenously.
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
C-9
If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer:
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vacdne.
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PCV: Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine (7-Valent)
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Use
Vaccine should appear as a homogenous
white suspension after vigorous shaking.
The vaccine should be administered
intramuscularly only.
Shelf Life After Opening
The vaccine should be administered shortly
after withdrawal from the vial.
Special Instructions
This vaccine is a suspension containing
adjuvant and should not be used if the
particles cannot be resuspended after
vigorous shaking.
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
PPV: Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine
(Polyvalent)
Shipping Requirements
Should be shipped in insulated container.
Maintain temperature at 35° to 46°F
(2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should not have been frozen or exposed to
freezing temperatures. Refrigerate upon
arrival.
Storage Requirements
Refrigerate immediately upon arrival. Store
at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C). Do not freeze or
expose to freezing temperatures.
Shelf Life
Check expiration date on vial or container.
Instructions for Use
Follow manufacturer’s directions.
Shelf Life After Opening
Single-Dose Vials: The vaccine should be
administered shortly after withdrawal from
the vial.
Multidose Vials: Unused portions of
multidose vials may be refrigerated at
35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C) and used until
outdated, if not contaminated.
Special Instructions
Do not inject intravenously. Intradermal
administration may cause severe local
reactions and should be avoided.
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office at the vaccine manufacturer :
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccine.
Varicella (Chickenpox) Vaccine
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Shelf Life
Check expiration date on container or vial.
Instructions for Reconstitution
and Use
Reconstitute just before using. Use only the
diluent supplied to reconstitute the vaccine.
Shelf Life After Reconstitution,
Thawing or Opening
Protect from light. Discard if not used
within 30 minutes of reconstitution.
Shipping Requirements
Vaccine: Use insulated container. Must be
shipped with dry ice only, at 4°F ('20°C) or
colder. Should be delivered within 2 days.
Diluent: May be shipped with vaccine, but
do not place in container with dry ice.
Condition upon Arrival*
Should be frozen. Vaccine should remain at
4°F ('20°C) or colder until arrival at the
healthcare facility. Dry ice should still be
present in the shipping container when
vaccine is delivered.
Storage Requirements
Vaccine: Freeze immediately upon arrival.
Maintain vaccine in a continuously frozen
state at 5®F ('15°C) or colder. No
freeze/thaw cycles are allowed with this
vaccine. Vaccine should only be stored in
freezers or refrigerator/freezers with
separate doors and compartments.
Acceptable storage may be achieved in
standard household freezers purchased in
the last 10 years, and standard household
refrigerater/freezers with a separate, sealed
freezer compartment. "Dormitory-style"
units are not appropriate for the storage of
varicella vaccine.
In order to maintain temperatures of
5°F ('15°C) or colder, it will be necessary in
most refrigerator/freezer models to turn the
temperature dial down to the coldest
setting. This may result in the refrigerator
compartment temperature being lowered as
well. Careful monitoring of the refrigerator
temperature will be necessary to avoid
freezing killed or inactivated vaccines.
Diluent: May be refrigerated or stored at
room temperature (68° to 77°F [20° to
25°C]). Do not freeze or expose to
freezing temperatures.
Special Instructions
If this vaccine is stored at a temperature
warmer than 5°F (-15°C), it will result in a
loss of potency and a reduced shelf life. If a
power outage or some other situation
occurs that results in the vaccine storage
temperature rising above the recommended
temperature, the healthcare provider should
contact Merck, the vaccine manufacturer, at
1'800-609-46 18 for a reevaluation of the
product potency before using the vaccine.
Rotate stock so that the earliest dated
material is used first.
NOTE: all materials used for administering live
virus vaccines should be burned, boiled, or
autoclaved prior to disposal.
* If you have questions about the condition of the material at the time of delivery, you should 1) immediately
place material in recommended storage; and 2) notify the Quality Control office ..at thg..Y.accing nianufaCtUCfili
and 3) notify your state health department immunization program if vaccine was publicly purchased vaccme.
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Manufacturer Quality Control Office
Telephone IMumbers
Manufacturer/Distributor Telephone
Number
Products
sanofi pasteur
vvvVw.i;s aventisDasteur.com
800-822-2463 DTaP, DTaP-Hib, DT,
Td, TT, Hib,
MCV4, MPSV4,
Influenza (TIV), IPV
Bayer Biological Products
,v.'. I' v.rfoioioqi ' ilsusa.b.i, rrlieaithcafeA‘':ini iJiodjats.
800-288-8371 IGIM, HBIG, TIG
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
Drug Service
wwvv.cclc.oov nqidoci sro cli iicjs clfua-sar- iceJitiV)!
404-639-3670 Distributor for
Diphtheria antitoxin
Chiron
Vvvv vv .ohiror.coir. ijroc.'iicts vaccines- index. htn'*!
800-20Q-4278
[medical information
pharmacist)
800-244-7668
(customer support)
Influenza (TIV)
GlaxoSmithKline
•v V vvw
. q s k . c o 1 11 • 0 f o cl 1 1 c t s • vaccines, isp
866-475-8222
(customer support)
888-825-5249
(customer support)
DTaP, DTaP-HepB-
IPV, HepA, HepB,
HepA-HepB
Massachusetts Biological Labs
617-983-6400 Td, TT, IGIM, VZIG
Medimmune, Inc.
www.medimmune.com
877-358-6478
(LAIV customer support)
877-633-4411
(general customer support)
Influenza (LAIV)
Merck
www.merck.com
800-609-4618
(customer support)
800-672-6372
(customer support)
Hib, Hib-HepB, PPV23,
HepA, HepB,
MMR, Measles, Mumps,
Rubella, Varicella
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals
www.nabi.com
800-635-1766 HBIG
Wyeth
www.wveth.com
800-999-9384 (storage)
800-934-5556
(customer support)
800-666-7248
(customer support)
Hib, PCV7
July 2004
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Checklist for Safe Vaccine Handling and Storage
He'e arc Ihe 23 (T Oi;L irnporlanL J ing'i you can do 'jc.feguardyuL.r vaccine iupp y, A e ycu doing .ncm all:
Re\'ie\v rg tnis list can help you imp-CA.'e your clinic’s vacc ne rnaragernent oract ces.
Yes Mo
1 . We have a designated person in change cf thie handling and storage of our vaccines.
2. V2e have a back uo person in cha'-ge ofthe nanding and storage of our vaccres.
3. A vaccine inventerv log is maintained that documents:
Yaccin e narn e ari d nurnbc' of doses '•eccived
Date tnn vaccine v/va.s received
.Arnval condition of vaco r e
Yaccin s man .racturer and lot n jr her
Yaccine exp'i rati on 'date
4. Our refrigerata' for vaccines s eithe" housenold-scyls or ccrnme'cia -style, NOT
dcrmito y'-st>'le. I hie "reezer compartrnert hias a separace exter or dc'Or.
5. V2e do NOT store any food or dnr k. r the refrigerator o" freezer.
6. V2e slot e vaccines in J e middle of 1.1 te r efnger ator or fr eezer, ar c NO“ in .he dou.
7. VVe sto<d< and rotate ou' vaccine supply so tnat the newest vacane cf eacn ?/pe (with thie
longest eypirat or cate) is placed behind the vaccine v/rh the shortest exoiration cate.
8. We checc'/accine expiration dates and yye first use those that wil exo re soonest.
9. V'/e post a sign oni tne refrigerator ccor sno’wing v./h ch vaccires s'loUd be stored iri ihie
refrigerator a.nd which shou c be. stored n the freezer.
0. Yv'e al ways keep a therm or' eter in tne refrigerator.
I. The tenpera,tu'’e ir The refrgem,'.or s rrainminee at
7. V7e keep extra containers ofwater in the refrgera,tor no helo r'ain-ain ccJrl tern pe-a.'!. res,
3. We always keep a therm or' eter in tne freezer.
4. The tenperatu"e ir the freeze" is m aintained at +5"T (- 1 5°C(; or colcat
P. Vde keep ice packs and otner ice-fillec contai ners ir thie freeze" to hi sip rricintain cold
temoeratures.
I 6. We post d ter" peratu"e og o'l the relngerator door cn whicn we record th e ret'igerdtrcr
and freezer ternpemtures tw'ice a day first thing in tne morning and at cli nic closing tir' e
a,nd vjc: know whomi to call if tnn tcrnpcrrdi.rr. goes o.Jt o' range.
/. V7e have a “Do Net Unplug” sign next to thie rerge-ator’s e ectr cal cutlet,
8. In the event cf a refrigerator fa lure, we ta<e the 'ollowing steps:
VVe assure that the vaccines are placed in a location witn adequate "efr ga'aticn.
We rnaj'k e:<p'Osed vacc nes and sepai'ate th em t'crn undamaged '/accines.
VVe note tn e retngeratc r or reezer terr p erature arid :c ntact the vacc ne rn anuta
c-
Lurer or sidle healldi depa' lj-nen. to oeLe'rnide hiow .o I andle the affected va'-cines.
VVe fcl ow the vaccire rnanufect]j"e'’s cr health department’s nstrudions as to
whetner the adoctec vaccines can be used, and, it so, we mait the viaJs v/i:n the
re'/iasd e:<pi ration date orovided by tne manufacturer or h ealth deoartmient.
9. We have ootainec a detailed wr tten po icy for geriera and emergenty vacc ne management
them oj" IO'3 l cr state healtn department,
70. Ifal above answersare “yes, ”vve. are, patting o.irsdves on frie.ba.ck. If rot ,
we. h ave
assigned scrnecne to imp ement needed changes! y,-,.wi-»Tunii=c^ci,-o':»3o:5chbpcf • ixm #f303S
• l573Selby.AveriLe • St. Paul, 551 (X • (651)547-9009 • w\w/.irrrfiLnize org
I 'nrrun iz ation ,Acti or Coalit on
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Vaccine Handling Tips
Outdated or improperly stored vaccines won’t protect patients!
Maintain freezer temperature
at 5°F (-15°C) or colder
Maintain refrigerator temperature
at 35-46°F (2-8°C)
Order vaccine carefully.
Inventory your vaccine at least monthly and before placing
an order. Expired vaccine must never be used and is money
wasted
!
Store vaccine correctly.^
Refrigerate or freeze immediately upon receiving shipment.
Do not store vaccine in the door of the refrigerator orfteezer.
Inactivated vaccines should always be placed in the middle
of the refrigerator far enough away from the freezer com-
partment to protect them from freezing.
Always use the vaccine with the earliest
expiration date first.
Move vaccine with the earliest expiration date to the front
and marie it to be used first. Keep vials in their boxes. Never
use outdated vaccine.
Stabilize temperatures.
Store ice packs in the freezer and large jugs of water in the
refrigerator along with the vaccine. This will help maintain
a stable, cold temperature in case of a power failure or if the
refrigerator or freezer doors ate opened frequently or left
open. Frequent opening of the refrigerator unit’s doors can
lead to temperature variations inside, which could affect
vaccine efficacy. For this reason you should not store food
or beverages in the refrigerator or freezer.
Safeguard the electrical supply to the refrigerator.
Make sure the refrigerator is plugged into an outlet in a pro-
tected area where it cannot be disconnected accidentally.
Label the refrigerator, electrical outlets, fuses, and circuit
breakers on the power circuit with information that clearly
identifies the perishable nature of vaccines and the immedi-
ate steps to be taken in case of interruption of power (use
DONOTUNPLUG stickers). Ifyour building has auxiliary
power, use the outlet supplied by that system.
*MMR may be stored in eitiier the freezer or the refiigerator.
^Refer to package insert for speci fic instructions on the storage of each vaccine. If you have questions about the condition of the vaccine, you should
immediately place the vaccine in recommended storage and call the vaccine manu£acturer(s) to determine whether the potency of the vaccine(s) has
been affected. For other questions, call the immunization program at your state or local health department.
Record your health department's phone number here:
Adapted by the Immunization Action Coalition, courtesy of the Minnesota Department ofHealth
www.immwv2eorg/<aIgd/p30-48 pdt • Item #P3(M8(HA)3)
Immunization Action Coalition • 1 573 Selby Avenue • St. Paul, MN55I0-4 * (651)647-9009 • www.immunize.org
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WARNING
Do not unplug the refrigerator/
freezer or break circuit.
Expensive vaccine in storage.
In event of electrical problem, immediately contact:
WARNING!
Do not unplug the refrigerator/ 1
freezer or break circuit. 1
Expensive vaccine in storage. “
ft 1 / iim
In event of electrical problem. Immediately contact:
WARNINGI
Do not unplug the refrigerator/ 1
freezer or break circuit. 1
Expensive vaccine in storage.
ft 1 {
In event of electrical problem, immediately contact:
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New from CDC:
Vaccine Storage
anti Hantiiing
Tooikit
Everything you want to know about vaccine storage and
handling in one place!
• Storage & handling guidelines
• Two videos
• Interactive game
• Forms
• Posters
• Checklists
• Contact information
Online at www2a.cdc.gov.nip/isd/shtoolkit/splash.html
or
Order CD-ROM from www.cdc.gov/nip/publications
C'16
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APPENDIX D
Vaccine Administration
Vaccine Administration Guidelines D'l
Skills Checklist for Pediatric Immunization D«13
Age, Body Mass, Needle Length, Site Table D-15
Immunization Site Map D'«16
Comforting Restraint for Immunizations D-17
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Vaccine Administration
Appropriate vaccine administration is critical to vaccine effectiveness. The recommended site,
route and dosage for each vaccine is based on clinical trials, practical experience and theoretical
considerations. The following information provides general guidelines for administration of
vaccines for those who administer vaccines, as well as those in training, education and
supervisory positions. This information should be used in conjunction with professional
standards for medication administration, vaccine manufacturers’ product guidelines. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP) General Recommendations on Immunization, the American Academy of Pediatrics’
(AAP) Report of the Committee on Infectious Diseases Red Book and state/agency-related
policies and procedures. An education plan that includes competency-based training on vaccine
administration should be considered for all persons who administer vaccines to children and/or
adults (refer to “Skills Checklist for Pediatric Immunization” - page G1 3).
Preparation
Patient Preparation - Patients should be prepared for vaccination with consideration for their
age and stage of development. Parents/guardians and patients should be encouraged to take
an active role before, during and after the administration of vaccines (refer to “Be there for
your child during shots” - page G 1 5). Parents/guardians who elect not to directly participate
during vaccine administration can wait in a nearby area.
Screening - All patients should be screened for contraindications and precautions for each
scheduled vaccine. Many state immunization programs and other organizations have
developed and make available standardized screening tools. Basic screening questions can
be found in Chapter 2. Sample screening forms for children and adults are included in
Appendix A
Vaccine Safety & Risk Communication - Parents/guardians and patients are exposed
through the media to information about vaccines, some of which is inaccurate or
misleading. Health-care providers should be prepared to discuss the benefits and risks of
vaccines using Vaccine Information Statements (VIS) and other reliable resources.
Establishing an open dialogue provides a safe, trust-building environment in which
individuals can freely evaluate information, discuss vaccine concerns and make informed
decisions regarding immunization (refer to Chapter 17 and Appendix F).
Atraumatic Care - Vaccine safety issues and the need for multiple injections have
increased the concerns and anxiety associated with immunizations. Health-care providers
need to display confidence and establish an environment that promotes a sense of security
and trust for the patient and family, utilizing a variety of techniques to minimize the stress
and discomfort associated with receiving injections. This is particularly important when
administering vaccines to children.
• Positioning & Comforting Restraint - The health-care provider must accommodate
for the patient’s comfort, safety, age, activity level, and the site of administration when
considering patient positioning and restraint. For a child, the parent/guardian should be
encouraged to hold the child during administration. If the parent is uncomfortable,
another person may assist or the patient may be positioned safely on an examination
table (refer to “Comforting Restraint for Immunizations” - page G 17).
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• Pain Control - Pain is a subjective phenomenon influenced by multiple factors,
including an individual’s age, anxiety level, previous health-care experiences, and
culture. Consideration for these factors is important as the provider develops a planned
approach to management of injection pain (see page G15).
y Topical Anesthetics or a vapocoolant spray may be prescribed pre-vaccination to
decrease pain at the injection site. These products should be used only for the ages
recommended and as directed by the product manufacturer.
y Analgesic Agents - A non-aspirin-containing pain reliever may be considered to
decrease discomfort and fever following vaccination. These products should be
used only in age-appropriate doses (refer to “After the shots. . in Appendix A).
y Diversionary Techniques - Age-appropriate non-pharmacologic techniques may
provide distraction from pain associated with injections. Diversion can be
accomplished through a variety of techniques, some of which are outlined on pages
G15-16.
y Dual Administrators - Some providers favor the technique oftwo individuals
simultaneously administering vaccines at separate sites. The premise is that this
procedure may decrease anxiety from anticipation of the next injection(s). The
effectiveness of this procedure in decreasing pain or stress associated with vaccine
injections has not been widely evaluated.
Infection Control - Health-care providers should follow Standard Precautions to minimize
the risks of spreading disease during vaccine administration.
Handwashing - The single, most effective disease prevention activity is good
handwashing. Hands should be washed thoroughly with soap and water or cleansed with
an alcohol-based waterless antiseptic between patients, before vaccine preparation or any
time hands become soiled, e.g. diapering, cleaning excreta, etc.
Gloving - Gloves are not mandatory for vaccine administration unless there is potential for
exposure to blood or body fluids or the provider has open lesions on the hands. It is
important to remember that gloves cannot prevent needle stick injuries.
Needle Stick Injuries should be reported immediately to the site supervisor with
appropriate care and follow-up given as directed by state/local guidelines.
Equipment Disposal - Used needles should not be detachedfrom syringes, recapped or
cut before disposal. All used syringe/needle devices should be placed in puncture proof
containers to prevent accidental needle sticks and reuse. Empty or expired vaccine vials
are considered medical waste and should be disposed of according to state regulations.
Vaccine Preparation - Proper vaccine handling and preparation is critical in maintaining the
integrity of the vaccine during transfer from the manufacturer’s vial to the syringe and
ultimately to the patient.
(
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Equipment Selection
• Syringe Selection - A separate needle and syringe should be used for each injection. A
parenteral vaccine may be delivered in either a 1 mL. or 3 inL. syringe as long as the
prescribed dosage is delivered. Syringe devices and sharps with engineered sharps injury
protection (SESIP) are available, recommended by OSHA and required in many states
to reduce the incidence of needle stick injuries and potential disease transmission.
Personnel should be involved in product evaluation and selection. Prior to use in the
clinical area, staff should receive training with the device.
• Needle Selection - Vaccine must reach the desired tissue site for optimal immune
response. Therefore, needle selection should be based upon the prescribed route, size
of the individual, and viscosity of the vaccine (See Subcutaneous & Intramuscular
Injections below). Typically vaccines are not highly viscous, and therefore, a fine
gauge needle can be used (22-25 gauge).
• Needle-free Injection - A new generation of needle-free vaccine delivery devices has
been developed in an effort to decrease the risks of needle stick injuries to health-care
workers and to prevent improper reuse of syringes and needles. For more information
on needle-free injection technology consult the CDC website,
www.cdc.gov/nip/dev/jetinject.htm.
Inspecting Vaccine - Each vaccine vial should be carefully inspected for damage or
contamination prior to use. The expiration date printed on the vial or box should be
checked. Vaccine can be used through the last day of the month indicated by the expiration
date. Vaccine past its expiration date should never be used.
Reconstitution - Some vaccines are prepared in a lyophilized form that requires
reconstitution, which should be done according to manufacturer guidelines. Diluent
solutions vary; only the specific diluent supplied for the vaccine should be used. Once the
vaccine vial is uncapped, clean the rubber stopper of the vial with an alcohol wipe and
allow to dry. Inject the entire content of the diluent vial into the vial of lyophilized vaccine
and agitate to ensure thorough mixing. Once reconstituted, the vaccine must be
administered within the time guidelines provided by the manufacturer or discarded.
Changing the needle after reconstitution of the vaccine is not necessary unless the needle
has become contaminated or bent. Continue with steps for filling the syringe.
Filling the Syringe -
• For vaccines that do not require reconstitution, uncap the vaccine vial, clean the rubber
stopper of the vial with an alcohol wipe and allow to dry.
• If possible, tighten the needle on the syringe.
• Pull back on the plunger to fill the syringe with an amount of air equal to the amount of
vaccine to be withdrawn.
• Remove the needle guard and place the guard where it will not become contaminated.
• With the vial upright, insert the needle directly into the center of the rubber stopper.
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• Inject the air into the vial, keeping the bevel of the needle above the level of the vaccine
to avoid producing air bubbles in the vaccine. The injected air will create positive
pressure in the vial and allow removal of the vaccine without creating a vacuum.
• Invert the vial and withdraw the vaccine keeping the bevel of the needle within the
solution to avoid drawing air into the syringe. For single dose vials, withdraw the entire
vial contents. For multidose vials, withdraw the desired vaccine dose.
• Remove the vial and expel any air bubbles or excess air from the syringe by gently
tapping the side of the syringe and advancing the plunger. Do not expel any of the
vaccine.
• Recap the needle. Since the needle has not been injected into the patient, recapping at
this point is allowable.
Prefilling Syringes - The National Immunization Program strongly discourages filling
syringes in advance because of the increased risks for administration errors. Once in the
syringe, it is difficult to tell which vaccine is which. Other problems associated with this
practice are vaccine wastage, and possible bacterial growth in vaccines that do not contain a
preservative. Furthermore, medication administration guidelines state that individuals should
draw up and prepare any medications they will administer. An alternative to the practice of
prefilling syringes is to use filled syringes supplied by the vaccine manufacturer. Syringes
other than those filled by the manufacturer are designed for immediate administration, not for
vaccine storage.
However, if you have a reason to reconstitute more than one dose of vaccine, perhaps for a
large influenza clinic, you should only prefill a few syringes at a time, which you can
administer while someone else is prefilling a few syringes they will administer. Any
syringes left at the end of the clinic day should be discarded.
Under NO CIRCUMSTANCES should MMR or varicella vaccine ever be reconstituted and
drawn prior to the immediate need for the vaccines. These live virus vaccines are unstable
and begin to deteriorate as soon as they are reconstituted with diluent.
Labeling - Once vaccines are drawn up, filled syringes should be identifiable in terms of the
vaccine or antigen(s) in the syringe(s). There are a variety of methods for identifying or
labeling syringes (e.g., keep syringes with the appropriate vaccine vials, place the syringes
in a labeled partitioned tray, or use color coded labels or preprinted labels). Some providers
may choose to include the lot number and date of filling on the identification.
1
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Administration
Route - Administering a vaccine by the recommended route is imperative. Delivering the
vaccine into the appropriate tissue promotes optimal vaccine efficacy and diminishes the risk
of severe local adverse reactions.
Administering Vaccines: Dose, Route, Site, and Needle Size
Vaccines Dose Route Site Needle Size
Diphtheria, Tetanujs PertuiisLs
(DTaP, DT, Td>
0.5 mL IM Vastus lateralis: for infants (& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass); Deltoid: for toddlers, children & adults
22-2.5g. 1-2"
Haemophilus ia/turnzjae type b
<IUb)
0.5 mL IM
Vmitus lateralis: fur infants (& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass); Deltoid: for toddlers & children 22-25g. I-2"
Hepatitis A (HepA) 5 I 8 yrs.: 0.5 mL
^19 yrs.: 1.0 mL
IM
Vastus lateralis: for infants {& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: fortoddlers. children & adults 22-25g.
I-2"
22-25g. 1-2"Hepatitis B (HepB) sl9 yri.: 0.5 mL*
^20 yrs.: 1.0 mL
LM
Vastus lateralis: for infants (& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: for toddlers, children & adults
InBuenza, live attenuated
(LAIV) 0.5 mL
Inirana&al
spray
Administer 0.25 mL dose into each nostril while
pattern is in an upright position
NA
lnRucn/4t, tiivalcnt
inactivated (TIV)
6-35 inoch: 0.25 mL
s3 yrs.: 0.5 mL
IM Vastus
lateralis: for infants (& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: for toddlers, children & udulls
22-25g. 1-2"
Measles, niuin(»,
rubella (MMR> 0.5 mL sc
Anterolateral fat of thigh: for young children
Pwiterulatenil fat of upper arm: for children & udulls
2.3-25g. 5/8"
Meningococcal (Men! OJi niL sc
AuterolaUTal fat of thigh: for young children
Posterolateral fat of upper arm; hn- children & udulls 2.5- 25g.
5/8"
Pneumococcal
conjugate (PCV)
0.5 ml. IM
Vastus lateralis: for infaiUs <& toddlers lacking adequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: for toddlers & children
22-25g. 1-2"
Pneumococcal
p<dysaccburkle IPPV) OJmL
IM
sc
Deltoid
Anterolateral fat of thigh: for young children
Pc^terolatcral fat of upper arm: for children &. adults
22-25g. 1-2"
2.V25g. 5/8"
Polio, inactivated <IPV) 0.5 ml.
IM
.SC
Vastus lateralis: for infants {/a toddlers lacking itdequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: for toddlers, children & adults
Anterolateral fat of thigh: for infants & young children
Posterolateral fat of upper arm: for children & adults
22-25g. 1-2"
h - -
2.5-25g. 5/8"
Vnricclla (Var) 0.5 mL SC
Anterolaltral ful of (high: for young ctiildren
Posterolateral fat of upper arm; for eliilJrcn & ailulis
2.5-25g. 5/8"
'Persons II through 15 >'cais of age tiuy be given HB'lMetelO 1.0 mL (adult fonnulalioni on a 2-dosc sehedule.
DTaP+HcpB+IPV (Pediarix™)
DTaP+Hib (Trihibit™)
Hib+HepB tComvax™)
0.5 mL IM Vastus lateralis: for
infants (& u»ddlcr\ lacking adequate
deltoid mass): Deltoid: for toddlers & children
22-25g. 1 -2"
Hep.A-fHepB (Twinrix’) ^18 yrs.; LO mL IM iX'lloid 22-25g.
1-2"
Please note: Always refer m itie package iasen incluJeU with each biologic for cximplclc vacx-iiie adminiviration informaiion. The Adv isoiy Commiiicc
on Immunizaiion Practices (ACIP) statement for the particular vaccine should he rcvicwc'd as well.
Immunization Action Coalition • 1 573 Selby Avenue • St. FSul, MN 55104 • (651)647-9009 • www.immunize.org
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Subcutaneous (SC) injections are
administered into the fatty tissue
found below the dermis and above
muscle tissue.
Lynne Larson, www.biovisuals.com
• Site - SC tissue can be found all over the body. The usual SC sites for vaccine
administration are the thigh and the upper outer triceps of the arm. If necessary, the
upper outer triceps area can be used to administer SC injections to infants.
Appendix
• Needle Gauge & Length - 5/8-inch, 23- to 25-gauge needle
• Technique
/ Following appropriate site assessment/selection, prep the injection site with an
alcohol wipe. Using a circular motion, wipe from the center out and allow to dry.
/ To avoid reaching the muscle, the fatty tissue is pinched up, the needle is inserted at
a 45 degree angle and the vaccine is injected into the tissue.
/ Withdraw the needle and apply light pressure to the injection site for several
seconds with a dry cotton ball/gauze.
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Intramuscular (IM) injections
are administered into muscle
tissue below the dermis and
SC tissue.
Lynne Larson, www.biovisuats.com
• Site - Although there are several IM injection sites on the body, the recommended IM sites
for vaccine administration are the vastus lateralis muscle (anterolateral thigh) and the deltoid
muscle (upper arm). The site depends on the age of the individual and the degree of muscle
development.
Lynne Larson, www.biovisuals.com
Deep
femoral
artery
Sciatic
nerve
Rectus
femoris
Vastus
lateralis
Femoral
artery
and vein
The vastus lateralis muscle of the upper thigh used for
intramuscular injections.
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The vastus lateralis site of the right thigh, used for an
intramuscular injection
The deltoid muscle site is most commonly used in older children and adults. The deltoid muscle
can be used in toddlers if the muscle mass is adequate. The buttock should never be used to
administer vaccines.
Lynne Larson, www.biovisuals.com
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• Needle Gauge - 22- to 25-gauge needle
• Needle Length - The needle length must be adequate to reach the muscle and is based
on the size of the individual. Following are the typical lengths for various ages.
Infant - 7/8- to 1-inch
Toddler & older children - 7/8- to 1 1 /4-inch
Adults - 1- to 1 '/2-inch
• Technique -
/ Following appropriate site assessment/selection, prep the injection site with an
alcohol wipe. Using a circular motion, wipe from the center out and allow to dry.
y To avoid injection into SC tissue, the skin of the selected vaccine administration
site can be spread taut between the thumb and forefinger, isolating the muscle.
Another technique, acceptable mostly for pediatric and geriatric patients, is to grasp
the tissue and “bunch up” the muscle.
y Insert the needle fully into the muscle at a 90 degree angle and inject the vaccine
into the tissue.
y Withdraw the needle and apply light pressure to the injection site for several
seconds with a dry cotton ball/gauze.
I
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Aspiration - Aspiration is the process of pulling back on the plunger of the syringe prior to
injection to ensure that the medication is not injected into a blood vessel. Although this
practice is advocated by some experts, there is no research data documented to support the
need for this procedure. If blood appears following aspiration, the needle should be
withdrawn, a new site selected and the entire administration process restarted.
Multiple Vaccinations - When administering multiple vaccines, NEVER mix vaccines in
the same syringe unless approved for mixing by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
If more than one vaccine must be administered in the same limb, the injection sites should
be separated by 1-2 inches so that any local reactions can be differentiated. Vaccine doses
range from 0.5 mL. to 1 mL. The recommended maximum volume of medication for an
IM site, varies among references and depends on the muscle mass of the individual.
However, administering two IM vaccines into the same muscle would not exceed any
suggested volume ranges for either the vastus lateralis or the deltoid muscle in any age
group. The option to also administer a SC vaccine into the same limb, if necessary, is
acceptable since a different tissue site is involved.
Nonstandard Administration - Deviation from the recommended route, site and dosage
of vaccine is strongly discouraged and can result in inadequate protection. In situations
where nonstandard administration has occurred, refer to the ACIP General
Recommendation on Immunization, MMWR 2002; 51 (RR-2), for specific guidance.
Special Situations
Bleeding Disorders - Individuals with a bleeding disorder or who are receiving
anticoagulation therapy may develop hematomas in IM injection sites. Prior to administration
of IM vaccines the patient or family should be instructed about the risk of hematoma
formation from the injection. Additionally, a physician familiar with the patient’s bleeding
disorder or therapy should be consulted regarding the safety of administration by this route. If
the patient periodically receives hemophilia replacement factor or other similar therapy, IM
vaccine administration should ideally be scheduled shortly after replacement therapy. A 23-
gauge or finer needle should be used and firm pressure applied to the site for at least two
minutes. The site should not be rubbed or massaged.
Latex Allergy - Administration of a vaccine supplied in a vial or syringe that contains natural
rubber (refer to product information) should not be administered to an individual with a
history of a severe (anaphylactic) allergy to latex, unless the benefit of vaccination clearly
outweighs the risk of an allergic reaction. These situations are rare. Medical consultation and
direction should be sought regarding vaccination. A local or contact sensitivity to latex is not
a contraindication to vaccination.
Limited Sites - Sometimes vaccination sites may be limited in an individual because of
amputation, injury, orthopedic device or cast, etc. It may be necessary to consult the patient’s
primary health-care provider to develop an individualized immunization schedule.
Syncopal or vasovagal response (“fainting”) may occur during vaccine administration,
especially with adolescents and adults. Because individuals may fall and sustain injury as a
result, the provider may consider having the patient sit during injection(s). A syncopal or
vasovagal response is not an allergic reaction, however, the provider should observe and
administer supportive care until the patient is recovered.
Doll
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Anaphylaxis (a life-threatening acute allergic reaction) - Each facility that administers
vaccines should have a protocol, procedures and equipment to provide initial care for
suspected anaphylaxis. Facility staff should be prepared to recognize and respond
appropriately to this type of emergency situation. All staff should maintain current CPR
certification. Emergency protocols, procedures and equipment/supplies should be reviewed
periodically. For detailed information on medical management, refer to the ACIP General
Recommendations on Immunization and AAP Red Book. Although both fainting and allergic
reactions are rare, some experts suggest observing patients for 1 5-20 minutes following
vaccine administration.
Documentation - All vaccine administration should be fully documented in the patient’s
permanent medical record to include:
1 . Date of administration
2. Name or common abbreviation of vaccine
3. Vaccine lot number
4. Vaccine manufacturer
5. Administration site
6. Vaccine Information Statement (VIS) edition date (found either in the lower left or lower
right comer of the VIS).
7. Name and address of vaccine administrator (This should be the address where the record is
kept. If immunizations are given in a shopping mall, for example, the address would be the
clinic where the permanent record will reside).
Facilities that administer vaccines are encouraged to participate in state/local vaccine registries.
The patient or parent should be provided with an immunization record that includes the vaccines
administered with dates of administration.
The California Department of Health Services’ Immunization Branch has developed a
complete package of resources on vaccine administration, including a training video,
posters and a skills checklist. Ordering information is available on the Immunization
Action Coalition (lAC) website, http://www.immunize.org/iztech/index.htm.
'12
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Age, Body Mass, Needle Length, and Site
Newborns, Infants, Toddlers, and Children (Through 10 Years)
Age Needle Length Injection Site
Newborn* (Premature or Term) 5/8" (16mm) Anterolateral Thigh
Infant 1-12 months 7/8"- 1" (22-25mm) Anterolateral Thigh
Child or Toddler 1-10 years
7/8"
- 1 1/4" (22-32mm) Deltoid Muscle of the Arm
1 - 1 1/4" (25-32mm) Anterolateral Thigh
Pre-Adolescents, Adolescents, and Adults (11 Years and Older)
Sex/Weight Needle Length (minimum) injection Site
Female < 90 kg (200 lbs)
1" (25mm)
Deltoid Muscle of the Arm
Male <118 kg (260 lbs)
Female > 90 kg (200 lbs)
ly/ (38mm)
Male >118 kg (260 lbs)
*Newborn = First 28 days of life
Adapted from AAP Red Book, Poland G, JAMA, 1977, and 2002 ACIP General
Recommendations
Appendix
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[ COMFORTING RESTRAINT ]
[
FOR IMMUNIZATIONS
•The method:
This method involves the parent in embracing the child and controlling ail four limbs. It avoids "holding
down” or overpowering the child, but it helps you steady and control the limb of the injection site.
• For infants and toddlers:
Gray Governor—Stirte of C*hfo<n«
GrftfttiarwS lohoson. Secretary—Health asnd Human Serwes Agervcy
Diana M- BonU., R.N., Or.P.H.. Director—Depanrtwm of Health Services
{mrmjosatioo SraocH • 2151 BericdeyWay • Serkefey. CA 94704
Hold the child on parent’s lap or
have the child stand in front of
the seated parent.
! . Parent's arms embrace the child
during the process.
2. Both legs are firmly between
parent's legs.
dRs
IMM-720(I2/OI)
Have parent hold the child on
parent’s lap.
I . One of the child’s arms
embraces the parent's back and
is held under the parent's arm.
2, The other arm is controlled by
the parent's arm and hand. For
infants, the parent can control
both arms with one hand.
3. Both legs are anchored with the
child's feet held firmly between
the parent's thighs, and con-
trolled by the parent’s other arm.
• For kindergarten and older children:
D-17
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Vaccine Information Statements
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Appendix E
It’s federal law!
You must give your patients current
Vaccine Information Statements (VISs)
A vaccine complication in Florida highlighis the importance ofdistributing the most recent VIS
to your patients. In 1997, a 3-month-old boy developed vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis
(VAPP)following a first dose of OPV. The hoy's parents ivported that their physicianfurnished
them with the 1994 polio VIS at the lime of vaccination. The polio VIS had been revised in 1997 to
reflect the ACIP preferencefor sequential use of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV)followed by live
polio vaccine {OPV), making the 1994 polio statement that was given to the parent outdated.
Note; the most current polio VIS carries the date of l/l/OO.
Institute for Vaccine Safety
Johns Hopkins University
The Institutefor Vaccine Safety is committed
to investigating vaccine safety issues and
pmviding timely and objective information on
vaccine .safety to health care providers, jour-
nalists, and parents. Visit their website at
H'vvH'. vuccinesafety.edu
This article was originally written by NealA. Halsey,
MD, Director, Institute for Vaccine Safety,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School ofPublic Health
and was updated by the Immunization Action Coa-
lition in December 2(K)5.
As readers oiNEEDLE TIPS understand, the risks
of .serious consequences following vaccines are
many hundreds or thousands of times less likely
than the risks associated with the diseases that the
vaccines protect against. Most adverse reactions
from vaccines ate mild and self-limited. .Serious
complications such as the one in the Roridacase are
rare, hut they can have a devastating effect on the re-
cipient, family members, and the providers involved
with the care ofthe patient. We must continue the ef-
forts to make vaccines as safe as possible.
Equally important is the need to fumi.sh vaccinees
(or the parents/legal guardians of minors) w ith ob-
jective information on vaccine safely and the dis-
eases that the vaccines protect against so that they
are actively involved in making decisions affect-
ing their health or the health of their children.
When people are not informed about vaccine ad-
verse events, even common, mild events, they can
lose their trust in health care providers and vac-
cines. Vaccine Information Siaiemenls (VISs) pro-
vide a standardized way to present objective infor-
mation about vaccine benefits and adverse events.
What are VISs?
VLSs arc developed by the staff of the Centers for
Disease Control and [Prevention (CDC) and un-
“We have an obligation to provide
patients and/or parents with informa-
tion that includes both the benefits and
the risks of vaccines. This can be done
with the Vaccine information State-
ments that health care providers are
required by law to provide prior to the
administration of vaccines.”
Walter A. Orenstein, MD, Past Director
National immunization Program, CDC
dergo intense scrutiny by panels of experts for
accuracy. Each VIS provides information to prop-
erly inform the adult vaccinec or the minor child's
parent or legal representative about the risks and
benefits of each vaccine. The VISs are not meant
to replace interactions with healthcare providers
who should answer questions and address con-
cerns that the vaccinee or the parent/legal repre-
sentative may have.
Use of the VIS is mandatory!
Before a healthcare provider vaccinates a child
or an adult with a dose of any vaccine containing
diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, measles, mumps,
rubella, polio, hepatitis B, Haemophilus infiuenzeie
type b (Hib). varicella (chickenpox). or pneumo-
coccal conjugate vaccine, the provider is required by
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA)
to provide a copy of the VIS to either the adult vac-
cinee or to the child’s parent/legal representative.
VISs are also available for influenza. pneumcK-oc-
cal polysaccharide, hepatitis A. meningococcal,
yellow fever, rabies, anthrax, and typhoid vac-
cines. and their use is recommended but not re-
quired by federal law. (EDITOR'S NOTE; Use of
the V I Ss for hepatitis A, influenza, and meningo-
coccal vaccines will become mandatory later in
2(X)5. These vaccines are, or soon will be, covered
by the NCVIA.)
Stale or kK-al health departments or individual pro-
viders may place identifiers on the VISs but any
other changes must be approved by the Director of
CDC’s National Immunization Program.
What to do with VISs
Some of the legal requirements concerning the
use of VISs are as follows;
I
.
Before an NCVIA-covered vaccine is adminis-
tered to anyone (this includes adults!), you must
give the patient or the parent/legal representa-
tive a copy of the most current VIS available for
that vaccine. Make sure you give your patient
time to read the VIS prior to the administration
of the vaccine.
2. You must record in your patient’s chart the date
the VIS was given.
3. You must also record on the patient's chan the
publication dale of the VIS. a dale which ap-
pears on the bottom of the VIS. As the Florida
case above illustrates, it is imperative that you
have the most current VIS.
Most current versions of VISs
As of December 2(X).‘i, the most recent versions of
the VISs are as follows;
DTaP/DT/DTP .... 7/30/01 1 PCV ... 9/30/02
hepatitis A 8/4/04 ‘ PFV .... 7/23/97
hepatitis B 7/11/01 polio 1/1/00
Hib 12/16/98 ‘ rabies ...11/4/03
influenza (LAW)
. KV20/05 Td ...6/10/94
rifluenza(TIV) .... 10/20/05 Tdap ... 9/22/05
Japan, enceph. ... 5/1 1/05 typhoid ....5/19/04
meningococcal .... 10/7/05 varicella .12/16/98
MMR 1/15/03 yellow fever
.
....11/9/04
How to get VISs
VISs are available by calling your state or local
health depanmeni. They also can be downloaded
from the Immunization Action Coalition's website
at www.immunize.org/vis or CIX"s website at
www.cdc.gov7nip/publication.s/vis
Foreign language versions ofVISs are not officially
available from the CIXT. However, several stale
health departments have arranged for their trans-
lations. These versions do not require CDC
approval. You can find more than .^0 languages on
the Immunization Action Coalition’s website at
www.immunize.org/vis or call your slate health
department.
To obtain a complete set
of current VISs, call your state
health department or visit
www.immunize.org/vis
>Ar»AAA'.infVTiunize.org/catg.d/p2027law.pdf • Item #P2027(I2X)5)
Immunization Action Coalition • 1 573 Selby Ave. • St. Paul, MN 55 104 • (651)647-9009 • www.immunize.org • www.vacone.nformation.org
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Instructions for the Use of
Vaccine Information Statements
Required Use
/. Provide VIS when vaccination is given.
As required under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (42 U.S.C. §300aa-26), all health care providers
in the United States who administer to any child or adult any vaccine containing diphtheria, tetanus,
pertussis, measles, mumps, rubella, polio, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), trivalent influenza
(use of influenza VIS required effective January 1, 2006), pneumococcal conjugate, or varicella (chickenpox)
vaccine shall, prior to administration of each dose of the vaccine, provide a copy to keep of the relevant
current edition vaccine information materials that have been produced by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC):
- to the parent or legal representative* of any child to whom the provider intends to administer such vaccine,
and
- to any adult to whom the provider intends to administer such vaccine. (In the case of an incompetent
adult, relevant VlSs shall be provided to the individual’s legal representative.* If the incompetent adult is
living in a long-term care facility, all relevant VISs may be provided at the time of admission, or at the time
of consent if later than admission, rather than prior to each immunization.)
If there is not a single VIS for a combination vaccine, use the VISs
for all component vaccines.
The materials shall be supplemented with visual presentations or
oral explanations, as appropriate.
2. Record information for each VIS provided.
Health care providers shall make a notation in each patient's permanent medical record at the time vaccine
information materials are provided indicating;
(1) the edition date of the Vaccine Information Statement distributed and
(2) the date the VIS was provided.
This recordkeeping requirement supplements the requirement of 42 U.S.C. §300aa-25 that all health care
providers administering these vaccines must record in the patient's permanent medical record (or in a
permanent office log):
(3) the name, address and title of the individual w'ho administers the vaccine,
(4) the dale of administration and
(5) the vaccine manufacturer and lot number of the vaccine used.
**T>egai representative” is de&ied as a
parent or other individual who is quali-
fied under State law to consent to the
immunization of a minor child or
incompetent adult.
Applicability of State Law
Health care providers should consult their legal counsel to
determine additional State requirements pertaining to
immunization. The Federal requirement to provide the
vaccine information materials supplements any applicable
State laws.
Availability of Copies
Single camera-ready copies of the vaccine information
materials are available from State health departments.
Copies are also available on the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s website at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publicationsAn;S.
Copies are available in English and in other languages.
Current Editions of VISs
Diphtheria, Tetanus, Permssis (DTaP/DT): 7/30/01
Haemophilus influenzae type b: 12/16/98
Hepatitis B: 7/11/01
Inactivated Influenza: 10/20/05
Live, Intranasal Influenza: 1 0/20/05
Measles, Mumps, Rubella (MMR): 1/15/03
Pneumococcal conjugate; 9/30/02
Polio: 1/1/00
Tetanus Diphtheria (Td): 6/10/94
Varicella (chickenpox); 12/16/98
Reference 42 U.S.C. §300aa-26
1 1/4/2005
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How to Get Vaccine Information Statements
1. The Internet. All current VISs are available on the internet at two websites:
- The National Immunization Program (www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/vis/default.htm)
- The Immunization Action Coalition (www.immunize.org/vis/index.htm)
VISs from these sites can be downloaded as pdf files and printed. You can also
order single hard copies of the VISs using NIP’s Online Order Forni (at
www.cdc.gov/nip/publications).
2. State Health Department. CDC sends each state health departments
immunization program cameraready copies when a new VIS is published. The
immunization program in turn provides copies to providers within the state.
A set of 7 Videotapes of VISs (MMR, DTP, Polio, Hepatitis B, Hib, Varicella, and
Pneumococcal Conjugate) is available in English and Spanish from Michigan State
University Extension. Tapes run approximately 59 minutes each, and a set costs
$25. For information, call (517) 432-8204.
Audio files for most VISs can be downloaded from the National Immunization
Program’s VIS webpage (www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/vis/default.htm).
Text versions of the VISs can also be accessed from the National Immunization
Program’s VIS webpage. These files are compatible with screen-reader devices.
VIS Translations are available in more than 30 languages from the Immunization
Action Coalition’s website at www.immunize.org/vis/index.htm.
Arabic French Korean Samoan
Armenian German Laotian Serbo-Croatian
Bosnian Haitian Marshallese Somali
Burmese Hindi Polish Spanish
Cambodian Hmong Portuguese Tagalog
Chinese llokano Punjabi Thai
Croatian Italian Romanian Turkish
Farsi Japanese Russian Vietnamese
Appendix E
Questions & Answers: Vaccine Information Statements1.
Should the VISs be used for adults getting vaccines as well as for children?
Yes. Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, anyone receiving a covered vaccine
should be given the appropriate VIS. VISs for vaccines that are administered to both
adults and children are worded so they may be used by both.
2.
Are VISs "informed consent" forms?
No. People sometimes use the term "informed consent" loosely when referring to VISs But
even when vaccine information materials had tear-off sheets for parents to sign, they were
not technical ly informed consent forms. The signature was simply to confirm that the
"Duty to Warn" clause in the vaccine contract was being fulfilled.
There is no Federal requirement for informed consent. VISs are written to fulfill the infor-
mation requirements of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. But because they cover
both benefits and risks associated with vaccinations, they provide enough information that
anyone reading them should be adequately informed. Some states have informed consent
laws, covering either procedural requirements (e.g., whether consent may be oral or must
be written) or substantive requirements (e.g., types of information required). Check your
state medical consent law to deter mine if there are any specific informed consent require-
ments relating to immunization. VISs can be used for informed consent as long as they
conform to the appropriate state laws.
3.
The law states that vaccine information materials be given to a child's legal
representatives. Is this the same as "legal guardian?"
Not necessarily. A "legal representative" is a parent or other individual who is qualified
under state law to consent to the immunization of a minor. It does not have to be the
child's legal guardian (e.g., it could be a grandparent). There is not an overriding Federal
definition.
4.
Must the patient, parent, or legal representative physically take away a copy of each
VIS, or can we simply let them read a copy and make sure they understand it?
Ideally the person getting the shot, or their representative, should actually take each VIS
home. VISs contain information that may be useful later (e.g., the recommended vaccine
schedule, information about what to do in the case of an adverse reaction). Patients may
choose not to take the VIS, but the provider must offer them the opportunity to do so.
4
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When do providers have to start using a new VIS?
The date for a new VISs required use is announced when the final draft is published in the
Federal Register. Ideally, providers will begin using a new VIS immediately, particularly if the
vaccine's contraindications or adverse event profile have changed significantly since the
previous version.
6.
How should we comply with the law for patients who cannot read the VISs (e.g., those
who are illiterate or blind)?
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act requires providers to supplement the VISs with
"visual presentations" or "oral explanations " as needed. If patients are unable to read the
VISs, it is up to the provider to ensure that they have access to the information they contain.
VISs can be read to these patients, or videotapes can be used as supplements. At least one
CD-ROM is being produced on which users can hear the VIS's read. Audio files and
versions of VISs that are compatible with screen reader devices are available on the NIP
website.
7.
Why are the dates on some of the VISs so old? Are they obsolete? Why can’t they be
updated every year?
VISs are updated only when they need to be. For instance, a VIS would be updated if there
were a change in ACIP recommendations that affected the vaccine’s adverse event profile,
indications, or contraindications. If VISs were dated annually, there would be multiple
editions in circulation that were identical but would have different dates. As it is, only the
most recently-dated VIS for each vaccine is valid. VISs posted on the National Immuni-
zation Program's VIS webpage will always be current, regardless of the edition date.
8.
Sometimes a VIS will contain a recommendation that is at odds with the
manufacturer's package insert. Why?
VISs are based on the ACIP's recommendations, which occasionally differ from those made
by the manufacturer. These differences may involve adverse events. Package inserts
generally tend to include all adverse events that were temporally associated with a vaccine
during clinical trials, whereas ACIP tends to recognize only those likely to be causally linked
to the vaccine.
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9.
What is the reading level of VISs?
Defining the readibility of a VIS by a traditional "grade level" measure can be difficult and
misleading. Two criteria used in standard readability formulas are word length and sentence
length. Neither is necessarily a reliable measure of readability. There are multi-syllable
words that are widely understood (e.g., "individual") and short words that are not (e.g.,
"spiv"). VISs often use bulleted lists, which a readability program might see as very long
sentences (no period), even though they are actually quite easy to understand.
Applying a Fletch-Kincaid test to a VIS usually reveals about a 10th grade reading level, but
this should be taken with the caveats in the preceding paragraph.
In what may be a more useful measure of readability, several VISs were the subject of a
series of focus groups among low literacy parents in a variety of racial and ethnic groups
(some not native English speakers) in 1998, and the participants overwhelmingly rated them
easy to read and understand.
10.
Which VISs must be used?
The appropriate VIS must be provided to the recipient of any vaccine covered by the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NVCIA). As of November 2005, these VISs are
DTaP, Td, MMR, Polio, Hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), Varicella,
Pneumococcal conjugate and Influenza vaccine. Final VISs for Hepatitis A and Tdap will be
available soon, and meningococcal conjugate vaccine will soon be covered by the NVCIA.
VISs are available for all vaccines licensed in the United States (except BCG). Their use is
strongly encouraged, whether it is mandated by the NCVIA or not.
11.
May providers develop their own vaccine information materials or modify the VISs?
Providers who administer vaccines covered by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
are required to use the official CDC VISs. However, providers may supplement the VISs
with materials of their own. Health departments or providers may add clinic name and
contact information to a VIS as long as no other changes are made. Any other addition to
these documents or variations from their language or format must have the prior written
approval of the Director of CDC's National Immunization Program.
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12. How should we distribute VISs when the parent or legal representative of a minor
is not present at the time the vaccination is given, for example during a school-
based adolescent vaccination program?
CDCs legal advisors have proposed two alternatives for this situation:
- Consent Prior to Administration of Each Dose of a Series. With this alternative the VIS
must be mailed or sent home with the student around the time of administration of each
dose. Only those children for whom a signed consent is returned may be vaccinated.
The program must place the signed consent in the patient's medical record.
- Single Signature for Series. This alternative is permissible only in those States where a
single consent to an entire vaccination series is allowed under State law and in those
schools where such a policy would be acceptable. The first dose of vaccine may be
administered only after the parent or legal representative receives a copy of the VIS and
signs and returns a statement that a) acknowledges receipt of the VIS and provides
permission for their child to be vaccinated with the complete series of the vaccine (if
possible, list the approximate dates of future doses); and b) acknowledges their accept-
ance of the following process regarding administration of additional doses:
Prior to administration of each dose following the initial dose, a copy of the VIS will be
mailed to the parent (or legal representative) who signs the original consent at the
address they provide on this statement, or the VIS will be sent home with the student;
and
The vaccine information statements for the additional doses will be accompanied by a
statement notifying the parent that, based on their earlier permission, the next dose will
be administered to their child (state the date), unless the parent returns a portion of this
statement by mail to an address provided, to arrive prior to the intended vaccination
date, in which the parent withdraws permission for the child to receive the remaining
doses.
The program must maintain the original consent signature and any additional dose veto
statements in the patient's medical record. A record must be kept of the dates prior to
additional doses that the VIS was mailed, or sent home with the adolescent.
Prior to administration of each additional dose, the provider should ask the adolescent
whether he/she experienced any significant adverse events following receipt of earlier
doses. If yes, the provider should consider consulting the parent or delaying the vaccination.
The adolescent's response to questions about adverse reactions to previous doses should
be kept in the medical record.
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CDC’s Vaccine Information Statement Webpage
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publicationsA/IS/default.htm
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The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS)
VAERS is a national vaccine safety surveillance program co-sponsored by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). VAERS
collects and analyzes information from reports of adverse events following immunization. Since
1990, VAERS has received over 123,000 reports, most of which describe mild side effects such
as fever. Very rarely, people experience serious adverse events following immunization. By
monitoring such events, VAERS can help to identify important new safety concerns.
Reporting to VAERS
Who can file a VAERS report: Anyone can submit a VAERS report. Most reports are sent in
by vaccine manufacturers (42%) and health care providers (30%). The rest are submitted by
state immunization programs (12%), vaccine recipients or their parent/guardians (7%), and
other sources (9%).
What adverse events should be reported: VAERS encourages the reporting of any clinically
significant adverse event that occurs after the administration of any vaccine licensed in the
United States. Report such events even if you are unsure whether a vaccine caused them.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) requires health care providers to report:
- Any event listed by the vaccine manufacturer as a contraindication to subsequent doses of the
vaccine.
- Any event listed in the Reportable Events Table that occurs within the specified time period
after vaccination.
A copy of the Reportable Events Table can be found on the next page (F2), or obtained by
calling VAERS at 1-800-822-7967 or by downloading it from http://vaers.hhs.gov/pubs.htm.
Filing a VAERS report: Use a VAERS report form (see page F6) to report any adverse event.
You can get pre-addressed postage paid report forms by calling VAERS at 1-800-822-7967, or
download a printable copy of the VAERS form from the following Internet sites:
- The VAERS Web site at http://vaers.hhs.gov/
- The Food and Drug Administration's Web site at http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaers/vaers.htm
- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web site at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/
Instructions are included with the form. You may use a photocopy of the VAERS form to submit
a report.
For more information:
- Send e-mail inquiries to info@vaers.org
- Visit the VAERS Web site at: http://vaers.hhs.gov
- Ca)l the toll-free VAERS information line at (800) 822-7967
- Fak inquiries to the toll-free information fax line at (877) 721-0366
This information has been adapted from the VAERS website (http://vaers.hhs.gov).
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Table of Reportable Events
Following Vaccination (RET)
Vaccine/Toxoid
1
1
Event
Interval
from
Vaccination
;
Tetanus in any
: combination;
DTaP, DTP, DTP-
,
Hib, DT, Td, or
|TT)
1
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 7 days
B. Brachial neuritis 28 days
C. Any sequelae (including death) of above
events
Not
applicable
D. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
i
! Pertussis in any
;
combination;
:
DTaP, DTP, DTP-
HiB, P
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 7 days
B. Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) 7 days
C. Any sequelae (including death) of above
events
Not
applicable
D. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
Measles,
mumps and
rubella in any
combination;
MMR, MR, M, or R
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 7 days
B. Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) 15 days
C. Any sequelae (including death) of above
events
Not
applicable
D. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
Rubella in any
combination;
MMR, MR, R
A. Chronic arthritis 42 days
B. Any sequelae (including death) of above
event
Not
applicable
C. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
Measles in any
combination;
MMR, MR, M
A. Thrombocytopenic purpura 7-30 days
B. Vaccine-strain measles viral infection in an
immunodeficient recipient 6 months
C. Any sequelae (including death) of above
event
Not
applicable
D. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
A. Paralytic polio 30 days/ 6
months
Oral Polio (OPV)
B. Vaccine-strain polio viral infection 30 days/ 6 j
months
j
C. Any sequelae (including death) of above
events
Not
j
applicable '
D. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
!seepac.a,e
i
insert
1
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 7 days
{
Inactivated Polio
(IPV)
B. Any sequelae (including death) of the above
event
Not
1
applicable
|
C. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package i
insert
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock
,
7 days
|
Hepatitis B
B. Any sequelae (including death) of the above
event
Not
applicable
I
C. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
1
Haemophilus
influenzae, type
b, (conjugate)
A. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
Varicella
A. Events described in manufacturer's package
insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package 1
insert
A. Intussusception 30 days
i
Rotavirus
t
B. Any sequela (including death) of the above
event
Not
applicable
C. Events described in manufacturer's package
;
insert as contraindications to additional doses I
of vaccine
See package
insert
Pneumococcal
conjugate
A. Events described in manufacturer's package
Insert as contraindications to additional doses
of vaccine
See package
insert
•Effective date: August 26,2002.
The Reportable Events Table (RET) reflects what is reportable by law (42 DSC 300aa-25) to the
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) including conditions found in the
manufacturers package insert. In addition, individuals are encouraged to report any clinically
significant or unexpected events (even if you are not certain the vaccine caused the event) for
any vaccine, whether or not it is listed on the RET. Manufacturers are also required by regulation
(21CFR 600.80) to report to the VAERS program all adverse events made known to them for any
vaccine.
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Reportable Events Table Definitions
Anaphylaxis and anaphylactic shock. Anaphylaxis and anaphylactic shock mean an acute, severe, and
potentially lethal systemic allergic reaction. Most cases resolve without sequelae. Signs and symptoms begin
minutes to a few hours after exposure. Death, if it occurs, usually results from airway obstruction caused by
laryngeal edema or bronchospasm and may be associated with cardiovascular collapse.
Brachial neuritis is defined as dysfunction limited to the upper extremity nerve plexus (i.e., its trunks, division,
or cords) without involvement of other peripheral (e.g., nerve roots or a single peripheral nerve) or central (e.g.,
spinal cord) nervous system structures. A deep, steady, often severe aching pain in the shoulder and upper
arm usually heralds onset of the condition. The pain is followed in days or weeks by weakness and atrophy in
upper extremity muscle groups. Sensory loss may accompany the motor deficits, but is generally a less notable
clinical feature.
Encephalopathy. For purposes of the Reportable Events Table, a vaccine recipient shall be considered to
have suffered an encephalopathy only if such recipient manifests, within the applicable period, an injury meet-
ing the description below of an acute encephalopathy, and then a chronic encephalopathy persists in such per-
son for more than 6 months beyond the date of vaccination.
1. An acute encephalopathy \s one that is sufficiently severe so as to require hospitalization
(whether or not hospitalization occurred).
a. For children less than 18 months of age who present without an associated seizure event, an
acute encephalopathy is indicated by a "significantly decreased level of consciousness" (see "D"
below) lasting for at least 24 hours. Those children less than 18 months of age who present follow
ing a seizure shall be viewed as having an acute encephalopathy if their significantly decreased
level of consciousness persists beyond 24 hours and cannot be attributed to a postictal state
(seizure) or medication.
b. For adults and children 18 months of age or older, an acute encephalopathy is one that persists
for at least 24 hours and is characterized by at least two of the following:
i. A significant change in mental status that is not medication related: specifically a confusional
state, or a delirium, or a psychosis;
ii. A significantly decreased level of consciousness, which is independent of a seizure and cannot
be attributed to the effects of medication; and
iii. A seizure associated with loss of consciousness.
c. Increased intracranial pressure may be a clinical feature of acute encephalopathy in any age
group.
2. A "significantly decreased level of consciousness" is indicated by the presence of at
least one of the following clinical signs for at least 24 hours or greater:
a . Decreased or absent response to environment (responds, if at all, only to loud voice or painful
stimuli);
b. Decreased or absent eye contact (does not fix gaze upon family members or other individuals); or
c. Inconsistent or absent responses to external stimuli (does not recognize familiar people or things).
The following clinical features alone, or in combination, do not demonstrate an acute encephalopathy or a sig-
nificant change in either mental status or level of consciousness as described above: Sleepiness, irritability
(fussiness), high-pitched and unusual screaming, persistent inconsolable crying, and bulging fontanelle.
Seizures in themselves are not sufficient to constitute a diagnosis of encephalopathy. In the absence of other
evidence of an acute encephalopathy, seizures shall not be viewed as the first symptom or manifestation of the
onset of an acute encephalopathy.
Appendix F
3. Chronic Encephalopathy occurs when a change in mental or neurologic status, first manifested
during the applicable time period, persists for a period of at least 6 months from the date of vaccina-
tion. Individuals who return to a normal neurologic state after the acute encephalopathy shall not be
presumed to have suffered residual neurologic damage from that event; any subsequent chronic
encephalopathy shall not be presumed to be a sequela of the acute encephalopathy. If a preponder-
ance of the evidence indicates that a child's chronic encephalopathy is secondary to genetic, prenatal
or perinatal factors, that chronic encephalopathy shall not be considered to be a condition set forth in
the Table.
An encephalopathy shall not be considered to be a condition set forth in the Table if it is shown that the
encephalopathy was caused by an infection, a toxin, a metabolic disturbance, a structural lesion, a
genetic disorder or trauma (without regard to whether the cause of the infection, toxin, trauma, meta-
bolic disturbance, structural lesion or genetic disorder is known).
Chronic Arthritis. For purposes of the Reportable Events Table, chronic arthritis may be found in a person
with no history in the 3 years prior to vaccination of arthropathy (joint disease) on the basis of:
1 . Medical documentation, recorded within 30 days after the onset, of objective signs of acute arthritis
(joint swelling) that occurred between 7 and 42 days after a rubella vaccination; and
2. Medical documentation (recorded within 3 years after the onset of acute arthritis) of the persistence of
objective signs of intermittent or continuous arthritis for more than 6 months following vaccination.
3. Medical documentation of an antibody response to the rubella virus.
The following shall not be considered as chronic arthritis: Musculoskeletal disorders such as diffuse connective
tissue diseases (including but not limited to rheumatoid arthritis, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus
erythematosus, systemic sclerosis, mixed connective tissue disease, polymyositis/dermatomyositis, fibromyal-
gia, necrotizing vasculitis and vasculopathies and Sjogren's Syndrome), degenerative joint disease, infectious
agents other than rubella (whether by direct invasion or as an immune reaction), metabolic and endocrine dis-
eases, trauma, neoplasms, neuropathic disorders, bone and cartilage disorders and arthritis associated with
ankylosing spondylitis, psoriasis, inflammatory bowel disease, Reiter's syndrome, or blood disorders.
Arthralgia (joint pain) or stiffness without joint swelling shall not be viewed as chronic arthritis.
Early-onset Hib disease is defined as invasive bacterial illness associated with the presence of Haemophilus
influenzae b (Hib) organism on culture of normally sterile body fluids or tissue, or clinical findings consistent
with the diagnosis of epiglottitis. Hib pneumonia qualifies as invasive Hib disease when radiographic findings
consistent with the diagnosis of pneumonitis are accompanied by a blood culture positive for the Hib organism.
Otitis media, in the absence of the above findings, does not qualify as invasive bacterial disease. A child is
considered to have suffered an adverse event only if the vaccine was the first Hib immunization received by
the child.
Sequela. The term "sequela" means a condition or event, which was actually caused by a condition listed in
the Reportable Events Table.
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VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM
24 Hour Toll-Free Information 1-800-822-7967
P.O. Box 1100, Rockville, MD 20849-1100
PATIENT IDENTITY KEPT CONFIDENTIAL
For CDC/FDA Use Only
VAERS Number
Date Received
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Ust First M.l.
Addrc.ss
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to Patient 0 Manufacturer D Other
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City .State Zip
Telephone no. ( )
City .State Zip
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State Zip
1
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/ /
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M Df
6, Dale form compleled
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mm dd w mm dd vv
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ar yy
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/ /
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Time
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dd yy AM
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Doses
d.
14. Any other vaccinations within 4 weeks prior to the date listed in no. 10
Vaccine (type) Manufacturer Lot number Route/Site
No. Previous
doses
Date
given
15. Vaccinated at:
Private doctor's office/hospital
n Public health clinic/hospital
Military dinic/hospital
D Other/unknown
16. Vaccine purchased with:
Private funds Military funds
Public funds Olher/unknowm
1 7. Other medications
18. Illness at time of vaccination (specify) 19. Pre-exisling physician-diagnosed allergies, birth defects, medical conditions (specify)
Only for children 5 and under
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23. No. ofbrothers and sisters
Only for reports submitted by manufi3cturerAmmunization project
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26. 15 day report?
Yes No
27. Report type
Initial Follow-Up
20. Have you reported
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No
To doctor
To health department
To manufacturer
21 . Adverse event following prior vaccination (check all applicable, specify)
Adverse Onset Type Dose no.
Event Age Vaccine in series
In patient
In brother
or sister
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Reports lor reactions to other vaccines are voluntary except when required as a conrStion of immunization grant awards.
Form VAERS-1 (foa)
fold in thirds, tape & mail— DO NOT STAPLK FORM"
BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FIRST-CLASS MAIL PERMIT NO. 1895 ROCKVILLE, MD
POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BYADDRESSEE
JlL
VAERS
VAERS
P.O. Box 1100
Rockville MD 20849-1100
NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES
OR APO/FPO
liilillliiiliiliiliilliliiiiilliiilllliiilliiiililil
DIRECTIONS FOR COMPLETING FORM
(Additional pages may be attached if more space is needed.)
GENERAL
• Use a separate form for each patient. Complete the form to the best of your abilities. Items 3, 4, 7, 8, 10. 1 1 , and 1 3 are considered
essential and should be completed whenever possible. Parents/Guardians may need to consult the facility where the vaccine was
administered for some of the information (such as manufacturer, lot number or laboratory data.)
• Refer to the Reportable Events Table (RET) for events mandated for reporting by law. Reporting for other serious events felt to be
related but not on the RET is encouraged.
• Health care providers other than the vaccine administrator (VA) treating a patient for a suspected adverse event should notify the
VA and provide the information about the adverse event to allow the VA to complete the form to meet the VA’s legal responsibility.
• These data will be used to increase understanding of adverse events following vaccination and will become part of CDC Privacy
Act System 09-20-0136, "Epidemiologic Studies and Surveillance of Disease Problems". Information identifying the person who
received the vaccine or that person's legal representative will not be made available to the public, but may be available to the
vaccinee or legal representative.
• Postage will be paid by addressee. Forms may be photocopied (must be front & back on same sheet).
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
Form Completed By: To be used by parents/guardians, vaccine manufacturers/distributors, vaccine administrators, and/or the person
completing the form on behalf of the patient or the health professional who administered the vaccine.
Item 7: Describe the suspected adverse event. Such things as temperature, local and general signs and symptoms, time course,
duration of symptoms, diagnosis, treatment and recovery should be noted.
Item 9: Check "YES" if the patient's health condition is the same as it was prior to the vaccine, "NO" if the patient has not returned
to the pre-vaccination state of health, or "UNKNOWN" if the patient's condition is not known.
Item 1 0: Give dates and times as specifically as you can remember. If you do not know the exact time, please
and 1 1 : indicate "AM" or "PM” when possible if this information is known. If more than one adverse event, give the onset dale and
time for the most serious event.
Item 12: Include "negative" or "normal" results of any relevant tests performed as well as abnormal findings.
Item 13: List ONLY those vaccines given on the day listed in Item 10.
Item 14: List any other vaccines that the patient received within 4 weeks prior to the date listed in Item 10.
Item 1 6: This section refers to how the person who gave the vaccine purchased it, not to the patient's insurance.
Item 1 7: List any prescription or non-prescription medications the patient was taking when the vaccine(s) was given.
Item 18: List any short term illnesses the patient had on the date the vaccine(s) was given (i.e., cold, flu, ear infection).
Item 1 9: List any pre-existing physician-diagnosed allergies, birth defects, medical conditions (including developmental and/or
neurologic disorders) for the patient.
Item 21 : List any suspected adverse events the patient, or the patient's brothers or sisters, may have had to previous vaccinations.
If more than one brother or sister, or if the patient has reacted to more than one prior vaccine, use additional pages to
explain completely. For the onset age of a patient, provide the age in months if less than two years old.
Item 26: This space is for manufacturers' use only.
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Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP)
The VICP is a no-fault alternative to the traditional tort system for resolving vaccine injury
claims. It was established as part of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,
after a rash of lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers and healthcare providers threatened
to cause vaccine shortages and reduce vaccination rates.
The VICP covers all vaccines recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention for routine administration to children. It is administered jointly by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (the
Court), and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The VICP is located in the HRSA
Healthcare Systems Bureau. Covered vaccines and compensible injuries are described on
the “Vaccine Injury Table” (see following page - F9).
The Claims Process
An individual claiming a vaccine-related injury or death files a petition for compensation
with the Court, and is may be represented by an attorney. The Secretary of HHS is named
as the Respondent.
An HHS physician reviews the petition to determine whether it meets the medical criteria
for compensation. This recommendation is provided to the Court through a Respondent's
report filed by the DOJ. The HHS position is presented by an attorney from the DOJ in
hearings before a "special master," who makes the decision for compensation under the
VICP. A decision may be appealed to the Court, then to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, and eventually to the U.S. Supreme Court.
If a case is found eligible for compensation, the amount of the award is usually negotiated
between the DOJ and the petitioner's attorneys, if the attorneys can't agree, the case is
scheduled for a hearing for the special master to assess the amount of compensation.
Compensable claims, and even most claims found to be non-compensable, are awarded
reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs. A petitioner may file a claim in civil court
against the vaccine company and/or the vaccine administrator only after first filing a claim
under the VICP and then rejecting the decision of the Court.
For more information, including information about restrictions that apply to filing a peti-
tion, visit the VICP website at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp or phone 1-800-338-2382.
For information on the Rules of the Court, including requirements for filing a petition, visit
the Court's Website at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osmPage.htm or phone
(202)357-6400.
This information has been adapted from the ViCP website (http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp)
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National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
Vaccine Injury Table^
Vaccine Adverse Event Time Interval
I Tetanus toxoid-containing vaccines (e.g.,
DTixW Tdap, DTP-1 fib, Ol
,
Td, TP)
A Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 0-4 hours
B Brachial neuritis 2-2S days
C Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above events Not applicable
II Pertussis antigen-containing vaccines (e.g..
DlaP, Tdap. DTP, P, DTP-Hib)
A Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 0-4 hours
B Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) 0-72 hours
C Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above events Not applicable
III Measles, mumps and rubella virus-containing
vaccines in any combination (e.g., M.MR, MR,
A Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 0-4 hours
M. R) B Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) 5-15 days
C Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above events Not applicable
IV Rubella virus-containing vaccines (e.g., MMR.
MR. R)
A Chronic arthritis 7-42 days
B Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above event Not applicable
V Measles virus-containing vaccines (e.g.,
MMR. MR. M)
A Thrombocytopenic puipura 1-M) days
B Vaccine-Stram Measles Viral Infection in an imrnunodeficient
recipient
0-6 months
C Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above events Not applicable
VI Polio live virus-containing vaccines (OPV) A Paralytic polio
- in a non-immunodeficient recipient O-.KI days
- in an immunodeficient recipient 0-6 months
- in a vaccine assoc, community case Not applicable
B Vaccine-strain polio viral infection
- in a non-immuiuxlericient recipient 0-.50 days
- in an immunodetlcicnt recipient 0-6 months
- in a vaccine assoc, community case Not applicable
C Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above events Not applicable
VTI Polio inactivated-virus containing vaccines A Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 0-4 hours
(e g.. IPV)
B Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above event Not applicable
VIII Hepatitis B amigen-atntaining vaccines A Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 0-4 hours
B Any acute complication or sequela (including death) of above event Not applicable
IX Haemophilus influenzae type b polysaccliaride
conjugate vaccines
A No condition specified for compensation Not applicable
X Varicella vaccine A No condition s|recilied for compensation Not applicable
XI Rotavirus vaccine A No condition specified for compensation Not applicable
XII Vaccines containing live, oral, rhesus-based
rotavirus
A Intussusception 0-.J0 days
B Any acute complication or sequela (including death) ofabove event Not applicable
XIII Pneumococcal conjugate vaccines A No condition specified tor compensation Not applicable
XIV Any new vaccine recommended by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention for routine
A No condition specified for compensation Not applicable
administration to children, after publication by
Secretaiy, HHS of a notice of coverage’’
“Effective dale; July 1. 2005
'' As of December 1, 2004. hepatitis A vaccines have been added to the Vaccine Injury Table (Table) under this Category. As ol .lul> 1, 2005. irivali’iu
influenza vaccines have been added to the Table under this Category. Trivalent influenza vaccines are given annually during the flu season either by needle
and syringe or in a nasal spray. All inlluenza vaccines routinely administered in the U.S. are trivalent vaccines covered under this Category. See Sews on the
VICP website for more information (wavw.hrsa.gov/osp.vicp).
J
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Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation
(1) Anaphylaxis and anaphylactic shock mean an acute, severe, and potentially lethal systemic allergic reac-
tion. Most cases resolve without sequelae. Signs and symptoms begin minutes to a few hours after exposure.
Death, if it occurs, usually results from airway obstruction caused by laryngeal edema or bronchospasm and
may be associated with cardiovascular collapse. Other significant clinical signs and symptoms may include
the following; Cyanosis, hypotension, bradycardia, tachycardia, arrhythmia, edema of the pharynx and/or
trachea and/or larynx with stridor and dyspnea. Autopsy findings may include acute emphysema which results
from lower respiratory tract obstruction, edema of the hypopharynx, epiglottis, larynx, or trachea and minimal
findings of eosinophilia in the liver, spleen and lungs. When death occurs within minutes of exposure and with
out signs of respiratory distress, there may not be significant pathologic findings.
(2) Encephalopathy. For purposes of the Vaccine Injury Table, a vaccine recipient shall be considered to have
suffered an encephalopathy only if such recipient manifests, within the applicable period, an injury meeting the
description below of an acute encephalopathy, and then a chronic encephalopathy persists in such person for
more than 6 months beyond the date of vaccination.
(i) An acute encephalopathy is one that is sufficiently severe so as to require hospitalization (whether or not
hospitalization occurred).
(A) For children less than 18 months of age who present without an associated seizure event, an acute
encephalopathy is indicated by a "significantly decreased level of consciousness" (see "D" below)
lasting for at least 24 hours. Those children less than 18 months of age who present following a
seizure shall be viewed as having an acute encephalopathy if their significantly decreased level of
consciousness persists beyond 24 hours and cannot be attributed to a postictal state (seizure) or
medication.
(B) For adults and children 18 months of age or older, an acute encephalopathy is one that persists for at I
least 24 hours and characterized by at least two of the following:
(1) A significant change in mental status that is not medication related; specifically a confusional state,
or a delirium, or a psychosis;
(2) A significantly decreased level of consciousness, which is independent of a seizure and cannot be
attributed to the effects of medication; and
(3) A seizure associated with loss of consciousness.
(C) Increased intracranial pressure may be a clinical feature of acute encephalopathy in any age group.
(D) A "significantly decreased level of consciousness" is indicated by the presence of at least one of the
following clinical signs for at least 24 hours or greater (see paragraphs (2)(I)(A) and (2)(I)(B) of this
section for applicable timeframes):
(1) Decreased or absent response to environment (responds, if at all, only to loud voice or painful
stimuli);
(2) Decreased or absent eye contact (does not fix gaze upon family members or other individuals); or
(3) Inconsistent or absent responses to external stimuli (does not recognize familiar people or things).
(E) The following clinical features alone, or in combination, do not demonstrate an acute encephalopathy
or a significant change in either mental status or level of consciousness as described above:
Sleepiness, irritability (fussiness), high-pitched and unusual screaming, persistent inconsolable crying,
and bulging fontanelle. Seizures in themselves are not sufficient to constitute a diagnosis of
encephalopathy. In the absence of other evidence of an acute encephalopathy, seizures shall not be
viewed as the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of an acute encephalopathy.
(ii) Chronic encephalopathy occurs when a change in mental or neurologic status, first manifested during
the applicable time period, persists for a period of at least 6 months from the date of vaccination.
Individuals who return to a normal neurologic state after the acute encephalopathy shall not be presumed
to hav6 sufforod rosidual nourologic damago from that 6v©nt; any subsoguent chronic ©ncaphalopathy
shall not be presumed to be a sequela of the acute encephalopathy. If a preponderance of the evi-
dence indicates that a child s chronic encephalopathy is secondary to genetic, prenatal or perinatal fac-
tors, that chronic encephalopathy shall not be considered to be a condition set forth in the Table.
(iii) An encephalopathy shall not be considered to be a condition set forth in the Table if in a proceeding on
a petition, it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the encephalopathy was caused by an
infec- tion, a toxin, a metabolic disturbance, a structural lesion, a genetic disorder or trauma (without
regard to whether the cause of the infection, toxin, trauma, metabolic disturbance, structural lesion or
genetic disorder is known). If at the time a decision is made on a petition filed under section 2111(b) of
the Act for a vaccine- related injury or death, it is not possible to determine the cause by a preponder-
ance of the evidence of an encephalopathy, the encephalopathy shall be considered to be a condition
set forth in the Table.
(iv) In determining whether or not an encephalopathy is a condition set forth in the Table, the Court shall-
con- sider the entire medical record.
3) Seizure and convulsion. For purposes of paragraphs (b)(2) of this section, the terms, "seizure" and "con-
vulsion" include myoclonic, generalized tonic-clonic (grand mal), and simple and complex partial seizures.
Absence (petit mal) seizures shall not be considered to be a condition set forth in the Table. Jerking move-
ments or staring episodes alone are not necessarily an indication of seizure activity.
(4) Sequela. The term "sequela" means a condition or event which was actually caused by a condition listed
in the Vaccine Injury Table.
(5) Chronic Arthritis. For purposes of the Vaccine Injury Table, chronic arthritis may be found in a person
with no history in the 3 years prior to vaccination of arthropathy (joint disease) on the basis of;
(A)Medical documentation, recorded within 30 days after the onset, of objective signs of acute arthritis
(joint swelling) that occurred between 7 and 42 days after a rubella vaccination;
(B) Medical documentation (recorded within 3 years after the onset of acute arthritis) of the persistence of
objective signs of intermittent or continuous arthritis for more than 6 months following vaccination:
(C) Medical documentation of an antibody response to the rubella virus.
For purposes of the Vaccine Injury Table, the following shall not be considered as chronic arthritis:
Musculoskeletal disorders such as diffuse connective tissue diseases (including but not limited to rheuma-
toid arthritis, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus erythematosus, systemic sclerosis, mixed con-
nective tissue disease, polymyositis/dermatomyositis, fibromyalgia, necrotizing vasculitis and vascu-
lopathies and Sjogren's Syndrome), degenerative joint disease, infectious agents other than rubella
(whether by direct invasion or as an immune reaction), metabolic and endocrine diseases, trauma,
neoplasms, neuropathic disorders, bone and cartilage disorders and arthritis associated with ankylosing
spondylitis, psoriasis, inflammatory bowel disease, Reiter's syndrome, or blood disorders.
Arthralgia (joint pain) or stiffness without joint swelling shall not be viewed as chronic arthritis for purposes
of the Vaccine Injury Table.
(6) Brachial neuritis is defined as dysfunction limited to the upper extremity nerve plexus (i.e., its trunks, divi-
sions, or cords) without involvement of other peripheral (e.g., nerve roots or a single peripheral nerve) or
central (e.g., spinal cord) nervous system structures. A deep, steady, often severe aching pain in the shoul-
der and upper arm usually heralds onset of the condition. The pain is followed in days or weeks by weak-
ness and atrophy in upper extremity muscle groups. Sensory loss may accompany the motor deficits, but
is generally a less notable clinical feature. The neuritis, or plexopathy, may be present on the same side as
or the opposite side of the injection; it is sometimes bilateral, affecting both upper extremities. Weakness is
required before the diagnosis can be made. Motor, sensory, and reflex findings on physical examination
and the results of nerve conduction and electromyographic studies must be consistent in confirming that
dysfunction is attributable to the brachial plexus. The condition should thereby be distinguishable from con-
ditions that may give rise to dys func tion of nerve roots (i.e., radiculopathies) and peripheral nerves (i.e.,
including multiple mononeuropathies), as well as other peripheral and central nervous system structures
(e.g., cranial neuropathies and myelopathies).
F
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(7) Thrombocytopenic purpura is defined by a serum platelet count less than 50,000/mml Thrombocytopenic
purpura does not include cases of thrombocytopenia associated with other causes such as hypersplenism,
autoimmune disorders (including alloantibodies from previous transfusions) myelodysplasias, lymphoproliferative
disorders, congenital thrombocytopenia or hemolytic uremic syndrome. This does not include cases of
immune (formerly called idiopathic) thrombocytopenic purpura (ITP) that are mediated, for example, by viral or
fungal infections, toxins or drugs. Thrombocytopenic purpura does not include cases of thrombocytopenia
associated with disseminated intravascular coagulation, as observed with bacterial and viral infections. Viral
infections include, for example, those infections secondary to Epstein Barr virus, cytomegalovirus, hepatitis A
and B, rhinovirus, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), adenovirus, and dengue virus. An antecedent viral
infection may be demonstrated by clinical signs and symptoms and need not be confirmed by culture or sero-
logic testing. Bone marrow examination, if performed, must reveal a normal or an increased number of
megakaryocytes in an otherwise normal marrow.
(8) Vaccine-strain measles viral infection is defined as a disease caused by the vaccine-strain that should be
determined by vaccine specific monoclonal antibody or polymerase chain reaction tests.
(9) Vaccine-strain polio viral infection is defined as a disease caused by poliovirus that is isolated from the
affected tissue and should be determined to be the vaccine-strain by oligonucleotide or polymerase chain
reaction. Isolation of poliovirus from the stool is not sufficient to establish a tissue specific infection or disease
caused by vaccine-strain poliovirus.
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Data and Statistics
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Appendix G
Reported Cases and Deaths from Vaccine Preventable
Diseases, United States, 1950-2003
Diphtheria Tetanus Pertussis Polio (paralytic)
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
1950 5,796 410 486 336 120,718 1,118 33,300 1,904
1951 3,983 302 506 394 68,687 951 28,386 1,551
1952 2,960 217 484 360 45,030 402 57,879 3,145
1953 2,355 156 506 337 37,129 270 35,592 1,450
1954 2,041 145 524 332 60,886 373 38,476 1,368
1955 1,984 150 462 265 62,786 467 28,985 1043
1956 1,568 103 468 246 31,732 266 15,140 566
1957 1,211 81 447 279 28,295 183 5,485 221
1958 918 74 445 303 32,148 177 5,787 255
1959 934 72 445 283 40,005 269 8,425 454
1960 918 69 368 231 14,809 118 3,190 230
1960 617 68 379 242 11,468 76 1,312 90
1962 444 41 322 215 17,749 83 910 60
1963 314 45 325 210 17,135 115 449 41
1964 293 42 289 179 13,005 93 122 17
1965 164 18 300 181 6,799 55 72 16
1966 209 20 235 158 7,717 49 113 9
1967 219 32 263 144 9,718 37 41 16
1968 260 30 178 66 4,810 36 53 24
1969 241 25 192 89 3,285 13 20 13
1970 435 30 148 79 4,249 12 33 7
1971 215 13 116 64 3036 18 21 18
1972 152 10 128 58 3,287 6 31 2
1973 228 10 101 40 1,759 5 8 10
1974 272 5 101 44 2,402 14 7 3
1975 307 5 102 45 1,738 8 13 9
1976 128 7 75 32 1,010 7 10 16
1977 84 5 87 24 2,177 10 19 16
1978 76 4 86 32 2,063 6 8 13
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Measles Mumps Rubella CRS
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases
1982 1,714 2 5,270 2 2,325 4 13
1983 1,497 4 3,355 2 970 3 7
1984 2,587 1 3,021 1 752 1 2
1985 2,822 4 2,982 0 630 1 2
1986 6,282 2 7,790 0 55 1 13
1987 3,655 2 12,848 2 306 0 3
1988 3,396 3 4,866 2 225 1 2
1989 18,193 32 5,712 3 396 4 2
1990 27,786 64 5,292 1 1,125 8 32
1991 9,643 27 4,264 1 1,401 1 34
1992 2,237 4 2,572 0 160 1 11
1993 312 0 1,692 0 192 0 4
1994 963 0 1,537 0 227 0 7
1995 309 2 906 0 128 1 3
1996 508 1 751 1 238 0 2
1997 138 2 683 0 181 0 9
1998 100 0 666 1 364 0 9
1999 100 2 387 1 267 0 6
2000 86 1 338 2 176 0 8
2001 116 1 266 0 23 2 3
2002 44 0 270 1 18 0 1
2003 56 NA 231 NA 7 NA 1
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Measles Mumps Rubella CRS
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases
1950 319,124 468 NR NR NR
1951 530,118 683 NR NR NR
1952 683,077 618 NR NR NR
1953 449,146 462 NR NR NR
1954 682,720 518 NR NR NR
1955 555,156 345 NR NR NR
1956 611,936 530 NR NR NR
1957 486,799 389 NR NR NR
1958 763,094 552 NR NR NR
1959 406,162 385 NR NR NR
1960 441,703 380 NR 42 NR 12 NR
1961 423,919 434 NR 53 NR 14 NR
1962 481,530 408 NR 43 NR 8 NR
1963 385,156 364 NR 48 NR 16 NR
1964 458,083 421 NR 50 NR 53 NR
1965 261,904 276 NR 31 NR 16 NR
1966 204,136 261 NR 43 46,975 12 NR
1967 62,705 81 NR 37 46,888 16 NR
1968 22,231 24 152,209 25 49,371 24 NR
1969 25,826 41 90,918 22 57,686 29 62
1970 47,351 89 104,953 16 56,552 31 67
1971 75,290 90 124,939 22 45,086 20 44
1972 32,275 24 74,215 16 25,507 14 32
1973 26,690 23 69,612 12 27,804 16 30
1974 22,094 20 59,128 6 11,917 15 22
1975 24,374 20 59,647 8 16,652 21 32
1976 41,126 12 38,492 8 12,491 12 22
1977 57,345 15 21,436 5 20,395 17 29
1978 26,871 11 16,817 3 18,269 10 30
1979 13,597 6 14,255 2 11,795 1 57
1980 13,506 11 8,576 2 3,904 1 14
1981 3,124 2 4,941 1 2,077 5 10
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Measles Mumps Rubella CRS
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases
1982 1,714 2 5,270 2 2,325 4 13
1983 1,497 4 3,355 2 970 3 7
1984 2,587 1 3,021 1 752 1 2
1985 2,822 4 2,982 0 630 1 2
1986 6,282 2 7,790 0 55 1 13
1987 3,655 2 12,848 2 306 0 3
1988 3,396 3 4,866 2 225 1 2
1989 18,193 32 5,712 3 396 4 2
1990 27,786 64 5,292 1 1,125 8 32
1991 9,643 27 4,264 1 1,401 1 34
1992 2,237 4 2,572 0 160 1 11
1993 312 0 1,692 0 192 0 4
1994 963 0 1,537 0 227 0 7
1995 309 2 906 0 128 1 3
1996 508 1 751 1 238 0 2
1997 138 2 683 0 181 0 9
1998 100 0 666 1 364 0 9
1999 100 2 387 1 267 0 6
2000 86 1 338 2 176 0 8
2001 116 1 266 0 23 2 3
2002 44 0 270 1 18 0 1
2003 56 NA 231 NA 7 NA 1
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Hepatitis A Hepatitis B Haemophilus Varicella
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
1966 32,859 NA 1,497 NA NR NR NR
1967 38,909 NA 2,458 NA NR NR NR
1968 45,893 NA 4,829 NA NR NR NR
1969 48,416 NA 5,909 NA NR NR NR
1970 56,797 NA 8,310 NA NR NR NR
1971 59,606 NA 9,556 NA NR NR NR
1972 54,074 NA 9,402 NA NR NR 164.114 122
1973 50,749 NA 8,451 NA NR NR 182,927 138
1974 40,358 NA 10,631 NA NR NR 141,495 106
1975 35,855 NA 13,121 NA NR NR 154,248 83
1976 33,288 NA 14,973 NA NR NR 183,990 106
1977 31,153 NA 16,831 NA NR NR 188,396 89
1978 29,500 NA 15,016 NA NR NR 154,089 91
1979 30,407 129 15,452 260 NR NR 199,081 103
1980 29,087 112 19,015 294 NR NR 190,894 78
1981 25.802 93 21,152 394 NR NR 200,766 84
1982 23,403 83 22,177 375 NR NR 167,423 61
1983 21,532 82 24,318 438 NR NR 177,462 57
1984 22,040 77 26,115 465 NR NR 221,983 53
1985 23,210 80 26,611 490 NR NR 178,162 68
1986 23,430 65 26,107 557 NR NR 183,243 47
1987 25,280 77 25,916 595 NR NR 213,196 89
1988 28,507 70 23,177 621 NR NR 192,857 83
1989 35,821 88 23,419 711 NR NR 185,441 89
1990 31,441 76 21,102 816 NR NR 173,099 120
1991 24,378 71 18,003 912 2,764 17 147,076 81
1992 23,112 82 16,126 903 1,412 16 158,364 100
1993 24,238 95 13,361 1041 1,419 7 134.722 100
1994 26,796 97 12,517 1120 1,174 5 151,219 124
1995 31,582 142 10,805 1027 1,180 12 120,624 115
1996 31,032 121 10,637 1082 1,170 7 83,511 81
Appendix G
Hepatitis A Hepatitis B Haemophilus Varicella
Year Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
1997 30,021 127 10,416 1,030 1,162 7 98,727 99
1998 23,229 114 10,258 1,052 1,194 11 82,455 81
1999 17,047 134 7,694 832 1,309 6 46,016 48
2000 13,397 106 8,036 886 1,398 6 27,382 44
2001 10,609 83 7,843 769 1,597 11 22,536 26
2002 8,795 76 7,996 762 1,743 7 22,841 32
2003 7,653 NA 7,526 NA 2,013 NA 20,948 NA
Notes
NA - Not Available
NR - Not nationally reportable
CRS: Congenital Rubella Syndrome
Prior to 1966, hepatitis A and B were not separated from other types of hepatitis. Prior to 1978, deaths from
hepatitis A and B were not separated from deaths from other types of hepatitis.
Haemophilus (Hi) reporting includes all serotypes and all ages. In 2003, 32 cases of invasive Hi type B
disease were reported among children <5 years of age.
Varicella was removed from the nationally notifiable disease list in 1991. In 2003, varicella cases were
reported from 21 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and American Samoa.
Sources;
Final totals for 2003: MMWR 2004;53(40):688-96.
Reportable diseases (1971-2002): Summary of Notifiable Diseases, United States, 2002. MMWR
2004;51(53):74-8.
Reportable disease (1950-1970): Earlier editions of Summary of Notifiable Diseases, published annually in
MMWR.
Deaths: National Center for Health Statistics Mortality Report for respective years.
8 Dec 2004
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Impact of Vaccines in the 20“^ Century
Disease
20*” Century
Annual Morbidity 2003 Total % Decrease
Smallpox 48,164 0 100
Diphtheria 175,885 1 >99.9
Pertussis 147,271 11,647 92.1
Tetanus 1,314 20 98.5
Polio (paralytic) 16,316 0 100
Measles 503,282 56 >99.9
Mumps 152,209 231 99.9
Rubella 47,745 7 >99.9
Congenital rubella 823 1 99.8
Haemophilus
influenzae (<5 yrs)
20,000 (est.)
259
(serotype B or
unknown serotype)
98.8
Sources:
1 . CDC. Impact of vaccines universally recommended for children - United
States, 1900-1998. MMWR 1999;48(12):243-8
2. CDC. Notice to Readers: Final 2003 Reports of Notifiable Diseases.
MMWR 2004;53(30):687
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Vaccine Coverage Levels - United States, 1962-2004
Year DTP3+ DTP4+ Polio3+ MMR* Hib3+ Var PCV3+ HepB3+ Combined
4-3-1
Combined
4-3-1
-3
1962 67.3
1963 71,4
1964 74.6
1965 72.7
1966 74,0
1967 77,9 60.0
1968 76.8 61.5
1969 77.4 61.4
1970 76.4 58,4
1971 77.8 62.2
1972 74.1 62.8
1973 71.7 59.5 61.0
1974 72,4 60.0 63.4
1975 73.2 63.6 65.5
1976 72.7 61.3 66.3
1977 69.6 62.6 65.0
1978 66.6 59.5 63.6
1979 64.4 59.7 66.5
1980 66.0 58.9 66.6
1981 68.1 59.2 66.8
1982 67.1 57.0 67.6
1983 65.4 56.9 66.3
1984 65.0 53.2 65.8
1985 63.6 53.6 61.2
1986
1987
1988
1989
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Year DTP3+ DTP4+ Polio3+ MMR* Hib3->- Var PCV3+ HepB3-»- Combined
4-3-1
Combined
4-3-1
-3
1990
1991 68.8 53.2 82.0
1992 83.0 59.0 72,4 82.5 28.2 8.0 68.7 55.3
1993 88.2 72.1 78.9 84.1 55,0 16.3 67 1
1994 93,0 77.7 83.0 89.0 86,0 37.0 750
1995 94.7 78.5 87.9 87,6 91,7 68.0 76.2 74 2
1996 95.0 81.1 91.1 90.7 91,7 16.0 81,8 78 4 76 5
1997 95.5 81.5 90,8 90.5 92,7 25.9 83.7 77.9 76.2
1998 95.6 83.9 90.8 92.0 93,4 43,2 87.0 80.6 79.2
1999 95.9 83,3 89.6 91.5 93.5 57.5 88.1 79.9 784
2000 94.1 81.7 89.5 90.5 93,4 67.8 90.3 77.6 76.2
2001 94.3 82.1 89.4 91,4 93.0 76.3 88.9 78.6 77.2
2002 94.9 81,6 90.2 91.6 93,1 80.6 40.8 89.9 78 5 77.5
2003 96.0 84.8 91.6 93.0 93,9 84,8 68.1 92.4 82.2 81 3
2004 95.9 85.5 91,6 93 . 0* 93.5 87.5 73.2 92.4 83.5 82 5
‘Previously reported as measles-containing vaccine (MCV).
Van varicella vaccine
Combined 4-3-1: Four or more doses of DTP/DTaP/DT, three or more doses of poliovirus
vaccine, and one or more doses of any measles-containing vaccine.
Combined 4-3-1-3: Four or more doses of DTP/DTaP/DT, three or more doses of poliovirus
vaccine, one or more doses of any measles-containing vaccine, and three or more doses of
Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccine.
Data prior to 1993 were collected by the National Health Interview Survey and represent 2-
year-old children. Data from 1993 are from the National Immunization Survey and represent
1 9-35 month-old children. Different methods were used for the two surveys. No national
coverage data were collected In 1986-1990.
Most recent publication: CDC. National, State, and Urban Area Vaccination Coverage Levels
Among Children Aged 19-35 Months - United States, 2004. MMWR 2004;54(29);71 7-721
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Introduction
In 1992, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), in collaboration with
the Ad Hoc Working Group for the Development of Standards for Pediatric
Immunization Practices, a working group representing public and private agencies with
input from state and local health departments, physician and nursing organizations, and
public and private providers, developed a set of standards as to what constitutes the
most essential and desirable immunization policies and practices. These standards were
endorsed by a variety of medical and public health organizations and represented an
important element in our national strategy to protect America's children against vac-
cine-preventable diseases.
Since that time, vaccine delivery in the US has changed in several important ways.
First, vaccination coverage rates among preschool children have increased substantially
and are now monitored by the National Immunization Survey.' ^ Second, vaccination
of children has shifted markedly from the public to the private sector,’ with an
emphasis on vaccination in the context of primary care and the Medical Home.^
The Vaccines for Children Program has provided critical support to this shift by
covering the cost of vaccinations for the most economically disadvantaged children and
adolescents. Third, the development and introduction of performance measures, such as
the National Committee for Quality Assurance's HEDIS (Health Plan Employer Data
and Information Set),^ have focused national attention upon the quality of preventive
care, including vaccination. Finally, high quality research in health services has helped
to refine strategies for raising and sustaining vaccination coverage levels among
children, adolescents, and adults.®
Health care professionals who vaccinate children and adolescents continue to face
important challenges. These challenges include a diminishing level of experience-
among patients, parents and physicians-with the diseases that vaccines prevent, the
ready availability of vaccine-related information that may be inaccurate or misleading,
the increasing complexity of the vaccination schedule, and the failure of many health
plans to pay for the costs associated with vaccination. In addition, recommendations
from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)
and the American Medical Association (AMA) in 1996 underscore the need to focus
on adolescent vaccination.®
In this context, NVAC, along with partners representing federal agencies, state and
local health departments, and professional organizations, revised and updated the
Standards during 2001-02 to reflect these changes and challenges in vaccine delivery.
The revision was approved by NVAC on February 8, 2002 and distributed widely
among a variety of medical and public health organizations for review and endorse-
ment. More than 40 organizations have formally endorsed the Standards for Child and
Adolescent Immunization Practices.
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The Standards are directed toward "health care professionals," an inclusive term for the
many persons in clinical settings who share in the responsibility for vaccination of
children and adolescents: physicians, nurses, mid-level practitioners (e.g., nurse
practitioners, physician assistants), medical assistants, and clerical staff. In addition to
this primary audience, the Standards are intended to be useful to public health profes'
sionals, policy makers, health plan administrators, employers who purchase health care
coverage, and others whose efforts shape and support the delivery of vaccination services.
Of note, the use of the term "standards" should not be confused with a minimum
standard of care. Rather, these Standards represent the most desirable immunization
practices, which health care professionals should strive to achieve. Given current
resource limitations, some health care professionals may find it difficult to implement
all of the Standards, because of circumstances over which they have little control. The
expectation is that, by summarizing best immunization practices in a clear and concise
format, the Standards will assist these providers in securing the resources necessary to
implement this set of recommendations.
By adopting these Standards, health care professionals can enhance their own policies
and practices, making achievement of vaccination objectives for children and adoles-
cents as outlined in Healthy People 2010, a nationwide health promotion and disease
prevention agenda from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,'® both
feasible and likely. Achieving these objectives will improve the health and welfare of
all children and adolescents as well as the communities in which they live.
H'4
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Standards for Child and Adolescent Immunization
Practices
Availability of vaccines
1. Vaccination services are readily available.
2. Vaccinations are coordinated with other health care services and provided in a Medical
Home^ when possible.
3. Barriers to vaccination are identified and minimized.
4. Patient costs are minimized.
Assessment of vaccination status
5. Health care professionals review the vaccination and health status of patients at every
encounter to determine which vaccines are indicated.
6. Health care professionals assess for and follow only medically accepted contraindications.
Effective communication about vaccine benefits and risks
7. Parents/guardians and patients are educated about the benefits and risks of vaccination in a
culturally appropriate manner and in easy-tO'understand language.
Proper storage and administration of vaccines and documentation of vaccinations
8. Health care professionals follow appropriate procedures for vaccine storage and handling.
9. Up-to-date, written vaccination protocols are accessible at all locations where vaccines are
administered.
10. Persons who administer vaccines and staff who manage or support vaccine administration are
knowledgeable and receive on-going education.
1 1 . Health care professionals simultaneously administer as many indicated vaccine doses as pos-
sible.
12. Vaccination records for patients are accurate, complete, and easily accessible.
13. Health care professionals report adverse events following vaccination promptly and accurate-
ly to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) and are aware of a separate
program, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP).
14. All personnel who have contact with patients are appropriately vaccinated.
Implementation of strategies to improve vaccination coverage
15. Systems are used to remind parents/guardians, patients, and health care professionals when
vaccinations are due and to recall those who are overdue.
16. Office- or clinic-based patient record reviews and vaccination coverage assessments are per-
formed annually.
17. Health care professionals practice community-based approaches.
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The Standards
Availability of vaccines
l. Vaccination services are readily available.
All health care professionals who provide primary care to children and adolescents should
always Include routinely recommended \’accines as a part of the care they deliver in the
Medical Home.''
For some children and adolescents, the main contact with the health care system is not in a
primary care provider's office, and therefore, opportunities for vaccination may be missed. Thus,
specialists and health care professionals in settings such as schools and school health clinics,
sports physical clinics, family planning clinics, sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics, and
substance abuse treatment centers, should assess each patient's vaccination status and either
offer indicated vaccines or refer for vaccination if necessary.
Information on vaccines administered outside the primary care setting should be communicated
to the primary care pro\'ider.
2.
\ accinations are coordinated with other health care services and provided in a Medical
Home'' when possible.
Ideally, \’accines should be given as part of comprehensive health care. In primary care settings,
vaccination serxdces should be coordinated with routine well-care visits and other visits.
Patients \'accinated in other settings should be encouraged to receive subsequent vaccines in
their primary care setting. Patients without a primary care provider should be assisted with iden-
tifying one.
3.
Barriers to vaccination are identified and minimired.
Baniers to receiving vaccines include delays in scheduling appointments, requiring a well-care
visit, long waiting periods in the office, and lack of culturally and age-appropriate educational
materials. A physical exam, while an important part of well care, should not be required before
administering vaccines: simply obser\’ing the patient and questioning about the patient's health
status, immunization history, and vaccine contraindications are sufficient. In addition,
vaccination-only visits should be available.
Health care professionals should seek ad\’ice from parents/guardians and patients to identify’ ways
to make vaccination services easier to use.
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4. Patient costs are minimized.
Out'of'pocket costS'including vaccine, administration, and office visit fees'should be as low as
possible for all patients, and no child or adolescent should be denied vaccination because of
inability to pay.
Resources should be identified to keep patient vaccination costs as low as possible. Free vaccine
is available through some public programs, although health care professionals offering these vac-
cines may charge a reasonable administration fee. Sources of publicly funded vaccines include
the Vaccines for Children (VFC) Program, Public Flealth Service Section 317 grants to States,
and state or local programs. Children and adolescents .should be screened for their eligibility to
receive vaccines through these programs. Vaccinations provided through VFC3 or Section 317
grants may not be denied becau.se of an inability to pay the administration fee, and health care-
professionals should a.ssure that parents/guardians and patients are aware of this requirement
(applies to all vaccines purcha.sed using Centers for Disea.se Control and Preventir^n contracts,
regardless of the setting-private or puhlic-in which the vaccines are administered).
To minimize costs for patients, health plans and insurance plans should include the provision
and administration of all routinely recommended vaccines as a covered benefit for all children
and adolescents. Furthermore, to minimize costs for health care professionals, purcha.sers and
health plans should reimburse health care profe.ssionals adequately for delivering vaccines,
including the time required for vaccine administration and for communicatirm about vaccine
benefits and risks.
* Further information
CDC maintains a weh page about VFC on the Internet at: wwvu.cdc.govinipivfc
Assessment of vaccination status
5. Health care professionals review the vaccination and health status of patients at every
encounter to determine which vaccines are indicated.
Health care professionals should review the vaccination status of all patients at all health care
visits to minimize the number of mis.sed opportunities to vaccinate. This review should deter-
mine if the patient has received any vaccinations elsewhere or is at high ri.sk for disease or
undervaccination. This information should be documented in the patient's chart and preventive
health summary. Health care professionals who do not offer vaccinations should refer patients
to a primary care provider for needed vaccinations.
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6. Health care professionals assess for and follow only medically
accepted contraindications.
Withholding vaccinations due to medical concerns that are not contraindications results in
missed opportunities for prevention. Health care professionals should ask about any condition
or circumstance that might indicate a vaccination should be withheld or delayed and about prior
adverse events temporally associated with any vaccination.
Health care professionals should support their decisions about what constitutes a contraindication
or deferral for each vaccine by consulting the Guide to Contraindications to Vaccinations
published by CDC (available on the Internet at: www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/contraindications.pdf), the
harmonized recommendations of the ACIP, AAP,and AAFP (available on the Internet at:
www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/child'Schedule.htm#Printable), the AAP's Red Book, and other relevant
recommendations. Vaccine Information Statements, and manufacturers' package inserts.
Contraindications and deferrals should be documented in the medical record.
Effective communication about vaccine benefits and risks
7. Parents/guardians and patients are educated about the benefits and risks of
vaccination in a culturally appropriate manner and in easy-tO'Understand language.
Health care professionals should allow sufficient time with parents/guardians and adolescent
patients to discuss the benefits of vaccines, the diseases they prevent, any known risks from
vaccines, the immunization schedule and the need to receive vaccines at the recommended ages,
and the importance of bringing the patient's hand-held vaccination record to each health care
visit. Health care professionals should encourage parents/guardians and adolescent patients to
take responsibility for ensuring that the patient is fully vaccinated.
For all commonly used childhood vaccines, all health care professionals are required by federal
law to give Vaccine Information Statements (VIS) to vaccine recipients or their
parents/guardians at each visit. A VIS is a vaccine-specific, two-page information sheet,
produced by CDC, which describes the benefits and risks of a vaccine. If necessary, health care
professionals should supplement the VIS with oral explanations or other written materials that
are culturally and linguistically appropriate. Health care professionals should review written
materials with patients and their parents/guardians and address questions and concerns.
Health care professionals should encourage parents/guardians and adolescent patients to inform
the health care professional of adverse events following the vaccine to be administered and
explain how to obtain medical care, if necessary.
See Standard 13 for a description of the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS).
* Further information
General vaccination information for health care professionals, parents, and members of the public may
H«8
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be obtained by calling the CDC National Immunization Information Hotline at H800'232'2522
(English) or H800'232'0233 (Spanish). Information about vaccine risk communication for health care
professionals can be found on the Internet at: www.cdc
.gov/nip/vacsafe/research/peds .htm and in the
latest edition of the Red Book. Vaccine Information Statements are available in English and numerous
other languages from State health departments and on the Internet at:
www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/VIS/default .htm and vuvuiv. immunize . org
Recommendations for national standards for culturally and linguistically appropriate services (CLAS) in
health care may be found on the Internet at:
u)ww .omhrc
.
gov/omh/programs/2pgprograms/finalreport
.
pdf
Proper storage and administration of vaccines and documentation of
vaccinations
8. Health care professionals follow appropriate procedures for vaccine storage and handling.
Vaccines should be handled and stored as recommended in the manufacturers' package inserts;
the expiration date for each vaccine should be noted. Temperatures at which vaccines are
stored and transported should be monitored and recorded twice daily. Summary information
about vaccine storage and handling procedures are also available from state and local health
departments and CDC.
Health care professionals should monitor vaccine inventory and undertake efforts to reduce
wastage and loss.
* Further information
CDC'recommended storage and handling procedures are available from CDC
by calling 404'639'8222
.
9. Up-to-date, written vaccination protocols are accessible at all locations where vaccines are
administered.
To promote the safe and effective use of vaccines, health care professionals should maintain
written protocols that detail the following: vaccine storage and handling; the recommended vac-
cination schedule, vaccine contraindications, and administration techniques; treatment and
reporting of adverse events; vaccine benefit and risk communication; and vaccination record
maintenance and accessibility.
These protocols should be consistent with established guidelines, reviewed frequently, and
revised as needed to assure that they remain up-to-date.
i'
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10.
Persons who administer vaccines and staff who manage or support vaccine administration
are knowledgeable and receive on-going education.
Health care professionals or others who administer vaccinations should be knowledgeable and
receive continuing education in vaccine storage and handling; the recommended vaccine
schedule, contraindications, and administration techniques; treatment and reporting of adverse
events; vaccine benefit and risk communication; and vaccination record maintenance and
accessibility. With appropriate training, and in accordance with state law/regulation/policy,
persons other than physicians and nurses may administer vaccines. In addition, other staff
should receive training and continuing education related to their specific roles and responsibili-
ties that affect vaccination services.
* Further information CDC sponsors distance'based training opportunities (e.g., satellite broadcasts,
web-based training, videotapes, self-administered print materials) for health care professionals.
Information about training is available on the Internet at: www.cdc.gov/nip/ed
1 1
.
Health care professionals simultaneously administer as many indicated
vaccine doses as possible.
Administering vaccines simultaneously (at the same visit), in accordance with recommendations
from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
and the American Academy of Family Physicians, is safe, effective, and indicated. Although the
immunization schedule provides age flexibility for administering certain vaccine doses, simulta-
neous administration decreases the number of visits needed and the potential for missed doses,
and enables earlier protection. When indicated vaccines are not simultaneously administered,
arrangements should be made for the patient's earliest return to receive the needed vaccination(s).
* Further information
Additional information on the safety of simultaneous vaccination may be found on the Internet at:
www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/research/simultaneous . htm
12.
Vaccination records for patients are accurate, complete, and easily accessible.
Vaccination records for patients should be recorded on a standard form in an easily accessible
location in the medical record to facilitate rapid review of vaccination status. Accurate record
keeping helps to ensure that only needed vaccinations are given. As required by federal law (42
US Code 300aa-25), health care professionals should assure that records contain the following
information for each vaccination: the date of administration, the vaccine manufacturer and lot
number, the signature and title of the person administering the vaccine, and the address where
the vaccine was given. Vaccine refusal should also be documented.
H-10
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The medical record maintained by the primary care provider should document all vaccines
received, including those received at a specialist's office or in another health care setting. When
a health care professional who does not routinely care for a patient vaccinates that patient, the
patient's primary care provider should be informed.
All vaccinations administered should be reported to state or local immunization registries, where
available, to ensure that each patient's vaccination history remains accurate and complete.
Registries also may be useful for verifying the vaccination status of new patients, determining
which vaccines are needed at a visit, printing official records, and providing reminders and
recalls to parents.
Health care professionals should assure that each patient has a hand-held vaccination record
that documents each vaccine received, including the date and the name of the health care pro-
fessional who administered the vaccine. Health care professionals should encourage
parents/guardians and adolescent patients to bring the patient's hand-held record to each health
care visit so it can be updated.
* Further information
The CDC maintains an Immunization Registry Clearinghouse. Information about this clearinghouse is
available on the Internet at: wivw.cdc.govlniplregistryl
13. Health care professionals report adverse events following vaccination promptly
and accurately to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) and are aware
of a separate program, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP).
Health care professionals should promptly report all clinically significant adverse events follow-
ing vaccination to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) even if the health
care professional is not certain that the vaccine caused the event. Health care professionals
should document in detail the adverse event in the patient's medical record as soon as possible.
Providers should be aware that parents/guardians and patients may report to VAERS, and that if
they choose to do so, they are encouraged to seek the help of their health care provider.
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) is a no-fault system that
compensates persons of any age for injuries or conditions that may have been caused
by a vaccine recommended by CDC for routine use in children. Health care professionals should
be aware of the VICP in order to address questions raised by parents/guardians and patients.
Since VAERS and VICP are separate programs, a report of an event to VAERS does not result
in the submission of a compensation claim to VICP. A brief description and contact information
for both programs is provided on each Vaccine Information Statement for those vaccines
covered by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.
o
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* Further information
Information about VAERS, as well as guidance about how to obtain and complete a VAERS form can
be found on the Internet: www.vaers.org or by calling l'800'822-7967 . Information about the VICP
is available on the Internet at: www.hrsa.gov/osplvicp or by calling l'800'338'2382.
14. All personnel who have contact with patients are appropriately vaccinated.
Health care professionals and other personnel who have contact with patients should be
appropriately vaccinated. Offices and clinics should have policies to review and maintain the
vaccination status of staff and trainees.
* Further information
ACIP recommendations for vaccinating health care workers are available on the Internet at:
ftp -.//ftp . cdc.gov/pub/publications/mmwr/rr/rr46 1 8 .pdf
Implementation of strategies to improve vaccination coverage
15. Systems are used to remind parents/guardians, patients, and health care professionals
when vaccinations are due and to recall those who are overdue.
Evidence demonstrates that reminder/recall systems improve vaccination coverage.”
Patient reminder/recall interventions inform individuals that they are due (reminder) or overdue
(recall) for specific vaccinations. Patient reminders/recalls can be mailed or communicated by
telephone; an autodialer system can be used to expedite telephone reminders. Patients who
might be at high risk for not complying with medical recommendations, for example those who
have missed previous appointments, should receive more intensive follow-up.
Similarly, provider reminder/recall systems alert health care professionals when vaccines are due
or overdue. Notices should be placed in patient charts or communicated to health care profes-
sionals by computer or other means. Immunization registries can facilitate automatic generation
of reminder/recall notices.
16. Office- or clinic-based patient record reviews and vaccination coverage assessments are
performed annually.
Evidence shows that assessments are most effective in improving vaccination coverage in a
practice when they combine chart reviews to determine coverage with the provision of results to
health care professionals and staff.”
Effective interventions also may incorporate incentives or compare performance to a goal or
standard. Coverage should be assessed regularly so that reasons for low coverage in the practice,
or in a sub-group of patients, are identified and addressed. For assistance in conducting
vaccination coverage assessments, health care professionals should contact their state or local
immunization program.
12
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17. Health care professionals practice community-based approaches.
All health care professionals share in the responsibility to achieve the highest possible degree of
community protection against vaccine-preventable diseases.
Immunization protects the entire community as well as the individual. No community is opti-
mally protected against vaccine-preventable diseases without high vaccination coverage.
Therefore, health care professionals should consider the needs of the community (especially
underserved populations) as well as those of their patients. Community-based approaches may
involve working with partners in the community, including public health departments, managed
care organizations, other service providers such as the US Department of Agriculture's Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), advocacy groups,
schools, and service organizations to determine community needs and develop vaccination serv-
ices that address these needs.
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Organizations providing endorsement for the revised
Standards for Child and Adolescent Immunization
Practices
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
Albert B. Sabin Vaccine Institute
Ambulatory Pediatric Association
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American Academy of Pediatrics
American Academy of Physician Assistants
American College of Emergency Physicians
American College of Osteopathic Pediatricians
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Introduction
As a result of successful immunization practices geared toward infants and children in the
United States, the incidence of childhood vaccine-preventable diseases has declined dramatically.
However, similar success among adults has not been achieved.
All adults should be immune to measles, mumps, rubella, tetanus, diphtheria, and varicella. All
those aged 50 or older, and younger persons at high risk should receive influenza vaccine annually;
all those aged 65 or older, and younger persons at high risk, should receive pneumococcal vac-
cine. Adults susceptible to hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and polio should be vaccinated if they are at
risk for exposure to an infection. Ideally, recommended vaccines should be given to all adults as
a routine part of health care.
Adults suffer the vast majority of vaccine-preventable disease in the U.S. During average
influenza seasons, up to 40 million Americans may suffer from influenza infection, approximately
100,000 are hospitalized, and approximately 40,000 die of influenza and its complications.''^
Pneumococcal infections account for 100,000 to 135,000 hospitalizations for pneumonia, more
than 60,000 cases of bacteremia and other forms of invasive disease, and about 7,000 death from
invasive pneumococcal disease each year.^’'*’’ More than 75,000 persons, mostly adolescents and
adults, contract hepatitis B each year.®'' There are approximately 4,000 to 5,000 deaths due to
hepatitis B each year, mainly among adults.® Approximately 8 million young women are unpro-
tected against rubella, putting their infants at risk for congenital rubella syndrome if these
women should become pregnant.^ Up to half of all Americans age 50 and older have not
received all of their recommended immunizations against tetanus and diphtheria.'®
Today, vaccines are safe, effective, and readily available. Benefits of vaccination include reduced
disease incidence, morbidity and mortality, and reduced health care costs. However, vaccines
remain underutilized among adults, especially among persons at high risk for infection and
complications of disease, and among certain racial/ethnic populations. For instance, the rates of
influenza and pneumococcal vaccination in African American and Hispanic populations are
significantly lower than those among whites."
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Healthy People 2010 outlines a
comprehensive, nationwide health promotion and disease prevention agenda.*’ There are 8
objectives that relate to adult immunizations or vaccine-preventable diseases. Achieving these
objectives will require a dramatic increase from current coverage levels.
For example, for influenza and pneumococcal vaccination of adults age 65 and older, the target
coverage is 90% for annual influenza immunization and 90% for one dose of pneumococcal
vaccine. In 2002, national statistics demonstrated rates of only 66% and 56%, respectively. 13
Among adults aged 65 years or less at high risk due to medical, behavioral, or environmental
risk factors, even greater increases will be required to reach the 2010 targets.
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In 1990, the National Coalition for Adults Immunization (NCAI) developed the first Standards
for Adult Immunization Practices, which were endorsed by more than 60 professional
organizations from the public and private sectors.''’ In January 1994, the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee (NVAC) reviewed the status of adult immunization in the United States
and presented specific goals and recommendations for improvement.'^ In 2000, NVAC issued a
report on adult immunization programs in nontraditional settings. This report included quality
standards for these programs as well as guidance for program evaluation.'®
To reflect the recommendations and standards in these recent reports and the Healthy People
2010 coverage goals, the NVAC and NCAI have revised the 1990 Standards. The revised
Standards are more comprehensive than the previous version and evidence-based medicine has
been used to support these Standards wherever possible. The Standards supplement research
with expert consensus in areas where research does not offer guidance but experience does.
Today, more tools are available to support immunization providers. The revised Standards
include links to web sites that contain information on model standing order policies, instruc-
tions for setting up reminder/recall systems, and templates for personal vaccination records.
The revised Standards for Adult Immunization Practices provide a concise, convenient summary
of the most desirable immunization practices. The Standards have been widely endorsed by
major professional organizations. This revised version of the Standards for Adult Immunization
Practices is recommended for use by all health care professionals and payers in the public and
private sectors who provide immunizations for adults. Everyone involved in adult immunization
should strive to follow these Standards. Not all practices and programs have the resources neces-
sary to fully implement the Standards, nevertheless, those lacking the resources should find the
Standards useful to guide current practice and to guide the process of defining immunization
needs and obtaining additional resources in the future.
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Standards for Adult Immunization Practices
Make vaccinations available
1. Adult vaccination services are readily available.
2. Barriers to receiving vaccines are identified and minimized.
3. Patient "out of pocket" vaccination costs are minimized.
Assess patients' vaccination status
4. Health care professionals routinely review the vaccination status of patients.
5. Health care professionals assess for valid contraindications.
Communicate effectively with patients
6. Patients are educated about risks and benefits of vaccination in easy-to-understand
language.
Administer and document vaccinations properly
7. Written vaccination protocols are available at all locations where vaccines are
administered.
8. Persons who administer vaccines are properly trained.
9. Health care professionals recommend simultaneous administration of all indicated
vaccine doses.
10. Vaccination records for patients are accurate and easily accessible.
11. All personnel who have contact with patients are appropriately vaccinated.
Implement strategies to improve vaccination rates
12. Systems are developed and used to remind patients and health care professionals when
vaccinations are due and to recall patients who are overdue.
13. Standing orders for vaccinations are employed.
14. Regular assessments of vaccination coverage levels are conducted in a
provider's practice.
Partner with the community
15. Patient'Oriented and community-based approaches are used to reach target
populations.
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The Standards
Make Vaccinations Available
Standard 1 : Adult vaccination services are readily available
Primary care health care professionals who serve adults should always include routinely recom-
mended vaccinations as part of their care. Specialists, whose patients may be at increased risk of
vaccine-preventable diseases, also should include routinely recommended vaccinations as part of
their care. For selected vaccines (e.g., meningococcal vaccine for college entrants, vaccines for
international travelers) patients may be referred to another provider.
Standard 2: Barriers to receiving vaccines are identified and minimized
Barriers to receiving vaccines may include requiring a physical examination before vaccination,
requiring an additional visit for vaccination, long waiting periods, and lack of educational mate-
rials that are culturally appropriate. Prior to vaccine administration, simply observing the
patient, asking if the patient is well and questioning the patient/guardian about vaccine con-
traindications is sufficient.
Standard 3: Patient "out of pocket" vaccination costs are minimized
Resources should be identified to keep patient vaccination costs as low as possible, specifically
for those patients aged 65 years or older and for vaccines not covered by Medicare Part B.
In the public sector, patient fees should include only the cost of vaccine and administration that
cannot be funded through another source. In the private sector, routinely recommended vacci-
nation services should be included in basic benefits packages. System and policy changes should
be addressed to provide adequate reimbursement to providers for delivering vaccinations to their
adult population.
Assess Patients' Vaccination Status
Standard 4: Health care professionals routinely review the vaccination status of patients
Health care professionals should review and document the vaccination status of all new patients
during initial office visits and also review vaccination status on an annual basis thereafter.
Health care professionals should ascertain if the patient has medical risk factors, lifestyle risk
factors, or an occupation for which certain vaccines may be indicated. Health care professionals
should record this information in the patient's chart and preventive health summary. Health
care professionals should routinely review pneumococcal vaccination status at the time of
influenza vaccination.
Standard 5: Health care professionals assess for valid contraindications
Failure to differentiate between valid and invalid contraindications often results in the needless
deferral of indicated vaccinations. Health care professionals should ask about prior adverse
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events in connection with a vaccination and about any conditions or circumstances that mi^hr
indicate vaccination should be withheld or delayed. Health care professionals should refer to
current Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations on valid and
invalid contraindications as well as on valid indications for vaccine use (www.cdc.gov/nip).
Communicate Effectively with Patients
Standard 6: Patients are educated about risks and benefits of vaccination in
easy'tO'Understand language
Health care professionals should discuss with the patient the benefits of vaccines, the diseases
that they prevent, and any known risks from vaccines. These issues should be discussed in tbe
patient's native language, whenever possible. Printed materials, accurately translated into the
patient's language should be provided. For most commonly used vaccines, the U.S. Federal
Government has developed Vaccine Information Statements for use by both public and private
health care professionals to give to potential vaccine recipients. For vaccines covered by the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, including those vaccines used in children, these forms
are required. These statements are available in English and other languages. Health care profes-
sionals should allot ample time with patients to review written materials and address questions
and concerns. Information and assistance can be obtained by calling the Immunization Hotline
(1'800'232'2522) or accessing the website (www.cdc.gov/nip).
Health care professionals should respect each patient's right to make an informed decision to
accept or reject a vaccine or defer vaccination until more information is collected.
Administer and Document Vaccinations Properly
Standard 7: Written vaccination protocols are available at all locations where vaccines are administered
The medical protocol should detail procedures for vaccine storage and handling, vaccine sched-
ules, contraindications, administration techniques, management and reporting of adverse events,
and record maintenance and accessibility. These protocols should be consistent with established
guidelines. CDC-recommended storage and handling procedures are available on the Internet at:
www.gravity.lmi.org/lmi_cdc/geninfo.htm.
Health care professionals should promptly report all clinically significant adverse events follow-
ing vaccination to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), even if the health
care professional does not believe that the vaccine caused the event.
Reporting is required for those vaccines given to adults and medical conditions covered by the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, as amended. Health care professionals should
be aware that patients may report to VAERS, and that if they choose to do so, they are encour-
aged to seek the help of their health care professional. Report forms and assistance are available
by calling 1-800-822-7967 or on the Internet at www.fda.gov/cber/vaers/vaers.htm.
Appendix H
The National Vaccine Injury compensation Program (VICP) is a no-fault system that compen-
sates persons of any age for injuries or conditions that may have been caused by a vaccine rec-
ommended by CDC for routine administration to children. Health care professionals should be
aware of the VICP in order to address questions raised by patients. Information about the VICP
is available on the internet at www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp.htm or by calling 1-800-338-2382.
Since VAERS and VICP are separate programs, a report of an event to VAERS does not result
in the submission of a compensation claim to VICP. Such a claim must be filed independently in
the U.S. Court of Eederal Claims. A brief description and contact information for both programs
is provided on each Vaccine Information Statement for
vaccines covered by the VICP.
Standard 8: Persons who administer vaccines are properly trained
All persons who administer vaccinations should be fully trained in vaccine storage and handling,
vaccine schedules, contraindications, administration techniques, management and reporting of
adverse events, and record maintenance and accessibility. Office staff should receive continuing
education on these issues annually. With appropriate training, persons other than physicians and
nurses can administer vaccines. Health care professionals should contact public health authori-
ties or other medical authorities in their state for more information concerning which individu-
als are permitted to administer vaccines.
Standard 9: Health care professionals recommend simultaneous administration
of all indicated vaccine doses
Administering indicated vaccines simultaneously is safe and effective. Simultaneous administra-
tion decreases the number of required visits and the potential for missed doses. Measles, mumps,
and rubella (MMR) vaccine and tetanus and diphtheria (Td) toxoids should always be adminis-
tered in their combined product. Giving influenza and pneumococcal vaccine at the same time
(but in separate arms) is also safe and effective. Health care professionals should respect the
choices of patients and their caregivers.
Standard 10: Vaccination records for patients are accurate and easily accessible
Patient vaccination histories should be recorded on a standard form in an easily accessible loca-
tion in the medical record to facilitate rapid review of vaccination status. Accurate record keep-
ing helps ensure that needed vaccinations are administered and unnecessary vaccinations are
not administered. Records should indicate the vaccine, the date of administration, the vaccine
manufacturer and lot number, the signature and title of the person administering the vaccine,
and the address where the vaccine was administered. The medical record at the primary care
provider's office, clinic or worksite should include all vaccinations received (such as those
received at a specialist's office, influenza vaccination clinic, or pharmacy).
Record keeping may be paper-based or computerized. Computer systems make record mainte-
nance, retrieval, and review easier.
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Health care professionals should give patients a personal record of vaccinations they have
received, including the dates and places of administration. Patients should be encouraged to
bring their vaccination records to all medical visits.
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Information and a modifiable template of these forms and records are available at
www.ahcpr.gov/ppip/adultflow.pdf and are also available on CD-ROM and can be ordered on the
internet: www.atpm.org/Immunization/whatworks.html
Standard 1 1: AH personnel who have contact with patients are appropriately immunized
Health care professionals and other personnel (including first responders) who have contact
with patients should be appropriately immunized (e.g., annual influenza vaccination, hepatitis B
vaccination). Institutions should have policies to review and maintain the appropriate vaccina-
tion of staff and trainees.
ACIP recommendations for vaccinating health care workers are available on the Internet:
www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/ACIP-list.htm
Implement Strategies to Improve Vaccination Rates
Standard 12: Systems are developed and used to remind patients and health care professionals when
vaccinations are due and to recall patients who are overdue
Evidence shows that reminder/ recall systems improve adult vaccination rates. Systems may be
designed to alert patients who are due (reminder) or overdue (recall) for specific vaccine doses
or they may alert patients to contact their provider to determine if vaccinations are needed.
Reminders or recalls can be mailed or communicated by telephone; an autodialer can be used to
expedite telephone reminders. Patients who might be at high risk for not complying with med-
ical recommendations may require more intensive follow-up.
Provider reminder/recall interventions inform those who administer vaccinations that individual
patients are due or overdue for specific vaccinations. Reminders can be delivered in patient
charts, by computer, and/or by mail or other means, and content of the reminders can be specific
or general.
Information about these strategies and resources to assist in their implementation are available
on CD-ROM and can be ordered on the internet: www.atpm.org/Immunization/whatworks.html.
Model reminder recall templates are also available at www.ahcpr.gov/ppip/postcard.pdf
Standard 13: Standing orders for vaccinations are employed
Evidence shows that standing orders improve vaccination coverage among adults in a variety of
health care settings, including nursing homes, hospitals, clinics, doctor's offices, and other insti-
tutional settings. Standing orders enable non-physician personnel such as nurses and pharmacists
to prescribe or deliver vaccinations by approved protocol without direct physician involvement
at the time of the interaction. Standing orders overcome administrative barriers such as lack of
physician personnel to order vaccines. Eurther, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid allow
standing order exemption from medicare rules www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/ltcsp/sc0302.pdf)
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Information about this strategy and its implementation is available on CD-ROM and can be
ordered on the internet: www.atpm.org/Immunization/whatworks.html
Standard 14: Regular assessments of vaccination coverage rates are conducted in a provider's practice
Evidence shows that assessment of vaccination coverage and provision of the results to the staff
in a practice improves vaccination coverage among adults. Optimally, such assessments are per-
formed annually. Provider assessment can be performed by the staff in the practice or by other
organizations including state and local health departments. Effective interventions that include
assessment and provision of results also may incorporate incentives or comparing performance to
a goal or standard. This process is commonly referred to as AEIX (Assessment, Eeedback,
Incentives, and Exchange of Information). Coverage should be assessed regularly so that reasons
for low coverage in the practice, or in a sub-group of the patients served, can be identified and
interventions implemented to address them.
Information about this strategy and its implementation is available on CD-ROM and can be
ordered on the internet: www.atpm.org/Immunization/whatworks.html
Software to assist in conducting coverage rate assessments and feedback is available at:
www.cdc.gov/nip
Partner with the Community
Standard 15: Patient'Oriented and community-based approaches are used to reach target populations
Vaccination services should be designed to meet the needs of the population served. Eor exam-
ple, interventions that include community education, along with other components, such as
extended hours, have been demonstrated to improve vaccination coverage among adults.
Vaccination providers can work with partners in the community, including other health profes-
sionals (e.g., pharmacists), vaccination advocacy groups, managed care organizations, service
organizations, manufacturers, and state and local health departments to determine community
needs and develop vaccination services to address them.
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The National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC)
Committee History
The National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) was chartered in 1988 to advise and make
recommendations to the director of the National Vaccine Program and the assistant secretary for
health, Department of Health and Human Services, on matters related to the prevention of
infectious diseases through immunization and the prevention of adverse reactions to vaccines.
The NVAC is composed of 15 members from public and private organizations representing vac-
cine manufacturers, physicians, parents, and state and local health agencies. In addition, repre-
sentatives from governmental agencies involved in health care or allied services serve as ex-offi-
cio members of the NVAC.
Committee Members
Georges Peter, MD (Chair)
Brown Medical School
Providence, RI
Ann Margaret Arvin, MD
Stanford University School of Medicine Stanford, CA
Jeffrey P. Davis, MD
Wisconsin Division of Health
Madison, WI
Michael D. Decker, MD, MPH
Aventis Pasteur
Swiftwater, PA
Patricia Fast, MD, PhD
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
New York, NY
Fernando A. Guerra, MD, MPH
San Antonio Metropolitan Health District
San Antonio, TX
Charles M. Helms, MD, PhD
University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics
Iowa City, lA
Alan Richard Hinman, MD
The Task Force for Child Survival and Development
Decatur, GA
Ruth Katz, JD, MPH
Yale University School of Medicine
New Haven, CT
Jerome O. Klein, MD
Boston Medical Center
Boston MA
Mary Beth Koslap-Petraco, MS, CPNP
Suffolk County Department of
Health Services
Lindenhurst, NY
Peter R. Paradiso, PhD
Wyeth'Lederle Vaccines and Pediatric American Home Products
West Henrietta, NY
William Schaffner, MD
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine
Nashville, TN
Patricia N. Whitley-Williams, MD
Robert Wood Johnson Medical School New Brunswick, NJ
Donald E. Williamson, MD
Alabama Department of Public Health Montgomery, AL
Appendix H
Acknowledgments:
The NVAC acknowledges the following liaison representatives and ex officio members for their
valuable contributions to this report:
Steven Black, MD
Kaiser Permanente Study Center
Oakland, CA
(representing the American Association of Health Plans)
Jackie Noyes
American Academy of Pediatrics
Washington, DC
(representing the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines)
David S. Stevens, MD
Emory University School of Medicine Atlanta, GA
(representing the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee)
Robert Daum, MD
University of Chicago Children's Hospital
Chicago, IL
(representing the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee)a
John F. Modlin, MD
Dartmouth Medical School
Lebanon, NH
(representing the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices)
Karen Midthun, MD
Food and Drug Administration
Rockville, MD
Col Renata J.M. Engler
Walter Reed Medical Center
Washington, DC
Carole Heilman, PhD
National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases
Bethesda, MD
Geoffrey Evans, MD
Health Resources and Services Administration
Rockville, MD
Appendix H
Ruth Frischer, PhD
US Agency for International Development
Washington, DC
T. Randolph Graydon
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Baltimore, MD
Walter A. Orenstein, MD
Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
William A. Robinson, MD
Health Resources and Services Administration Rockville, MD
Emily Marcus Levine
Office of the General Counsel
Department of Health and
Human Services
Rockville, MD
aFormer liaison representative to NVAC
Executive and Writing Committee
Gregory A. Poland, MD
Mayo Clinic and Foundation
Rochester, MN.
Abigail M. Shefer, MD
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
Peggy S. Webster, MD
Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Park, IL
(formerly of the National Coalition for Adult Immunization).
Mary McCauley, MTSC
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
H^38
Appendix H
Edward W. Brink, MD
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
Marc LaForce, MD
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Seattle, WA (formerly of BASICS II, Arlington, VA)
Dennis J. O'Mara
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
James A. Singleton, MS
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
Raymond A. Strikas, MD
National Immunization Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
Patricia N. Whitley-Williams, MD
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey - Robert Wood Johnson
Medical School,
New Brunswick, NJ
Georges Peter, MD
Brown Medical School
Providence, RI
H-39
Appendix H
Essential Public Health Services
"The individuals who work in public health have entered the field from many professional disciplines—medicine,
nursing, law, dentistry, teaching, social work, and even the ministry. When there's a straightforward task to be
done—inspecting restaurants, handing out a WIC voucher, or checking vital signs—it's easy for everyone to see
the purpose of public health and understand it. It's much harder for staff to understand the "why" of public
health—why we give immunizations
,
why community assessments are important, and how all the work of public
health is interconnected."
- Local health deparement director
The U.S. public health workforce consists of approximately 500,000 individuals currently employed by a range of
organizations involved in public health practice, including governmental public health agencies, other public
sector agencies, health care delivery organizations, voluntary organizations, community-based groups, academia,
and other entities. The public health workforce is defined less by where they work than by what they do, which
is to provide essential public health services to communities throughout the nation. The essential services were
listed in a statement. Public Health in America in 1994.
The Public Health Functions Steering Committee, comprising representatives of several national organizations
and federal agencies involved in public health, developed Public Health in America as a consensus statement "to
explain what public health is; clarify the essential role of public in the overall health system; and provide
accountability by linking public health performance to health outcomes." The statement provides a common
vision for public health, "Healthy People in Healthy Communities" as well as a mission, "To promote physical
and mental health and prevent disease, injury and disability." The Essential Public Health Services provides a
list of ten public health services that define the practice of public health. (Table 1)
Since 1994, there is momentum around using the Essential Services framework. It has already been proven to be
valuable in assessing organizational capacity, job performances and expenditures. There is more work needed to
increase the usefulness of this framework. One promising area is the use of the essential services to identify the
general knowledge, skills and abilities (i.e., core competencies) that are needed by public health workers regard-
less of where they work or their specific role, background or programmatic responsibility. Examples of core com-
petencies include epidemiology, health communications/social marketing, community needs assessment, and
mobilization.
As one state health director explained, "Historically, we've generally done a good job of tasks like screening children or
treating STDs and TB. We haven't done as well with some other tasks critical to improving the public's health, because
our people lack the skills to convene and talk to community groups, analyze and explain data, sit at a policy table, or
assess community needs .
"
It has been estimated that almost 4 out of 5 public health workers nationwide are under
trained in the disciplines of public health. A major challenge in the 21st century will be to ensure that all public
health workers have access to the training and continuing education needed to perform the essential services.
Your participation in "Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine Preventable Diseases" contributes directly to
competent delivery of the essential services of public health. As part of the public health team, your role is
broad and more complicated than just providing personal health services. You are helping the community create
conditions in which everyone can be healthy.
To learn about the Public Health Functions Project, visit their website at http://web.health.gov/phfunctions
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Table 1 . Ten Essential Public Health Services
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Monitor health status to identify community health
problems.
Diagnose and investigate health problems and health
hazards in the community.
Inform, educate and empower people about health
issues.
Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve
health problems.
Develop policies and plans that support individual and
community health efforts.
Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and
ensure safety.
Link people to needed personal health services and assure
the provision of health care when otherwise unavailable.
Assure a competent public health and personal health
workforce.
Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of per-
sonal and population-based health services.
Research for new insights and innovative solutions to
health problems.
Public Health Functions Steering Committee, Public Health in America, July 1995
Appendix H
Adult Immunization
Summary of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee Report
David S Fedson. MD. for the National Vaccine Advisory Committee
In January 1 994 the National Vaccine Advisory Committee adopted a report that
reviewed the status of adult immunization in the United States. Vaccine-
preventable infections of adults represent a continuing cause of morbidity and
mortality. Their major impact isamong older persons. Effective and safe vaccines
against these diseases are available, but they are poorly used. Several reasons
account for low immunization levels aimong adults, including inadequate aware-
ness by health care providers and the public of the importance and benefits of
vaccination. Health care providers often fail to take advantage of opportunities
to immunize adults during office, clinic, ar\d hospital contacts and fail to organize
programs in medical settings that ensure adults are offered the vaccines they
need. Inadequate reimbursement lor adult immunization by public and private
health insurers and a lack of federal programs to support vaccine delivery are
also major problems. The National Vaccine Advisory Committee’s report in-
cludes five goals and 1 8 recommendations for improving adult immunization. To
reach the Public Health Service adult immunization goals for the year 2000, the
Committee recommends (1 ) improvements in public and provider education; (2)
major changes in clinical practice; (3) increased financial support by public and
private health insurers; (4) improved surveillance of vaccine-preventable dis-
eases and vaccine production and delivery; and (5) support for research on
vaccine-preventable diseases, new and improved vaccines, immunization prac-
tices, and international programs for adult immunization.
UAMA. 19»«Z7Z;n33-n37)
IMMUNIZATION programs in the
United States have dramaticallyreduced
the occurrence of many childh^ infec-
tious diseases (Table Diphtheria and
childhood tetanus have practically disap-
peared, and fatal casesofpertus^(whoop-
ing cough) are rare.* No cases of indig-
enous poliomyelitis have been reported
since 1979.* The occurrence of measles
has been substantially reduced.* Cases of
childhood rubellaare rarelyobserved, and
there are few reports of congenital ru-
beUa syndrome.* Childhood mumps is sel-
dom encountered by physicians.' The re-
cent extraordinary decline in Haemophi-
ius tn/It<.m.»ie typeb meningitis is lar^ly
attributable to widespread use of Hae-
mophilua influenzae type b vacdnes.'
Nonetheless, thereemergence ofmeasles
during the period 1989 through 1991,* the
persistence of congenital rubella syn-
drome,' and lingering questions aboutthe
safety of pertussis vacdne’ are sobering
reminders that control ofvaccine-pievent-
able childhood diseases requires constant
vigilance. Our nation has responded with
an unhesitating commitment ofresources
A compMi* o< commSM mamtMrs »QO»tn u
ine stk] oI mu aniCm
fleptini f«<]uesls 10 NjtiofW Vacoo* Proo^am 0(-
liCO. fiocKwail II BiOfl, Suita lOrS. 5600 RjOais Ln.
OockviM, MO 208S2
to expand ourimmunization efforts, most
notably the president’s Childhood Immu-
nization Initiative"
The contrast between the impact of
vacdne-preventable diseases of adults
compared with those of children is strik-
ing. Each year, fewer than 500 persons in
the United States die ofvaccine-prevent-
able diseases of childhood. By compari-
son, 50000 to 70000 adults (he of influ-
enza, pneumococcal infections, and hepa-
titis B (Table 2)." In addition,many child-
hood vaccine-preventable infections are
now found among young adults. Out-
breaks of measles,*'" rubella." and
mumps' " have caused major disruptions
on college campuses, in the worl^lace,
and in institutions such as hospitals and
prisons. Vacdne-preventable diseases re-
main an important cause of costly hospi-
talization, especially among the elderiy."
Currently, 98% or more of American
children are fully irtununized by the time
of school entry.' Although in some com-
munities the proportion hilly immunized
by 2 years of age is much lower, several
programs have been established to ad-
dress this problem." In contrast, and in
spite of the much heavier burden of dis-
ease, vaccines that are recommended for
adults are not widely used (Table 2)."
Several reasons have been given to ex-
plain this. First, there is a limited per-
ception on the part of both health care
providersand the general public that adult
vacdne-preventable diseases are signifi-
cant health problems. Second, there are
doubts in the minds of some health care
providers and the public about the effi-
cacy and safety of several of the vaccines
used for adults. Third, adult immuniza-
tion is selective not universal; different
vaccines have different target groups
(Table 3). Fourth, the sizes of the adult
target populations for individual vaccines
vary and for some vaccines are much
larger than the target population for child-
ho^ vaccination. Fifth, unlike the child-
hood vaccination schedule that must be
completed if children are to enter school,
there are no statutory requirements for
adult immunization. Sixth, unlike the child
health care practices in most communi-
ties, there are few programs in either the
public or private sectors for vaccinating
adults. Finally, reimbursement for adult
immunization has traditionally been ne-
glected by both government and private
insurers; children can usually obtain in-
expensive or free vaccines from public
health clinics, but until recently most
adults have h^ to pay the full costs for
most of their vaccines. The public avail-
ability of vaccines, school entry vaccina-
tion requirements, and responsible
parenting have given our nation a high
level of childhood immunization. In the
best of circumstances, it would be diffi-
cult to achieve the same for adults.
In spite of these problems, adult im-
munization has not been ignored. More
than 10 years ago two new vaccines for
adults were licensed; pneumococcal vac-
cine in 1977 and hepatitis B vacdne in
1963. The 1900b brought many new ini-
tiatives to promote adult immunization,
induding those of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Immunization Practices,"-'’ the
American College of Physicians," the In-
fectious Diseases Society ofAmerica,"and
the US Preventive ServicesTask Force."
In 19% the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministnlion (HCFA) launched its Medi-
care Influenza Vaccine Demonstration.*
During the next 4 years, dose to S69 mil-
lion was spent in a multifaceted program
to increase influenza vaccination among
Medicare enroUeesand to evaluate itscos^
effectiveness and health benefits.
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Tabi« 1 .—A«<ion«d CasM <X Vaccinc-Pravamabie ChHdhood OisaasM m tha Untad Sutas*
OtaMaa Maximal No. ot Caaaa (y) 1993 Caaaat WaducSon. %
Oiplithana 206 939(1921) 0 -100.0
Paouasls 265269(1934) 6132 -97.7
Tetanust 1560(1923) 9 -99.4
Pofiomyalitis (paralytic) 21269(1952) 0* -100.0
Maasias 894134(1941) 277
-999
Rubellal 57686(1969) 188 -99.7
Congarutal rubafia synOroma 20000(1964-1965) 7
-99.9
MumptH 152 209(1968) 1630 -96.9
*OaU from ma Nasonal tmmunizabon Pfogram. Cantata for Oiaaasa Control and Pravantlon (COC), Atlanta, Oa.
tProvnronal data that may changa t>acauaa ot lata roponing.
(Data from tha COC on latanua rafar to daaVta net caaaa: COC doaa not hava nformallon on lha numtiaia ot
repoitad latanua caaas batora 1947. Tha nuntiar of raportad daatht ratars to 1992. Mortality data for 1993 ira not
availabla. Tha piovialonal numbar of tatanus caaaa raponad for 1993 « 42.
$Exdudaa an aiOmatad lour caaaa of vaoctna-asaocialad paralyata.
iRubatta lirat bacama a raportabta diaaasa in 1966.
HMumpa first bacama a raportabta disaaaa In 1968.
Table 2.—Estimated Eflact of Ftil Use ot Vaccinas Currently Ftacommanoad for Adutis*
EaUmatad EaUmatad Currant Additional
Annual Vaectna Vaccina rTWVvnKIW
Dlaaata Daatha, No. Eltleacy, %t UtUtzaSon. %4 Daattie par y, No.§
infiuanza 20000) 70 41 8260
Pneumococcal infaction 40000 60 20 19200
Hepams 8 5000 90 101 4050
Tatanus-dipmoana <25 99 40# <15
Measles, mumps, and njbslla <30 95 Variebla <30
Traveleii' diseases’* <10
...It <10
’Adapted from G«dnar and Sehsftner."
tindicaias efficacy in immunocompatant adults. Among afdarty and immunocompronusad pabanta, aatimatad
afflcacy may ba lower
STha parcantaga of targeted groups who hava bean nnmunoad according to currant racommandattons. Rataa
vary among different taigetad groups. Oau tor influenza and pnaumoooccal vaotanaa ware obtamad from tfia 1991
National Health tntarviaw Survey and apply to parsons 65 years of agt or oldar.
SCalcvialsd as follows: (potential adcMonal vaocma u(ilizallon)it(astimatad vacant atflcacy)x(astlmalsd annual
deaths).
IVanaola (range. 0 to 4OCXI0).
IHighly vanabla (range. 1% to 617%) among drlfarant taryatad groups.
sTTm astimals is based on saropravalanca data.
‘’Travelers' disaasas mduda choiara. typhoid. Japanasa ancaphalitis. yafiow fever, poliomyafitis. and reblaa.
tttfiipsas indicsta not applicabla.
Discussion ofhow to improve adult im-
munization must be included in the de-
bate over health system reform in the
United States. Vaccine-preventable dis-
eases of adults impose significant health
care costs on the nation. Yet, there is
strong evidence that adult immunization
is highly coat-effective.“-“Thus, the choice
we face is not simply deciding whether to
pay for adult immunization, it is whether
to pay more for the coats of treating un-
prevented illness or less forpreventing it
from occurring in the first place.
In January 1994 the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee (NVAC) adopted
a report that reviewed the status ofadult
immunization in the United States.^ This
article summarizes the NVAC report,
including the committee’s goals and rec-
ommendations (Table 4).
1. INCREASE THE DEMAND
FOR ADULT VACCINATION
BY IMPROVING PROVIDER
AND PUBUC AWARENESS
In 1980 the surgeon general recom-
mended that by 1990 60% of all elderly
and high-risk persons should be immu-
nized with influenza and pneumococcal
vaccines and 50% of target groups for
new vaccinea (eg, hepatitis B vaedne)
should be vaccinated within 5 years of
vaccine licensure.^ In 1990 these goals
had not been reached.
Surveys conducted during the 1980s
showed that physicians generally under-
stood the importance ofvaedne-prevent-
abie diseases and knew about the efficacy
and safety of vaednes recommended for
adults. However, they often failed to
translate their Imowledge into clinical
practice.® Several studies demonstrated
that good administration and organiza-
tion were the keys to the success of vac-
cination programs.® Although spedfic de-
tails varied, for each successful program
a decision had been made to establish an
organized approach for offering vaednes
to adults on a regular basis.
Better pubb'c understanding of the se-
riousness ofvacdne-preventable diseases
and the benefits of vaccination is essen-
tial."*® Many elderly patients fail to ap-
preciate that influenza presents a risk of
severe illness that may lead to hospital
admission ordeath.® Most elderly patients
have no knowledge of the frequency or
severity ofpneumococcal infections. Few
young adults who have multiple sexual
partners understand their ni^ for ac-
quiring hepatitis B. Many adults are un-
aware of the clinical effectiveness and
safety of the vaednes that can prevent
these diseases. BducationaJ programs can
help increase public understanding ofthe
ne^ for and benefits of adult immuniza-
tion. This was illustrated recently during
the HCFA Medicare Influenza Vaedne
Demonstration, when a letter sent to
Medicare enroUees by the HCFA admin-
istrator was helpftil in persuading older
persons to get vaccinated.®
The NVAC recommends that educa-
tional programs be undertaken to improve
the adult inrununization practices of phy-
sicians and other health care proviiiers.
These programs should emphasize wide-
spread disMmination ofthe goals and rec-
ommendations for adult immunization, pe-
riodic assessment of provider knowledge
and attitudes about vaednes aixi immu-
nization practices, and better understand-
ing of the administrative and organiza-
tional features of successful vaccination
programs. Greater emphasis should be
given to adult immunization in profes-
sional education and certification, and
more attention should be devoted to prac-
tical approaches for vaedne delivery in
training programs, induding appropriate
immunization of students and trainees
themselves. The committee recommends
that the public also be better informed of
the importance ofvacdne-preventable dis-
eases ofadults and ofthe safety and ben-
efits ofimmunizatioa This will require an
understanding of factors that constitute
barriers or promote easy access to vac-
cination services. The committee recom-
mends educational programs and media
campaigns for adult immunization, espe-
cially those that are bnked to announce-
ments routinely directed to target popu-
lations by government agendes and com-
munity organizations.
2. ASSURE THAT THE HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM HAS AN ADEQUATE
CAPACITY TO DELIVER
VACaNES TO ADULTS
An efficadous vaccine will be effective
in preventing disease only if it is given to
those whow^ benefit The importance of
vaedne delivery has been dramatically
demonstrated by the contributions of the
Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) to childhood immunization. Ap-
proximately half of all children in the
United States are immunized through
state and local public health programs that
use vaednes purchased under federal con-
tracts negotiated by the CDC.' Studies
by CDC investigators on the epidemiol-
ogy of vacdne-preventable diseases, the
susceptibility of children to infection, and
the shortcomings of vaccine delivery pro-
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TaM 3.—VaocinM and Toioida n«oonvn«ndad tor Al AduKa*
AgaOrovto, y
bdlMenM
(Annueav) RubaRa Mumpa Tdt
X X X X
2S64 X» X XI X
MS X X X
*AdVM0 tiom Ctntai* tor OMaaaa Control ** Thia raport titouU b« oonauNad tor <MaM raoommandaaona on
mvnuitdr^ aiMts wrio twva niglwWi nwdtoal oondWona: •T'o on Imrnunoeomprornaatt «too hava tptolal oocu-
oaaoiw. anwytoa. oranotronmantalonaanatanc—:ori«noai»Wvtof».towig<*odanto.<Tinivint».orf»togata.
rTpiii wdtoait vaoana or tocoiO not uvwtraafy raoommandad tor al adiAa.
tTatMW and dipndwna loxotdi adaortwd (tor mUI uaa).
tOna doaa of nudii vaocitM a ndtoalad tor panona bom aflar 1966. A aaoond doaa a aOcalad tor oanona
bom altar 1996 wtio aia antamg haalti caia amptoymant. noaa «mo aia Mvioanta a> poaiaaccnoary aducaoonal
mabtubona. and tioaa wbo ara plannng miamaional traval.
ynftr atoll ler paiaona bom alMr 1966.
gnuns provide the basis forthe Childhood
Immunisstion Initiative'* TTiis research
has shown that the miuon^y of children
and aduhs who develop vacdne-pievent-
able illnesses have been seen previously
by health care providers and could have
b^ vaccinated at the time but were not.*
Such ‘^missed opportunities” for vaccina-
tion have several causes, including mis-
conceptionssbout contraindications to vac-
cination and the lack of an organized ap-
proadi to offering vacdnes. The failure to
prevent vacane-preventable diseases is
far more often due to the failure to vac-
dnste rather than to the failure of the
vaccines themselves. The costs of these
“miasad opportimitiea" are very high.
Most vaccines given to adults are ad-
ministered by generalist physicians, yet
wide variations have been shown in their
immunization practices.'*^ Many adults
who should be vaccinated receive their
principal care ftnm spedalists rather than
general physicians or ftxtm hi^tly spe-
cialized teams of health care profession-
als or administiative units such as dinics.
In such settings, a single focus ofrespon-
sibility for offering vacdnes is often dif-
ficult to identify, l^us, efforts to improve
adult immunization must focus on devel-
oping woricsble systems for regularly of-
fering vaccines to patients at risk, re-
gardless ofwhere they receive their care.
Such systems should reflect practioe
guidelines, and their evaluation should
become a common feature of quality as-
surance and accreditation programs.
The NVAC reoommuida that theCDC
and other federal agendee assume in-
creased responsibility ftn* assuring that
adults are appropriately immunized. This
will require support for vaodne purchase
and program administration at the state
and local levels, as well as increased staff
and support at the CDC itself The com-
mittee urges that all health care provid-
ers, whether generalistsorspedali^ con-
sider any contact with adult patients as
an opportunity to provide recommended
vacdnes. The committeerecommends that
health care providers and the institutions
in which they practice adopt administra-
tive and organizational arrangements that
guarantee Che regular offering ofvacdnes
to adults, devel^ and implement stan-
dards and practice guidelines for adult
immunization, and indude regular evalu-
ation of immunization practices as part of
their quality assurance programs.
3. ASSURE ADEQUATE RNANONQ
MECHANISMS TO SUPPORT
THE EXPANDED DEUVERY
OF VACCINES TO ADULTS
Childhood inununization programs
have long received financial support from
federal, state, and local governments. Pub-
lic agendea have been much less involved
with adult immunization; in 1991 less than
10% of all doses of inffusnza and pneu-
mococcal vacdnes used in the United
States were given by state and local health
departments (CDC, unpublished data,
19%). To address this pix>bl€in, in 1981
the (fongr^ instructed the HCFA to
pay physicians for pneumococcal vacd-
nation ()f elderly patients under Part B of
the Medicare program.* In 1984 reim-
bursement for ^patitis B vaccinationwas
added for Medicare patients with end-
stage renal disease. In 1993 Medicare was
authorized to pay for influenza vacdne
and its administration.*
The implementation ofMedicare reim-
bursement for vaccination has not mea-
sured up to its promise. For example,
Medicare reimbursement forpneumococ-
cal vaccination during the 1980s barely
covered the coet of the vaccine alone.*
Eachyear duringthe period 1985 through
1968,only300 000 to400 OOOdoees ofpn^
mococcal vacdne—25% of all doaea dis-
tributed nationwide—could be accounted
for by the Medicare reimbursement pro-
gram. Whether adequate reimbursement
is important for adultimmunizationshould
become apparent in Medicare’s recently
establish^ program to pay for annu^
influenza vaccination.
There is little information on the ex-
tent to which private health insurance
companies provide coverage for adult im-
munization. Health maintenance organi-
zations may (nttvide such services, but
their immunization rates are often no bet-
ter than those ofpatients covered by tra-
ditional health insurance.* Reliance on
regulat^ af^trosches to improve private
health insuranoe coverage of adult im-
munization may not be suffident; busi-
nesses that self-insttre their employees
are not subject to regulation by state gov-
ernments. Proposals for health system
reform usually indude coverage of child-
hood immunization. Similar coverage is
needed for adult immunization.
The NVAC recommends that publidy
ftmded health insurance programs ad-
equately reimburse providers for the
costs of vacdnes and their administra-
tion to adults. Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement polidea must be moni-
tored to ensure tlut they are effectively
implemented by fiscal intermediaries and
providers alike. When problems are iden-
tified, technical assiatance must be pro-
vided and financial or other incentives
considered so that adultsenroUed in these
programs are appropriately immunized.
Similarly, the committee recommends
that private health insurance companies
adequately reimburse providers for adult
immunization, without requiring indi-
vidual co-payments or deductibles. Busi-
ness and la^ leaders and state health
insurance regulators should encourage
induaion of adult immunization as a cov-
Tabto 4.—The NaSonal Vaccine Advtoory C^om-
mOM'i Goat! Mid Racommendwoni tor Adua
Imnuniztfion*
1. tncTMee (he dwnand tor adie vaoanMon by
tinptoytnQ proMdw Mid pubSc ewMeneeb
• Condua ettoelve WtormDon progitow tor
• HmMi oMe providw* ID Improve twir
wnmitoiiiaon precSne
• Ttw pubic to wnpheem tw ImpoitMio* ol
iwrine pieimntebto (tMeoe* Mid tie lately
Mid bmiito a immunaeaon
2. Aaawe tw haMei ctn ryitom hai mi adiqueM
capacNy to drtvar vaooMS to edato
• CitdbiMi Ml adult knmunaaaan gntd progrim
to aa«M ftoto and looM iwaOi dapMnarn
a Raduoa mtoaad opponunilfaa tor vaobnaton
a Apprapriatoly vaocinaia aduR paaanti In
a Prtnwry cm« aaiSnoa
a Spadtolty pracbcaa and nadtuttona
a imptoiaant puidallnaa and itandarta tor aduH
tmmunuatdn pracSoa
3. Aaaura adaquaia llnanctol nwctiantoma to auppon
tw aitoandad ptmAaian ol vaoonaa to aduRa
a Art^wialy foanbuiaa prewdara bireugli
a Pubicly lundad programa auch aa Matocare
andMadtoaai
a Pnvato twaWi inauianca
a induda covaraga Mr adiil mmuioalan in
nasonal twaan aiwMm retomi
4. Uonaor and impaova Vw pattormanoa ct Sw
naaen'a vaocaw daivaty ayatom
• &toand programa tor dtoaaaa aurvatoanca
• Praaanie and aeengawn vandna-
manuiacaiing capacdy to maai ew nadnn'a
naada
a Endaavdr to adiava Iw adie immunizabon
goala el MaaWiy Paopla 2000
5. Aaaura adaquato auppon tor raaaarch
• Support raaaarcn on
a Adua vaocaw prevantabw diaaaaaa
a ESoacy, aMMy, caracal aRacaverwaa. arto
a Eptoarraetogy ol acM amirtzilen ptiacia
• Nov and improvad vacGlnaa
a iniamaaonM piograma tot adVI Imnwgaaen
*Ffom National vaocaw Advwory Commawa.*'
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ered benefit for thoie insured. Finally,
the conunittee strongly reconunends that
all national health syttem reform pro-
posals include coverage for adult inunu-
nization services axKl provide roechanisrns
to finance their delivery.
4. MONITOR AND IMPROVE TNE
PERFORMANCE OF THE NATION’S
VACONE DEUVERY SYSTEM
The nation’s ability to control vacdne-
preventable diseases requires continu-
ing surveillance of the diseases them-
selves, an assured manufacturing capac-
ity to provide the vaccines needed, and
periodic assessment ofwhether the vac-
cines are reaching the persons forwhom
they are intended.
The effective and efficient use of vac-
cines in adults depends on a clear un-
derstanding of which diseases are epi-
demiologic^y important and which per-
sons are at risk of infection. The CDC
works closely with state and local health
departments to monitor the occurrence
ofvacdne-preventable diseases. For ex-
ample, it regularly provides timely ad-
vice on the identity of influenza viruses
causing outbreaks and information on
whether the ctirrent influenza vaccine
should be protective.” Surveillance by
the CDC has provided better under-
standing of the epidemiology of hepati-
tis B* and pneumococcal infections.*
These programs could be improved if
inexpensive methods were developed for
more rapid diagnosis of disease. Sur-
veillance is also essential for accurately
assessing the economic impact of vac-
dne-preventable diseases.
The success of our nation’s immuniza-
tion programs depends on the capacity of
ourvacdne Doanufacturers to produce and
distribate a constant supply of vacdne
products. During the swine influenza pro-
gram in 1976, our system for vacdne sup-
ply was severely tested* In the 1960s
babihty cosu contributed to the rise in
prices for chiklhood vacdnes azid seriously
threatened the economic viability of vac-
cine manufacturers.* The National Vac-
dne Injury Compenaacian Program, es-
tablished in 1966, provides a mechanism
by which dairns for childhood vaedne-as-
sodated injuries can now be settled* Al-
though tu impiementatian has been costly
and not without probiems, the program
has succeeded in stabilizing the market
for (he vaoone manufocturers.
One reason why the 1990 goals for adult
immunization were not reached may be
the failure to monitor adult immungatma
practices. In 1969 the National Center for
Health Statistics began to gather better
mformation on vacanatioo levels agamst
influenza, pneumococcal disease, tetanus,
and diphtheria. Its National Health In-
terview Survey has shown, for example.
that only20% ofelderly persons haveever
received pneumococcal vacdne.* How-
ever, little is known about geographic
variations in the use of this vacdne or
about vaccination rates in persona at in-
creased risk of disease. For hepatitis B
vacdne, a great deal is known about vac-
cination status of health care workers,
but almost nothing is known about the
status of the other high-risk groups that
account for nwre than 96% of ail cases of
the disease.*
The NVAC recommends that surveil-
lance of vacdne-preventable diseases by
the CDC and by state and kxal health
agencies be strengthened, including the
development of better methods of diag-
nosing disease. The committee recom-
mends that the capadty of the nation’s
vacdne manufacturers to meet current
and future needa for vacdnes be peri-
odically assessed to identify potential
technical, r^;ulatory, financial, legal, or
political problems tJ^ could threaten
adequate supplies of vaccines for adult
immunization. This assessment should
also determine the appropriate level of
federal involvement in vaccine purchase,
production,andcompensationforvacdne-
relsted adverse events. To reach the adult
immunization goals of Heolihy People
iOOO, the committee recommends more
detailed evaluation of vaccination levels
in adults with spedfic high-risk condi-
tions and in sped& population groups at
risk. U also recommends sup^xnt for pro-
grams to improve vaceme delivery where
immunization rates are found to be un-
satisfactory. (The adult immunization
goals of HtaJUky People tOOO provide for
increases in inanumzstioo levels as fol-
lows: (1) poeumococcal pneumoma and
influenza inminizarinnsnMnginatituQon-
alized chronicaily m or cider people to at
least 80%; (2) pneumococcal pneumonia
and influMua immuctzation among rx»-
institatiooaiized, higb-riak population as
defined by *iie Advisory Committee on
Immumzation Practices to at least 60%;
and (3) hepstitia B immusizatKm among
high-risk populations, induding infinu
or surface antigen-positive motheri, to
at least 90%; oocupatfonaCy exposed work-
ers to at least 90^, mtrsvenous-drag us-
era indrug trestment programs to at least
50%; and homosexual men to St least 50%.)
5. ASSURE ADEQUATE SUPPORT
FOR RESEARCH
Basic researdi on the wuses and bac-
teria that cause disease is essential if we
are to develop new and unproved vac-
cines.* Equally importam a research on
host responses to infection and vaccina-
tion, especaOy the resporaes of older
adults whose immune systems become
leas responsrve wnh sdvaneng age. Par
each vacdne. suaal evakaaaoc of as ef-
fic^ must be followed by an assessment
of its dinicsl effectiveness In preventing
the more serious and costly outcomes of
disease. In addition, much more needa to
be known about the health and economic
consequences ofvacdne-preventable dis-
eases. The cost-effectiveneas of adult im-
munizaUon must be forther aaseaaed; cur-
rent evidence suggests that mfluenza and
pneumococcal vaccination are highly cost-
effective when compared with other pre-
ventive, wreerung, and treatment inter-
ventions in common use among elderly
persons.* New knowledge about the epi-
demiology of vaccaie-preventable diaes^
must be accompanied by research on the
epidemiology of efforts to prevent these
diseases, induding variations in the vac-
cination practices of health care provid-
ers. The importance of this research la
illustratedbyareoentttudy ihowingthat
persona at greatest risk ofinfluenza were
least Hkely to be vaccinated.*
Researen has provided several new
and improved vaccines that may benefit
adults, induding cold-sdapted bve in-
fluenza, pneumococcal conjugate, van-
cella-zoster, hepatitis A, and acellular
pertussis vaccines.'*^ Promising new
methods of vaccine adnunutration are
being developed, induduig newer adju-
vants, epitope-based strategies that re-
flect an understanding of antigen rec-
ognition sites, particulate antigens de-
livered SI microcapsules, glycoconjugate
preparations, immunologic boocting with
cytokines and lymphotones, and the use
of vacane vectors.
Whether aduita m the United States
are to be protected against vsedne-pre-
ventable daesses will depend to some
extent on the oceurrence of these dis-
eases in otherpara ofthe world. Current
internatkmalprogrsmsforrriorntonngdjs-
eases such as mffjenza need to be supple-
mented oy surveillaoce programs for
otheremergsig ard reemergmg infectv>js
dseases, such as diphthena m countries
ofthe former Soviet UnioD,* a new strain
of V\bno ckolerxu in South Asia,* and
the spread of antamcrobul-resw, arjt
Sierptoeoeau jmeumomae m msny cour.-
tnes.” Internationai disesse rurveilanoe
and vaccination programs have
pad richdmdendsm the worldwide ersdi-
cabon of smaJpoz and the ecniinauor, of
poiioniyeiCJB m the Amencae Gtren the
yrofisse of new and unproved vacar<es,
the Quldren's Vacdne IntiatTve has be-
come the orgaruzTjg focus to emrimaot
the 'Taraixe at new technologiM fer vac-
ane production and vacane delivery to
developoig eoustnet * Many aspects of
tais program have dtrset mpueataons for
t.ie drrejopment of new and -noproved
•facaaea for ad'aits.
The NVAC recommends
suppor. of resesirh on the rjoTOoicer -
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cal agenta of and the host response to
vacdne-preventable infections, induding
those of inununocompromised and aging
mdividuals. The comniittee urges the de-
velopment of better measures of the
health and economic consequences ofcur-
rent and future vacdne-preventable dis-
eases. The committee recognizes that the
viability of our nation’s adult immuniza-
tion programs reqtiires continued evi-
dence of^e efBcacy, effectiveness, safety,
and cost-effectiveness of current and fu-
ture vaccines. The committee recom-
mends greater attention be given to stud-
ies of the epidemiology of immunization
practices. Research on new and improved
vaccines for use in the United States and
internationally must be assured stable
and continuing support. Finally, the com-
mittee encourages greater coUidraration
between federal agencies, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, professional associa-
tions, and vaccine companies in the United
States and their counterparts in intema-
tional organizations and in countries
throughout the world.
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
and
National Immunization Program
Contact Information & Resources
Telephone
Immunization Call Center
800-232-4636 (800-CDC-INFO)
Contact CDC'INFO 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in English or Spanish, with questions
concerning immunizations or vaccine'preventable diseases, or to find the kxation of
immunization clinics near you, or to order single copies of immunization materials from NIP.
E-Mail
nipinfo@cdc.gov
Healthcare providers can send their immunization or vaccine-preventable disease related
questions to this e-mail address. You will get an answer from a National Immunization Program
expert, usually within 24 hours.
Internet
NIP: http://www.cdc.gov/nip
Hepatitis: http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis
Influenza: http://www.cdc.gov/flu
Travelers’ Health: http://v/ww.cdc.gov/travel
Calendar of upcoming events, online access to publications such as ACIP statements and Vaccine
Information Statements, online publications ordering, vaccine safety' information, latest pediatric
and adult immunization schedules, downloadable Clinic Assessment Software Application
(CASA), Frequently Asked Questions, PowerPoint slide presentations from the Pink Brx^k and
from NIP satellite broadcasts, links to other immunization sites, and much more.
NIP Training & Education Resources. Download NIP’s curriculum brochure:
http://w\\'w.cdc.gov/nip/ed/curricuIum/curric-brochure.htm
Publications may be ordered through NIP’s online order form:
http://ww'w.cdc.gov/nip/publications
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lAC’s Online Directory of
Immunization Resources
Visit our website to find the Immunization Action
Coalition’s online directory of immunization resources.
Continually updated, it keeps you in the know about
immunization and viral hepatitis issues and resources.
Use it to gain access to hundreds of reliable sources
of information with the click of a mouse. Here’s
what you’ll find:
• Books and Periodicals: Standard resources for
providers, as well as helpful and informative
books for patients and parents.
• CDC Materials: Ordering information for
CDC-produced materials; links to frequently
requested items, live satellite broadcasts, and
websites: and a listing of telephone and email
information services.
Visit us:
www.immunize.org/
resources
* Continuing Educational Opportunities for
Health Professionals: Listings and links for
providers needing CMEs, CNEs, CEUs, or
just to stay current.
• Email Subscriptions: Information about how
to sign up to receive periodic email updates from
several immunization-related organizations.
• lAC Materials: Links to lAC’s ready-to-print
educational pieces for providers, patients, and
parents— and much more.
• Other Immunization Partners: Links to
other organizations and professional societies
that provide immunization information.
• Hotlines: Information about toll-free hotlines
for providers and patients.
* International Organizations: Links to
organizations (e.g., WHO, PAHO, GAVI)
providing information on global and international
immunization and hepatitis issues.
• State and Federal Agencies and Programs:
Links to most federal agencies (e.g., CDC,
FDA) and state health departments.
• Videos: Helpful videos for providers, patients,
and parents to learn more about immunization
and viral hepatitis.
www.>rnmiinize.ofg/i>e<vs.<l/60 1 2resf.pdf * ttem #U60I2{IZA)4)
Immunization Action Coairtion • 1 573 Selby Avenue • St. Paul, MN 55104 • (651)647-9009 • www.immunize.org
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Sample lAC Print Materials
These, and many other useful materials for both providers and patients, can be downloaded
free of charge from the lAC s website at http://www.immunize.0rg/catg.d/free.htm
VecckM AdmMistration Recofd
for ChIMron end Teens
Vaccine AdministrationRecord
for Children and Teens
http://www.lmmunize.org/catg.d/p2022b. pdf
Influenza Vaccine to Adults
http://www.immunize.Org/catg.d/p3074. pdf
Scr«nlng Quntlonnjkp
^
(Of Child and Teen Immuni/atlon a cr
"A.
http://www.immunize.0rg/catg.d/llteens8.pdf
Screening Questionnaire
for Child and Teen Immunization
http://www.immunize.org/catg.d/p4060scr.pdf
Temperature Log for Vaccines (Fahrenheit)
http://www.immunize.org/catg.d/p3039pdf
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bo you spend too much
time fishing for practical
vaccine information?
> i
lAC
EXPRESS
delivers vaccine information
directly to your e-mail box
• new ACIP and AAP recommendations
• newly released Vaccine Information
Statements (VISs)
• /14A1U/A? articles
• FDA; new vaccines, treatments
• CbC: hot topics, vaccine safety
• calendar of events
• reports of people with vaccine-preventable
diseases
aap •
SIGN UPl"
To sign up, visit www.immunize.org/express
or send an e-mail message to express@immunize.org
and enter the word SUBSCRIBE in the “Subject:” field.
To see what's already been published, visit 'www.immunize.org/express
CD(
ACIP
iwn #U«|(»0(I lAM)
Immunization Action Coalition • 1573 Selby Avenue • St. Poul, MN 55104 • (651)647-9009 • www.immunize.org
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IMMUNIZATION
TECHNIQUES Order Form
Safe*Effective*Caring
This award winning 35-minute program, by the California Department of Health Services Immunization
Branch, includes the latest information on injection techniques for immunizing children and adults.
Available on VHS and DVD. DVD includes English and Spanish versions plus resources. This program
can be ordered by fax or online at www.cdlhn.com.
Billing Information
Please print clearly and minimize use of abbreviations
Name:
Organization: Dept:
Address:
City: State: Zip:
Telephone:
^ ) E-mail:
Shipping Information (If different from Billing Information)
Name:
Organization: Dept
Add ress:
City: State: Zip:
Telephone:
^ ) E-mail:
Item # Item Name Quantity Unit Price Total
1
IMM-712 Immunization Techniques Video: l-IO copies @ $30.00 ea n Eng. Span. $30.00 each
lMM-712 Immunization Techniques Video: 1 l-lOO copies @ $25 00 ea Eng- CSpan. $25.00 each
IMM-712 Immunization Techniques Video: 101+ copies @ $20,00 ea n Eng, CSpaa $20.00 each
IMM.7I2 0VD
1
Immunizaaon Techniques DVD English & Spanish
|
$35.00 each
other immunization related products:
Balance Due
IMM-67<( Immunizatron Techniques - Comfort Measures Poster $20/set of 5
IMM-720 Immunization Techniques - Comforung Restraint Double-sided Flyer $2 each
IMM-712 Immunization Techniques - Comfort Measures English/Spanish Take Home Flyer $ 10/tablet of SO
IMM-686 Immunization Techniques - Anatomic Sites $20/sct of 5
IMM-721 Immunization Techniques - Print Materia! Artwork $50
Make checks or money orders payable to: California Distance Learning Health Network
We also accept purchase order numbers. PO#_
Credit Card Information
Credit card type: Visa MasterCard
Credit card number:
Expiration date: /
(mo.) (yr.)
Signature of card holder;
Fax your order to (619) 594-21 1 I or order online at www.cdlhn.com.
For inquiries contact:
California Distance Learning Health Network
9245 Sky Park Court, Suite 1 00, San Diego, CA 92 1 23 (619) 594-5933 orders@cdlhn.com
www.cdlhn.com
California Distance Learning Health Network is an authorized distributor of the Immunization Techniques suite of products.
1
I'5
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Global Vaccination Information
Statistics and Graphics
(http://www.who.int/immunization_monitoring/data/en/)
This page contains links to slides, maps, tables, and other documents relating to
global and national disease incidence, vaccine coverage, and other immunization-
related topics.
Global Summary “Country Profile Selection Centre”
(http://www-nt.who.int/immunization_monitoring/en/globalsummary/countryprofileselect.cfm)
On this page the reader can view an “Immunization Profile” for a selected country,
which includes information on population, disease incidence, vaccine coverage,
and the routine schedule.
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NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM
IMMUNIZATION GRANTEES
December 13, 2005
STATE & CITY GRANTEES
ALABAMA
Alabama Department of Public Health
State Immunization Program
P.O. Box 303017
Montgomery, AL 36130-3017
Fed Ex: Disease Control/lmmunization Div.
The RSA Tower
201 Monroe St., Suite 1460
Montgomery, AL 36104
PHONE#: (334) 206-5023
FAX #: (334) 206-2044
Program Manager: Winkler Sims
Email: wsims@adph. state. al.us
ALASKA
Alaska Department of Health and Social Services
Immunization Program
3601 C. Street, Suite 540
P.O. Box 240249
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
PHONE#: (907) 269-8000
FAX #: (907) 562-7802
Program Manager: Laural H. Wood
Email: laurel_wood@health.state.ak.us
ARIZONA
Arizona Department of Health Services
Immunization Program Office
150 N. 18th Ave.
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3233
PHONE #: (602) 364-3630
FAX#: (602)364-3276
Program Manager: Kathy Fredrickson
Email: Fredrik@azdhs.gov
ARKANSAS
Arkansas Department of Health
Immunization Program
4815 West Markham
Slot #48
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
PHONE#: (501) 661-2000
FAX#: (501) 661-2300
Program Manager: Charles Beets
Email: cbeets@healthyarkansas.com
CALIFORNIA
California Department of Health Svcs
Immunization Branch
850 Marina Bay Parkway, Building P
Richmond, California 94804-6403
PHONE#: (510) 540-2065
FAX#: (510)883-6015
Program Manager: Howard Backer
Email: Hbacker@dhs.ca.gov
COLORADO
Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment
PSD-IMM-A4
4300 Cherry Creek Dr., South
Denver, Colorado 80246-1530
PHONE #: (303) 692-2650
FAX#: (303) 691-6118
Program Manager: Rebecca Jordan
Email: rebecca.jordan@state.co.us
CONNECTICUT
Connecticut State Dept of Public Health
Immunization Program
P.O. Box 340308
410 Capitol Avenue, MS# 11 MUN
Hartford, Connecticut 06134-0308
PHONE #: (860) 509-7929
FAX#: (860) 509-7945
ProgramManager: Vincent Sacco
Email: vincent.sacco@po.state.ct.us
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DELAWARE
Immunization Program/Div of Public Health
Delaware Dept of Health & Social Services
The Jessie Cooper Building
Federal & Water Street
Dover, Delaware 19901
FLORIDA
Florida Department of Health
Bureau of Immunization
4052 Bald Cypress Way, #A-11
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1719
Fed Ex: 2585 Merchants Row Blvd, Rm 210
Prather Bldg, Suite 210
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1719
GEORGIA
Georgia Department of Human Resources
Division of Public Health
Two Peachtree Street, N.W., 15th Floor, Rm 470
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
HAWAII
Hawaii Department of Health
Immunization Program
1250 Punchbowl Street - Room 428
P.O. Box 3378
Honolulu, Hawaii 96801
Fed Ex: 1250 Punchbowl St., Rm 428
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
IDAHO
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
Immunization Program
4th Floor, 450 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83270
ILLINOIS
llinois Department of Public Health
Immunization Program
525 West Jefferson Street
Springfield, Illinois 62761
CHICAGO
Chicago Department of Health
Immunization Program
Westside Center for Disease Control
2160 West Ogden Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60612
INDIANA
Indiana State Department of Health
Immunization Program
2 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-3003
PHONE#: (302) 741-2940
FAX#: (302) 739-2358
ProgramManager: Martin Luta
Email: martin.Iuta@state.de.us
PHONE#: (850) 245-4342
FAX#: (850) 922-4195
Program Manager: Charles Alexander
Email: charles_alexander@doh.state.fl.us
PHONE#: (404) 657-3158
FAX#: (404) 657-1463
Program Manager: Michael Chaney
Email: mechaney@dhr.state.ga.us
PHONE#: (808) 586-8300
FAX #: (808) 586-8302
Program Manager: Malama Markowitz
Email: ralene.m.markowitz@doh.hawaii.gov
PHONE#: (208) 334-5931
FAX#: (208) 334-4914
Program Manager: Tricia Hosch-Hebdon
Email: hoscht@idhw.state.id.us
PHONE#: (217) 785-1455
FAX#: (217) 524-0967
Program Manager: Karen McMahon
Email: Kmcmahon@idph.state.il.us
PHONE#: (312) 746-5380
FAX#: (312) 746-6388
Program Manager: Maribel Chavez-Torres
Email: Chavez-Torres_M@cdph.org
PHONE#: (800) 701-0704
FAX#: (317) 233-7805
Program Manager: Carol Briley
Email: cbriley@isdh.lN.govs
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IOWA
Iowa Department of Public Health
Division of Family/Community Health
321 E. 12th Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0075
KANSAS
Kansas State Department of Health
Bureau of Disease Prevention
900 S.W. Jackson Street
L.S.O.B Suite 901 N
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1274
KENTUCKY
Kentucky Department for Public Health
Immunization Program
275 East Main Street, HSIC-D
Frankfort, Kentucky 40621-0001
LOUISIANA
Louisiana Office of Public Health
Immunization Program - Suite 107
1450 L and A Road
Metairie, Louisiana 70001
MAINE
Maine Department of Human Services
Immunization Program
2 Bangor Street
11 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
PHONE#: (515) 281-4923
FAX #: (800) 831-6292
Program Manager: Don Callaghan
Email: dcallagh@idph.state. ia.us
PHONE #: (785) 296-5591
FAX#: (785) 296-6368
Program Manager: Michael Runau
Email: mrunau@kdhe.state. ks.us
PHONE #: (502) 564-4478
FAX #: (502) 564-4760
Program Manager: David Miller
Email:
PHONE #: (504) 838-5300
FAX#: (504) 483-1909
Program Manager: Ruben Tapia
Email: RAT1017@yahoo.com
PHONE#: (207) 287-3746
FAX#: (207) 287-8127
Program Manager: Jiancheng Huang
Email: jiancheng.haung@maine.gov
MARYLAND
Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene
Center for Immunization
201 West Preston Street, 3rd Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts State Lab Inst - CDC
Division of Epidemiology & Immunization
305 South Street, Room 506B
Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts 02130-3597
MICHIGAN
Michigan Department of Community Health
Division of Immunization
201 Townsend Street
P.O. Box 30195
Lansing, Michigan 48909
MINNESOTA
Minnesota Department of Health
Immunization Program
625 N. Roberts Street
P.O. Box 64975
St. Paul, Minnesota 55164-0975
PHONE#: (410)767-6679
FAX#: (410) 333-5893
Program Manager: Gregory Reed
Email: reedgre@dhmh.state.md.us
PHONE#: (617) 983-6800
FAX#: (617) 983-6868
Program Manager: Pejman Talebian
Email: PeJman.Talebian@state.ma.us
PHONE#: (517)335-8159
FAX#: (517) 335-9855
Program Manager: Bob Swanson
Email: SwansonR@michigan.gov
PHONE#: (612) 676-5100
FAX #: (612) 676-5689
Program Manager: Kristin Ehressmann
Email: Kristen. Ehresmann@health.state.mn.us
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MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi State Department of Health
Division of Immunization
570 Woodrow Wilson Blvd
P.O. Box 1700
Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1700
PHONE#: (601) 576-7751
FAX#: (601) 576-7686
Program Manager: Joy Sennett (acting)
Email: jsennett@msdh.state.ms.us
MISSOURI
Missouri Department of Health
Section of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
930 Wildwood Drive
P.O. Box 570
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102
PHONE #: (573) 751-6439
FAX #: (573) 526-6892
Program Manager; Brad Hall
Email: hallb@dhss.state.mo.us
MONTANA
Montana Department of Health & Human Svcs
Health Policy and Services Div
Cogswell Building - Room C211
P.O. Box 202951
Helena, Montana 59620
PHONE#: (406)444-5580
FAX#: (406) 444-2920
Program Manager: Joyce Burgett
Email: jburgett@state.mt.us
NEBRASKA
Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services
Immunization Program
301 Centennial Mall South
P.O. Box 95044
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5044
PHONE#: (402)471-6423
FAX#: (402) 471-6426
Program Manager: Barbara Ludwig
Email: barbara.ludwig@hhss.ne.gov
NEVADA
Nevada State Health Division
Immunization Program
505 King Street
Carson City, Nevada 89710
PHONE #: (775) 684-5900
FAX#: (775) 684-8338
Program Manager: Bob Salcido
Email: bsalcido@nvhd.state.nv.us
NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire Department of Health & Human Svcs
Immunization Program
Six Hazen Drive
Concord, New Hampshire 03301
PHONE#: (603) 271-4482
FAX#: (603) 271-3850
Program Manager: Michael Dumond
Email: mdumond@dhhs.state.nh.us
NEW JERSEY
New Jersey State Department of Health & Senior Svcs
Immunization Program
P.O. Box 369
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0369
Fed Ex; 3635 Quaker Bridge Road
Mercerville, NJ 08619-9998
PHONE #: (609) 588-7520
FAX #: (609) 588-7431
Program Manager: Kate Wytovich
Email: Katherine.Wytovich@doh.state. nj.us
NEW MEXICO
New Mexico Department of Health
Immunization Program
1190 St. Francis Drive
Rennels Building - Suite 1261
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87502
PHONE #: (505) 827-2369
FAX#: (505) 827-2898
Program Manager: Steve Nickell
Email: steveni@doh.state.nm.us
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NEW YORK
New York State Department of Health
Immunization Program
Corning Tower Building
Room 649
Albany, New York 12237-0627
PHONE#: (518)473-4437
FAX#: (518) 474-7381
Program Manager: David Lynch
Email: DRL05@health.state.ny.us
NEW YORK CITY
New York City Department of Health
Bureau of Immunization
2 Lafayette Street - 19th Floor
New York, New York 10007
PHONE#: (212) 676-2259
FAX#: (212) 676-2252
Program Manager: Jane Zucker
Email: jzucker@health.nyc.gov
NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina Division of Public Health
Immunization Branch
1917 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-1917
Fed Ex: 5601 Six Forks Road
2nd Floor
Raleigh, NC 27609-3811
PHONE#: (919) 707-5550
FAX #: (919) 870-4824
Program Manager: Beth Rowe-West
Email: beth.rowe-west@ncmail.net
NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota Department of Health
Division of Disease Control
State Capitol
600 East Boulevard
Bismarck, North Dakota 58505-0200
PHONE#: (701)328-2378
FAX#: (701) 328-1412
Program Manager: Heather Weaver
Email: hweaver@state.nd.us
OHIO
Ohio Department of Health
Immunization Program
35 East Chestnut - 7th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
PHONE#: (614)466-4643
FAX#: (614) 728-4279
Program Manager: Tony Payton
Email: Tpayton@odh.ohio.gov
OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma State Department of Health
Immunization Program - 0306
1000 N.E. 10th Street
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73117-1299
PHONE#: (405) 271-4073
FAX#: (405) 271-6133
Program Manager: Don Blose
Email: donb@health.state.ok.us
OREGON
Oregon Immunization Program
800 NE Oregon Street
Suite 370
Portland, Oregon 97232
PHONE#: (503) 731-4020
FAX #: (503) 731-3095
Program Manager: Lorraine Duncan
Email: Lorraine. Duncan@state.or.us
PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Department of Health
Division of Immunizations
Rm 1026 Health & Welfare Bldg
Commonwealth & Forrester St.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
PHONE#: (717)787-5681
FAX#: (717) 705-5513
Program Manager: Alice Gray
Email: agray@state.pa.us
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PHILADELPHIA
Philadelphia Department of Health
Division of Disease Control
500 South Broad Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19146
PHONE#: (215) 685-6748
FAX#: (215) 685-6806
Program Manager: Andrew Chilkatowsky
Email: andrew.chilkatowsky@phila.gov
RHODE ISLAND
Rhode Island Department of Health
mmunization Program
3 Capital Hill - Room 302
Providence, Rhode Island 02908-5097
PHONE#: (401) 222-2312
FAX#: (401) 222-1442
Program Manager: Becky Bessette
Email: BeckyB@doh.state.ri.us
SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control
Immunization Division
1751 Calhoun Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
PHONE#: (803) 898-0460
FAX#: (803) 898-0318
Program Manager: Jesse Greene
Email: greeneje@dhec.sc.us
SOUTH DAKOTA
South Dakota Department of Health
615 East 4th Street
Pierre, South Dakota 57501
TENNESSEE
PHONE #: (605) 773-5323
FAX#: (605) 773-5509
Program Manager: Michelle Hudacek
Email: michelle.hudecek@state.sd.us
Tennessee Department of Health
Immunization Program
Cordell Hull Building, 4th Floor
425 5th Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37247-4911
PHONE#: (615) 741-7247
FAX#: (615) 741-3857
Program Manager: Pamelia Baggett
Email: Pamelia.baggett@state.tn.us
TEXAS
Texas Department of Health
Immunization Division
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, Texas 78756
PHONE#: (512)458-7284
FAX#: (512) 458-7288
Program Manager: Jack Sims
Email: Jack.sims@dshs.state.tx.us
HOUSTON
Houston Health & Human Services Dept
Immunization Bureau
8000 North Stadium Drive
Houston, Texas 77054
PHONE#: (713) 794-9267
FAX#: (713) 794-9937
Program Manager: Risha Jones
Email: Risha.Jones@cityofhouston.net
SAN ANTONIO
San Antonio Metro Health District
Immunization Division
332 West Commerce Street, Suite 202
San Antonio, Texas 78205
PHONE#: (210) 207-8790
FAX#: (210) 207-8882
Program Manager: Brenda Lemke
Email: BrendaL@sanantonio.gov
UTAH
Utah Department of Health
CFHS/lmmunization
P.O. Box 142001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2001
PHONE#: (801) 538-9450
FAX#: (801) 538-9440
Program Manager: Linda Abel
Email: lable@utah.gov
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VERMONT
Vermont Department of Health
Immunization Program
P.O. Box 70
108 Cherry Street
Burlington, Vermont 05402
PHONE #: (802) 863-7638
FAX#: (802) 865-7701
Program Manager: Sue Barry
Email: sbarry@vdh.state.vt.us
VIRGINIA
Virginia State Department of Health
Division of Immunization
1500 E. Main Street - Room 120
Richmond, Virginia 23219
PHONE #: (804) 864-8055
FAX#: (804) 786-0396
Program Manager: Jim Farrell
Email: jfarrell@vdh.virginia.gov
WASHINGTON
Washington State Department of Health
Office of Immunization
Newmarket Industrial Campus
P.O. Box 47843
Olympia, Washington 98504-7843
Fed Ex: DOH/lmmunization Program
Newmarket Industrial Campus Bldg 1
7171 Cleanwater Lane
Olympia, WA 98501
PHONE #: (360) 236-3595
FAX #: (360) 235-3590
Program Manager: Janna Bardi
Email: jjanna.bardi@doh.wa.gov
WASHINGTON, DC
Department of Public Health
Preventive HIth Svcs Administration
Division of Immunization
1131 Spring Road, N.W.
Washington, DC 20010
PHONE#: (202) 576-7130
FAX#: (202) 576-6418
Program Manager: Rosie McLaren
Email: Rmclaren@dc.gov
WEST VIRGINIA
West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources
Bureau for Public Health
Immunization Program
350 Capitol Street, Rm 125
Charleston, West Virginia 25301-3715
PHONE#: (304) 558-2188
FAX#: (304) 558-1941
Program Manager: Jeff Neccuzi
jeffneccuzi@wvdhhr.org
WISCONSIN
Wisconsin Division of Public Health
Immunization Program
1 West Wilson St, Rm 318
P.O. Box 2659
Madison, Wisconsin 53702-2659
PHONE#: (608) 267-9959
FAX #: (608) 267-9493
Program Manager: Dan Hopfensperger
Email: hopfedj@dhfs.state.wi.us
WYOMING
Wyoming Division of Health
Community and Family Health Div.
Hathaway Building, Room 424
2300 Capitol Ave
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
PHONE #: (307) 777-7942
FAX#: (307) 777-6001
Program Manager: Katelyn Wells-Fahling
Email: kfahli@state.wy.us
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OTHER GRANTEES
AMERICAN SAMOA
Department of Health, IM Program
Division of Public Health
Government of American Samoa
LBJ Tropical Medical Center
Pago Pago, AS 96799
GUAM
Department of Public Health and Social Services
Immunization Program
123 Chalan Kareta, Route 10
Mangilao, Guam 96923
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE
Indian Health Services HQ West
Epidemiology Department - 3rd Floor
5300 Homestead Rd., N.E.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Republic of the Marshall Islands
Ministry of Health Services
Immunization Program
P.O. Box 16
Majuro, Marshall Island 96960
MICRONESIA
Federated States of Micronesia
Division of Health Services
Immunization Program
P.O. Box PS 70, Palikir
Ponape, FM 96941
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
Department of Public Health & Environmental Service
Commonwealth Health Center
Lower Navy Hill
P.O. Box 409
Saipan, N. Mariana Is. 96950
PALAU
Bureau of Health Services
Immunization Program
Republic of Palau
Belau National Hosp Building
Koror, RP 96940
PHONE #: 011-684-633-7223
FAX#: 011-684-633-5379
Program Manager: Joseph Tufa
Email: yt_masunu@hotmail.com
PHONE #: 011-671-735-7143
FAX#: 011-671-734-1475
Program Manager: JosieO’Mallan
Email: JTOMallan@dphss.govguam.net
PHONE#: (505) 248-4226
FAX#: (505) 248-4393
Program Manager: Amy Groom
Email: amy.groom@mail.ihs.gov
PHONE #: 011-692-625-8457
FAX#: 011-692-625-3432
Program Manager: Mailynn Konelios
Email: phadmin@ntamar.net
PHONE#: 011-691-320-2619
FAX#: 011-691-320-5263
Program Manager: Louisa Helgenberger
Email: lahelgenberger@mail.fm
PHONE#: 011-670-236-8733
FAX#: 011-670-234-8930
Program Manager: Mariana Sablan
Email: mariana@gtepacifica.net
PHONE#: 011-680-488-4804
FAX#: 011-680-488-3115
Program Manager: Ann Klass
Email: phpal@palaunet.com
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PUERTO RICO
Puerto Rico Department of Health
Immunization Program
Program for Communicable Diseases
P.A.S.E.T., Box 70184
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936
Fed Ex: Dept. De Salud, Edificio A
Antigua Hosp de Psiquiatria
Pabellon #1, Primer Piso
Seccion de Vacunacion
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00922
VIRGIN ISLANDS
Virgin Islands Department of Health
Roy L. Schneider Hospital
Immunization Program
48 Sugar Estate
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802
PHONE#: (787) 274-5612
FAX#: (787) 274-5619
Program Manager: Angel Rivera
Email: anrivera@salud.gov.pr
PHONE #: (340) 776-8311 ext. 2151
FAX#: (340)777-8762
Program Manager: Joan Montenegro
Email: immunize@viaccess.net
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Notes

• LIBRARY
Amazing Help.
http://nihlibrary.nih.gov
10 Center Drive
Bethesda, MD 20892-1150
301-496-1080

